SVETIC v. FIRST KEY HOMES LLC (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Leah Svetic, pro se, appeals the trial court's order evicting her from a residence she had leased from First Key Homes, LLC (“First Key”) in Noblesville.¹ Svetic raises numerous issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court's judgment is erroneous. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In April 2023, Svetic entered into a written residential lease agreement with First Key. The agreement required Svetic to pay $2,605 in rent on the first of each month. However, in December 2024, Svetic stopped making her rent payments. In February 2025, First Key filed its complaint for possession of the residence in the Hamilton County small claims court.

[3] Svetic appeared at the ensuing evidentiary hearing before the court. There, she told the court that she had paid her rent, but she provided no evidence of payment beyond her representation. First Key, meanwhile, submitted an affidavit from its counsel with Svetic's residence ledger attached, which showed Svetic's arrearage. The trial court did not credit Svetic's representations, found her to be in breach of her lease, and ordered her to vacate the premises.

[4] This appeal ensued.

Standard of Review

[5] Svetic appeals the small-claims court's judgment. Small claims actions involve informal trials with the sole objective of dispensing speedy justice between the parties according to the rules of substantive law. Harvey v. Keyed in Prop. Mgmt., LLC, 165 N.E.3d 584, 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. Accordingly, judgments from small claims actions are provided a deferential standard of review. Id. We will neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment. Pfledderer v. Pratt, 142 N.E.3d 492, 494 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). However, this deferential standard relates only to procedural and evidentiary issues; it does not apply to substantive rules of law, which we review de novo. Id.

The court's judgment is not erroneous.

[6] Svetic proceeds pro se on appeal. Indiana law has long recognized that pro se litigants are “held to the same standards as a trained attorney,” and they are “afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.” Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Liu, 250 N.E.3d 406, 410 (Ind. 2025) (quotation marks omitted). And Indiana law is equally clear that parties may not raise arguments for the first time on appeal; arguments not first presented to the trial court are generally not available for appellate review. See, e.g., Finnegan v. State, 240 N.E.3d 1265, 1270 n.3 (Ind. 2024).

[7] In her brief to our Court, Svetic first argues that the trial court denied her due process during the evidentiary hearing on First Key's complaint in the following ways: the trial court erroneously relied on First Key's purportedly false affidavit; the court did not give her a proper opportunity to rebut that affidavit; she was not given an opportunity to be heard; and the court erroneously denied her offer to place the disputed funds into escrow. Svetic also argues that the trial court was not the proper venue for First Key's complaint. Appellant's Br. at 15-19, 49-52. But Svetic never objected in the trial court on any of those grounds. See, e.g., In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016) (unpreserved due-process argument not available for appellate review). And her assertions of constitutional and structural error on appeal are not persuasive in any event.

[8] We next consider Svetic's arguments that the trial court erred by “summarily ruling” for First Key “despite [Svetic's] multiple assertions of legal and factual disputes.” Appellant's Br. at 19. In particular, Svetic asserts that the trial court erred by not giving credit to her representations of payment to First Key; that a letter she wrote to First Key asking to have the “balance” applied to her “rent” constituted a “money order” that showed her payment; that First Key's refusal to do so was a breach of an alleged duty of good faith and fair dealing owed to Svetic and constructive fraud; that First Key had “monetized” the lease and “held [it] in a trust structure” that “gave rise to fiduciary obligations” owed to Svetic; and that First Key's alleged refusal to negotiate with Svetic should have been used by the court against First Key. Id. at 19-24, 31-45.

[9] Svetic's arguments are not well-taken. Her assertions notwithstanding, Svetic's arguments here are either a request for our Court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do, or they are devoid of cogent reasoning, especially her arguments regarding the “money order,” the “trust structure,” the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and fraud. We reject all of these arguments accordingly. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).

[10] Svetic also argues that the lease agreement was an unenforceable “adhesion contract.” Appellant's Br. at 25. Under Indiana law, an adhesion contract is unenforceable if it is “such as no sensible man not under delusion, duress[,] or in distress would make, and such as no honest and fair man would accept.” State v. Terrell, 40 N.E.3d 501, 506 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). Assuming for the sake of argument that Svetic preserved this issue for appellate review, we agree with First Key that she did not present any evidence in the trial court to show that her lease met that standard, and we reject her argument accordingly. Svetic's other arguments with respect to purportedly unconscionable contract terms or practices of First Key are not supported by cogent reasoning, and we do not consider them. See App. R. 46(A)(8)(a).

Conclusion

[11] For all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Svetic lived at the residence with her husband, Eric Jenski, but she represents only herself. Jenski does not participate in this appeal.

Mathias, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Pyle, J., concur.