IN RE: the ADOPTION OF B.C. (Minor Child) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] B.C. (“Child”) was removed from T.K. (“Mother”) because Mother was severely intoxicated while caring for Child. After Child's removal from Mother, Mother did not see Child over the next ten years due to Mother's drug use and resultant incarceration. Meanwhile, Child was placed with Ja.C. (“Father”) who married J.C. (“Wife”). Together, Father and Wife have cared for Child for most of Child's life. Wife filed a petition to adopt Child because Father was diagnosed with a terminal illness, and they wanted to ensure Child's safe and appropriate upbringing. The trial court found that Mother's consent to the adoption was not required and granted the adoption petition. Mother now appeals and raises one issue for our review: Whether the trial court clearly erred by determining that Mother's consent to the adoption was not required.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Child was born in September 2013 and is the child of Mother and Father. Mother moved in with Father after Mother became pregnant. During Mother and Father's “short term relationship,” Supp. Tr. Vol. II at 26, Mother drank alcohol “[e]xcessively” on a “[d]aily basis,” including while pregnant with Child, id. at 31. Mother had also been addicted to methamphetamine since she was 14 years old. The Department of Child Services (“DCS”) became involved with the family in January 2014 after an incident in which Mother was “severely intoxicated” while Child was in her care. Tr. Vol. II at 20. Mother was “running around barefooted” in her sister's yard, and Child was “not dressed properly [for] the winter.” Supp. Tr. Vol. II at 30. Mother “smelled of alcohol, fell down multiple times due to poor balance,” “could not remember” how she got to her sister's home, and gave “inconsistent stories.” Appellee's App. Vol. II at 20. Law enforcement was contacted, and Child was removed from Mother. Mother woke up several hours later and contacted law enforcement because she did not know where Child was.

[4] DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a child in need of services (“CHINS”), and during the ensuing proceedings, Mother tested positive for alcohol and drugs, and the juvenile court ordered her to “vacate” Father's home. Tr. Vol. II at 22. Child was adjudicated a CHINS and placed in Father's care. Mother was permitted to have supervised visitations with Child but never scheduled any visitations. Mother was also ordered to pay child support, but failed to make any payments until 2024, a couple months after the adoption petition was filed.

[5] After Mother left Father's house, she was homeless and “living on the streets.” Tr. Vol. II at 23. In March 2016, Mother was arrested for conspiracy to commit dealing in methamphetamine. Mother was released on bond but failed to appear for a hearing and was subsequently rearrested. She sent birthday and Christmas cards to Child around this time. Mother pled guilty to the conspiracy offense in July 2017 and was sentenced to four years in prison, three years on community corrections, and four years on probation. Around this time, Mother's other children from previous relationships were adopted.

[6] Mother had not seen Child since the CHINS proceedings. While serving her sentence, Mother filed a petition “seeking an order that [Father] be directed to bring [Child] to the prison” for visitations, but the motion was not granted, and Mother did not appeal. Tr. Vol. II at 30.

[7] In September 2019, Mother was placed on community corrections with work release. Mother was employed for two weeks, which constitutes her “entire work history,” but then cut her GPS bracelet and absconded. Tr. Vol. II at 28. Mother later cut her GPS bracelet and absconded a second time after she was returned to the community corrections program. In 2020, Mother admitted to violating her community corrections placement, pled guilty to escape, and was ordered to serve an additional sentence in prison. In 2023, Mother was released from prison.

[8] Reverting back to 2014, while the CHINS case was still ongoing, Father began a relationship with Wife. In 2018, Father and Wife married. Wife worked for Father's family business and helped Father care for Child and the maintenance of the home. Wife “has been [Child's] mom since” then. Tr. Vol. II at 44. Wife views Child as her own daughter, and Child views Wife as her mother. Wife has another daughter from a prior relationship who lives with Wife and Father, and Wife and Father have another daughter together. Child is “uninterested” in Mother and “does not know” her. Tr. Vol. II at 52.

[9] At some point, Father was diagnosed with terminal lung cancer.¹ Father wished for Wife to be “the custodial parent” of Child after he passed away, Supp. Tr. Vol. II at 46, so in April 2023, Wife petitioned to adopt Child. Wife argued that Mother's consent to the adoption was not required because Mother: (1) “ha[d] not seen [C]hild since 2014 despite the ability to do so”; (2) “abandoned and deserted [C]hild for the six months immediately preceding the filing of [the adoption] petition”; (3) “failed without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with [C]hild and has knowingly failed to provide for the care and support of [C]hild when able to do so”; and (4) “is unfit and the best interests of [C]hild will be served by dispensing with [Mother's] consent.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 39. Mother thereafter filed a motion to contest the adoption.

[10] In 2024, the trial court held three hearings on the adoption petition and Mother's motion to contest it. At the time of the hearings, Mother was living in a halfway house to address her addictions and was on probation in her conspiracy to commit dealing in methamphetamine case. Mother had still not seen Child in person since Child was removed in 2014, but she had recently had a phone call with Child.

[11] Following the hearings, the trial court determined that Mother's consent to the adoption was not required and granted the adoption. In support of its conclusion that Mother's consent was not required, the trial court found that Mother failed to communicate significantly with Child for two periods greater than one year. The first period “void of any effort to communicate” was the time between 2014, when the CHINS proceedings began and Mother left Father's home, and 2018, when Mother petitioned for visitation with Child while Mother was incarcerated.² Appellant's App. Vol. II at 30. The second period without significant communication was “between Mother's September 2019 release and her reincarceration in December 2020.” Id. at 31.

[12] The trial court also found that there were “at least two periods of time, each greater than one (1) year, when Mother was not incarcerated and capable of working to pay [child] support but failed to do so.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 32. Additionally, the trial court found that Mother was “unfit” to parent Child and that it was in Child's “best interests” that Mother's consent to the adoption not be required based on (1) Mother's “drug and alcohol use” that “has persisted throughout Child's entire life, beginning when Child was still in Mother's womb,” id. at 32; (2) Mother's inability to “maintain stable housing,” id. at 33; and (3) Mother's minimal employment history. This appeal ensued.³

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court Did Not Clearly Err by Determining that Mother's Consent to the Adoption Was Not Required

[13] Mother challenges the trial court's order finding that Mother's consent to the adoption was not required. Our Supreme Court has described our deferential review in adoption decisions:

We generally show “considerable deference” to the trial court's decision in family law matters “because we recognize that the trial judge is in the best position to judge the facts, determine witness credibility, get a feel for the family dynamics, and get a sense of the parents and their relationship with their children.” E.B.F. v. D.F., 93 N.E.3d 759, 762 (Ind. 2018) (cleaned up). So, “when reviewing an adoption case, we presume that the trial court's decision is correct, and the appellant bears the burden of rebutting this presumption.” Id. And we will not disturb that decision “unless the evidence leads to but one conclusion and the trial judge reached an opposite conclusion.” In re Adoption of T.L., 4 N.E.3d 658, 662 (Ind. 2014). “We will not reweigh evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses.” E.B.F., 93 N.E.3d at 762 (citation omitted). “Rather, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision.” Id. (citation omitted).

In re Adoption of I.B., 163 N.E.3d 270, 274 (Ind. 2021).

[14] In determining Mother's consent to the adoption was not required, the trial court issued findings and conclusions. Thus, we apply a clearly erroneous standard where “we must first determine whether the evidence supports the findings and second, whether the findings support the judgment.” T.L., 4 N.E.3d at 662 (quoting In re Adoption of T.W., 859 N.E.2d 1215, 1217 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)). Mother claims that the trial court clearly erred in determining that her consent to the adoption was not required.

[15] Natural parents have special protections in adoption proceedings, and we “strictly construe our adoption statutes to preserve the fundamentally important parent-child relationship.” I.B., 163 N.E.3d at 274 (citing In re Adoption of N.W., 933 N.E.2d 909, 913 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)). However, there are limitations on the special protections provided to parents in our adoption statute. See I.B., 163 N.E.3d at 274; Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8. For instance, “ ‘under carefully enumerated circumstances,’ the adoption statutes allow ‘the trial court to dispense with parental consent and allow adoption of the child.’ ” I.B., 163 N.E.3d at 274 (quoting N.W., 933 N.E.2d at 913).

[16] The consent-to-adoption statute provides in relevant part as follows:

(a) Consent to adoption, which may be required under section 1 of this chapter, is not required from any of the following:

* * *

(2) A parent of a child in the custody of another person if for a period of at least one (1) year the parent:

(A) fails without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with the child when able to do so[.]

I.C. § 31-19-9-8. A parent's consent to the adoption is also not required if the child has been “abandoned or deserted for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition for adoption,” id. § 31-19-9-8(a)(1); the parent “knowingly fails to provide for the care and support of the child when able to do so,” id. § 31-19-9-8(a)(2)(B); or the parent is “unfit to be a parent” and the “best interests of the child sought to be adopted would be served if the court dispensed with the parent's consent,” id. § 31-19-9-8(a)(11).

[17] Our Supreme Court recently recognized a “familiar theme” in our case law on Indiana Code section 31-19-9-8:

A parent who meets society's expectations by maintaining a connection with her child and by financially supporting her child cannot have her legal relationship with the child severed without her consent. Conversely, when a parent fails to maintain a meaningful relationship with, or fails to financially support, that child, she loses her right as a natural parent to withhold consent to adoption.

I.B., 163 N.E.3d at 276. The party petitioning for adoption bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that consent is unnecessary. Id. at 274–75 (citing I.C. §§ 31-19-10-1.2(a), 31-19-10-0.5).

[18] Mother claims the trial court clearly erred when it determined that she, for a period of one year, failed without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with the Child when able to do so. Regarding whether a communication is significant, the Indiana Supreme Court has explained:

“A determination on the significance of the communication is not one that can be mathematically calculated to precision.” E.B.F. [v. D.F.], 93 N.E.3d [759,] 763 [(Ind. 2018)]. Indeed, “[e]ven multiple and relatively consistent contacts may not be found significant in context.” Id. On the other hand, “a single significant communication within one year is sufficient to preserve a non-custodial parent's right to consent to the adoption.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

I.B., 163 N.E.3d at 276.

[19] Mother argues that she sent birthday and Christmas cards to Child in 2016. However, Mother had not seen or communicated with Child since 2014 when the CHINS proceedings began. This was more than one year prior to the time Mother sent the cards to Child.

[20] Additionally, although Mother unsuccessfully sought to visit with Child in 2018 while Mother was in prison for the conspiracy to commit dealing in methamphetamine offense, Mother did not communicate with Child again until around the time of the adoption hearings. This constituted a second period greater than one year in which Mother did not communicate significantly with Child.

[21] Mother has since had one phone call with the Child, but nothing has prevented Mother from exercising her right to supervised visitation since her release from prison. Nothing has prevented Mother from continuing to send cards to Child like she did in 2016. Based on Mother's lack of significant communication with Child for at least two periods greater than one year, the trial court did not clearly err by ordering that Mother's consent to the adoption was not required.⁴ Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's ruling.

[22] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The date of Father's diagnosis is unclear from the record. According to Wife's Appellee's Brief, Father passed away in June 2025 during the pendency of this appeal.

2.   The trial court “[a]ssum[ed]” Mother's petition for visitation with Child constituted a significant communication. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 31.

3.   In addition to these reasons for dispensing with Mother's consent to the adoption, the trial court observed in the adoption decree that Mother had “abandoned and deserted” Child “for more than six (6) months immediately preceding the filing of the petition for adoption.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 16. The trial court, however, did not make accompanying findings of fact regarding this determination in its separate order finding that Mother's consent to the adoption was not required.

4.   Mother also challenges the trial court's conclusions that she: (1) abandoned or deserted Child for at least six months immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition for adoption, (2) failed to provide for the care and support of Child, and (3) is unfit to parent Child and Child's best interest would be served by dispensing with Mother's consent to the adoption. We decline to address these arguments because we conclude the trial court did not clearly err by finding that Mother failed to communicate significantly with Child for a period of at least one year, and this finding is sufficient to affirm the trial court's ruling.

Felix, Judge.

Foley, J., and Scheele, J., concur.