WILSON v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Matthew D. Wilson was charged with misdemeanor reckless driving and a speeding infraction and was found guilty of both. He now appeals, arguing the evidence is insufficient to support his reckless-driving conviction and the trial court erred in imposing costs and fees without first determining his ability to pay. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Around 8 a.m. one weekday in September 2023, Indiana State Trooper Ryan Johnson was patrolling U.S. 50 in Knox County near Robinson Road when he observed Wilson driving a Dodge Ram at a “high rate of speed” in the left passing lane. Tr. p. 32. Trooper Johnson used his radar and clocked Wilson at 104 miles per hour. The speed limit was 60 mph. Trooper Johnson, who was driving in the opposite direction, turned around at Robinson Road so that he could follow Wilson. It took Trooper Johnson a little over 3 miles driving at 140 mph to catch up to Wilson, during which time he passed “at least a dozen vehicles.” Id. at 35. When Trooper Johnson caught up to Wilson, he again clocked him at 104 mph driving in the left passing lane. The speed limit in this area was 55 mph. Trooper Johnson activated his lights and pulled Wilson over.

[3] The State charged Wilson with Class C misdemeanor reckless driving and Class C infraction speeding. At the March 2025 bench trial, the State admitted dashboard-camera footage from Trooper Johnson's patrol car, which showed him turning around at Robinson Road and catching up to Wilson on U.S. 50. It also showed the cars that Trooper Johnson passed. Trooper Johnson testified that there are “numerous crossroads” on U.S. 50 and that one of those crossroads, Robinson Road, is a “heavy cut-through for the school traffic.” Id. at 36. Trooper Johnson believed that traveling at 100 mph when there is traffic, especially school traffic, was “dangerous to other people [o]n the road.” Id.

[4] The judge found Wilson guilty. At sentencing, Wilson testified that he lived with his three children (one of whom was in college) and that he had split custody of his two younger children. He also testified that he had two jobs; his main job was a union job with a construction company. The State argued that given Wilson's criminal history and the speed at which he was driving, it was asking for “60 days at the Knox County Jail, all of that suspended to 360 days of probation; and then [on the speeding count], a $200 fine.” Id. at 71. Defense counsel argued the following:

So Judge, I think Mr. Wilson, more than anybody else, should be sentenced to a time served or just a conviction, fine, and court costs. I just don't see -- and don't get me wrong, Judge, and I do want to clarify. I am not saying we're not okay with probation. We are fine with probation. And if the Court did order probation, we would ask for 180 days as opposed to a year.

But Judge, probation is for the purpose of rehabilitating the offender, but this is not a drug offense. He wasn't under the influence. This isn't a case where we have multiple driving while suspendeds leading up to this. This isn't a case where there was an accident, you know, property damage. This is case where I lost track of my speed, I recognize I was going 104 miles per hour. I won't do it again.

And then, Judge, I would ask the Court to sentence him to conviction, fine, and costs on Count I, and then a $200 fine on Count II, speeding. But in the alternative, Judge, 180 days on probation or 60 days suspended to 180 days.

Id. at 72.

[5] For reckless driving, the judge sentenced Wilson to 60 days suspended with 360 days of probation and ordered him to pay $189 in court costs, “a fine of $100.00 paid to the Public Defender Fund,”¹ and the following probation fees: “$50.00 (Administration fee), $30.00 (Initial User's fee), and $20.00 (Monthly fee).” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 6.² For speeding, the judge ordered Wilson to pay a $200 fine. The court then told Wilson that he had a “probation order” for him to go over. Tr. p. 73. The judge handed the document to Wilson's attorney and said he would stay on the record while Wilson read it. The judge told Wilson to “take [his] time” reading it because it contained “all of the fines, fees, and costs in there.” Id. The document, called the Knox County Adult Probation Rules and Waiver, provided that for the reckless-driving conviction, Wilson had to pay a “$50.00 Probation Administration Fee,” a “$30.00 Initial Probation User's Fee,” and a “$20.00 Monthly Probation User's Fee.” Cause No. 42D02-2309-CM-628 (Mar. 24, 2025). The document also provided that Wilson had to pay a “$100.00 fine” (presumably to the “Public Defender Fund”) and $189 in court costs. Id. After Wilson and defense counsel conferred, the judge asked Wilson if he had any questions; Wilson said no. Wilson signed the document, and the judge “adopted [it] and made [it] part of the record.” Tr. pp. 73-74.

[6] Wilson now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. The evidence is sufficient to support Wilson's reckless-driving conviction

[7] Wilson first contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for reckless driving. When reviewing sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015). We will only consider the evidence supporting the conviction and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence. Id. A conviction will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[8] To convict Wilson of Class C misdemeanor reckless driving as charged here, the State had to prove that he operated a vehicle and recklessly drove at such an unreasonably high rate of speed under the circumstances as to endanger the safety or property of others. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 18; Ind. Code § 9-21-8-52(a)(1)(A). Wilson doesn't dispute that he recklessly drove at an unreasonably high rate of speed. Rather, he argues that the State failed to prove “any actual endangerment to other motorists or property.” Appellant's Br. p. 8.

[9] A defendant's unreasonably high rate of speed is not the sole determining factor when analyzing whether the endangerment element has been satisfied. Crussel v. State, 29 N.E.3d 746, 751 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Instead, a defendant's speed, in conjunction with the other attending circumstances, determines whether a defendant has endangered the safety or property of others. Id. Based on the evidence presented here, it was reasonable for the judge to conclude that Wilson endangered the safety or property of others. That is, Wilson drove 104 mph in 55-mph and 60-mph zones around 8 a.m. on a weekday. This was about 45 and 50 mph over the speed limits. In addition, U.S. 50 has many crossroads. One of those crossroads, Robinson Road, is a heavy cut-through for school traffic. As the dash-cam footage showed, other cars were traveling in the same direction as Wilson. Trooper Johnson estimated that he passed a dozen cars while catching up to Wilson.

[10] Wilson notes that he was driving on a sunny morning with good road conditions, that he was driving in the passing lane and not swerving between lanes, and that other cars were not forced to take any evasive action. This, however, is merely a request for us to reweigh the evidence, which we don't do. The evidence is sufficient to support the endangerment element. We therefore affirm Wilson's reckless-driving conviction.

II. Wilson waived any challenge to costs and fees

[11] Wilson also contends that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay “costs and fees” for his reckless-driving conviction without first determining his ability to pay. Appellant's Reply Br. p. 5. Fines, costs, and fees generally require an indigency hearing when, as here, there is no cash-bail agreement. Spells v. State, 225 N.E.3d 767, 775 (Ind. 2024). Indiana Code section 35-33-7-6.5(a) requires a trial court to consider a convicted person's “assets,” “income,” and “necessary expenses” in determining whether the person is indigent.

[12] The State argues that Wilson has waived review of the costs-and-fees issue because he “failed to object to the court's failure to hold a hearing when levying” them. Appellee's Br. p. 10. In support, the State cites a footnote in Spells in which our Supreme Court observed that the issue of costs and fees could be waived:

We note that Spells did not raise her appeal issues before the trial court. No objection was required to preserve a challenge to her fine, because a fine, like restitution, is part of the sentence. See Bell v. State, 59 N.E.3d 959, 962 (Ind. 2016). But costs (which include most fees) are not part of the sentence, I.C. § 33-37-2-2(a), and so Spells's challenge to these could arguably be waived. However, as the State addressed the issues head-on without arguing for waiver, we exercise our discretion to excuse any such default. See Leonard v. State, 73 N.E.3d 155, 165 n.6 (Ind. 2017).

225 N.E.3d at 771 n.5 (emphasis added). Although our Supreme Court didn't definitively hold that an objection is required to preserve a defendant's challenge to costs and fees imposed without an indigency hearing, it suggested that it would entertain a waiver argument when made by the State. And here, the State has argued waiver. As the State highlights, for Wilson's reckless-driving conviction, defense counsel asked the judge to impose a fine and costs in lieu of probation. When the judge then imposed probation as well as fees and costs, defense counsel did not object. The judge told Wilson to go over the probation rules with defense counsel and to “take [his] time” reading the document because it contained “all of the fines, fees, and costs in there.” After Wilson and defense counsel reviewed the document, which set forth the specific amounts, defense counsel again did not object. This was Wilson's opportunity to argue that the amount was too high or to request an indigency determination. Having not done so, we agree with the State that Wilson has waived review of this issue.

[13] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although the judge used the word “fine” to describe the $100 that Wilson had to pay to the “Public Defender Fund,” Wilson doesn't treat the $100 as a fine on appeal, and it appears to be classified as a fee. See Ind. Code § 35-33-7-6 (authorizing a $100 fee for misdemeanor actions and a $200 fee for felony actions and explaining that these fees are split between “the county's supplemental public defender services fund established by IC 33-40-3-1” and “the state comptroller for deposit in the public defense fund established by IC 33-40-6-1”); Eversole v. State, 260 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (referencing “$100 public defender fee”). Despite the language used by the judge, we consider the $100 a “fee.”

2.   The order also said that “if applicable,” Wilson had to pay certain home-detention fees. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 6. But because Wilson was not sentenced to home detention, we don't address those fees.

Vaidik, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.