TAYLOR v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Carltez Taylor shot an unarmed boy in the back. A jury convicted Taylor of murder, and it recommended he be sentenced to life without parole. The trial court imposed that sentence, but on direct appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court revised Taylor's sentence to 80 years of incarceration. Taylor later filed a petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”), alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that his revised sentence was unconstitutional, among other claims. The PCR court denied Taylor's petition. Taylor now appeals and raises two issues for our review that we restate as the following single issue: Whether the PCR court erred by denying his PCR petition.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Initially, we review the facts of Taylor's underlying offenses, trial, conviction, and direct appeal. We then summarize the facts pertaining to Taylor's PCR claims. Additional facts are included in the Discussion section as necessary.

The Crime, Trial, Sentencing, & Direct Appeal

[4] In 2016, a jury convicted Taylor of murder and conspiracy to commit murder, found him not guilty of attempted murder, and determined he was eligible for an enhanced sentence for using a firearm. The Indiana Supreme Court has previously set out the facts underlying these convictions as follows:

On the night after Thanksgiving in 2015, seventeen-year-old Carltez Taylor went with a friend to hang out at D.G.’s house. D.G. and one of her friends—both teenage girls—were home on weekend passes from a juvenile detention center. D.G. knew Taylor as “Looney,” and introduced him that way to her mother, Lyn. Uncomfortable with Taylor and his friend, Lyn ordered the boys to leave. They went outside and smoked cigarettes, but soon snuck back into the house and to the basement.

Later that night, another teenage boy arrived, bringing a 9mm Hi–Point handgun. He handed it to one of the other boys, who removed the magazine and handed the gun to Taylor. Taylor then put the magazine back in the gun and stuck the Hi–Point into his waistband.

As the night wore on, D.G. texted J.W. (a recent fling) about hanging out and having sex. When Taylor found out, he called J.W. a “b****” and said he “wasn't s*** [and] wasn't about nothing.” The three boys plotted about “b****ing him” or “punking him out,” which D.G. described as fighting someone who does not want to fight.

The rhetoric escalated. Taylor threatened to beat up D.G. unless she got J.W. to come over. Afraid, D.G. began enticing J.W.— who was suspicious, repeatedly asking if it was a setup. But after D.G. lied that she was alone, J.W. ultimately agreed to meet her at the corner near her house. J.W. and his nephew, T.S., met her there shortly thereafter.

D.G. asked J.W. and T.S. if they were “strapped” (had guns on them)—they did not. Then, D.G. kept them waiting at the corner for about ten minutes, supposedly for her “sister.” But instead of a friend, a figure wearing black emerged from between two houses, with a hood snugly tied around his face. Seeing him, J.W. and T.S. walked the other way.

As the hooded person approached, D.G. recognized him as Taylor and watched him pull out the 9mm Hi–Point. When shots started flying—five or six in total—J.W. and T.S. took off running. They ran toward an alley, but when T.S. got there, he realized that J.W. was no longer with him. He returned to the street and found J.W. lying on the sidewalk, shot in the back.

T.S. then watched the shooter run past, recognizing him as Carltez Taylor, an acquaintance he knew from playing basketball. As Taylor ran by J.W., he said “CTK b****.” J.W. and his friends were known as the “cream team,” and “CTK” means “cream team killer.” Within minutes, J.W. died on the sidewalk from a single gunshot wound to the back.

Before learning J.W.’s fate, D.G. and Taylor ran back to her house. As they arrived, Taylor grabbed D.G., put the still-hot gun to her head, and told her that if she said anything he would kill her. They returned to D.G.’s basement, where Taylor asked D.G. if he hit J.W. She told him that he did.

Taylor then removed his hoodie and texted a friend to pray for him. He and the other teenage boys hid the gun and magazine in separate parts of the basement's ceiling and made a large hole in the wall to hide inside.

The next day, T.S.’s family told police that Taylor was the shooter, and D.G. led detectives to the hoodie and the murder weapon. After DNA from the hoodie matched Taylor—leading to a warrant for his arrest—he turned himself in to police. Months later, when D.G. saw Taylor at juvenile court, he called her “the police” and said he “should have killed [her] when he had the chance.”

Taylor v. State, 86 N.E.3d 157, 160–61 (Ind. 2017) (alterations in original), reh'g denied (Feb. 15, 2018), cert. denied, 586 U.S. 1034 (2018).

[5] The State charged Taylor with murder, attempted murder, and conspiracy to commit murder; he was found guilty of all but the attempted murder count. The State filed a sentencing enhancement for all three offenses based on Taylor's use of a firearm, and it sought a life without parole (“LWOP”) sentence based on Taylor committing the murder by lying in wait. The jury found Taylor had used a firearm in committing his offenses, and it recommended LWOP. Upon the jury's recommendation, the trial court sentenced Taylor to LWOP.

[6] On direct appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court unanimously affirmed Taylor's convictions, and a 3-2 majority revised Taylor's sentence from LWOP to an aggregate 80-year term. The Indiana Supreme Court later denied Taylor's petition for rehearing, and the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari.

PCR Proceedings

[7] In 2019, Taylor filed a PCR petition, alleging in relevant part that his trial counsel (“Trial Counsel”) provided ineffective assistance and that his revised 80-year sentence is unconstitutional. After an evidentiary hearing in 2024, the PCR court denied Taylor's petition. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The PCR Court Did Not Err by Denying Taylor's PCR Petition

[8] Taylor contends that the PCR court erred when it denied his PCR petition. “Post-conviction actions are civil proceedings, meaning the petitioner (the prior criminal defendant) must prove his claims by a preponderance of the evidence.” Bobadilla v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1272, 1279 (Ind. 2019) (citing Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5); Wilkes v. State, 984 N.E.2d 1236, 1240 (Ind. 2013)). When a petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, he “appeals from a negative judgment, so he must show that ‘the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the postconviction court.’ ” Kelly v. State, 257 N.E.3d 782, 792 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Conley v. State, 183 N.E.3d 276, 282 (Ind. 2022)). That is, the petitioner must demonstrate “clear error—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Bobadilla, 117 N.E.3d at 1279 (quoting Humphrey v. State, 73 N.E.3d 677, 682 (Ind. 2017)). “We do not reweigh the evidence presented at the post-conviction proceedings, and we examine only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the post-conviction court's determination.” Kelly, 257 N.E.3d at 792 (quoting Conley, 183 N.E.3d at 282). We review pure legal questions de novo. Id. (citing State v. Stidham, 157 N.E.3d 1185, 1190 (Ind. 2020)).

[9] In support of his position that the PCR court's denial of his petition was clearly erroneous, Taylor raises two main issues for our review: (a) whether the PCR court clearly erred by concluding Taylor did not establish that Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance, and (b) whether the PCR court clearly erred by concluding Taylor's 80-year sentence is not unconstitutional. We address each contention in turn.

a. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

[10] To evaluate a petitioner's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, “we apply the well-established, two-part Strickland test.”¹ Bobadilla, 117 N.E.3d at 1280 (citing Humphrey, 73 N.E.3d at 682). Under that test, the defendant must prove: (1) “counsel rendered deficient performance, meaning counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as gauged by prevailing professional norms”; and (2) “counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant,” that is, there exists a reasonable probability that “but for counsel's errors the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (citing Ward v. State, 969 N.E.2d 46, 51 (Ind. 2012)); see also Middleton v. State, 72 N.E.3d 891, 891 (Ind. 2017) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 694 (1984)) (“[T]o demonstrate prejudice from counsel's deficient performance, a petitioner need only show ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ”). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Middleton, 72 N.E.3d at 891–92 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694) (citing Campbell v. State, 19 N.E.3d 271, 274 (Ind. 2014); Wilkes v. State, 984 N.E.2d 1236, 1241 (Ind. 2013)). Failure to satisfy either of the two prongs will cause the claim to fail. French v. State, 778 N.E.2d 816, 824 (Ind. 2002).

[11] “There is a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Counsel is afforded considerable discretion in choosing strategy and tactics and these decisions are entitled to deferential review.” Weisheit v. State, 109 N.E.3d 978, 983 (Ind. 2018) (internal citations omitted) (citing Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 746–47 (Ind. 2002)). Moreover, “isolated mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience and instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render representation ineffective.” Id. at 984 (citing Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 747). We also consider the “legal precedent available to counsel at the time of his representation of the accused, and counsel will not be deemed ineffective for not anticipating or initiating changes in the law.” Lee v. State, 91 N.E.3d 978, 987 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Sweeney v. State, 886 N.E.2d 1, 8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied) (citing Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679, 690 (Ind. 2005)), trans. denied.

[12] Taylor alleges Trial Counsel was ineffective for (i) failing to object to certain testimony and statements made during the State's closing argument, and (ii) failing to present certain mitigating evidence at sentencing. We address each argument in turn.

i. Failure to Object to Certain Evidence and State's Closing Argument

[13] Taylor first challenges Trial Counsel's failure to object to testimony about and the State's references during closing argument to his nickname of “Looney the Shooter.” In addressing a similar argument on direct appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court described the use of Taylor's nickname as follows:

Before trial, Taylor asked the trial court to bar the State's witnesses from calling him “Looney the Shooter.” He acknowledged that “Looney” was relevant to his identity, but argued that “Looney the Shooter” was too prejudicial. The trial court granted Taylor's request. Nonetheless, at trial the State asked its lead detective what Taylor's nickname was, and he told the jury “Looney the Shooter.”

Taylor, 86 N.E.3d at 162. Trial Counsel did not object to this testimony. Id. at 161.

The State then used the nickname during closing argument. It argued that “Carltez Taylor began firing bullets at [J.W.] and [T.S.]. ․ Carltez Taylor refers to himself as Looney the Shooter, that is for your consideration.” And later: “Is it reasonable to believe that someone who identifies themselves as Looney the Shooter would even let someone pull the trigger[?]”

Taylor, 86 N.E.3d at 162 (alterations in original). Trial Counsel did not object to these statements during closing argument. Id. at 161.

[14] In addressing Taylor's challenge to the use of “Looney the Shooter” on direct appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court determined that “[t]hese references ․ were improper” but did not constitute fundamental error because they “did not create undeniable harm or potential for harm, or make a fair trial impossible” given the “strong evidence against Taylor.” Taylor, 86 N.E.3d at 162–63. That strong evidence included the two witnesses to the murder identifying Taylor as the shooter, Taylor's close ties to the murder weapon and clothes worn by the shooter, and Taylor's post-murder incriminating statements. Id. at 162.

[15] At the evidentiary hearing on Taylor's PCR petition, Trial Counsel testified that deciding whether to object is “always a strategic decision, for me,” PCR Tr. Vol. II at 19,² and that he “chose not to object” to the use of “Looney the Shooter” because trial counsel believed that such an objection “was going to basically put a spotlight on the fact of Looney the Shooter,” id. at 20. The PCR court concluded that this decision “to not draw attention to a negative use of nickname [was] a reasonable trial strategy.” PCR Appellant's App. Vol. II at 145. Further, the PCR court concluded Taylor was not prejudiced by Trial Counsel's failure to object to the use of “Looney the Shooter” at trial based on the Indiana Supreme Court's determination that such failure did not constitute fundamental error.

[16] When a petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object at trial, the petitioner “must prove that the trial court would have sustained the objection” to show prejudice under the second prong of the Strickland test. Passwater v. State, 989 N.E.2d 766, 770 (Ind. 2013) (citing Lowery v. State, 640 N.E.2d 1031, 1042 (Ind. 1994)). Here, even if we assume arguendo that Trial Counsel was deficient and that objections to the use of Taylor's nickname would have been sustained,³ Taylor still has not demonstrated that a reasonable probability exists that but for Trial Counsel's failure to object, the jury's verdict would have been different. As the Indiana Supreme Court stated in deciding Taylor's direct appeal, there was “compelling evidence” of Taylor's guilt that “minimize[ed] the danger that the jury found him guilty based on his nickname.” Taylor, 86 N.E.3d at 162. Based on the “compelling evidence” of Taylor's guilt, Trial Counsel's failure to object to the few “Looney the Shooter” references during trial do not undermine our confidence in the jury's verdict, so Taylor has failed to show that Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance on this basis.

ii. Failure to Present Certain Mitigating Evidence at Sentencing

[17] Taylor next challenges Trial Counsel's alleged failure to conduct an adequate mitigation investigation and to present certain mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of his trial. During the penalty phase, Trial Counsel called four witnesses: Taylor's pastor Marvin Barner Jr., Taylor's great uncle James Mayes, family friend Chavis Jefferson, and Taylor's grandmother Ruby McDaniels. First, Barner testified that Taylor's family “ha[d] been just long term members of [his] church,” DA Tr. Vol. VII at 180, and Taylor “always proved to be a respectable young man,” id. at 181. Second, Mayes testified that he and Taylor volunteered together at the Evansville Christian Life Center, where they would serve meals, and a local church, where they would “help with anything that need[ed] to be [done] around there.” Id. at 185. According to James, Taylor “was very good with his hands” and would help James “work[ ] around the house.” Id. James also testified that Taylor's father was not very involved in Taylor's life, and the neighborhood the family had lived in since the 1980s and 1990s had seen increased gang activity and substance abuse. Further, James stated that he had seen a “shift” in Taylor's behavior in the two years before trial, and this occurred “when [Taylor] stopped coming to church.” Id. at 189.

[18] Third, Jefferson testified that he was like an uncle to Taylor and had seen “all the good characters in him.” DA Tr. Vol. VII at 192. Jefferson also testified that he had previously been incarcerated but “straightened up” and had stayed out of prison for more than 40 years. Id. at 193. Fourth, McDaniels testified that Taylor “was a happy camper,” id. at 198; “liked to fix on stuff,” id.; was dependable; and had a child who lived in Louisiana.

[19] Trial Counsel primarily argued one mitigating factor—namely, Taylor's young age when he murdered J.W. Trial Counsel also contended that Taylor was not “the worst of the worst among us.” DA Tr. Vol. VII at 212. The State argued one aggravating factor—namely, based on the evidence presented during the guilt phase of trial, Taylor lay in wait to kill J.W. The State also pointed out that the jury had already determined that Taylor's decision to kill J.W. was premeditated and that when Taylor killed J.W., J.W. was several months younger than Taylor. The jury found the State proved the lying-in-wait aggravator and recommended LWOP, and the trial court accepted the recommendation. On direct appeal, a majority of the Indiana Supreme Court revised Taylor's sentence from LWOP to 80 years of incarceration based on its “collective judgment.” Taylor, 86 N.E.3d at 167.

[20] Taylor now argues that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present readily available mitigating evidence. At the evidentiary hearing on Taylor's PCR petition, Trial Counsel testified that he “leaned on [Taylor's] family quite a bit” in investigating potential mitigating circumstances. PCR Tr. Vol. II at 21. In particular, Trial Counsel recalled speaking with James, McDaniels, and Taylor's mother Tracy Mayes, who was Trial Counsel's “main point of contact.” Id. at 27. Based on the information they provided, as well as reviewing Taylor's records from school and the Lampion Center, Trial Counsel was unable to identify any significant mitigating factors aside from Taylor's age: “[F]or a seventeen year old, there's very little to draw on. ․ I wasn't able to find anything that I thought would benefit Mr. Taylor,” id. at 22. For instance, Trial Counsel's mitigation investigation revealed that Taylor had some behavioral problems but overall did fairly well in school and his “family was not aware of any sort of mental health diagnosis” that Trial Counsel “thought would serve as mitigation.” Id. at 21. There was nothing about Taylor's family's criminal history or the neighborhood in which they lived that stood out to Trial Counsel, who was familiar with the area.

[21] Trial Counsel stated that he selected the four witnesses who testified during the penalty phase of Taylor's trial because he thought they “would be effective and would be helpful,” and he did not think it would benefit Taylor to “bring[ ] in fifteen different witnesses that might not be able to offer as much.” PCR Tr. Vol. II at 28. Additionally, Trial Counsel believed “that a mitigation expert was probably necessary in [a] case as serious” as Taylor's, but Taylor's family did not have the funds to hire such an expert, and the trial court denied Trial Counsel's request to hire a mitigation expert at public expense. Id.; see also id. at 25.

[22] Also at the PCR hearing, Taylor presented testimony from Kathleen Heide, a licensed mental health counselor and professor who specializes in dealing with juveniles who have committed murder. Heide interviewed Taylor in early April 2022, and she met with Taylor's mother, uncle, and four of his siblings. Based on her evaluation, Heide described Taylor as having been “immature for [a] typical seventeen year old” and as “functioning on a level that we see more characteristic of young kids” when he was 17 years old, which she believed was “a result of not having developed.” PCR Tr. Vol. II at 59. Heide testified that Taylor “was born addicted to crack cocaine”; both his parents “were substance abusers, pretty severe”; and the neighborhood he grew up in was “very violent.” Id. at 63. Heide also stated that Taylor's parents had both been incarcerated, his father “abandon[ed]” him, and his mother was “unable to parent effectively and emotionally because of her drug addiction.” Id. at 65. Furthermore, Heide testified that Taylor “was diagnosed at a young age with ADHD,” id. at 72; had “behavioral problems” at school, id.; “admired” his older brother who had “several convictions for violent crimes,” id. at 77; and “hung out” with peers who were using illegal substances and committing delinquent acts, id. at 80. According to Heide, if she had evaluated Taylor in 2016 as she did in 2022, she probably would have been able to testify at trial to all these circumstances, which she considered to be mitigating.

[23] Additionally, Taylor presented testimony from several other witnesses regarding his parents’ incarcerations, his father not being present, his mother's drug use, and his child.

[24] The PCR court denied Taylor's ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on the alleged failure to present certain mitigating evidence. In support, the PCR court found and concluded in relevant part as follows:

21. The Court finds that many of the points Dr. Heide made during the hearing were covered by other witnesses.

22. [Taylor's older half-brother] testified at the Evidentiary Hearing that [Taylor] grew up without a father around, however James Mayes also testified to that during the penalty phase. ․ [Taylor's child's mother] testified to their relationship and their shared son, but the Court and jury were also made aware that [Taylor] was a new father. ․ [Taylor's child's grandmother] testified that [Taylor] helped her with housework, but [Taylor]’s grandmother similarly testified how [Taylor] would help her around the house. ․

23. The Court finds Dr. Heide's testimony to be speculative and has the benefit of hindsight. Dr. Heide's opinion is based on her interview/evaluation of [Taylor] in 2022, over five years after the alleged incident and sentencing.

* * *

29. The Court finds trial counsel's performance during the penalty phase was reasonable and strategic. Trial counsel adequately presented evidence about Petitioner's background, family, work history, school performance, and other social history in the form of witness testimony. ․

30. Even if trial ․ counsel[’s] performance during the penalty phase was deficient, [Taylor] has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that this issue would have resulted in the trial court revising his life without parole sentence or the Supreme Court's revising the 80-year aggregate sentence. ․

PCR Appellant's App. Vol. II at 147–50.

[25] Even if we assume for the sake of argument that Trial Counsel was deficient as Taylor alleges, Taylor has not demonstrated that Trial Counsel's failure to present certain allegedly mitigating evidence prejudiced Taylor. To determine “whether a defendant is prejudiced by counsel's failure at sentencing to present mitigating evidence,” courts must determine “what effect the totality of the omitted mitigation evidence would have had on the sentence.” McCarty v. State, 802 N.E.2d at 968–69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Coleman v. State, 741 N.E.2d 697, 702 (Ind. 2000)). Because a trial court's sentencing decision is generally given great deference, Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 269 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), as amended (July 10, 2007), decision clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)), reh'g denied (Aug. 17, 2023), we are “hard pressed to conclude there is a reasonable probability that the trial court would have imposed a lesser sentence had it been presented with additional mitigating evidence that trial counsel should have brought to light,” McCarty, 802 N.E.2d at 968.

[26] Taylor argues that if Trial Counsel had presented to the jury “the evidence which was presented at post-conviction,” the jury would not have recommended LWOP. Appellant's Br. at 32. We cannot agree. As the PCR court acknowledged, much of the testimony provided at the PCR hearing was covered in some way by the testimony provided during the penalty phase of Taylor's trial. And regardless of the circumstances of Taylor's life, the fact remains that he chose to lure an unarmed J.W. into an ambush, where Taylor shot him in the back as he tried to escape. Thus, to the extent any testimony presented at the PCR hearing was not covered during the penalty phase of trial, we are hard pressed to conclude that there is a reasonable probability the jury would have determined that omitted evidence would have outweighed the lying-in-wait aggravator such that the jury would not have recommended LWOP. Taylor has therefore failed to show that Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance on this basis.

b. Constitutionality of LWOP and 80-Year Sentences

[27] Taylor also contends that his original LWOP sentence and his revised 80-year sentence are unconstitutional because of the alleged deficient presentation of mitigating evidence during the penalty phase. According to Taylor, this court “can consider whether his sentence, reduced though it may be, is nevertheless in violation because he was ordered to serve LWOP under a sentencing regime that applied to him as equally as an adult without consideration of the unique characteristics of children” due to Trial Counsel's alleged ineffective assistance by not offering additional mitigating evidence. Appellant's Br. at 47; see also Appellant's Reply Br. at 8 (“With the benefit of a complete post-conviction record, [Taylor] asks this court to re-consider the constitutionality of his sentence.”).

[28] First, Taylor's LWOP sentence is no longer the operative sentence in this case, see Taylor, 86 N.E.3d at 167, so we cannot review its constitutionality, see G.W. v. State, 231 N.E.3d 184, 188 (Ind. 2024) (quoting T.W. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 121 N.E.3d 1039, 1042 (Ind. 2019)) (holding an issue is “moot when no effective relief can be rendered to the parties before the court”). Even if we could, the Indiana Supreme Court clearly determined that “Taylor's LWOP sentence was lawful.” Taylor, 86 N.E.3d at 165; see also id. at 169 (Slaughter, J., concurring) (concluding Taylor's LWOP sentence was “lawful” and “appropriate”).

[29] Second, the State argues in relevant part that this court cannot review a sentence imposed by the Indiana Supreme Court and that Taylor's 80-year sentence is the law of the case. Even if we were to assume without deciding that the State is correct, Taylor's constitutional claims are without merit. Specifically, those claims are based entirely on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding mitigation evidence, so they must fail based on our conclusion that he did not demonstrate that Trial Counsel was ineffective on that basis. We therefore cannot say the PCR court erred by concluding Taylor failed to prove his 80-year sentence is unconstitutional.

Conclusion

[30] In sum, the PCR court did not err by determining that Taylor failed to prove his ineffective assistance of counsel claims and failed to show his 80-year sentence was unconstitutional. We therefore affirm the PCR court's denial of Taylor's PCR petition.

[31] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

2.   Citations to the PCR record are denoted by “PCR,” and citations to Taylor's direct appeal record are denoted by “DA.”

3.   In “preliminarily grant[ing]” Taylor's motion in limine concerning the use of his nickname, the trial court told Taylor that “if [he] has identified himself that way, there's a possibility it's going to come in.” DA Tr. Vol. V at 94.

Felix, Judge.

Pyle, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.