Vincent McCurtis, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Vincent McCurtis and Brandon Jackson were charged with murder after both men were alleged to have beaten Bryan Ward to death. At a joint jury trial, McCurtis’ neighbor testified that she heard McCurtis say, among other things, that he “want[ed] [Ward] dead” and was “going to kill him.” Transcript Vol. 3 at 194. After the close of evidence, McCurtis and Jackson tendered proposed jury instructions on several lesser-included offenses, including reckless homicide. The trial court determined that “there [was] a serious evidentiary dispute ․ as to what each of these individuals did” but that McCurtis’ statements expressing his intent to kill excluded any arguable grounds to suggest that he had acted recklessly. Tr. Vol. 5 at 42. Accordingly, the court decided to instruct the jury on reckless homicide as to Jackson, but not McCurtis.

[2] The jury found McCurtis guilty of murder and Jackson guilty of reckless homicide. The trial court accepted both verdicts and entered judgments of conviction. McCurtis now appeals.¹

Facts and Procedural History 2

[3] Late in the afternoon on May 14, 2023, Victoria Navarrete returned to her duplex apartment in Indianapolis. McCurtis and Nicole Stewart—her neighbors who lived in the adjacent unit—were in the backyard with Jackson and Ward. As Navarrete walked up the stairs to enter her side of the duplex, Ward said, “I love those legs.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 183. She brushed this comment off and went inside.

[4] After changing clothes, Navarrete went out on her front porch, where she planned to read a book. There, she found that McCurtis, Stewart, Jackson, and Ward had also moved to the front of the duplex, where they were playing music, talking, drinking alcohol, and smoking marijuana. She sat with them and chatted with Stewart about the books she had purchased earlier that day.

[5] McCurtis and Jackson went inside after spending some time “passing [a] bottle around,” but Ward stayed outside with Navarrete. Id. at 185. He showed her a picture of a woman on his phone who he thought she resembled. McCurtis came outside and, seeing Ward speaking with Navarrete, said “hey, [ ] don't talk to her, [ ] don't talk to my sister.³ I told you I don't want anyone talking to her. I don't want you talking to her.” Id. at 187. Ward replied, “[O]kay, I won't. I won't[,]” but McCurtis became angry and continued, “[N]o, [ ] I told you, don't talk to her․ [Y]ou're disrespecting me.” Id. at 188.

[6] Ward walked off the side of the porch and “looked like he was trying to leave.” Id. However, McCurtis told him, “[N]o, you don't get to leave[.]” Id. at 191. McCurtis then yelled for Jackson to come outside and attack Ward, instructing him to “beat [Ward] up. [ ] [T]his is what I do[.] ․ I want him dead. I kill people.” Id. As McCurtis repeated that “this is what [he] do[es], [ ] [he] kill[s] people[,]” Jackson jumped off the porch, ran to Ward, and started hitting him. Id.

[7] Navarrete and Stewart remained seated on the porch as McCurtis went to join Jackson. Navarrete could not see what McCurtis and Jackson were doing but could “hear[ ] the sounds of skin being slapped or smack[ed]” for “longer than a minute.” Id. at 192, 193. Eventually, Stewart rose from her seat to try to see what was happening, but McCurtis ran over to her and said, “[Y]ou two need to stay here․ [Y]ou don't leave. You don't call the police. This is what I do.” Id. at 193.

[8] McCurtis went back to where he had left Jackson and Ward, out of the sight of Navarrete and Stewart. He screamed at Jackson to “take [Ward's] phone; take his keys. Give them to me.” Id. As Jackson tossed him Ward's keys, McCurtis yelled, “[T]his is what I do, I kill people. I want him dead. I'm going to kill him.” Id. at 194. He told Navarrete, “I'm doing this for you.” Id. He then climbed into Ward's truck, drove it around the block, and yelled at Jackson to take Ward inside and drown him. He told Jackson that he wanted Ward “dead, but not dead-dead” and that he wanted Jackson to “put him in the bathtub and drown him, but don't kill him” because McCurtis “want[ed] to be the one to finish him off[.]”⁴ Id. at 194, 219. Jackson did as he was told and, as McCurtis drove around the block, Navarrete texted people asking them to call the police because she feared that if McCurtis saw her calling 911, “he would do something to” her. Id. at 195.

[9] McCurtis eventually parked Ward's truck and followed Jackson into his apartment, after which Navarrete could hear Ward being beaten again. She went inside her unit and continued texting with a person who had agreed to call the police. As she did so, McCurtis came back outside and said, “[W]here is she? Where is she? She's calling the cops.” Id. at 196. She ran back outside and lied to McCurtis, telling him that she went inside to put on a sweater. He replied by instructing her “to not call the cops.” Id.

[10] McCurtis went back inside his unit and, after a moment, Navarrete went inside hers. Minutes later, McCurtis opened Navarrete's front door, invited her to come over to his apartment, and told her he “want[ed] to show [her] what [he] did for [her].” Id. at 197. She refused, but he was adamant that he “want[ed] to show [her] what [he] do[es] for [his] family.” Id. She again refused to follow him to his half of the duplex, so he told her, “I'll just bring him out to you[.]” Id.

[11] Navarrete shut and locked her front door and peered through her side window to see McCurtis and Jackson carrying Ward by his arms and legs. They dropped Ward's seemingly lifeless body at her doorstep with a “thud[.]” Id. McCurtis pounded on her door and, when he finally realized she was not coming out, he dragged Ward back inside his apartment.

[12] When officers arrived at the scene, they found Ward alive but unresponsive. He had visible bruising on his head and agonal breathing.⁵ His condition rapidly deteriorated, his pulse stopped, and emergency medical services rushed him to a hospital where “[h]e was dead upon arrival[.]” Tr. Vol. 3 at 237. Although medical providers were able to restart his heart, he was declared brain-dead the following day.⁶ Ward's family decided to take him off life support, and he quickly succumbed to his injuries.

[13] During an investigation, officers found blood on the wall above McCurtis’ bathtub. Subsequent DNA testing suggested this blood was a mixture of McCurtis’ and Ward's. Ward's DNA was also found on samples taken under McCurtis’ fingernails.

[14] The State charged McCurtis and Jackson with murder, a felony.⁷ At a joint trial, McCurtis and Jackson both tendered proposed jury instructions on several lesser-included offenses, including reckless homicide. When the trial court and counsel discussed the proposed instructions, the court reasoned:

THE COURT: ․ [T]there was evidence that [McCurtis] had told [Navarrete] that he --

[THE STATE]: That he was going to kill [Ward].

THE COURT: -- wanted to kill [Ward], so the Court is not going to give [McCurtis’ reckless homicide instruction].

Tr. Vol. 5 at 36. However, when discussing Jackson's proposed reckless homicide instruction, the court found “a serious evidentiary dispute ․ as to what each of these individuals did” and reasoned that it was “up [to] the jury to decide on whether or not what [ ] Jackson did was reckless.” Id. at 40, 42. When McCurtis’ counsel responded that the jury should also be able to decide whether what McCurtis did was reckless, the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: And what [differs for] your client is ․ there was evidence ․ that came out that he said I want to be [the] one that kills [Ward].

[McCurtis’ COUNSEL]: And the jury is free to disregard that.

THE COURT: And they may, and you may argue that[.]

Id. at 40.

[15] Ultimately, the trial court denied McCurtis’ request to instruct the jury that it could convict him of reckless homicide but did give Jackson's proposed reckless homicide instruction. The jury found McCurtis guilty of murder and Jackson guilty of reckless homicide. The court entered a judgment of conviction against McCurtis for murder.

Discussion and Decision

[16] On appeal, McCurtis argues the trial “court committed reversible error in refusing to give” his proposed reckless homicide instruction. Appellant's Brief at 11. Where, as here, the court rejects a proposed lesser-included instruction after finding the evidence presented at trial did not warrant it, “we review its ruling only for an abuse of discretion.” Evans v. State, 727 N.E.2d 1072, 1081 (Ind. 2000).⁸ An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's “decision was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if it misapplied the law.” Collins v. State, 252 N.E.3d 971, 976 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (citing M.D. v. State, 108 N.E.3d 301, 303 (Ind. 2018)).

[17] We apply an analytical framework established by our Supreme Court in Wright v. State to determine whether the record supported giving a lesser-included jury instruction. 658 N.E.2d 563, 566-67 (Ind. 1995). Under Wright, we first determine whether the offense described in the defendant's proposed instruction was either inherently or factually included in the charged offense. Id. If it was, we then examine whether the record shows a “serious evidentiary dispute about the element or elements distinguishing the greater from the lesser offense” such that, “in view of this dispute, a jury could conclude that the lesser offense was committed but not the greater[.]” Id. at 567. When there is a serious evidentiary dispute, “it is reversible error for a trial court not to give an instruction, when requested, on the ․ lesser offense.” Id.

[18] Here, McCurtis requested that the jury be instructed on reckless homicide, which our Supreme Court has consistently held is “an inherently included offense of [m]urder[.]” Id.; see also Webb v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1103, 1106 (Ind. 2012); Dearman v. State, 743 N.E.2d 757, 760 (Ind. 2001) (explaining that “[t]he only element distinguishing murder from reckless homicide is the defendant's state of mind”). Accordingly, we focus our analysis on whether there was a serious evidentiary dispute enabling the jury to conclude that McCurtis committed reckless homicide but not murder. See Evans, 727 N.E.2d at 1082 (proceeding directly to the final step of the Wright analysis because “[r]eckless homicide is an inherently included offense of murder”) (emphasis in original).

[19] We agree with the trial court that McCurtis’ statements of intent left no serious evidentiary dispute that to the extent he participated in beating Ward, he did so with the intent to kill. We find the circumstances of this case akin to Evans, where the defendant was convicted of murder after he killed his ex-girlfriend's new boyfriend. 727 N.E.2d at 1076. On appeal, Evans argued the trial court erred in refusing to give his proposed jury instructions on involuntary manslaughter and reckless homicide. Id. at 1080. Our Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning:

The critical element distinguishing involuntary manslaughter from murder in this case is intent – the intent to kill or the intent to batter. And the record before us reveals no serious evidentiary dispute concerning whether Defendant intended to kill or batter [the boyfriend]․

In regard to Defendant's intent to kill, after the close of evidence, the trial judge questioned whether “involuntary manslaughter [was] still appropriate” given Defendant's “professed intent to kill” while proclaiming, “We're all going to die here today.” In ultimately rejecting the instruction on involuntary manslaughter, the trial court stated that this professed intent to kill “excludes any arguable grounds to suggest that he didn't have an intent to kill.” We agree with the trial court[.] ․

Defendant also tendered an instruction on reckless homicide, . . which the trial court refused. The only distinguishing feature in the elements of murder and reckless homicide is the mens rea required of each offense․

Following a similar analysis as presented above, we again note that the record reveals no serious evidentiary dispute concerning the mens rea element. Therefore, we agree with the trial court when it ruled that Defendant's professed intent to kill “excludes any arguable grounds to suggest that he didn't have an intent to kill,” and thus “[r]eckless [was] out too.” The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give the instruction.

Id. at 1081-82.

[20] McCurtis attempts to distinguish the facts of his case from Evans by arguing that there, a single defendant was accused of committing the crime while here, it is not clear whether McCurtis, Jackson, or both inflicted fatal injuries to Ward. We note, however, that the only difference between murder and reckless homicide is not whether the defendant engaged in an act that caused death, but rather what his state of mind was when he did so. See Etienne v. State, 716 N.E.2d 457, 462 (Ind. 1999) (“[R]eckless homicide occurs when the defendant ‘recklessly’ kills another human being and murder occurs when the killing is done ‘knowingly’ or ‘intentionally.’ ” (quoting Ind. Code §§ 35-42-1-1(1), 35-42-1-5 ⁹ )).¹⁰

[21] Thus, to find McCurtis guilty of either murder or reckless homicide, the jury necessarily had to find that he did in fact cause Ward's death. In other words, had the jury concluded that McCurtis did not participate in Ward's beating to such an extent that he inflicted a fatal injury, it could not find him guilty of murder or reckless homicide, because an essential element of both crimes is that the defendant “kill[ed] another human being[.]” I.C. §§ 35-42-1-1(1), 35-42-1-5. This lends further support to the State's position that—to the extent the jury concluded that McCurtis caused Ward's death—his “expression of intent left no evidentiary dispute as to whether he committed [murder] so no instruction for [reckless homicide] was necessary.” Appellee's Br. at 17.¹¹

[22] We do not agree with McCurtis’ argument that “it is impossible to reconcile the trial court's” decision to give Jackson's proposed instruction but not McCurtis’. Appellant's Br. at 24. As the court explained when McCurtis’ trial counsel raised this same argument below, what differed between Jackson and McCurtis was not the evidence regarding the extent of their participation in the beating, but rather that McCurtis “said [he] want[ed] to be [the] one that kill[ed]” Ward, while Jackson did not make any statements expressing a similar intent. Tr. Vol. 5 at 40. Thus, the jury could have reasonably inferred that Jackson's actions were merely reckless but could not do the same for McCurtis. This is because, as the Court expressed in Evans, a “[d]efendant's professed intent to kill excludes any arguable grounds to suggest that he didn't have an intent to kill[.]” 727 N.E.2d at 1082 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Conclusion

[23] For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give McCurtis’ proffered reckless homicide instruction, as there was no serious evidentiary dispute that McCurtis’ actions were intentional, not reckless. Accordingly, we affirm McCurtis’ conviction.

[24] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Jackson does not participate in this appeal.

3.   McCurtis is not biologically related to Navarrete, but he “would always [ ] say that [they] were family because” they lived in adjacent units in “the same house[.]” Tr. Vol. 3 at 187.

4.   During oral argument, McCurtis’ counsel correctly noted that Navarrete did not testify during her direct examination that she heard McCurtis say he “want[ed] to be the one to finish [Ward] off[.]” Tr. Vol. 3 at 219. Instead, that statement came into evidence during Navarrete's cross examination in the following exchange with Jackson's attorney:Q And then [McCurtis] would occasionally stop and scream some stuff; is that correct?A Correct.Q Like put him in the bathtub and drown him, but don't kill him. I want to be the one to finish him off; is that correct?A Yes.Id. at 218-19. We are convinced that by answering counsel's question in the affirmative, Navarrete indicated that she had in fact heard McCurtis say that he “want[ed] to be the one to finish him off[.]” Id. at 219. To the extent McCurtis believed that Navarrete did not intend to testify to that fact, he could have asked her to clarify or correct her answer during re-cross examination, but he declined the opportunity to do so.

5.   A police officer who testified at the joint trial described agonal breathing assomeone's last breaths. It's when your body is no longer functioning the way it should be and it's still trying to work. However, the breathing comes across as being irregular, not normal․ That's a big sign that [a] person is very badly injured and in need of [ ] immediate medical assistance.Tr. Vol. 4 at 14.

6.   At trial, McCurtis argued that Ward was not killed by his actions, but rather by negligent medical care he received at the hospital, including a misplaced breathing tube which may have punctured a lung. However, a forensic pathologist from the Marion County Coroner's Office testified that the rib fractures Ward sustained from his beating or the chest compressions performed by paramedics while en route to the hospital could have caused the lung puncture. He also testified that the puncture may not have caused Ward's death because even before he suffered that injury, “his condition was already bad.” Tr. Vol. 4 at 142.

7.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).

8.   In contrast, when the trial court rejects an instruction on a legal basis, rather than an evidentiary one, its decision is reviewed de novo. Evans, 727 N.E.2d at 1081. Here, McCurtis and the State agree the abuse of discretion standard applies.

9.   Though Etienne cited the 1998 version of Indiana Code section 35-42-1-5, the amendments effective July 1, 2014, made no substantive changes to the statute. Compare I.C. § 35-42-1-5 (1998) (amended 2014) (classifying reckless homicide as a Class C felony) with I.C. § 35-42-1-5 (2025) (classifying reckless homicide as a Level 5 felony).

10.   A defendant kills recklessly when he takes an action “in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and the disregard involves a substantial deviation from the acceptable standards of conduct.” Etienne, 716 N.E.2d at 462 (citing I.C. § 35-41-2-2(c)). In contrast, a defendant kills knowingly when he is “aware of a ‘high probability’ that he ․ is doing so.” Id. (quoting I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b)). And a defendant kills intentionally when “it is his conscious objective to do so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(a).

11.   To be clear, we disagree with the State's position that the jury could have found McCurtis guilty of murder as Jackson's accomplice under Indiana's accomplice liability statute, Indiana Code section 35-41-2-4, which provides that “[a] person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense[.]” The State could have argued at trial that even if the jury did not find that McCurtis personally struck Ward, it could still find him guilty of murder because his instructions induced Jackson to do so. See, e.g., Haskett v. State, 467 N.E.2d 32, 35 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (affirming attempted robbery conviction when the defendant's instructions were the impetus for his co-conspirator's actions), reh'g denied, trans. denied. But the State did not do so. Indeed, though the jury was instructed that it could find Jackson guilty under a theory of accomplice liability, no such instruction was given for McCurtis. See Appellant's Appendix Vol. 3 at 27 (instructing the jury that before finding Jackson guilty of murder, it must find that the State proved he knowingly aided McCurtis in killing Ward).

DeBoer, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.