BAYLIFF v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Danny Bayliff molested his wife's granddaughter S.O. on multiple occasions when she was six and seven years old. S.O. later disclosed the abuse, and Bayliff was charged with and convicted of child molesting after he entered into a plea agreement. Bayliff's plea agreement capped any executed portion of his sentence at six years but otherwise left his sentence to the trial court's discretion. The trial court sentenced Bayliff to nine years with five years executed to the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”), one year executed on home detention, and three years suspended to probation. Bayliff now appeals, raising one issue for our review: Whether Bayliff's sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] At all times relevant to this case, Bayliff was married to S.O.’s grandmother, and S.O. regularly visited their home. On September 3, 2023, S.O. returned home after one such visit and told her mother that S.O. and Bayliff had a secret. When asked what the secret was, S.O. said that Bayliff touched her vagina with his hand while she was sitting on his lap and this had happened multiple times over the past year. During a forensic interview, S.O. described the encounters as Bayliff's hand touching the outside of her vagina, inside her underwear, and that, on at least one occasion, Bayliff penetrated her vagina with his finger. After each encounter, Bayliff told S.O. it was a secret.

[4] S.O.’s parents reported the molestation that same day. When law enforcement officers interviewed Bayliff about S.O.’s allegations, he admitted to “rubb[ing] around [ ] the outside of [S.O.’s] vagina” and that he knew it was wrong. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 58. Bayliff claimed the devil “got ahold of him,” id. at 57, and he did not know whether S.O. wanted him to touch her, but “she didn't try to pull it (his hand) out or anything,” id. at 58.

[5] Bayliff was charged with and pled guilty to one count of child molesting as a Level 4 felony.¹ Under the terms of Bayliff's plea agreement, his sentence was left to the trial court's discretion, except that any executed portion of his sentence could not exceed six years. The trial court accepted the plea agreement and after a sentencing hearing, ordered Bayliff to serve a nine-year sentence, with six years executed -- five years at the DOC and one year on home detention, and three years suspended to probation. Bayliff was also ordered to register as a sex offender. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Bayliff's Sentence Is Not Inappropriate Under Appellate Rule 7(B)

[6] Bayliff argues his sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B) and should be revised.² The Indiana Constitution authorizes us to independently review and revise a trial court's sentencing decision. Russell v, State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 855–56 (Ind. 2024) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6; Jackson v. State, 145 N.E.3d 783, 784 (Ind. 2020)). That authority is implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), which permits us to revise a sentence if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, [we] find[ ] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1092 (Ind. 2025) (quoting McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020)).

[7] Our Supreme Court has explained our role under Appellate Rule 7(B) as follows:

“[O]ur constitutional authority to review and revise sentences boils down to our collective sense of what is appropriate,” Cramer [v. State], 240 N.E.3d [693,] 698 [(Ind. 2024)] (quoting Taylor v. State, 86 N.E.3d 157, 165 (Ind. 2017)), an act that, importantly, is reserved for “exceptional” cases, id. (citing Gibson v. State, 43 N.E.3d 231, 241 (Ind. 2015)). Determining a sentence's appropriateness thus “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” McCain, 148 N.E.3d at 985.

Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1092.

[8] Additionally, the defendant bears the burden of proving that “his or her sentence has met the inappropriateness standard of review.” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1092 (quoting Cramer, 240 N.E.3d at 698). And because sentencing “ ‘is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference,’ a trial court's sentencing decision will generally prevail ‘unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense ․ and the defendant's character ․’ ” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)).

[9] In reviewing the defendant's sentence, “we are not limited to the mitigators and aggravators found by the trial court,” Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 4 (Ind. 2014), and we “focus on the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count,” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)). Similarly, a defendant “need not ‘necessarily prove’ that the sentence is inappropriate on both counts” so long as “one of the prongs weighs heavily in favor” of revising the defendant's sentence. Id. at 126–27 (quoting Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)) (emphasis in original). Nonetheless, “to the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Id. at 127 (citing Connor, 58 N.E.3d at 220).

[10] A trial judge may impose any sentence within the statutory range without regard to the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 489 (Ind. 2007), as amended (July 10, 2007), decision clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). When considering the nature of the offense, we start with the advisory sentence. Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 4 (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 494). Here, Bayliff was convicted of and sentenced on one count of child molesting as a Level 4 felony. “A person who commits a Level 4 felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between two (2) and twelve (12) years, with the advisory sentence being six (6) years.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5 (emphasis added). The trial court sentenced Bayliff to a total of nine years with five years executed at the DOC, one year executed on home detention, and three years suspended to probation.

[11] Next, we consider “whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense committed by the defendant that makes it different from the ‘typical’ offense accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory sentence.” T.A.D.W. v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1205, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Holloway v. State, 950 N.E.2d 803, 806–07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)), as amended (May 26, 2023). We also consider whether the offense was “accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality.” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1093 (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)).

[12] As set forth in more detail above, Bayliff—a 74-year-old man—abused his position of trust by repeatedly molesting S.O., his wife's granddaughter, while she was 6 and 7 years old. By warning S.O. not to tell anyone about the abuse, Bayliff signaled his knowledge that his conduct was a serious fracture from social norms and placed S.O. in the difficult position of choosing to reveal the abuse or maintain her relationship with Bayliff. Bayliff also blamed S.O. for the molestations, claiming S.O. put his hand between her legs or, alternatively, that she did not “try to pull [his hand] out.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 58. Further, as the State points out, a single instance of fondling is sufficient to support Bayliff's conviction, and Bayliff admitted to fondling S.O. multiple times. We therefore decline to accept Bayliff's characterization of the offense as “no more egregious than a typical offense of Child Molesting as a Level 4 Felony.” Appellant's Br. at 11.

[13] In considering the character of the offender, “we engage in a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities,” T.A.D.W., 51 N.E.3d at 1211 (citing Aslinger v. State, 2 N.E.3d 84, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), clarified on other grounds on reh'g), including whether the defendant has “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character,” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1093 (quoting Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122).

[14] Bayliff's presentence investigation report reveals that he does not have a prior criminal history, which he argues is a “positive reflection on his character,” Appellant's Br. at 14. The report also shows Bayliff was medically retired from the United States Marine Corps and that he maintained steady employment at Chrysler until his retirement. While these qualities are commendable, they are not substantially virtuous or indicative of persistent examples of good behavior in light of the following: Bayliff (1) molested S.O. multiple times; (2) did not express any remorse for the impact his conduct had on S.O.; (3) admitted to previously “forc[ing him]self on women,” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 95; (4) previously touched his wife's daughter-in-law inappropriately and without her permission; (5) blamed S.O., claiming that “she started putting [Bayliff's] hand between her legs outside of her panties” and that she did this three or four times, id. at 116; and (6) blamed “Satan,” whom he claimed “talk[ed him] into doing this terrible thing,” for Bayliff molesting S.O., id. at 117. Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that Bayliff has produced compelling evidence demonstrating that the nature of his offense or his character renders his sentence inappropriate. See Lane, 232 N.E.3d 119; Russell, 234 N.E.3d at 855–56. Bayliff's sentence is not inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B). We therefore affirm the trial court.

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(b).

2.   Bayliff argues that only the “five year executed portion to [DOC]” is inappropriate. We deny this request to “focus on the trees” in this manner and choose to review the total sentence—that is, the “forest.” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024).

Felix, Judge.

Brown, J., and Scheele, J., concur.