SMITH v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] William J. Smith appeals his convictions for Level 6 felony domestic battery and Level 6 felony intimidation. He also appeals his sentence. Smith raises two issues for our review, which we restate as follows:

1. Whether the trial court's explanation of why it found Smith's closing argument unpersuasive demonstrates a due-process error.

2. Whether Smith's sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In December 2023, Smith and A.C. were in a romantic relationship. Smith was homeless and living out of his car. A.C. lived in an apartment in Goshen with her seven-year-old daughter, L.M.

[4] In the evening hours of December 7, Smith informed A.C. that he needed to have his car towed because “it wasn't drivable.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 65. A.C. met Smith near his car and contacted a tow company; she paid $150 in cash, which was “a lot” for her, to have Smith's car towed to her apartment. Id. at 146. Smith then accused A.C. of “having some type of relationship with the tow truck driver,” a random “guy walking around the park” where Smith had had his car, and the driver of a vehicle next to them on the way back to A.C.’s apartment. Id. at 65-66. A.C. had never met any of those men before.

[5] After having arrived at A.C.’s apartment, Smith got into his car and drove away, which upset A.C. because the car was not supposed to be drivable. He was gone for about five minutes before coming back. When he returned, he was “still angry” with A.C. Id. at 68. Inside her apartment, he “grabbed [her] purse” and ran toward the door. Id. A.C. “had everything” in her purse and also grabbed it. Id. Smith then “shoved” A.C. “up against the wall,” which hurt A.C.’s shoulder. Id. L.M. was in the same room at the time and “was screaming” for the two adults “to stop.” Id. at 70. Smith then “let go of the purse” and again “pushed” A.C. Id. at 73.

[6] Smith exited the apartment by going into a garage area, at which point A.C. locked all the doors to her apartment as well as her car. A.C. did not immediately contact law enforcement, however, “out of fear that [her] daughter would be taken” out of her home. Id. at 74. For the next three hours, Smith “tried to talk” to A.C. through her doors; he was “so loud the neighbors could hear him.” Id. A.C. then contacted law enforcement, and responding officers arrested Smith.

[7] The State charged Smith in relevant part with Level 6 felony domestic battery and Level 6 felony intimidation. A.C. and Smith both testified at the ensuing bench trial. During closing argument, Smith's counsel attacked A.C.’s credibility as follows:

[A.C.] testified that she was afraid to call the police because she didn't want to have her children taken away. I don't understand that, how she would think that her children would be taken away if someone actually did shove her with their forearm. It doesn't quite make sense to me, but that's what she testified to.

․ [She] testified that she paid $150 to a tow driver, and it's a lot of money to her, which it's a lot of money to everyone, but if she paid $150 to a tow driver, why would Mr. Smith take her purse? The State hasn't even addressed that issue ․

Id. at 160.

[8] Following the parties’ closing arguments, the court pronounced Smith guilty of the two Level 6 felony charges. In doing so, the court explained that it found A.C.’s testimony to be credible. The court added:

[S]ome of the dynamics and some of the events that took place while out of context of the domestic violence world make zero sense. Within the context of the domestic violence situation [they] are extraordinarily consistent. The taking of the purse or the attempted taking the purse where presumably there is a phone, keys, ID, that happens more often than this Court would like to see.

The fact that there was fear that the child would be taken from her, unfortunately I have seen situations and I'm aware of situations where a person calls for assistance from law enforcement only to have the investigation turned on that person who called for assistance. We just had a trial a couple of weeks ago where that happened. So I'm aware that that happens and that there is that fear in the community․

Id. at 167-68.

[9] Following a sentencing hearing, the court ordered Smith to serve two years executed for each conviction, to be served consecutively for an aggregate sentence of four years. This appeal ensued.

1. The trial court's explanation of why it did not find Smith's closing argument persuasive does not demonstrate a due-process violation.

[10] On appeal, Smith first argues that the trial court committed fundamental error when it purportedly relied on information from “outside the evidence” when it found Smith guilty. Appellant's Br. at 10. The parties agree that this issue is subject to appellate review under the fundamental error doctrine. To demonstrate fundamental error, an appellant must show that the alleged error “made a fair trial impossible or constituted a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.” Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 652 (Ind. 2018) (quotation marks omitted). Fundamental error is “extremely narrow” and “encompasses only errors so blatant that the trial judge should have acted independently to correct the situation.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

[11] Smith complains about the trial court's comments regarding domestic violence, which comments the trial court made in pronouncing its judgment against Smith and in response to Smith's closing argument. We agree with the State that the court's comments do not reflect reliance on information from outside the record. At most, the court's comments reflect the court's own experiences, which is appropriate for the fact-finder to rely on in assessing the credibility of witnesses. See Halsema v. State, 823 N.E.2d 668, 673-74 (Ind. 2005). Accordingly, the court's comments do not demonstrate an impermissible consideration, let alone a due-process violation.

2. Smith's sentence is not inappropriate.

[12] Smith also argues that his aggregate sentence of four years executed is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may modify a sentence that we find is “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Making this determination “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).

[13] However, sentence modification under Rule 7(B) is reserved for “a rare and exceptional case.” Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 612 (Ind. 2018) (per curiam). Thus, when conducting this review, we will defer to the sentence imposed by the trial court unless the defendant demonstrates compelling evidence that portrays the nature of the offenses and his character in a positive light, such as showing a lack of brutality in the offenses or showing substantial virtuous character traits. Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[14] The sentencing range for Smith's Level 6 felonies is six months to two-and-one-half years, with an advisory term of one year. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b) (2023). In imposing consecutive two-year sentences for his two convictions, the court relied on Smith's significant criminal history and the fact that the instant domestic battery conviction is Smith's sixth battery conviction. The court also relied on Smith's historical failure to take advantage of “programming or alternative sanctions,” such as community supervision. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 178. The court did not find any mitigating circumstances.

[15] We cannot say that Smith's aggregate four-year sentence requires revision. Regarding his character, Smith has fourteen prior convictions, including five prior battery convictions. Regarding the nature of the offenses, he manipulated A.C. into helping him with his car; falsely accused her of having affairs; and then accosted her in her apartment and in the presence of her young daughter. Further, he does not direct us to any compelling evidence that portrays his character or the nature of the offenses in a positive light. We therefore cannot say that his sentence is inappropriate.

Conclusion

[16] For all of these reasons, we affirm Smith's convictions and sentence.

[17] Affirmed.

Mathias, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Pyle, J., concur.