Ivan Juhan Jones, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Following a jury trial, Ivan Juhan Jones (“Jones”) was convicted of Level 5 felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated (“OVWI”) causing serious bodily injury ¹ and found to be a habitual vehicular substance offender (“HVSO”)² and a habitual offender.³ Jones now appeals his convictions and sentence enhancements, presenting the following two restated issues for our review:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain statements, which Jones argues were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); and

II. Whether—as the State agrees—remand is necessary to vacate rather than merge certain judgments of conviction.

[2] We affirm Jones's conviction for Level 5 felony OVWI causing serious bodily injury and the HVSO and habitual offender enhancements, and remand with instructions to vacate the remaining convictions that were subject to merger.

Facts and Procedural History 4

[3] This case stems from a vehicle collision that took place around 5:00 p.m. on January 7, 2023. On appeal, Jones concedes he ran a red light traveling through the intersection of State Road 39 and U.S. 40 in Clayton, Indiana. His vehicle crashed into a vehicle driven by Christopher Wheat (“Wheat”), who was severely injured in the collision. Jones sustained injuries as well.

[4] A bystander called 911, and three officers from the Hendricks County Sheriff's Department responded—Deputy Josh Cain (“Deputy Cain”), Deputy Zach Elliott (“Deputy Elliott”), and Corporal Nicholas Korpal (“Corporal Korpal”). When Corporal Korpal arrived, he approached Jones, who was seated in his vehicle with the door open. Bodycam footage reveals that he was seated sideways in the driver's seat with his feet swung outside the vehicle and a deployed airbag resting against his midsection.

[5] Corporal Korpal initiated the conversation by saying, “You alright?” State's Ex 10A at 00:11. Jones said no. Corporal Korpal then asked, “What happened?” Id. at 00:13. Jones stammered as he responded, saying, “I think I'm, I'm, I'm injured here.” Id. at 00:14–00:17. Corporal Korpal said, “Okay.” Id. at 00:18. Corporal Korpal then asked, “Where [are] you coming from?” Id. at 00:20. Jones told Corporal Korpal that he was traveling westbound from Plainfield. Corporal Korpal asked his name, and Jones responded, “Ivan.” Id. at 00:37. At that point, Corporal Korpal assured him that medics would be coming soon. Corporal Korpal then asked where his billfold was. Jones said it was in his pocket. At this point, Jones's right arm was positioned behind him. Corporal Korpal asked whether he could move his right hand. Jones said he was unable to do so. He stammered a bit and again said he was injured. Corporal Korpal asked if he could move his toes. Jones said that he could. Corporal Korpal observed multiple beer cans in the front seat area of Jones's vehicle, including an open beer can in the center console. Corporal Korpal also smelled the odor of alcohol emanating from Jones's person.

[6] Corporal Korpal asked Jones where in Plainfield he was traveling from. He repeated the word “Plainfield” and said something inaudible. Id. at 01:20–:23. Corporal Korpal then said: “What? Plainfield, that's it? Mm-kay.” Id. at 01:24–:26. Corporal Korpal retrieved Jones's wallet from his front pocket. He then pulled out Jones's driver's license and asked him, “Where do you live at?” Id. at 01:36. Jones provided an address. Corporal Korpal reassured him medics would be arriving soon, then walked away and began speaking with a bystander. An ambulance arrived, and Corporal Korpal told emergency personnel that Jones's arm was pinned behind him, and he was reporting he was hurt. Corporal Korpal also said: “ETOH too, by the way.”⁵ Id. at 03:37.

[7] Corporal Korpal spoke with other witnesses, then walked over to Deputy Cain with Jones's driver's license and said: “He had beer cans in there, and you can kind of smell it.” Id. at 05:05–07. Deputy Cain went to his police vehicle and ran Jones's information. Next, Deputy Cain got out of his vehicle and approached Jones, who “was being escorted from his vehicle by medics” and was “on a gurney [being escorted] over to the ambulance where he would be receiving medical treatment.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 116. Deputy Cain would later testify that he approached Jones because he wanted “to get his statement of how the crash occurred.” Id. As Deputy Cain approached Jones, he initiated the conversation by asking Jones, “How's it going?” State's Ex. 4 at 00:05. Deputy Cain's bodycam footage reflects that, at that point, Jones was strapped on a gurney, which was positioned just outside the ambulance. Two emergency medical technicians (“EMTs”) were standing nearby. As Deputy Cain neared the gurney, he asked Jones, “Can you tell me what happened?” Id. at 00:09. Jones said, “Huh?” Id. at 00:10. Deputy Cain then reached the gurney, stood beside it, and again asked, “Can you tell me what happened?” Id. at 00:11. The gurney was being pushed into the ambulance when Jones responded, stating, “Well, I think, I think I ran the red. I, I mean it was yellow.” Id. at 00:16–19. As a medic pushed the back of the gurney into the ambulance, the EMT said to Deputy Cain, “You can smell some ETOH.” Id. at 00:20–21. By that point, Deputy Cain had also smelled the odor of alcohol on Jones's breath.

[8] As Deputy Cain got into the ambulance, Jones said, “It was yellow.” Id. at 00:23. Deputy Cain responded, “It was yellow, you think?” Id. at 00:24–26. Jones responded, “It was yellow. You know how when you run through the yellow light, it turns red?” Id. at 00:24–00:32. An EMT stood next to Jones, who continued speaking: “It was yellow, so I thought I'd go on through.” Id. at 00:37–:43. Deputy Cain then said, “Okay. What injuries do you have?” Id. at 00:43–:45. Jones said, “I have injuries right here.” Id. at 00:48–:52. As he responded, a different EMT not captured on video interjected and reported on Jones's injuries, noting that his arm appeared “banged up.” Id. at 00:50.

[9] Jones told Deputy Cain that the injuries around his midsection seemed to be the worst, at which point the EMT working nearby stepped closer to Jones while putting on gloves, then took a look at him and said the injuries were most likely caused by an airbag. Jones again referred to a yellow light, and the EMT said, “Who ran the yellow light, you?” Id. at 01:17. Jones said, “Yeah.” Id. at 01:19. As the EMT hooked Jones up to medical equipment, Deputy Cain asked for his phone number, which he provided. At that point, another EMT stepped into view and conferred with the other EMT. Deputy Cain then said, “All right, [Jones]. How, how much have you had to drink today?” Id. at 01:36–:38. Deputy Cain added: “I mean, I can smell it.” Id. at 01:39–:40. Jones made incriminating statements, responding that, over the course of the day, he had probably consumed a half-pint of Fireball.⁶ Id. at 01:40–2:05. At that point—which was approximately two minutes into the encounter—Deputy Cain began conducting the horizontal gaze nystagmus (“HGN”) test, which took approximately one minute and revealed six out of six clues indicative of alcohol impairment. Deputy Cain next read Jones the Indiana implied consent advisement prior to seeking his consent for blood testing. Jones stated he would consent to a chemical test and Deputy Cain advised that he would meet Jones at the hospital for the blood draw.

[10] Deputy Cain later met with Jones at the hospital, where he was about to undergo a blood draw. Deputy Cain explained the process, and Jones signed a consent form. Deputy Cain then read Miranda warnings to Jones, who said he was willing to speak with Deputy Cain. He then told Deputy Cain that he had been traveling from Payless Liquors and “drank a couple beers,” telling Deputy Cain he drank a shot of Fireball before driving and, while driving, “popped the tab” on a 24-ounce Coors beer. State's Ex. 5 at 05:20–06:50. Jones added that he did not think that he was intoxicated. Id. at 06:50–:59.

[11] Jones's blood was sent out for laboratory testing. The laboratory results indicated that, at the time his blood was drawn, Jones had a blood alcohol concentration level of .228 grams per 100 milliliters of blood, or the equivalent of between “seven and ten standard drinks.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 177. The forensic scientist who tested the blood explained that, based on Jones's BAC level when the blood was drawn, his BAC level at the time of the vehicle collision would have been “anywhere between .222 to .279.” Id. at 178.

[12] The State charged Jones with Count 1 – Class A misdemeanor OVWI endangering a person; Count 2 – Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle with an ACE of .15 or more; Count 3 – Level 5 felony OVWI causing serious bodily injury; and Count 4 – Level 5 felony causing serious bodily injury when operating a motor vehicle with an ACE of .08 or more. The State also sought HVSO and habitual offender sentence enhancements. A jury trial was scheduled for July 9, 2024. A week or so before trial, Jones filed a Motion to Suppress Statements, seeking to suppress statements he made to Deputy Cain “at the scene while ․ strapped to a gurney in an ambulance and unable to leave[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 93. He argued the statements were subject to suppression because Deputy Cain failed to issue Miranda warnings. Jones filed a separate motion to suppress the blood test results. The trial court held a hearing on July 8, 2024, where it denied Jones's motions as untimely.

[13] A jury trial commenced on July 9, 2024. When the State attempted to elicit testimony from Deputy Cain about how he approached Jones “to get his statement of how the crash occurred,” Jones objected “to the custodial interrogation ․ without being properly Mirandized[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 116. The trial court overruled the objection, concluding that Jones “was not in legal custody” when he spoke to Deputy Cain. Id. at 117. At trial, the State ultimately presented testimony from the responding officers, the forensic scientist, and multiple individuals who witnessed the collision. At one point, Deputy Cain was asked whether he believed that Jones “had the ability to leave once [Deputy Cain] began questioning him” in the ambulance. Id. at 145. Deputy Cain responded: “Absolutely. He could have said he didn't want medical treatment and walked out of the ambulance.” Id. At trial, the State also presented testimony from the victim, Wheat. Collectively, the witnesses’ testimony indicated that Jones was responsible for the collision because he ran a red light. The forensic scientist explained the effects of alcohol as it metabolizes and testified that, based on Jones's BAC, “[i]t could be difficult for him if he's impaired to judge the distance between him and [a yellow light]” and to “make that decision, can I actually make this [traffic light?]” Id. at 179.

[14] Following the guilt phase of the trial, the jury found Jones guilty of all counts. The trial court entered judgment of conviction upon all counts. Following two enhancement phases, the jury found that Jones was both an HVSO and a habitual offender. The trial court entered judgment on the enhancements and set the matter for sentencing.

[15] The trial court held the sentencing hearing on August 5, 2024, where the State argued that the four counts “cannot be sentenced individually and any sentence has to run concurrent.” Tr. Vol 3 p. 40. The trial court asked if the counts could be merged, and the State answered affirmatively. The State next argued that the sentence enhancements “cannot stack as in run consecutive, but they can run concurrent.” Id. The court ultimately merged “Count[s] 1, 2, and 4 ․ into Count 3,” which was Level 5 felony OVWI causing serious bodily injury. Id. at 44. The trial court imposed six years for the Level 5 felony, seven years for the HVSO enhancement, and six years for the habitual offender enhancement. The enhancements were to run concurrently, resulting in an aggregate sentence of thirteen years in the Indiana Department of Correction. Jones now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Admission of Evidence

[16] Jones claims the trial court abused its discretion in admitting statements he made to Deputy Cain while strapped to a gurney, where Deputy Cain did not first give Jones Miranda warnings. Statements obtained in violation of Miranda are generally inadmissible. State v. Hicks, 882 N.E.2d 238, 241 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). In general, we review the trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Risinger v. State, 137 N.E.3d 292, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. Rulings involving Miranda present “a mixed question of fact and law.” State v. E.R., 123 N.E.3d 675, 679 (Ind. 2019). To the extent the trial court's ruling turns on a determination of fact, we will not reweigh the evidence and will consider conflicting evidence in a light most favorable to the ruling. Id. To the extent the ruling turns on a question of law, we review the question de novo. Id.; cf. Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014).

[17] The Miranda decision “adopted the now-famous ‘Miranda warnings.’ ” B.A. v. State, 100 N.E.3d 225, 230 (Ind. 2018) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444). These warnings “apply to suspects under custodial interrogation, who must be told that they have ‘a right to remain silent, that any statement [they do] make may be used as evidence against [them], and that [they have] a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.’ ” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444). Miranda warnings ultimately “safeguard the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by warding off police coercion,” id., with the specific warnings designed to “overcom[e] the inherently coercive and police-dominated atmosphere of custodial interrogation.” Gibson v. State, 733 N.E.2d 945, 952 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); see also B.A., 100 N.E.3d at 230 (acknowledging that “ ‘the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals,’ ․ so they may be psychologically coerced into speaking.” (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455)). An atmosphere is police dominated if it inherently undermines a person's will to resist and compels him to speak where he would not normally do so. Wells v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1256, 1260 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied, cert. denied.

[18] A person is entitled to Miranda warnings before law enforcement conducts a “custodial interrogation.” White v. State, 772 N.E.2d 408, 412 (Ind. 2002). Interrogation means “express questioning or its functional equivalent,” i.e., “words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–01 (1980). Here, the State does not dispute an interrogation occurred; rather, the focus is whether Jones was in custody when Deputy Cain questioned him at the scene.

[19] It is worth pointing out that “[a] person stopped by police, while ‘seized’ and momentarily not free to go, is ordinarily not considered in custody.” Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. 2009). As our Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he line between ordinary investigative detentions and full-blown custodial interrogations” is determined by “examining the circumstances for objectively overpowering, coercive, or restraining police behavior[.]” Id. Indeed, “custody” is “a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion.” State v. Diego, 169 N.E.3d 113, 117 (Ind. 2021) (emphasis removed) (quoting Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 508–09 (2012)). In this context, custody means that a person's freedom of action has been “curtailed to a ‘degree associated with [a] formal arrest.’ ” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam)); see also id. at 442 (looking to whether there was “the functional equivalent of formal arrest”).

[20] To determine whether a person was in custody, we apply an objective test, “asking whether a reasonable person under the same circumstances would believe themselves to be ‘under arrest or not free to resist the entreaties of the police.’ ” Torres v. State, 673 N.E.2d 472, 474 (Ind. 1996) (quoting Jones v. State, 655 N.E.2d 49, 55 (Ind. 1995)); Albrecht v. State, 737 N.E.2d 719, 727 (Ind. 2000). In analyzing custody, courts must examine “the totality of objective circumstances[.]” E.R., 123 N.E.3d at 680. Relevant circumstances include “the location, duration, and character of the questioning; statements made during the questioning; the number of law-enforcement officers present; the extent of police control over the environment; the degree of physical restraint; and how the interview begins and ends.” Id.

[21] Jones claims “the trial court erred in admitting statements [he] made while he was not free to leave and subject to custodial interrogation without first being advised of his Miranda rights.” Appellant's Br. p. 8. Jones points out that he “was questioned about what he drank before the accident while he was being treated by medics and not free to leave.” Id. He argues that “a reasonable person in [his] position would not have felt free to leave and would not have felt free to resist answering Deputy Cain's questions.” Id. at 10. Jones claims that several factors indicate that he was in custody. He notes that he “was injured in the car accident he caused” and “placed on a gurney by EMTs and placed in the back of an ambulance.” Id. at 8. He adds that he “was strapped to a gurney and Deputy Cain was standing over him blocking the exit of the ambulance.” Id. at 8–9. According to Jones, this restraint and positioning created a situation where he was “not free to leave the ambulance while Deputy Cain blocked the exit” and was “subject to custodial interrogation.” Id. at 10.

[22] Although there was evidence Deputy Cain was positioned between Jones and the ambulance doors, it is not as though the questioning took place in a police-dominated environment. Rather, Deputy Cain was the only officer present, and the conversation took place in a relatively public area—in front of EMTs who felt free to voice their opinions and observations. Moreover, Deputy Cain was not responsible for strapping Jones to the gurney or placing him in the ambulance—those were the actions of third parties not under the control of the police. Furthermore, the police encounter was relatively brief and involved the types of questions that might be posed during a routine traffic stop where there was suspicion of impairment. Based on the totality of the circumstances, Deputy Cain's questioning of Jones does not strike us as a custodial interrogation. Cf. State v. Harris, 581 S.W.3d 711, 713 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019) (concluding that a defendant restrained in an ambulance was not in custody when subjected to similar questioning). Indeed, although Deputy Cain's decision to question Jones in the ambulance might have been opportunistic, we cannot say the circumstances presented a serious danger of coercion tantamount to the functional equivalent of formal arrest.

[23] In any case, even if we concluded that Jones was entitled to Miranda warnings when questioned inside the ambulance, we must apply our harmless error doctrine, which provides that “[n]o error or defect in any ruling ․ is ground for granting relief or reversal on appeal where its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is substantially minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A). As our Supreme Court explained: “The improper admission of evidence is harmless error when the conviction is supported by such substantial independent evidence of guilt as to satisfy the reviewing court that there is no substantial likelihood the [improperly admitted] evidence contributed to the conviction. Lafayette v. State, 917 N.E.2d 660, 666 (Ind. 2009); see also Davies v. State, 730 N.E.2d 726, 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that statements obtained in violation of Miranda and erroneously admitted “are subject to harmless error analysis”), trans. denied, cert. denied.

[24] Here, there was overwhelming independent evidence of guilt such that we are satisfied there was no substantial likelihood that Jones's statements in the ambulance contributed to his conviction. As the State points out, Corporal Korpal, Deputy Cain, and the EMT loading Jones into the ambulance all smelled alcohol emanating from his person. Furthermore, law enforcement observed cans of beer in his vehicle, including an open container in the center console. Multiple witnesses confirmed that he ran a red light and was at fault for the collision with Wheat. He failed the HGN test, giving six out of six clues for alcohol impairment. There were lab results showing that he had a blood alcohol concentration level of .228 grams per 100 milliliters of blood, which was the equivalent of seven to ten standard alcoholic beverages. And there was testimony from a forensic scientist attributing his inability to perceive the light changing from yellow to red due to alcohol impairment. Moreover, after Jones received Miranda warnings at the hospital, he told Deputy Cain that he was traveling from Payless Liquors, drank a shot of Fireball before driving, and opened a 24-ounce beer while driving.

[25] Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence, and even if it did, any error was harmless under the circumstances. We therefore affirm the conviction for Level 5 felony OVWI causing serious bodily injury and the two sentence enhancements.

II. Merger

[26] The parties agree that the trial court erred in merging, rather than vacating, the additional judgments of conviction it entered on the related offenses of Class A misdemeanor OVWI endangering a person, Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle with an ACE of .15 or more, and Level 5 felony causing serious bodily injury when operating a motor vehicle with an ACE of .08 or more. The parties are correct that merger does not remedy double jeopardy issues stemming from the entry of multiple judgments of conviction. See, e.g., West v. State, 22 N.E.3d 872, 875 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“A trial court's act of merging, without also vacating the conviction, is not sufficient to cure a double jeopardy violation.”), trans. denied. We therefore remand with instructions to vacate the three additional merged convictions so that the record reflects only a single judgment of conviction for Level 5 felony OVWI causing serious bodily injury.

Conclusion

[27] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence, but any error is at most harmless under the circumstances. To resolve double jeopardy issues, we remand with instructions to vacate the merged convictions for offenses other than Level 5 felony OVWI causing serious bodily injury.

[28] Affirmed and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 9-30-5-4(a)(3) (2019).

2.   I.C. § 9-30-15.5-2 (2015).

3.   I.C. § 35-50-2-8(d) (2017).

5.   ETOH is an abbreviation for ethyl alcohol, which is the type of alcohol in beer, wine, and liquor. See, e.g., Popovich v. Danielson, 896 N.E.2d 1196, 1203 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.

6.   The parties refer to Fireball as whiskey. See Appellant's Br. p. 9; Appellee's Br. p. 8.

Foley, Judge.

May, J. and Brown, J., concur.