IN RE: the Paternity of E.S. and H.S.; Luke Steffel (Father) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In these paternity proceedings, Luke Steffel (Father) appeals the trial court's order giving Sarah Kroeger (Mother) primary physical custody of their minor children. He argues, among other things, that the court abused its discretion by basing its decision on his status as a Wisconsin Air National Guardsman and that it did not properly evaluate all factors relevant to the best interests of the children. We reverse and remand with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Until Summer 2024, Father and Mother were in a romantic relationship and lived together near South Bend. They are the parents of two children, E.S. (born in 2017) and H.S. (born in 2022).¹

[3] Father is employed in a civilian role by the United States Department of Defense and is also a member of the Wisconsin Air National Guard (the National Guard). These jobs required him to spend a significant amount of time away from the parties’ home. He worked on a hybrid schedule for the Defense Department, meaning he worked in-office three days a week in Madison, Wisconsin, and virtually during the remainder of the work week. Typically, he would leave Indiana on Monday night, spend three days in Madison, and return home on Thursday night. Additionally, his duties for the National Guard included serving at least one weekend a month training, and he was deployed overseas from January to June 2023.

[4] When Father was away for work or for military service, Mother was primarily responsible for the care of the children. But when he was home, Father was, by all accounts, a capable and attentive parent. See Appealed Order at 4 (finding that “[b]oth parents are very intelligent, capable, and good parents.”); Appellee's Brief at 5 (conceding that “when [Father] was home[,] he would assist in the care of the children”).

[5] In June 2024, Mother told Father that she had accepted a job with the United States Department of the Treasury and that she was moving to Washington, D.C. At the same time, she served him with a petition to establish paternity and a notice of intent to relocate that she had filed the previous month. The petition asked, in part, for the trial court to “enter orders ․ as [to] the children's physical care, custody[,] and financial support.” Appellee's Appendix Vol. 2 at 2. In July, Father filed his own notice of intent to relocate indicating that he was moving to Waunakee, Wisconsin, stating that he “contest[ed] [Mother's] move[,]” and seeking “primary custody of the children[.]”² Id. at 5-6.

[6] The trial court held a final hearing over two days on September 16 and October 11, 2024. Mother testified that during the time the parties lived together, she had been responsible for the children's day-to-day care. She further testified that the children had moved with her to D.C. and were doing well in school and daycare. Father testified that in his opinion, Mother was not a capable caregiver because she would not clean the home when he was away. He further disagreed with Mother's assertion that she had been the children's sole caregiver during his absences because she had relied on several nannies and an au pair to provide childcare services. And when he was home, according to Father, he and Mother both took care of the children's daily needs.

[7] After the hearing, the trial court entered an order awarding Mother primary physical custody and approving her request to relocate with the children to D.C. At Mother's request, it entered findings of fact and conclusions of law that provided, in part:

During the parties[’] period of co-habitation [sic], Father's employment required him to be away from the family residence quite frequently. However, when [he] was home, he provided daily care for the children as well as clean [sic] the marital residence.3 Mother has been the primary caregiver for the children. [She] was principally responsible for addressing [their] education and childcare. [She] provided transportation each morning for [them] to their school or childcare. If the child [sic] did not have school or daycare, Mother would take the day off from work so that she could care for the[m]. Parties [sic] had hired the services of a nanny during Father's deployment. The children are involved in various extracurricular activities such as dance, soccer, and swimming. Mother provided most of the children's transportation to the various activities. When Father was home, he was very much “hands on” with the children's care and would provide transportation as well.

Both parents are very intelligent, capable, and good parents. The children love their parents very much. The issue of physical custody is a difficult one for the Court. It certainly would not be in the children's best interests to separate them by giving custody of one child to each parent. Ironically, the parties are expecting another child.

* * *

It is without question that Father is an honorable person who has served our country well. The Court has some concerns regarding [his] ability to care for the children should he be required to train for extended periods of time or be deployed for months at a time. The Court must observe that this has been a very difficult decision to reach. All things considered, [ ] Mother shall be granted physical custody[,] and the parties shall share legal custody[.]

Appealed Order at 3-4. Father filed a motion to correct error, which the trial court denied. Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Father raises three issues on appeal, two of which we find dispositive and restate as follows:

I. Whether the trial court erred by basing its physical custody determination on the potential that Father may be ordered to active duty status for the National Guard.

II. Whether the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions thereon are sufficient to enable us to conclude that it considered all factors relevant to determining what custody arrangement is in the children's best interests.

1. Standard of Review

[9] Father appeals following the denial of his motion to correct error, which we review for an abuse of discretion. Coronado v. Coronado, 243 N.E.3d 1121, 1124 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). We will reverse if “the trial court's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court [ ] misinterpreted the law.” Id. (quoting Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Watson, 70 N.E.3d 380, 384 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017)). Where a motion to correct error raises legal issues, we review the court's decision as to those issues de novo. Id.

[10] Additionally, reviewing an order denying a motion to correct error necessarily involves review of the underlying order. Id. Here, the underlying order was a child custody determination, which we also review for an abuse of discretion. Russell v. Russell, 682 N.E.2d 513, 515 (Ind. 1997). Furthermore, we “grant[ ] latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016) (quoting In re Marriage of Richardson, 622 N.E.2d 178, 178 (Ind. 1993)). We do not reweigh evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses; instead, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment. In re Paternity of B.Y., 159 N.E.3d 575, 578 (Ind. 2020), reh'g denied.

[11] We also note that at Mother's request, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A).⁴ Under Rule 52(A)’s two-tiered standard of review, we first determine whether the evidence presented supports the findings and, if so, whether the findings support the judgment. Hazelett v. Hazelett, 119 N.E.3d 153, 157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). We will reverse the findings only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. In this context, “[a] judgment is clearly erroneous when the record contains no facts or inferences to support it and after evaluating the record, we are firmly convinced a mistake has been made.” Id.

2. Physical Custody

[12] Under Indiana's paternity statutes, the trial court was required to “determine custody in accordance with the best interests of the child[ren]” by considering “all relevant factors,” which include:

(1) The age and sex of the child[ren].

(2) The wishes of the child[ren]’s parents.

(3) The wishes of the child[ren], with more consideration given to the child[ren]’s wishes if the child[ren] [are] at least fourteen [ ] years of age.

(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child[ren] with:

(A) the child[ren]’s parents;

(B) the child[ren]’s siblings; and

(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child[ren]’s best interest.

(5) The child[ren]’s adjustment to home, school, and community.

(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent.

(8) Evidence that the child[ren] ha[ve] been cared for by a de facto custodian[.]

Ind. Code § 31-14-13-2.⁵ Because the court was required to consider “all relevant factors[,]” it had to consider any relevant factor even if not “explicitly listed in the statute.” Russell, 682 N.E.2d at 515 (emphasis added). Additionally, because here the court made “an initial custody determination, it [was] required to consider all evidence from the time of [the] child[ren]’s birth[s] in determining” what physical custody arrangement was in their best interests. In re Paternity of M.W., 949 N.E.2d 839, 843 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

A. Father's Military Service

[13] Father argues that “the trial court erred when it considered [his] absence due to military service in awarding Mother primary physical custody of the [ ] children.” Appellant's Brief at 16. We agree insomuch as the court should not have considered the potential that Father may “be deployed for months at a time” when determining what custody arrangement is in the children's best interests. Appealed Order at 4.

[14] Indiana Code section 31-17-2-21.3(a) provides that “[a] court may not consider a parent's absence or relocation due to active duty service as a factor in determining custody or permanently modifying a child custody order.” “Active duty,” as used in section 31-17-2-21.3(a), includes “full-time service in[ ] ․ the National Guard ․ for a period that exceeds thirty [ ] consecutive days in a calendar year.” I.C. § 31-9-2-0.8.

[15] Here, Mother concedes that “[t]he trial court's comment that it ha[d] ‘some concerns’ about [F]ather's ability to care for the children if deployed or if training for extended periods of time makes it difficult to argue the court didn't consider his military service.” Appellee's Br. at 10. However, she also correctly points out that this error, in and of itself, does not require reversal. Compare Hazelett, 119 N.E.3d at 161 (reversing when trial court “consider[ed] Father's absence due to his military service” and the remaining findings were insufficient to affirm its judgment) with Purnell v. Purnell, 131 N.E.3d 622, 629 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (affirming when trial court considered Father's active duty status but “the totality of the remaining ․ findings and conclusions” were sufficient), trans. denied.

[16] Thus, we turn to whether the trial court's remaining findings and conclusions are sufficient to affirm its custody determination.

B. Sufficiency of the Findings

[17] Generally, “[a]lthough a court is required to consider all relevant factors in making its [custody] determination, it is not required to make specific findings.”⁶ Russell, 682 N.E.2d at 515. However, when a party requests findings of fact pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A), the purpose of those findings “is ‘to provide the parties and the reviewing court with the theory upon which the trial judge decided the case in order that the right of review for error may be effectively preserved.’ ” Hazelett, 119 N.E.3d at 159 (quoting In re Paternity of S.A.M., 85 N.E.3d 879, 885 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017)).

[18] In Hazelett, a panel of this Court reversed a custody determination with instructions for the trial court to enter adequate findings because it was “unable to determine whether the [ ] court's findings support[ed]” the determination because “the bulk of the[ ] findings ․ [were] merely a recitation of each party's contentions, arguments, proposed findings, [ ] portions of relevant statutory provisions[,] ․ undisputed background information,[ ] and a recitation of the court's jurisdiction[.]” 119 N.E.3d at 159. Similarly, in In re Paternity of V.D., another panel did the same after finding that the trial court “rel[ied] on only some of the [statutory] factors and bas[ed] its custody determination largely on a finding that was unsupported by the evidence[.]” 226 N.E.3d 816, 828 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

[19] Mother contends that Hazelett is distinguishable from the present circumstances and directs us instead to Purnell. There, the trial court awarded primary physical custody to the mother, supporting its decision with ninety-five findings of fact and forty-seven conclusions of law that “relied on several of the statutory factors[.]” Purnell, 131 N.E.3d at 627. However, one of the court's conclusions was that placing the child with the father would create “the real potential for an itinerant life dictated by [his] changing military assignments.” Id. at 626. The father argued on appeal that the court erroneously relied on his military “service, and the future assignments it contemplated, as a determining factor[.]” Id. at 628. The panel agreed, but nonetheless affirmed because “unlike Hazelett, ․ the trial court entered extensive findings of fact and conclusions thereon” that supported the judgment. Id. at 629.

[20] We find that the trial court's custody determination in the present case is more akin to those reversed in Hazelett and Paternity of V.D. than the one affirmed in Purnell. The surface-level findings and conclusions at issue here are a far cry from the detailed rationale provided by the trial court in Purnell. Instead, the gist of the appealed order is that, in the trial court's opinion, “[b]oth [parties] are very intelligent, capable, and good parents” and that deciding which one of them should be the primary physical custodian was “a very difficult decision to reach.” Appealed Order at 4. While the court made certain findings regarding the background of the parties and their effectiveness as parents, it failed to explain how, in its estimation, these facts were relevant to determining what custody arrangement was in the best interests of the children. In fact, nowhere in its order did the court expressly conclude that living with Mother in D.C. is in the children's best interests.

[21] Mother contends that this omission does not require reversal because “though [it] did not use the phrase ‘best interests[,]’ ․ such a determination is implicit in the court[’]s ruling and the specific facts identified.” Appellee's Br. at 10. We are not so sure. As Father argues, by concluding that he and Mother are both good parents and suggesting that determining which of them should be the primary physical custodian was a difficult decision, the court appears to have concluded “that the best interests of the children might be [ ] served with either” parent undertaking the primary physical custodial role. Appellant's Reply Br. at 7.

[22] Indeed, we agree with Father that the trial court appears to have used his military “service as a ‘tie-breaker’ [sic]—all things considered (and being otherwise equal), the possibility that [he] might be ordered into active duty again at some time in the future [was] ․ the determining factor.” Appellant's Br. at 17. We find this “tiebreaker” decision-making approach comparable to Paternity of V.D., where the trial court based its determination largely on a finding unsupported by the evidence. 226 N.E.3d at 828. Likewise, here, the court appears to have based its decision largely on a factor it was statutorily prohibited from considering: Father's potential to be ordered to active duty military service. See supra Section 2(A).

[23] Accordingly, we adopt the approach of the panel in Paternity of V.D., reverse the trial court's award of primary physical custody to Mother, and remand for reconsideration of the issue in light of our decision.⁷ 226 N.E.3d at 828. Upon remand, the court should enter a physical custody order that reflects its consideration of all factors relevant to determining what custody arrangement is in the children's best interests and contains findings of fact and conclusions of law articulating the rationale for its decision. Id.

Conclusion

[24] For the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court abused its discretion when it considered the potential that Father's service in the National Guard may result in him being ordered to active duty status. We further find the court's remaining findings of fact and conclusions thereon insufficient for us to determine whether it considered all factors relevant to what custody arrangement was in the children's best interests. Thus, we reverse and remand with instructions for the court to reconsider and clarify the issue of physical custody and make appropriate findings.

[25] Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   As the trial court noted in the appealed order, during these proceedings “the parties [were] expecting another child.” Appealed Order at 4. Because these proceedings concerned only E.S. and H.S., any issues regarding the parties’ third child are not at issue in this appeal.

2.   Father did not contest paternity.

3.   We note that the parties were never married, and the trial court apparently erroneously used the phrase “marital residence” to refer to the parties’ family residence.

4.   Effective July 1, 2025, Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8.2(b)(1) requires trial courts to include findings of fact and conclusions of law in all final custody orders. Here, the statute was not in effect when the trial court issued the appealed order.

5.   We note that here, the trial court's order referenced Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8, which governs child custody determinations in dissolution actions and is inapplicable to paternity proceedings. See In re Paternity of V.D., 226 N.E.3d 816, 827 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). However, as the court observed in Paternity of V.D., sections 31-14-13-2 and 31-17-2-8 “contain identical provisions.” Id.

6.   We reiterate that the legislature abrogated this rule when it passed Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8.2(b)(1), effective July 1, 2025. See supra note 4.

7.   Father requests that instead, we “remand with instructions to award primary physical custody of the children to him.” Appellant's Br. at 21. We decline to do so, as it would require us to wade into questions of fact outside our purview as an appellate court. It is the trial court's role, not ours, to “[ ]weigh evidence[ ] [and] judge the credibility of witnesses[.]” Kondamuri v. Kondamuri, 852 N.E.2d 939, 946 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Father is effectively asking that we “substitute our judgment for that of the trial court[,]” which we will not do. Id.

DeBoer, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.