SIMMONS v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Jerico L. Simmons appeals his conviction for murder, claiming that the trial court erred in admitting the pretrial statements of a witness—who was deceased at the time of trial—that were recorded on police officers’ dashcams and bodycam. Simmons also argues that the eighty-five-year sentence imposed for murder, which was enhanced by twenty years for committing the offense with the use of a firearm, is inappropriate.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On February 27, 2023, Simmons drove to Christopher Trice's home in Fort Wayne and arrived there around 7:00 p.m. While Simmons and Trice were watching television, a mutual friend—Timothy Coats—called Simmons and invited him to play cards. Simmons accepted the invitation and drove himself and Trice to Jovanna Britt's residence. Britt was Coats's girlfriend, and they had been living together for several weeks. The four of them and another friend played cards, listened to music, drank alcohol, and smoked marijuana in Britt's garage.

[4] At some point, Simmons left the room and went into the bathroom. When he returned, he said nothing and pulled out a handgun from his waistband. Simmons then placed the gun against the right side of Coats's head and shot him, causing Coats to fall out of his chair and onto the floor. Coats eventually died from the single gunshot wound.

[5] Trice ran from the garage and into a field behind Britt's house. Shortly thereafter, Trice returned to Britt's residence as Simmons was leaving. Simmons ordered Trice into his car, rammed the vehicles in front him, and sped away. Simmons was “flipping out” while driving and grabbing Trice by the torso, saying that he “loved Trice but could not let him live.” Transcript Vol. I at 228. Trice attempted to reach for a gun that was strapped to his hip, but Simmons grabbed it from him.

[6] Meanwhile, Deputy Evan Gregory of the Allen County Sheriff's Department arrived at Britt's residence within minutes of a 911 dispatch and spoke with Britt, who was screaming for someone to assist Coats. Britt told Deputy Gregory that Simmons had shot Coats, and she provided him with a description of Simmons. This conversation was recorded by Deputy Gregory's dashcam.

[7] Sheriff's Deputy Calvin Yates arrived at the residence and transported Britt, who was extremely “frantic” and emotional, to the hospital. Transcript Vol. II at 15. Britt continued to plead for someone to save Coats. Deputy Yates instructed Britt to take deep breaths and at some point, Britt suddenly yelled, “why the f**k would he jump up and just shoot him like that?” State's Exhibit 14. Britt again identified Simmons as the shooter and her statements were recorded on Deputy Yates's dashcam.

[8] When Britt arrived at the hospital, she was still very emotional, “oscillating between being upset, scared, and angry.” Transcript Vol. II at 23. While at the hospital, Britt told Detective Marc Deshaies of the Fort Wayne Police Department that Simmons shot Coats. Britt explained that the group was playing cards and that Simmons suddenly pulled out a gun and shot Coats without saying a word. Those statements were recorded on Detective Deshaies's bodycam.

[9] In the meantime, Simmons continued driving at a high rate of speed, eventually lost control of his vehicle, and crashed it into a tree and a fence. Trice exited the vehicle, and Simmons grabbed the gun used to kill Coats and threw it over the fence.

[10] After an Indiana State Trooper arrived at the scene, Simmons was arrested and transported to a local hospital. During a search of the area, police officers found the gun that Simmons had tossed over the fence. Trice's gun was found on the front, driver's side floorboard of Simmons's vehicle.

[11] On March 9, 2023, the State charged Simmons with murder and requested “An Additional Penalty for Use of a Firearm” during the commission of the offense. Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 29. Britt subsequently died in an unrelated gun violence incident in December 2023.

[12] Prior to trial, Simmons filed a motion to exclude Britt's statements that were recorded on the police officers’ bodycam and dashcams, claiming that they were inadmissible hearsay and violated his right to confrontation. The trial court denied Simmons's motion. At trial, Simmons objected to Britt's statements on “hearsay” and “hearsay confrontation” grounds. Transcript Vol. II at 16-17, 25. The trial court admitted the evidence over Simmons's objections and allowed Britt's statements to be played for the jury. Trice also testified at trial that he witnessed Simmons remove a gun from his waistband and shoot Coats in the head.

[13] Simmons testified that the shooting was accidental and that he did not intend to shoot Coats. The firearms expert testified on behalf of the State that several pounds of pressure were required to be applied on the gun's trigger for a bullet to release. She opined that the gun had no malfunctions or defects and that it had not been accidentally discharged. The jury convicted Simmons of murder and found that he used a firearm when committing that offense.

[14] At the sentencing hearing on November 21, 2024, the trial court found no mitigating factors, noting that Simmons had not accepted responsibility for his actions and that he had refused to participate in the interview for the presentence investigation (PSI) report. The trial court identified Simmons's lengthy juvenile and criminal histories, his failed prior attempts at rehabilitation and community supervision, and the nature and circumstances of the crimes as aggravating factors. Simmons was sentenced to sixty-five years of incarceration that the trial court enhanced by twenty years because Simmons used a firearm when committing the offense, for an aggregate sentence of eighty-five-years.

[15] Simmons now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Admissibility of Britt's Statements

[16] Simmons argues Britt's statements to police officers should not have been admitted at trial because they were hearsay. Simmons maintains that the trial court erred in concluding that the statements were excited utterances that qualified as exceptions to the hearsay rule.

[17] In general, we review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Wanke v. State, 231 N.E.3d 878, 882 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). The trial court abuses its discretion when its evidentiary ruling was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or when the court misinterpreted the law. J.Q.R. v. State, 252 N.E.3d 919, 924 (Ind. 2025).

[18] Hearsay is defined as “a statement that ․ is not made ․ by the declarant while testifying at trial or hearing; and ․ is offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c)(1) and (2). Hearsay is inadmissible at trial unless it falls under an exception to the hearsay rule. Ind. Evidence Rule 802. One such exception—and relevant here—is the excited utterance rule under Ind. Evidence Rule 803(2) that applies to “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.” The party seeking admission of hearsay under the excited utterance rule must show: (1) a startling event; (2) a statement made by the declarant while under the stress of excitement caused by the event; and (3) a relationship between the statement and the event. Chambless v. State, 119 N.E.3d 182, 189 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

[19] Only the second requirement is at issue here. That is, Simmons argues that Britt's statements were not excited utterances because the evidence showed that she was not under stress when she made them. The event and utterance need not be contemporaneous to have been made under the stress of the excitement of the event to qualify. Id. But the time between the event and utterance is a factor to consider when determining whether the statement was spontaneous and unrehearsed. Id. And “the longer the time between an event and an utterance, the greater the likelihood that the statement is a narrative of past events instead of an excited utterance.” Id. Whether a statement constitutes an excited utterance is a factual determination subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review. Id.

[20] In this case, the evidence established that Britt and others witnessed Simmons—with no forewarning—shoot Coats in the head. Those circumstances certainly qualify as a startling event. All the statements that Britt made to the police officers related to that event, and the evidence established that she was under the stress of the event when she made the statements. More particularly, Britt spoke with Deputy Gregory only minutes after the shooting. As Britt was screaming and crying for someone to help Coats, it cannot be disputed that she made the statements to Deputy Gregory while she was under the stress of the shooting before she was capable of calm reflection.

[21] The record also demonstrates that Britt remained under the stress of witnessing Simmons shoot Coats when she made statements to Deputy Yates on the way to the hospital. Deputy Yates had to repeatedly instruct Britt to breathe deeply while trying to calm her. Britt identified Simmons as the shooter while “very frantic,” crying, cursing, and begging for someone to save Coats. Transcript Vol. II at 15.

[22] When Britt made her statements to Detective Deshaies at the hospital, she was still very upset, scared, and angry from the incident and had to be calmed. Although it had been an hour since the shooting, Britt remained under the stress of witnessing the shooting. Her statements to Detective Deshaies qualified as an excited utterance. See Yamobi v. State, 672 N.E.2d 1344, 1346 (Ind. 1996) (finding that a victim's statement made to an officer nearly an hour after the event was an excited utterance).

[23] In sum, Britt's three recorded statements that she made to the police officers, as documented on dashcam and bodycam, were excited utterances under the exception to the rule against hearsay. Thus, the trial court properly admitted her statements into evidence.¹

II. Inappropriate Sentence

[24] Simmons argues that his sentence is inappropriate when considering the nature of the offense and his character. His sole contention is that the maximum sentences should not have been imposed for murder and the enhanced penalty because his offense was not among the “worst of the worst that this court has seen.”² Appellant's Brief at 14.

[25] We evaluate inappropriate sentence claims under the following well-settled standard of review:

We “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, [we find] the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. App. R. 7(B). Our role in reviewing a sentence pursuant to Appellate Rule 7(B) “should be to attempt to leaven the outliers, and identify some guiding principles for the trial courts and those charged with improvement of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). “The defendant bears the burden of persuading this court that his or her sentence is inappropriate.” Kunberger v. State, 46 N.E.3d 966, 972 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

“Whether a sentence is inappropriate ultimately turns on the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and a myriad of other factors that come to light in a given case.” Thompson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 383, 391 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

Belcher v. State, 138 N.E.3d 318, 328 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

[26] We note that the two prongs—nature of the offense and character of the offender—are “separate inquiries that we ultimately balance․” Turkette v. State, 151 N.E.3d 782, 786 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. While Simmons's argument does not touch on his character, we will consider both prongs in our assessment. Id. at 1103.

[27] When considering the nature of the offense, we first look to the advisory sentence for the crime. McHenry v. State, 152 N.E.3d 41, 46 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). When a sentence deviates from the advisory sentence, we consider whether “there is anything more or less egregious about the offense committed by the defendant that makes it different from the ‘typical’ offense accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory sentence.” Holloway v. State, 950 N.E.2d 803, 806-07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Rich v. State, 890 N.E.2d 44, 54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied). In this case, Simmons was convicted of murder, the sentence for which ranges from forty-five to sixty-five years, with an advisory sentence of fifty-five years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3. And under I.C. § 35-50-2-11—the enhanced penalty for use of a firearm statute—the additional fixed term of imprisonment ranges from five to twenty years. Here, the trial court imposed the maximum sentence for murder and the enhancement.

[28] The evidence at trial established that Simmons—without warning and for no apparent reason—placed a gun to Coats's head and shot and killed him in front of several witnesses. Simmons then sped away from the scene after consuming alcohol and smoking marijuana, crashed into multiple vehicles, forced Trice into his car, and threatened his life. Simmons then drove toward Indianapolis at a high rate of speed, further endangering Trice.

[29] At some point, Simmons lost control of his vehicle and crashed into a fence. Following the crash, Simmons tossed the murder weapon over the fence. Given these circumstances, the physical and emotional damage that Simmons inflicted and his attempt to conceal the evidence went far beyond the elements of the offense. The severity of Simmons's offense supports the sentence.

[30] When analyzing a defendant's character, we consider a wide range of factors, including his age, criminal history, background, and past rehabilitative efforts. Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91, 100 (Ind. 2021). Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character and demonstrates that he was not deterred by previous contact with the criminal justice system. Harris v. State, 163 N.E.3d 938, 957 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied.

[31] The record shows that Simmons—who was twenty-nine years old at the time of the offense—has significant juvenile and criminal histories. Simmons amassed juvenile adjudications for battery, disorderly conduct, resisting law enforcement, possession of cocaine, and carrying a handgun without a license. As an adult, Simmons has four prior felony convictions and four prior misdemeanor convictions, including battery, carrying a firearm without a license, resisting law enforcement, battery on a public safety official, operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration of .15 or more, possession of a synthetic drug, and failure to return to lawful detention. Many of Simmons's prior convictions and adjudications involved crimes of violence that are particularly indicative of his poor character. See, e.g., Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the number of prior offenses in relation to the current offense is significant in assessing the defendant's character).

[32] We also note that Simmons was on parole when he murdered Coates and, at the time of sentencing, he had several unrelated pending criminal charges in a different county. Simmons has continued to commit crimes, and his repeated and consistent disregard for the law does not portray his character in “a positive light.” See Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[33] Simmons also showed no remorse for killing Coats, and he failed to take responsibility for his actions. At trial, Simmons claimed he accidentally shot Coats despite compelling evidence to the contrary. It was further established that Simmons refused to participate with the probation department during the PSI process. All the circumstances described above reflect Simmons's poor character. In short, Simmons has failed to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate.

[34] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We note that Simmons makes the bald assertion in his appellate brief that Britt's statements were inadmissible under the “Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.” Appellant's Brief at 12. Simmons has made no Confrontation Clause argument in his appellate brief separate from his hearsay claim. Thus, the issue is waived. See, e.g., Holloway v. State, 69 N.E.3d 924, 931 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (recognizing that the failure to provide a separate and independent analysis of an issue raised on appeal results in waiver), trans. denied; see also Ind. Appellate Rule 45(A)(8)(a) (each argument “must be supported by cogent reasoning” and “citations to the authorities ․ relied on ․”).

2.   Simmons does not challenge any of the aggravating factors that the trial court identified.

Altice, Chief Judge.

May, J. and Foley, J., concur.