Stacy Wissel, Trustee in Bankruptcy of the Estate of Sean Ryan Allen, Appellant-Defendant/Cross-Appellee v. Kristen Carlisle, Appellee-Plaintiff/Cross-Appellant (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Stacy Wissel, as trustee of the bankruptcy estate of Sean Ryan Allen, appeals the trial court's grant of Kristen Carlisle's second motion for summary judgment. Wissel alleges the trial court erred in concluding Allen was not and could not establish that he was the father of Carlisle's child, T.C., for purposes of the child wrongful death statute. Carlisle cross-appeals the trial court's denial of her first motion for summary judgment. Because our resolution of Wissel's appeal is dispositive, we do not reach the merits of Carlisle's cross-appeal. The trial court did not err in finding that Allen was not the father of T.C. for purposes of the child wrongful death statute or in concluding that Allen could not maintain a claim for T.C.’s wrongful death as a matter of law. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In August 2018, Kristen Carlisle became pregnant while engaged in a relationship with Sean Ryan Allen. Initially, Allen didn't believe Carlisle was pregnant and “thought it was a way to try to get [him] to be with her.” App. Vol. II p. 68. After Carlisle's pregnancy was confirmed, Allen wanted “nothing to do with” Carlisle, her pregnancy or the child. Id. at 124.

[3] On March 29, 2019, the child, T.C., died during childbirth. Carlisle later filed a medical malpractice action against her healthcare providers and did not name Allen as a party to the suit. At least as far back as April 2019, Allen was aware of the lawsuit and was willing to “sign paperwork” indicating that he “d[id]n't want to be a part of” the lawsuit. Id. at 97. Years later, in April 2022, Allen again intended to sign paperwork indicating that he released “any interest in the wrongful death proceeds regarding [T.C.’s] death[.]” Id. at 99. However, according to Allen, his bankruptcy trustee and attorneys would not allow him to sign a release of his interest in T.C.’s wrongful death claim. See id. at 102.

[4] Carlisle eventually reached a settlement in her malpractice suit. In February 2023, Carlisle filed a petition in the Marion Superior Court to recover excess damages from the Indiana Patient's Compensation Fund (the Fund Case), from which this appeal arises. In the Fund Case, Carlise named the Fund and Allen as defendants. Because Allen was in bankruptcy, Stacy Wissel, the trustee of Allen's bankruptcy estate, substituted as the real party in interest in Carlisle's claim against the Fund.¹

[5] In November 2023, Carlisle filed her first motion for summary judgment in the Fund Case, alleging in pertinent part that Allen had no claim for T.C.’s wrongful death because he had not established paternity. Shortly after, Allen filed a petition to establish paternity of T.C. (the Paternity Case) in the Vanderburgh Superior Court (the Paternity Court). Allen then filed a response in the Fund Case opposing Carlisle's first motion for summary judgment, asserting the conclusion of the Paternity Case “should determine whether paternity is legally established and [the Marion Superior Court] should not rule on this portion of [Carlisle's first motion for summary judgment] until at least after” the hearing in the Paternity Case. App. Vol. II p. 21. In April 2024, while the Paternity Case was pending, the trial court denied Carlisle's first motion for summary judgment in the Fund Case.

[6] Meanwhile, Carlisle filed a motion for summary judgment in the Paternity Case, asserting Allen was barred from establishing paternity under the doctrine of laches. The Paternity Court considered the designated evidence offered by Carlisle and Allen—including undisputed evidence of the biological connection between Allen and T.C.—and held a hearing on the motion for summary judgment. See id. at 213-26. In May 2024, the Paternity Court granted Carlisle's motion for summary judgment and denied Allen's petition to establish paternity over T.C. In doing so, the Paternity Court made material findings of fact in Allen's favor, including that he and Carlisle conceived T.C. together. The Paternity Court ultimately concluded Allen was barred from establishing paternity as contrary to the interests of justice and under the doctrine of laches. See id. at 224-26. Allen did not appeal the Paternity Court's final judgment.

[7] On July 1, 2024, Carlisle filed her second motion for summary judgment in the Fund Case, asserting that because Allen's paternity was denied and he could not legally establish he was T.C.’s parent, he lacked standing to maintain a claim for T.C.’s wrongful death. Carlisle argued Allen had already conceded that the outcome of the paternity action would determine whether he could pursue a claim for T.C.’s wrongful death. See id. at 21. Allen filed a response opposing Carlisle's second motion for summary judgment, arguing he was indisputably the father of T.C. despite paternity being denied and the child wrongful death statute did not require a finding of paternity to answer for his interest in the claim. He further alleged that Carlisle mischaracterized his responsive argument to her first motion for summary judgment: Allen explained his “expectation” was that his paternity action would be unopposed and Carlisle's claim that he had not established paternity would be moot. Id.

[8] Following a hearing on the motion, the Marion Superior Court granted Carlisle's second motion for summary judgment in December 2024. The court concluded that “Allen attempted to establish legal paternity and his petition was denied” and “establishment of paternity is necessary for Allen to be found to be a parent pursuant to the [Indiana] Child Wrongful Death Statute.” Id. at 24. The Marion Superior Court further concluded the Paternity Court previously determined the issue of paternity by denying Allen's petition to establish paternity of T.C. and “[t]hat issue is now res judicata.” Id. (emphasis in original). Therefore, the court concluded Allen could not establish that he is T.C.’s parent to maintain a claim for T.C.’s wrongful death and granted Carlisle's motion for summary judgment. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Allen claims the trial court erred in granting summary judgment by concluding he was not T.C.’s father for purposes of the child wrongful death statute. Carlisle cross-appeals the trial court's denial of her first motion for summary judgment. Because our resolution of Allen's appeal is dispositive, we need not address Carlisle's cross-appeal.²

I. Standard of Review

[10] Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). “When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment, this court stands in the shoes of the trial court and applies the same standards in deciding whether to affirm or reverse the ruling.” Longest ex rel. Longest v. Sledge, 992 N.E.2d 221, 225 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Carlisle, as the party seeking summary judgment, bears the burden of showing that no genuine issues of material fact exist and she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Johnson v. Harris, 176 N.E.3d 252, 255 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. Summary judgment is improper if Carlisle failed to meet that burden. Id. We construe all factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and all doubts as to the existence of a material issue against the moving party. Id.

II. Res Judicata

[11] The crux of Allen's argument is that even though his paternity was denied, he is indisputably the father of T.C. for purposes of Indiana Code section 34-23-2-1, the Indiana child wrongful death statute (CWDS). In relevant part, the CWDS provides:

(c) An action may be maintained under this section against the person whose wrongful act or omission caused the injury or death of a child. The action may be maintained by:

(1) the father and mother jointly, or either of them by naming the other parent as a codefendant to answer as to his or her interest[.]

Ind. Code § 34-23-2-1(c) (2009).

[12] Although he made such arguments to the trial court, Allen does not now, on appeal, dispute the trial court's conclusion that to have standing in a child wrongful death action, status as a father needs to be established by paternity. Allen thus waives this argument, and we need not resolve whether paternity must be established to have an interest in a child wrongful death claim.

[13] Rather, Allen asserts his status as T.C.’s “father” under the CWDS is nonetheless established by actions and statements he characterizes as judicial admissions. The trial court disagreed, concluding that Allen's response to Carlisle's second summary judgment motion amounted to a second attempt to establish paternity, which was barred by res judicata.

[14] “Res judicata serves to prevent repetitious litigation of disputes which are essentially the same.” Hilliard v. Jacobs, 957 N.E.2d 1043, 1046 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied, cert. denied. “The doctrine of res judicata consists of two distinct components: claim preclusion and issue preclusion.” Id.

The second branch of the principle of res judicata is issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel. Issue preclusion bars the subsequent litigation of a fact or issue that was necessarily adjudicated in a former lawsuit if the same fact or issue is presented in the subsequent lawsuit. If issue preclusion applies, the former adjudication is conclusive in the subsequent action, even if the actions are based on different claims.

Brimner v. Binz, 149 N.E.3d 1214, 1219 (Ind. Ct. App 2020) (citing Angelopoulos v. Angelopoulos, 2 N.E.3d 688, 696 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied). “The former adjudication is conclusive only as to those issues that were actually litigated and determined therein.” Angelopoulos, 2 N.E.3d at 696. To determine whether issue preclusion is applicable, we apply a two-part analysis: “(1) whether the party in the prior action had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue and (2) whether it is otherwise unfair to apply issue preclusion given the facts of the particular case.” Id.

[15] Because Allen's paternity was not presumed or established by a paternity affidavit, pursuit of an action under Indiana Code article 31-14 was his only available method of establishing paternity. See Ind. Code § 31-14-2-1 (1997); Ind. Code § 31-14-7-1 (2001). Allen initiated the Paternity Case in the Paternity Court and had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of T.C.’s paternity. Following Carlisle's motion for summary judgment in that case, Allen responded and presented the factual basis to establish his paternity of T.C. Allen and Carlisle designated evidence, and the court made material findings of fact in Allen's favor, including that he and Carlisle conceived T.C. together. Ultimately, though, the Paternity Court entered final judgment denying Allen's petition to establish paternity, and Allen did not appeal that judgment. His second attempt to prove paternity here is tantamount to an impermissible collateral attack on the Paternity Case's final judgment. And we identify no reason why it is otherwise unfair to apply issue preclusion to the facts in this case. The trial court did not err in applying res judicata to Allen's claim.

II. Judicial Admissions

[16] Even if Allen was not barred from relitigating the issue of paternity, his assertion that judicial admissions established he was T.C.’s father would fail. Judicial admissions “are voluntary and knowing concessions of fact by a party or a party's attorney occurring at any point in a judicial proceeding.” Stewart v. Alunday, 53 N.E.3d 562, 568 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing C.J.S., Evidence § 624 (2008)). “The party must testify clearly and unequivocally to a fact peculiarly within his knowledge in order for it to be considered a judicial admission.” Id. “Judicial admissions may be contained in stipulations, current pleadings in the case being tried, admissions made in open court, and admissions made pursuant to requests to admit.” Id. “[J]udicial admissions are conclusive and binding on the trier of fact.” Id.

[17] In her petition for damages, Carlisle stated Allen was “named as a defendant herein to answer to his interest in any claims, as contemplated in I.C. 34-23-2-1 and Trial Rule 19.”  ³ App. Vol. II p. 237. Allen first claims that by naming him as a defendant in her action pursuant to the CWDS and as a necessary party under Indiana Trial Rule 19, Carlisle made a binding judicial admission that Allen was T.C.’s father. Allen asserts “there was no other reason to name Sean Allen as a defendant other than him being [T.C.’s] father.” Appellant's Br. p. 7.

[18] First, Allen consistently attempted to release any interest that he had to T.C.’s wrongful death claim. As early as 2019 and into 2022, he intended to sign release paperwork. Allen later affirmed in a deposition that his bankruptcy trustee and attorneys would not allow him to release his interest in T.C.’s wrongful death claim despite his personal desire to do so. Carlisle, therefore, had at least one other reason to name Allen as a defendant: Allen's bankruptcy trustee and attorneys would not allow him to release his potential interest.

[19] Further, Allen provides no authority to support the position that simply naming a defendant amounts to a conclusive concession. In civil litigation, plaintiffs often name defendants who have or may have an interest in an action; but the burden has long been on a named party to respond to a complaint in order to protect and maintain one's interests. See e.g., Brower Corp. v. Brattain, 792 N.E.2d 75, 79 (Ind. Ct. App 2003) (named defendants that may have an interest were obligated to respond to the complaint to protect their interests); Centex Home Equity Corp. v. Robinson, 776 N.E.2d 935, 944 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (defendant was named as a party only for purposes of providing defendant with the opportunity to answer as to its interest), trans. denied; Masters v. Templeton, 92 Ind. 447, 450 (Ind. 1884) (explaining that “if anyone who has an interest is made a party, he must assert and maintain his interest[.]”).

[20] Here, Carlisle, as a mother filing alone, was obligated under the CWDS to name the “other parent as a codefendant”; but it was Allen's burden to “answer as to his or her interest” to have standing to recover. I.C. § 34-23-2-1(c)(1). Indeed, Carlisle's statement reflects the same—she named Allen so that he could answer to his interest; she made no concession to support Allen's possible interest. Merely naming a defendant who may have an interest in a civil action does not amount to a concession by the plaintiff that such defendant has an interest or standing. Neither does naming a defendant relieve him of his obligation to respond and maintain his own interest. Carlisle's act of naming Allen as a defendant was neither a clear and unequivocal testimonial to the fatherhood of T.C. or Allen's standing nor a judicial admission to such effect.

[21] Allen also contends he made judicial admissions that he was T.C.’s father in his answer to Carlisle's petition. Paragraph 3 of Carlisle's petition in the Fund Case alleged as follows:

It is believed that Sean Allen is [T.C.’s] biological father. Sean Allen was never married to plaintiff Kristen Carlisle. Sean Allen did not offer any financial support for [T.C.] and did not pay any of the hospital, funeral, or burial expenses for [T.C.]. Sean Allen is not listed as the father of [T.C.] on the death certificate. Sean Allen was not listed as [T.C.’s] father in the obituary. Paternity of [T.C.] has never been established. Sean Allen has never acknowledged that he is the biological father of [T.C.]. Sean Allen was not present at the birth of [T.C.]. Sean Allen and Kristen Carlisle no longer communicate and it is believed that Sean Allen currently resides in Posey, Indiana. Sean Allen is named as a defendant herein to answer to his interest in any claims, as contemplated in I.C. 34-23-2-1 and Trial Rule 19.

App. Vol. II p. 237.

[22] In his answer, Allen responded as follows:

a. It is believed that Sean Allen is [T.C.’s] biological father. Admit.

b. Sean Allen was never married to plaintiff Kristen Carlisle. Admit.

c. Sean Allen did not offer any financial support for [T.C.] and did not pay any of the hospital, funeral, or burial expenses for [T.C.]. Admit.

d. Sean Allen is not listed as the father of [T.C.] on the death certificate. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge and information to form a belief as to the truth of this allegation.

e. Sean Allen was not listed as [T.C.’s] father in the obituary. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge and information to form a belief as to the truth of this allegation.

f. Paternity of [T.C.] has never been established. Admit.

g. Sean Allen has never acknowledged that he is the biological father of [T.C.]. Deny.

h. Sean Allen was not present at the birth of [T.C.]. Admit.

i. Sean Allen and Kristen Carlisle no longer communicate and it is believed that Sean Allen currently resides in Posey, Indiana. Admit to the extent this allegation should read “Posey County, Indiana.”

j. Sean Allen is named as a defendant herein to answer to his interest in any claims, as contemplated in IC 34-23-2-1 and Trial Rule 19. To the extent this allegation requires an answer, Admit.

App. Vol. II p. 239-40 (emphasis in original).

[23] Allen claims the trial court erred “when it found that an allegation and admission of paternity in the pleadings is somehow insufficient to establish paternity for the purposes of the Child Wrongful Death Act[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 8. However, Allen mischaracterizes the pleadings. Taken as a whole, Carlisle's allegations and Allen's responses are not a clear and unequivocal judicial admission as to Allen's paternity.⁴

IV. Conclusion

[24] The trial court did not err in concluding Allen was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of paternity in this matter or in concluding there were no judicial admissions establishing Allen's fatherhood of T.C. Because Allen cannot maintain a claim under the CWDS, summary judgment was appropriate.

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   For consistency, Wissel will continue to be referred to as Allen unless otherwise noted.

2.   Carlisle notes the “procedural posture of this case makes it unclear if [her] challenge to the lower court's ruling on her [first summary judgment motion] needs to be raised through a cross-appeal.” Appellee's Br. p. 10. In requesting that we affirm the trial court's grant of her second summary judgment motion, Carlisle explains that she relies on issues raised in both her first and second motions for summary judgment; accordingly, although she does not seek reversal of the court's denial of her first motion for summary judgment, she cross-appeals the denial of her first summary judgment to avoid waiver. See id. Because we affirm the second summary judgment and Carlisle does not request that we reverse denial of her first summary judgment motion, we need not address her cross-appeal.

3.   In pertinent part, Trial Rule 19 provides that a person shall be joined as a party if “complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties” in the person's absence; or if “he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action” and the disposition of the action in his absence may “impair or impede his ability to protect that interest,” or “leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.” Ind. Trial Rule 19(A).

4.   Allen also asserts the court erred in concluding that “ ‘Carlisle was required by the bankruptcy to add Allen as a defendant to determine if he, in fact, had an interest in this proceeding.’ [Appellant's App. Vol. II, pp. 19-25, 22-23].” Appellant's Br. p. 9. But Allen testified that his bankruptcy trustee and attorneys would not allow him to sign a release of any potential interest. And Allen fails to provide authority demonstrating why this conclusion, even if erroneous, precludes summary judgment. Having conducted our de novo review and concluding that summary judgment is appropriate, we decline to address this argument.

Scheele, Judge.

Foley, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.