Ronnie D. Brooks, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After Ronnie D. Brooks pled guilty to Level 5 felony intimidation and Level 5 felony attempted battery and admitted to being a habitual offender, the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of ten years of incarceration. Brooks contends that his sentence is inappropriately harsh. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On December 2, 2024, David Vanlandingham was working as a mail carrier for the United States Postal Service when he approached the porch of 2017 Nelle Street in Anderson. Brooks, who did not live at the address but was present, told Vanlandingham to leave and not deliver the mail, and, when Vanlandingham did, in fact, deliver the mail, Brooks pulled out a knife and threatened to “cut” him. Tr. Vol. II p. 48. After Brooks pursued Vanlandingham and struck him in the face with the hand in which he held the knife—luckily making only slight contact—Vanlandingham was able to subdue Brooks and disarm him. Vanlandingham warned Brooks to “cut it out” or he would call the police and returned to his truck. Tr. Vol. II p. 48. Brooks retrieved his knife, followed Vanlandingham to his truck, banged on the window, and again threated to “cut” him. Tr. Vol. II p. 49.

[3] On December 3, 2024, the State charged Brooks with Level 5 felony intimidation and Level 5 felony attempted battery by means of a deadly weapon and, on January 10, 2025, alleged that he was a habitual offender. On January 31, 2025, Brooks pled guilty as charged and admitted to being a habitual offender. On March 21, 2025, the trial court sentenced Brooks to five years of incarceration each for intimidation and attempted battery, ordered that the sentences be served concurrently, and enhanced the sentence five years by virtue of his habitual-offender status.

Discussion and Decision

[4] Brooks contends that his aggregate ten-year sentence is inappropriately harsh. We “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). “Although appellate review of sentences must give due consideration to the trial court's sentence because of the special expertise of the trial bench in making sentencing decisions, Appellate Rule 7(B) is an authorization to revise sentences when certain broad conditions are satisfied.” Shouse v. State, 849 N.E.2d 650, 660 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citations and quotation marks omitted), trans. denied. “[W]hether we regard a sentence as appropriate at the end of the day turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). In addition to the “ ‘due consideration’ ” we are required to give to the trial court's sentencing decision, “we understand and recognize the unique perspective a trial court brings to its sentencing decisions.” Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Appellate R. 7(B)). Brooks pled guilty to two Level 5 felonies, and Indiana Code section 35-50-2-6(b) provides that a person convicted of a Level 5 felony “shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between one (1) and six (6) years, with the advisory sentence being three (3) years[,]” making his sentence significantly enhanced.

[5] In evaluating the nature of Brooks's offense, we consider “the nature, extent, heinousness, and brutality of the offense[,]” Dean v. State, 222 N.E.3d 976, 990 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied, and, in so doing, we find it to be moderately heinous. For no apparent reason, Brooks attacked Vanlandingham, who, it seems, was just trying to do his job. Brooks threatened to cut Vanlandingham and attempted to punch him in the face while holding a knife, luckily making only slight contact. Even after Vanlandingham had disarmed and subdued him, Brooks retrieved his knife and went after him again, banging on the windows of his truck and threatening to cut him again. The senselessness of the attack and potential for far greater harm do not justify a reduction in Brooks's sentence.

[6] Brooks's character also justifies the length of his sentence. In evaluating a defendant's character, we consider “the defendant's age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse.” Wilson v. State, 221 N.E.3d 667, 680 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91, 100 (Ind. 2021), and McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020)). Brooks's criminal record is, to say the least, lengthy and serious, including six juvenile adjudications, thirty prior misdemeanor convictions, fifteen prior felony convictions, and twelve alleged community-supervision violations. As a juvenile, Brooks was found delinquent for committing what would be theft, robbery, and four counts of burglary if committed by an adult. As an adult, Brooks has convictions for theft, five counts of public intoxication, fleeing law enforcement, burglary, five counts of battery, six counts of resisting law enforcement, five counts of disorderly conduct, receiving stolen property, two counts of robbery, carrying a handgun without a permit, criminal mischief, possession of cocaine, possession of a look-a-like substance, illegal possession of paraphernalia, four counts of intimidation, four counts of driving while intoxicated, two counts of domestic battery, strangulation, invasion of privacy, and failure to return to lawful detention. Brooks has also previously been found to be a habitual offender and has violated the terms of various placements eleven times. “Significance [of criminal history] varies based on the gravity, nature and number of prior offenses as they relate to the current offense[,]” Wooley v. State, 716 N.E.2d 919, 929 n.4 (Ind. 1999), and the sheer number of Brooks's prior criminal convictions, including nine for crimes of violence, is significant indeed.

[7] Brooks's admitted history of substance abuse (much of which has been illegal) also does him no credit. Brooks, sixty-three years old at the time of sentencing, has been drinking alcohol since he was eighteen. Brooks admitted to drinking up to a gallon of alcohol a day around the time he had attacked Vanlandingham and that he had been intoxicated on alcohol, cocaine, and methamphetamine when the attack had occurred. “[L]ongstanding drug or alcohol abuse without improvement despite opportunities for rehabilitation may support such a conclusion [of bad character].” Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 6 (Ind. 2014); see also Mefford v. State, 983 N.E.2d 232, 237–38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (noting that a long history of substance abuse did not reflect well on a forty-one-year-old defendant's character), trans. denied. As was the case in Mefford, Brooks's “history of criminal activity, multiple probation violations and revocations, and admitted illegal drug use reflect poorly on his character and indicate nothing but a disregard for the law.” Mefford, 983 N.E.2d at 238.

[8] We acknowledge the testimony at Brooks's sentencing that he had been acting as a caretaker for his girlfriend and mother and was suffering from schizophrenia. The fact that Brooks had the responsibility of caring for others, if anything, makes his latest offenses even more egregious because they will now prevent him from doing so. Moreover, even though Brooks testified to having schizophrenia, he did not testify that his criminal conduct was a result of his alleged mental illness. These purported mitigators do not rise to the level of “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character” necessary to overcome the deference given to the trial court's sentencing decision. Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). Given the egregious nature of Brooks's offenses and his truly appalling criminal history, he has failed to convince us that, in light of the nature of his offenses and his character, a reduction in his ten-year sentence is warranted.

[9] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Bradford, Judge.

Weissmann, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.