Tawana Evette Monroe, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Tawana Evette Monroe pled guilty to Level 6 felony operating a vehicle as a habitual traffic violator and Level 6 felony theft. The trial court accepted Monroe's guilty plea and imposed an aggregate two-and-one-half-year sentence. Monroe contends that her sentence is inappropriate. Concluding otherwise, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On or about May 4, 2014, Monroe's driving privileges “were suspended for ten (10) years” after Monroe “was found to be a habitual traffic violator.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 44. On February 18, 2024, Monroe operated “a 2017 Dodge Journey, a motor vehicle, in the vicinity of 61st Avenue and Virginia Street in Merrillville, ․ after her driving privileges had been suspended[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 44. On February 18, 2024, the State charged Monroe under Cause Number 45G02-2403-F6-766 (“Cause No. F6-766”) with Level 6 felony operating a vehicle as a habitual traffic violator.

[3] Between September 20, and September 23, 2024, Monroe cared for Orithia Howard in Howard's Merrillville home. While in Howard's home, Monroe “took an American Express credit card and an Advanced Federal Credit card, both belonging to [Howard].” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 45. Monroe “then took said credit cards and made several purchases at Walmart and Southlake Mall, both located in Merrillville, ․ with [the] purchases totaling $1046.00.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 45. Monroe “did not have the permission of [Howard] to take said property or make said purchases.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 45. On November 7, 2024, the State charged Monroe under Cause Number 45G02-2411-F6-3073 (“Cause No. F6-3073”) with two counts of Level 6 felony theft and three counts of Class A misdemeanor fraud.

[4] On April 9, 2025, Monroe pled guilty as charged under Cause No. F6-766 and to one count of Level 6 felony theft under Cause No. F6-3073. Monroe and the State agreed that her sentence under Cause No. F6-766 would be capped at six months and that sentencing for Cause No. F6-3073 would be left to the trial court's discretion. In exchange for Monroe's guilty plea, the State also agreed to dismiss the remaining charges in Cause No. F6-3073 as well as the criminal charges that had been brought under four other cause numbers. The trial court accepted Monroe's guilty plea and sentenced her to six months in the Lake County Jail (“the Jail”) for Cause No. 766 and two years in the Department of Correction (“DOC”) for Cause No. 3073, for an aggregate two-and-one-half-year sentence.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Monroe contends that her two-and-one-half-year sentence is inappropriate. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “[t]he Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” In analyzing such claims, we “concentrate less on comparing the facts of [the case at issue] to others, whether real or hypothetical, and more on focusing on the nature, extent, and depravity of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced, and what it reveals about the defendant's character.” Paul v. State, 888 N.E.2d 818, 825 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal quotation omitted), trans. denied. The defendant bears the burden of persuading us that her sentence is inappropriate. Sanchez v. State, 891 N.E.2d 174, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[6] To the extent that Monroe argues that her sentences should have been suspended to probation rather than executed in the Jail and the DOC, we note that “[t]he place where a sentence is to be served is subject to review under Rule 7(B).” Moon v. State, 110 N.E.3d 1156, 1162 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). “However, this court has recognized that it is quite difficult for [an appellant] to prevail on a claim that his placement is inappropriate.” Id. (bracketed material added, internal quotation omitted). “Moreover, because our appellate review is focused not on whether another sentence might be more appropriate, but on whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate, [an appellant] challenging the placement of a sentence must convince us that the given placement is itself inappropriate.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).

[7] “A person who commits a Level 6 felony ․ shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between six (6) months and two and one-half (2 1/212) years, with the advisory sentence being one (1) year.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b). Again, the trial court sentenced Monroe to six months in the Jail for Cause No. 766 and two years in the DOC for Cause No. 3073. Monroe “does not raise a challenge to the trial court's findings as to aggravating and mitigating circumstances or their weight but only asserts that the sentence is inappropriate based on her character and the nature of her offense.” Appellant's Br. p. 8.

[8] We first turn to the nature of Monroe's offenses. “The nature of the offense is found in the details and circumstances of the commission of the offense and the defendant's participation.” Perry v. State, 78 N.E.3d 1, 13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Monroe operated a vehicle despite knowing that her driving privileges had been suspended. The fact that Monroe had multiple prior convictions for the same offense makes her current conviction more egregious in that it demonstrates an ongoing disregard for the laws of this State. Monroe also took advantage of a position of trust by taking two credit cards from an elderly individual, to whom she had been providing care and making $1046.00 in unauthorized charges.

[9] Turning to Monroe's character, we note that “[t]he character of the offender is found in what we learn of the offender's life and conduct.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). “A defendant's criminal history is one relevant factor in analyzing his or her character[.]” Madden v. State, 162 N.E.3d 549, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). “This weight is measured by the number of prior convictions and their gravity, by their proximity or distance from the present offense, and by any similarity or dissimilarity to the present offense that might reflect on a defendant's culpability.” Bryant v. State, 841 N.E.2d 1154, 1156 (Ind. 2006).

[10] Monroe has committed numerous traffic offenses, dating back to when she was a juvenile. Her driving-related prior offenses include an informal adjustment as a juvenile for committing what would be Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle without ever receiving a license if committed by an adult, a traffic infraction for operating a motor vehicle without a license, a conviction for Class C misdemeanor operating a motor vehicle without ever receiving a license, two convictions for Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended, and three convictions for Level 6 felony operating a vehicle as a habitual traffic violator. Monroe also has prior convictions for Class A misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, Class A misdemeanor theft, Level 6 felony forgery, and Level 6 felony theft. In addition, it is of note that three of the cases dismissed pursuant to Monroe's plea agreement also included charges for operating a vehicle as a habitual traffic violator. The other involved a failure to return to lawful detention.

[11] Monroe has also failed to take advantage of prior opportunities to rehabilitate herself, and prior attempts at leniency have been unsuccessful, as Monroe has previously failed to comply with the terms of her probation, has had prior placements on probation revoked, and has been unsatisfactorily discharged from prior placements on probation. In addition, Monroe was found to be a moderate risk to reoffend. Monroe's criminal history, which includes past convictions for both of the crimes that she pled guilty to committing here, and failure to reform her behavior reflects poorly on her character. See Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character.”).

[12] The fact that Monroe violated a position of trust by committing theft against an elderly individual, to whom she was providing care, also reflects poorly on her character. See Walters v. State, 68 N.E.3d 1097, 1103 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (concluding that the defendant's violation of a position of trust reflected poorly on his character and supported an enhanced sentence), trans. denied. Furthermore, while Monroe pled guilty, she received a substantial benefit from doing so with the dismissal of numerous other charges, which suggests that her guilty plea was more a pragmatic decision than a true acceptance of responsibility for her actions. See Wells v. State, 836 N.E.2d 475, 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that a guilty plea is not necessarily a demonstration of remorse but rather a pragmatic decision when the defendant receives a substantial benefit from the plea), trans. denied. To the extent that Monroe claims that she has expressed remorse for her actions, we note that the trial court did not find her claimed remorse to be genuine and we defer to the trial court's evaluation of remorse. See Corralez v. State, 815 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (providing that substantial deference must be given to a trial court's evaluation of remorse because the trial court, which has the ability to directly observe the defendant and listen to the tenor of his or her voice, is in the best position to determine whether the claimed remorse is genuine). Monroe has failed to convince us that her two-and-one-half-year aggregate sentence is inappropriate. See Sanchez, 891 N.E.2d at 176.

[13] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Bradford, Judge.

Weissmann, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.