CODALATA v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Anthony Codalata and his girlfriend, K.W., got into an altercation at K.W.’s apartment during which Codalata tackled her, grabbed her feet, and dragged her across the floor. As a result, K.W. sustained injuries to her arm and her nails. Codalata was charged with domestic battery and battery resulting in bodily injury. After a bench trial, he was found guilty on both counts but sentenced only on the domestic battery charge. He now challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. We affirm but sua sponte remand to correct a sentencing error.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In November 2023, K.W., Codalata's girlfriend of eight years, returned home from a nail appointment to find Codalata had “trashed” it. Transcript at 14. After she cleaned up, she and Codalata fell asleep. K.W. awoke early that morning to loud noises from Codalata throwing her backpack around the apartment. K.W. called her mother for help, and her mother began driving to K.W.’s apartment. While still talking to her mother, Codalata became aggressive with K.W., causing her to hang up the phone.

[3] Codalata tackled K.W. and they fought over her phone. She attempted to get him off her and tried to crawl away, but “he grabbed [her] by [her] feet[ ] and [ ] dragged [her] on the floor.” Tr. at 15. Not long after that, her mother arrived, followed by the police. The police took photos of K.W.’s injuries at the scene, which included a scratch on her arm and two damaged, bloody nails. See Exhibits at 3-5.

[4] Codalata was charged with Count I: Domestic Battery, as a Class A misdemeanor;¹ and Count II: Battery Resulting in Bodily Injury, a Class A misdemeanor.² At the bench trial, K.W. testified about the altercation and shared that she also sustained a bruised tailbone and a cut on her foot. Codalata claimed he woke up to K.W. searching through his phone and “frantically slapping” him. Tr. at 21. He testified that K.W. began throwing his belongings into the yard and that he had to hold her down to keep her from “throwing blows at” him. Id. at 22. He did not claim he sustained any injuries, and none were documented.

[5] The trial court found Codalata guilty on both counts, but “merge[d]” Count II into Count I and sentenced him as to Count I only. Tr. at 28; see Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 77. The court entered a no contact order and sentenced Codalata to 365 days in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC), with four days of credit time and the remaining 361 days suspended to probation. He was ordered to complete the Marion County Drug and Alcohol Services Program and upon completion, his probation would be terminated. Codalata now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] On appeal, Codalata argues only that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. However, we also find it necessary to address sua sponte the trial court's attempt to resolve its double jeopardy concerns by merging, without vacating, Codalata's conviction on Count II.

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[7] In a sufficiency review, weighing evidence and assessing witness credibility are matters left to the trier of fact, not appellate courts. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). Thus, “when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, they must consider it ‘most favorably to the trial court's ruling.’ ” Id. (quoting Wright v. State, 828 N.E.2d 904, 906 (Ind. 2005)). We “consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict.” Id. (quoting McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126) (Ind. 2005)) (emphasis in original). We will affirm if, given the probative evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. McHenry, 820 N.E.2d at 126.

[8] Codalata was convicted of Class A misdemeanor domestic battery, which required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he: (1) knowingly or intentionally, (2) touched a family or household member,³ (3) in a rude, insolent, or angry manner. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1). Codalata asserts that the evidence is insufficient “because it is not substantial and was more likely suggesting a mutual combat scenario.” Appellant's Brief at 7. We disagree and find there is sufficient evidence to support his conviction.

[9] K.W. testified that he tackled her, grabbed her feet, and dragged her across the floor. See Tr. at 15. The State presented further evidence of the fresh injuries to her nails and arms following the altercation. See Ex. at 3-5. This evidence satisfies the elements of the domestic battery offense. While Codalata provided contradictory testimony, asserting instead that K.W. had hit him, we must consider such conflicting evidence “most favorably to the trial court's ruling.” Wright, 828 N.E.2d at 906. Notably, Codalata states as much in his brief, conceding that “[i]t is clear that the facts presented by these two witnesses could support a finding against either[.]” Appellant's Br. at 8 (emphasis added). Thus, Codalata is merely requesting that we reweigh evidence and judge witness credibility, which we decline to do.⁴

2. Merger

[10] We sua sponte address the trial court's merger of Codalata's two battery convictions. The sentencing order lists “Finding of Guilty” as the disposition for Count I, domestic battery, and “Conviction Merged” as the disposition for Count II, battery resulting in bodily injury. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 77. The judgment entry in the chronological case summary states the same. Id. at 10. As mentioned above, at trial, the court found Codalata “guilty of the domestic, as well as the battery resulting in bodily injury.” Tr. at 28. It then stated, “I think with the two cases they are going to -- they're going to merge.” Id. However, because it appears the court entered judgment of conviction on both counts, merely merging the offenses was insufficient to resolve the presumed double jeopardy issue. See Owens v. State, 206 N.E.3d 1187, 1190-91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (where the trial court entered judgment of conviction on a lesser included offense, “merging the offenses was not enough to resolve the court's double jeopardy concern”), trans. denied.

[11] Because the battery convictions were merged for sentencing, there are no more or less severe penal consequences for vacating one conviction instead of the other. Thus, we remand this case to the trial court to vacate the “merged” conviction for Count II, battery resulting in bodily injury. See Noble v. State, 734 N.E.2d 1119, 1126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (vacating the second battery conviction where the sentences for each conviction were of equal length), trans. denied.

Conclusion

[12] Finding sufficient evidence to support Codalata's domestic battery conviction, we affirm. However, we remand with instructions to vacate his “merged” conviction for Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury.

[13] Affirmed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1).

2.   I.C. § 35-42-2-1(c)(1), (d)(1).

3.   A “family or household member” includes a person the individual “is dating or has dated[.]” I.C. § 35-31.5-2-128(a)(2).

4.   While Codalata asserts that the record reveals only “mutual combat,” this argument is futile. Appellant's Br. at 7. “Mutual combat” does not excuse or preclude battery; indeed, whether Codalata and K.W. each battered one another is immaterial, as being the first aggressor is not an element of the offense. See I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1). When two individuals have, by definition, battered each other, a prosecutor has the discretion to charge one person, both, or neither. Cain v. State, 955 N.E.2d 714, 718 (Ind. 2011) (“Prosecutors have broad discretionary power to choose the persons whom they prosecute[.]”). Regardless of any mutual fighting that may have occurred, there was still sufficient evidence upon which the trial court could find Codalata guilty of domestic battery.

DeBoer, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.