IN RE: K.D. (Minor Child) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] K.B. (Mother) was arrested and charged with Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death after an unrelated infant died of injuries received while in her care. Mother's seven-year-old son, K.D. (Child), who reported witnessing the infant's abuse, was traumatized. When Mother was taken into custody, her father (Grandfather) cared for Child. But the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) soon removed Child from Grandfather's home due, in part, to his extensive criminal history. DCS also petitioned to find Child to be a child in need of services (CHINS). Following a fact-finding hearing at which Mother appeared telephonically from jail, the trial court determined Child was a CHINS.

[2] Mother appeals, contending the trial court abused its discretion in overruling her objection to appearing telephonically at the hearing. She also asserts that the State's removal of Child from Grandfather's home and its filing of the CHINS action were unwarranted because Grandfather was an adequate caretaker for Child. The evidence established, however, that in addition to Grandfather's criminal history, Child had experienced trauma that would not likely be addressed by Grandfather and that Child had disclosed during DCSarranged therapy that Grandfather had sexually abused him. We affirm.

Facts

[3] After Mother's arrest in connection with the 17-month-old infant's death, a DCS worker interviewed Mother in jail and inquired about Child. Mother asked that DCS not intervene as to Child because he was in a safe place with Grandfather, who had cared for Child previously when Mother was incarcerated. Yet Mother would not disclose where Grandfather lived. DCS determined that Child should be removed from Grandfather's care because Grandfather had at least four prior felony convictions—including a 2018 conviction for possession of methamphetamine and possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon—and had no legal guardianship or custody of Child.

[4] DCS petitioned to adjudicate Child a CHINS due to Mother's alleged involvement in the infant's death and subsequent arrest and incarceration. The trial court authorized DCS to place Child in foster care, and DCS referred Child to therapy. Child disclosed to his therapist that he had witnessed his “brother”—the deceased 17-month-old child—being physically abused. Tr. Vol. II, p. 36. Child also later revealed that Grandfather had touched Child's penis and that Child feared that someone would go to jail if he spoke to authorities. However, DCS was unable to substantiate Child's allegation of sexual abuse.

[5] At the initial hearing on the CHINS petition, DCS moved to allow Mother to appear telephonically because she was in jail, and the trial court granted that motion. The record does not make clear whether Mother appeared at the initial hearing in person or telephonically. During the five months between the initial hearing and the fact-finding hearing, Mother remained in jail. At no point did she seek an order to transport her to the fact-finding hearing. She appeared telephonically at the fact-finding hearing, although her counsel was present in the courtroom.

[6] After DCS began presenting its evidence, Mother's counsel objected to Mother's telephonic appearance, arguing that she “has the right to be present at a fact[-]finding hearing, not just via telephone.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 7. The trial court denied the motion after noting Mother's incarceration, the lack of any motion to transport, and “the seriousness of the felony she's charged with.” Id. The court concluded that “for security's sake I think this is sufficient confrontation for her to be available by phone.” Id. During the hearing, the telephone call with Mother briefly dropped, but the court immediately called the jail back and Mother was reconnected before any additional testimony was taken.

[7] The trial court determined Child was a CHINS based on the following findings:

• Mother had been arrested and incarcerated on a charge of Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death;

• A 17-month-old infant had died after being in Mother's care;

• Child was traumatized after witnessing abuse of the infant;

• Child disclosed that Grandfather had touched his genitals;

• Mother had no contact with Child after her arrest in May 2024;

• Grandfather had no legal guardianship or custody rights to Child; and

• Child needed therapy to process his trauma.

Mother appeals the CHINS determination.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Mother raises two issues on appeal. First, she argues that the trial court abused its discretion by overruling her objection to appearing telephonically at the fact-finding hearing. Second, she contends that DCS failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that Child is a CHINS.

I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Denying Mother's Objection to Her Telephonic Appearance

[9] Mother contends the trial court abused its discretion when it overruled her objection to appearing telephonically. An incarcerated parent does not have an absolute constitutional right to be physically present at CHINS proceedings. In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); see also In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 922-23 (Ind. 2011) (holding that an incarcerated parent does not have an absolute due process right to be transported to a termination of parental rights hearing). Rather, the decision whether to permit an incarcerated person to attend a hearing rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. Telephonic participation is a valid alternative to in-person attendance for an incarcerated parent. See In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d at 922-23.

[10] In S.P.H., this Court addressed a similar situation where the incarcerated parent argued “his due process rights were violated because the trial court failed to secure his presence during the CHINS hearings.” 806 N.E.2d at 879. This Court ruled that “the trial court did not even have to reach this decision” because the parent “never filed a motion to transport for the CHINS hearings.” Id.

[11] Here, as in S.P.H., Mother never filed a pretrial motion to transport. On June 12, 2024, DCS moved for Mother's telephonic appearance at the initial hearing—a motion that the trial court granted. Because Mother remained incarcerated throughout the CHINS proceeding, she was reasonably informed that through the trial court's order that telephonic participation might be required at subsequent hearings. Yet, Mother never moved for her transport to the fact-finding hearing or otherwise informed the court of her desire to appear in person until after the hearing began—five months after the initial hearing.

[12] Mother's counsel merely objected to telephonic participation for the first time after DCS's first witness began testifying at the fact-finding hearing. When the trial court overruled the objection, Mother did not seek a continuance of the hearing to allow her physical presence in the courtroom. Under these circumstances, the trial court was not obligated to sua sponte arrange for Mother's presence at the fact-finding hearing. See id.

[13] Mother's reliance on Indiana Administrative Rule 14(C) is misplaced. This rule provides that “[a] court must conduct all testimonial proceedings in person except that a court may conduct the proceedings remotely for all or some of the case participants for good cause shown or by agreement of the parties.” To the extent the trial court was required to make a good cause determination under Rule 14(C), the court complied. When Mother's counsel objected, the court noted that “no motion to bring her over here was presented” and that “based on the seriousness of the felony she's charged with, I think for security's sake ․ this is sufficient confrontation for her to be available by phone.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 7.

[14] The court's reasoning was particularized to Mother's situation and the circumstances of this case. These are not inadequate “boilerplate” or “one-size-fits-all” reasons, but case-specific findings that take into account the procedural posture and security concerns. Cf. B.N. v. Health & Hosp. Corp., 199 N.E.3d 360, 365 (Ind. 2022) (finding an abuse of discretion when the trial court relied on generic criteria rather than particularized findings but ultimately ruling the error was harmless).

[15] Moreover, Mother fails to demonstrate how she was harmed by appearing telephonically. She listened to the testimony, was permitted to testify, and was represented by counsel, who appeared in person throughout the proceedings. See Matter of C.C., 170 N.E.3d 669, 676 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (finding no due process violation from mother's alleged lack of notice of termination of parental rights hearing when she was represented by counsel –a circumstance that “provided due process protections to her”). Although Mother asserts the connection was “breaking up” and briefly dropped, the record shows the court promptly reconnected the call before proceeding. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 123-25. Any testimony Mother may have missed was that of the maternal grandfather—her own witness—while her counsel remained present. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother's objection to appearing telephonically.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[16] When reviewing a CHINS adjudication for sufficient evidence, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the trial court's decision without reweighing the evidence or judging witness credibility. In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1286-87. A CHINS adjudication under Indiana Code § 31-34-1-1 requires DCS to prove three elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the parent's actions or inactions seriously endangered the child; (2) the child's need for care, treatment or rehabilitation is unmet; and (3) that need is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court. See id. at 1287; Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3. Mother contends only this final element was unproven, as she had already arranged that Grandfather provide care for K.D. while Father and she were incarcerated.

[17] The CHINS statute guards against unwarranted State interference in family life because “[n]ot every endangered child is a child in need of services, permitting the State's parens patriae intrusion into the ordinarily private sphere of the family.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287. For this reason, courts “should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.” In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 580 (Ind. 2017). When determining whether coercive intervention is necessary, “the question is whether the parents must be coerced into providing or accepting necessary treatment for their child.” Matter of E.K., 83 N.E.3d 1256, 1262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).

[18] The infant died of injuries allegedly sustained in Mother's care in mid-May 2024, and DCS removed K.D. from Grandfather's home about two weeks later. There was no evidence that during those two weeks, Grandfather had taken any steps to arrange therapy for K.D. to address the trauma he had witnessed. Contrary to Grandfather's testimony, the evidence suggested he would not seek such services. It was only three months later, after DCS intervened and referred K.D. to therapy, that K.D. began receiving treatment. K.D. disclosed to his therapist that both Mother and “pops”—K.D.’s name for his Grandfather—had told him not to talk to DCS or law enforcement. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 35-36.

[19] When K.D. began therapy, he appeared nervous and traumatized when discussing what he had witnessed. According to the therapist, the trauma weighed heavily on him. Without court intervention ensuring K.D. could receive therapy in an environment where he felt safe to disclose what he experienced, his therapeutic needs would remain unmet.

[20] Moreover, the placement Mother arranged was neither safe nor appropriate. Grandfather had at least four prior felony convictions, including a 2018 conviction for possession of methamphetamine and possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. During therapy, K.D. disclosed that Grandfather had touched his penis. Although this report was ultimately not substantiated, the therapist still believed the abuse occurred based on her dealings with K.D. The therapist recommended that visits with Grandfather be suspended so K.D. could process his trauma. Yet Mother continued to seek placement of K.D. with Grandfather and did not believe he was a threat to K.D. Given the evidence that K.D. had been coached not to disclose information, Grandfather's criminal history, and the therapist's concerns about Grandfather, the trial court did not err in determining placement with Grandfather would not provide the therapeutic environment K.D. needed.

[21] Finding no error, we affirm.

Weissmann, Judge.

Bradford, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.