IN RE: T.O. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In October of 2024, the then-sixteen-year-old T.O. (“Child”) was living with his mother R.S. (“Mother”) in Plymouth. On October 20, 2024, Mother and Child fought over a sweatshirt, with Mother putting her arm around Child's neck at one point, which caused significant swelling to his neck; the incident led to criminal charges for Mother. The Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) removed Child from Mother's care and petitioned to have him found to be a child in need of services (“CHINS”). The juvenile court found Child to be a CHINS and ordered Mother to participate in various services aimed at reunification. Mother contends that DCS failed to establish that Child is a CHINS. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born on September 15, 2009, to Mother and Father ¹ and, in October of 2024, resided with Mother in Plymouth. On October 20, 2024, Plymouth Police Officer Jesse Witkowski responded to a report of domestic violence at Mother's home and found her and Child fighting over a sweatshirt. Officer Witkowski observed the home to be in disarray, with “clothes all over, [․] the kitchen was in disarray, [․] the table was stacked full of food and other items, [․] dirty clothes.” Tr. Vol. II p. 7. Mother admitted that Child had “been physical with her before.” Tr. Vol. II p. 8. Officer Witkowski observed redness on Child's face and the top of his head and decided to take Mother into custody. Mother told Officer Witkoski that she did not want Child anymore, “that she was sick of him[, and] she just wanted him to be gone.” Tr. Vol. II p. 9. Mother was arrested and later charged with domestic battery in cause number 50D03-2411-F6-281, and a no-contact order was entered on or about November 6, 2024.

[3] Meanwhile, Child was taken to a hospital for treatment and told Forensic Nurse Ashley Crawford that he had returned home from a walk when Mother had asked him why he was wearing a certain hoodie that he was not supposed to be wearing. When Child had offered to go to the basement and change to another hoodie, Mother had told him, “no, you're not going to do that,” and the conflict had become physical when Mother slapped him. Tr. Vol. II p. 14. Mother had also put her arm around Child's neck and pulled his hair before calling the police. A follow-up examination of Child revealed that he had had significant swelling of his neck three days previously.

[4] On October 21, 2024, DCS sought authorization to petition to have Child found to be a CHINS, which the juvenile court granted the next day. On March 6, 2025, the juvenile court held a fact-finding hearing. DCS Family Case Manager Morgan Anderson (“FCM Anderson”) testified that she had been involved with Mother and Child's case from the beginning. FCM Anderson testified that Mother had been charged with battery of Child and that a no-contact order entered in that case had prevented the standard visitation from occurring. FCM Anderson indicated that Child had been doing relatively well in his kinship-home placement, getting “pretty good grades” and regularly taking his ADHD and mood-regulating medication, which had apparently not been the case previously. Tr. Vol. II pp. 28–29. FCM Anderson indicated that services had been offered to Mother, including individual therapy and parent education, but that DCS had been unable to confirm if Mother had complied with any of them.

[5] Mother testified that she had begun therapy for herself and had had Child in different forms of therapy over the course of several years. Mother claimed to have participated in every one of those therapy sessions and that she had been given coping skills to redirect and address Child's behavior. According to Mother, Child had threatened to commit suicide on September 19, 2024, and had been taken by police to a hospital where he had been admitted for one week. One of Mother's exhibits indicated that, during the eleven months preceding the domestic-battery incident, police had received several reports concerning issues with Child from Mother and neighbors. Mother also advised that she had been unable to find anyone to care for Child and had no placement for him if the CHINS case was dismissed while her criminal matter was pending. At the conclusion of the fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court found Child to be a CHINS.

[6] On March 13, 2025, the juvenile court issued written findings and conclusions, adjudicating Child a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code sections 31-34-1-1 and 31-34-1-2. The juvenile court also concluded that DCS had provided sufficient evidence to support a presumption of CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-12-4. The juvenile court noted that the amended no-contact order in Mother's criminal case provided that any contact between Mother and Child would be determined by DCS pending an adjudication of the CHINS case; in other words, if the CHINS petition were to be dismissed, Mother would be prohibited from having contact with Child. The juvenile court concluded that coercive intervention of the court was necessary to ensure that Child received the necessary care and treatment that Mother is otherwise unable to provide. The juvenile court concluded that it was in the best interests of Child to remain removed from Mother's home and in the placement and care of DCS.

[7] At the April 15, 2025, dispositional hearing, FCM Anderson testified regarding DCS's recommendations, which included a clinical assessment, parenting education, individual therapy, family therapy, visitation, and for Mother to sign the appropriate releases, which had not yet been done. Mother indicated that she would refuse to participate in a clinical assessment, claiming to have already begun individual therapy. With respect to parenting education, Mother indicated that if the juvenile court ordered her to participate, she would either comply or “file a motion to vacate because there's no [․] logical reason for such.” Tr. Vol. II p. 84. On April 16, 2025, the juvenile court ordered wardship of Child to DCS with responsibility for supervision, care, and placement and ordered Mother to participate in various reunification services, as recommended by DCS.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Mother contends that DCS failed to produce evidence sufficient to sustain the juvenile court's finding that Child is a CHINS, specifically, that DCS failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish that she was unable to provide care, rehabilitation, or treatment without resorting to court intervention. In a CHINS proceeding,

“the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code.” In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010). We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Egly v. Blackford County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1992). We consider only the evidence that supports the [juvenile] court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. We reverse only upon a showing that the decision of the [juvenile] court was clearly erroneous. Id.

In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012) (footnote omitted). “We give due regard to the [juvenile] court's ability to assess the credibility of witnesses.” In re Des.B., 2 N.E.3d 828, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). A decision is clearly erroneous if the facts do not support the findings or if the juvenile court applied the wrong legal standard to properly-found facts. In re D.J. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 68 N.E.3d 574, 578 (Ind. 2017).

[9] Here, DCS alleged that Child was a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code sections 31-34-1-1 and 31-34-1-2. To meet its burden pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, DCS was required to prove that Child is under the age of eighteen and that

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; [and]

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1. DCS also alleged Child was a CHINS pursuant to Section 31-34-1-2(a), which required DCS to prove Child is under eighteen and that

(1) the child's physical or mental health is seriously endangered due to injury by the act or omission of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

Ind. Code § 31-34-1-2(a).

[10] Finally, DCS invoked the Presumption Statute in this case, which creates a rebuttable presumption that a child is a CHINS because of an act or omission of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian if DCS produces evidence that

(1) the child has been injured;

(2) at the time the child was injured, the parent, guardian, or custodian:

(A) had the care, custody, or control of the child; or

(B) had legal responsibility for the care, custody, or control of the child;

(3) the injury would not ordinarily be sustained except for the act or omission of a parent, guardian, or custodian; and

(4) there is a reasonable probability that the injury was not accidental.

Ind. Code § 31-34-12-4. Once this showing is made, the rebuttable presumption that a child is a CHINS applies to all the statutory CHINS elements detailed in various sections of Indiana Code chapter 31-34-1, including the “coercive intervention” element. Matter of K.Y., 145 N.E.3d 854, 861 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. The purpose of the Presumption Statute is, in cases where a child has injuries that suggest neglect or abuse, to shift the burden to the party most likely to have knowledge of the cause of the injuries—the parent, guardian, or custodian—to produce evidence rebutting the presumption that the child is a CHINS. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. v. J.D., 77 N.E.3d 801, 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied.

[11] The juvenile court found that a rebuttable presumption was established that Child was a CHINS and adjudicated him to be so pursuant to Indiana Code sections 31-34-1-1 and 31-34-1-2. To support these conclusions, the juvenile court made the following findings, none of which Mother challenges:

2) Jesse Witkowski is an officer with the Plymouth Police Department. He testified that in October 2024, he responded to a domestic call at Mother's residence. Upon arrival, he observed Mother and Child to be physically fighting over an article of clothing.

3) Officer Witkowski took statements from Mother and Child and was able to observe the condition of the home, which he described as “in disarray” with clothes and trash throughout.

4) At the conclusion of his assessment, Officer Witkowski took Mother into custody. He opined that due to the nature of the incident, it was Mother's responsibility as a parent to de-escalate conflict with the child, which she failed to do.

5) The child was observed to have injuries and transported to the hospital to be medically evaluated.

6) Ashley Crawford is a forensic nurse with Beacon Health Systems. She conducted the initial examination of the child following the domestic incident on October 20, 2024.

7) Nurse Crawford observed injuries on the child's body. She asked him for an account of what occurred. The child disclosed that he and Mother engaged in an altercation in which Mother slapped him several times, pulled his hair, and placed her arm across his neck forcibly. The child expressed feeling pain as a result.

8) Due to the disclosure of possible strangulation, Nurse Crawford conducted a CT scan to examine for internal injuries. None were found.

9) Nurse Crawford then measured the child's neck circumference. The child was instructed to return in 72 hours to be measured again to determine whether there was any swelling.

10) Nancy Grant is a forensic nurse and the Forensic Coordinator at St. Joseph Medical Center. Nurse Grant conducted the followup examination on the child. She found a significant decrease in the child's neck circumference from the last visit, indicating that swelling had occurred, which is itself an indicator of strangulation.

11) Nurse Grant testified that strangulation is a medically serious event, as even temporary lapses of oxygen flow to the brain can have multiple harmful effects including neurological damage, stroke, and death.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 131–32.

[12] These findings established that Mother injured Child while he was in her care by strangling him with her arm during an argument, an injury that would not have been ordinarily sustained without an act by Mother and was not accidental, sufficient to raise the presumption that Child was a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-12-4. See In re C.K., 70 N.E.3d 359, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (concluding that the statutory presumption that the child was a CHINS applied where the child showed symptoms of a head injury sustained while in the mother's care and the injury was of a type not ordinarily sustained except for an act or omission of a parent and was not accidental). The Presumption Statute requires only “competent evidence of probative value” of the circumstances set out therein, and this threshold was crossed. Ind. Code § 31-34-12-4.

[13] The burden therefore shifted to Mother to produce evidence to rebut the presumption in the juvenile court that Child was a CHINS. See J.D., 77 N.E.3d 801 at 809 (“DCS need only produce some relevant and admissible evidence tending to establish the elements of the Presumption Statute in order to shift the burden of production to the parents or custodians.”). Mother draws our attention to evidence that Child had been engaged in therapy and that she had made attempts to address his problems without DCS or court involvement. Even if we assume that this evidence might have rebutted the presumption that Child is a CHINS, the juvenile court was under no obligation to credit any of it and very possibly did not. See In re Des.B., 2 N.E.3d at 836 (“We give due regard to the [juvenile] court's ability to assess the credibility of witnesses.”). In any event, the evidence Mother points to seems to establish—at best—that she had made unsuccessful attempts to address Child's issues on her own. The record contains evidence that, when he lived with Mother, Child was allowed to walk to counseling appointments alone, choose not to go on occasion, and did not regularly take his medications. Moreover, evidence of Child's hospitalization following his threat to commit suicide, mere weeks before being removed from Mother by DCS, indicates that his mental-health needs were not being met by her. Mother's argument in this regard is nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See, e.g., In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1253 (“We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses.”).

[14] We affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father apparently has not had any contact with Child in many years and does not participate in this appeal.

Bradford, Judge.

Weissmann, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.