Kafele Jahi Marsh, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Kafele Jahi Marsh appeals his conviction of invasion of privacy, as a Class A misdemeanor. The only issue he raises is whether there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Finding that there was, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Pursuant to a plea agreement into which Marsh entered in another criminal case ¹ on January 7, 2025, Marsh was sentenced to an aggregate term of three years in Community Corrections and was ordered to “have no contact of any kind” “throughout [his] entire sentence” with Daisha McGraw. Ex. at 3. On January 23, Marsh asked McGraw to bring him a check that had been delivered to McGraw's residence. The two then met between noon and 2:00 p.m. that day, while McGraw was on a break from work. While they were together, Marsh asked McGraw to drive him back to Community Corrections placement later that day, and McGraw agreed. When McGraw left work at 4:30 p.m. that day, she picked up her children and then picked up Marsh. McGraw drove to her home to “get [her] children situated” before driving Marsh to Community Corrections, and Marsh waited outside McGraw's home in McGraw's car. Tr. at 68.

[3] At 6:44 p.m., Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Logan Nethery responded to a dispatch from Marion County Community Corrections for a welfare check. Officer Nethery arrived at McGraw's residence approximately ten minutes later and saw a black sedan parked outside the home, with Marsh seated inside. Marsh exited the vehicle, but Officer Nethery could not immediately identify him because his clothing obscured his features. Officer Nethery asked Marsh what his name was, and Marsh responded, “Kyrie.” Id. at 55. Marsh then re-entered the vehicle. Another officer arrived and recognized the person inside the vehicle as Marsh. The officers had Marsh exit the vehicle again, and they handcuffed him. The officers then once again asked Marsh what his name was, and Marsh identified himself as “Kyrie Irving[.]” Id. Marsh appeared intoxicated and was slurring his words as he spoke with the officers.

[4] Officers conducted a record check using Computer Aided Dispatch (“CAD”) and the search revealed an active and served no-contact order on Marsh, with McGraw listed as the protected party. Officer Nethery also checked the website mycase.in.gov, which showed that a no-contact order had been issued against Marsh.² By this time, McGraw had exited her home and was standing outside her door. Officer Nethery overheard McGraw and Marsh stating that they “were confused” and thought the no-contact order was “dismissed or not active.” Id. at 59. McGraw had previously “looked at” the public version of mycase.in.gov and had seen an entry that some no-contact orders against Marsh had been terminated; “because of that,” she mistakenly believed that the no-contact order prohibiting Marsh from contact with her had been “terminated.” Id. at 69-70.

[5] On January 24, the State charged Marsh with invasion of privacy, a Class A misdemeanor. Following an April 15 jury trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict. The trial court held a sentencing hearing on April 30, and sentenced Marsh to 270 days executed in the Indiana Department of Correction. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Marsh challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of invasion of privacy, a Class A misdemeanor.

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed to support a criminal conviction, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. We consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such evidence. We will affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value such that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Bailey v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. 2009) (citation modified).

[7] To convict Marsh of invasion of privacy, as a Class A misdemeanor, the State was required to prove that Marsh: (1) knowingly and intentionally; (2) violated an order issued as a condition of an executed sentence under Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-30. Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1(a)(12). “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b). “A person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(a). “Knowledge and intent are both mental states and, absent an admission by the defendant, the jury must resort to the reasonable inferences from both the direct and circumstantial evidence to determine whether the defendant has the requisite knowledge or intent to commit the offense in question.” Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1091 (Ind. 2025) (citation modified).

[8] Here, there is undisputed evidence that the no-contact order was in place when Marsh had contact with McGraw in January 2025. Marsh does not dispute that the order existed, that it was entered as a condition of his sentence, and that he violated it. Rather, his only assertion is that he lacked the mens rea for the crime because he mistakenly thought the no-contact order was no longer in effect at the time he had contact with McGraw.

[9] Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-7 provides: “It is a defense that the person who engaged in the prohibited conduct was reasonably mistaken about a matter of fact, if the mistake negates the culpability required for commission of the offense.”

When the State has made a prima facie case of guilt, the burden is on the defendant to establish an evidentiary predicate of his mistaken belief of fact. Saunders v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1117, 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Hoskins v. State, 563 N.E.2d 571, 575 (Ind. 1990)). Upon invoking mistake of fact as a defense, the burden shifts to the defendant to satisfy three elements: “(1) that the mistake be honest and reasonable; (2) that the mistake be about a matter of fact; and (3) that the mistake negate the culpability required to commit the crime.” Potter v. State, 684 N.E.2d 1127, 1135 (Ind. 1997)․.

Chavers v. State, 991 N.E.2d 148, 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Regarding the first element, whether the mistake was honest “is a subjective test dealing with what [the] appellant actually believed. Reasonableness is an objective test inquiring what a reasonable man situated in similar circumstances would do.” Barton v. State, 936 N.E.2d 842, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), trans. denied.

[10] This case is akin to Chavers, in which the defendant also professed that he lacked the mens rea for invasion of privacy because he mistakenly believed a protective order of which he had been aware had been vacated. 991 N.E.2d at 152. As in Chavers, Marsh attempted to evade capture by the police,³ thus casting doubt on the honesty of his alleged belief. Id.; see also Bennett v. State, 883 N.E.2d 888, 892 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citations omitted) (“The giving of a false name is a form of flight and thus evidence of consciousness of guilt.”), trans. denied.

[11] In addition, like the defendant in Chavers, Marsh had conflicting information regarding the validity of the no-contact order. Marsh was aware that he had been ordered to have “no contact of any kind” with McGraw “throughout [his] entire sentence” and that his aggregate sentence ran for “three years.” Ex. at 3 (plea agreement signed and initialed by Marsh); 8 (abstract of judgment). However, as in Chavers, Marsh had been told by the protected person—here, McGraw—that the protective order was no longer active. In such circumstances of conflicting information, we held that “a reasonable person would attempt to verify the validity of the order, by looking at the dismissal papers personally, or by contacting the clerk of the issuing court.” Chavers, 991 N.E.2d at 152. Here, as in Chavers, Marsh did neither,⁴ and that failure was not reasonable. Our conclusion in Chavers applies equally here:

[I]t was for the [trier of fact] to determine whether [the defendant] relied at all or rather, saw an opportunity to try and skirt the law; or, if he did rely, whether his reliance was reasonable. In these cases, it is even more important than usual to remember that on appeal, we do not reweigh the evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, or substitute our judgment for that of the [trier of fact].

Id. at 153.

[12] The State provided sufficient evidence to support Marsh's conviction of invasion of privacy, a Class A misdemeanor.

[13] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Under the plea agreement, Marsh pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a Level 4 felony, and domestic battery, as a Class A misdemeanor, in Cause No. 49D29-2404-F3-11531.

2.   Marsh alleges that “the public version of mycase[.in.gov] does not show that one no contact order was still active to protect the victim or protected person.” Appellant's Br. at 6. That statement is inaccurate; Officer Nethery testified that the public version of mycase.in.gov did show that a no-contact order was in place against Marsh, but it did not disclose the name of the protected person—i.e., McGraw. However, both CAD and the private version of the mycase website did disclose that McGraw was the person protected by the active no-contact order.

3.   In Chavers, the defendant attempted to hide from the police. Marsh attempts to distinguish his case from Chavers by claiming that he “was cooperative by stepping out of the vehicle and identify[ing] himself.” Appellant's Br. at 12. However, that claim is not supported by the evidence. Rather, the police testified that Marsh twice misidentified himself as “Kyrie.” Tr. at 54-55.

4.   There is no evidence to support Marsh's claim that he, in addition to McGraw, “checked the public version of mycase to verify the existence of the no contact order.” Appellant's Br. at 12. Indeed, Marsh provides no citation to the record in support of his inaccurate claim that he had also checked mycase. See id.

Bailey, Judge.

Tavitas, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.