IN RE: the Civil Commitment of K.R. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] K.R. appeals the trial court's order involuntarily committing him for not more than ninety days.¹ K.R. raises a single issue for our review, namely, whether Community Fairbanks Behavioral Health (“Community”) presented sufficient evidence to support his temporary commitment. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] For several years, K.R. has lived with his aunt C.W. in Indianapolis. On August 30, 2025, K.R. began acting erratically. He was pacing up and down the street and was “really focused on the neighbors and what they were doing and worried that they were going to hurt” K.R. and C.W. Tr. p. 5. K.R. was also “yelling and screaming,” including profanity and inappropriate sexual comments when there were children nearby. Id. K.R. and C.W. had no history of “issues” with their neighbors. Id.

[3] K.R.’s behavior was “off and on all day,” and he would not listen to C.W. when she asked him to stop. Id. at 6. At some point, C.W. told K.R. to keep off the road and away from traffic. K.R. responded that “he was going to put on all black clothes and walk in front of a car.” Id. at 7. At that point, C.W. contacted law enforcement for K.R.’s own safety. Law enforcement officers, in turn, transported K.R. to Community.

[4] Dr. Syed Hasan, a psychiatrist, met with K.R. at Community. Dr. Hasan learned that K.R. had previously been diagnosed with autism and/or Asperger's syndrome, PTSD, anxiety, and depression. Dr. Hasan further learned that K.R. had previously been hospitalized for “psychosis where he was hearing voices and being paranoid.” Id. at 22. K.R. informed Dr. Hasan that “he doesn't like to take medications” and that “he smoke[s] marijuana.” Id.

[5] While Dr. Hasan was interviewing K.R., K.R. “described himself [as] being a guard at one time and being Jesus Christ.” Id. K.R. indicated that “he has heard voices” in the past. Id. During a prior hospitalization, K.R. “was alleged of attacking a physician or [being] aggressive towards a physician ․” Id. K.R. has had “psychotic symptoms on and off since then.” Id. Indeed, K.R. informed Dr. Hasan that, “when he first arrived on the unit, he started feeling extremely intimidated with the staff and then he thought that he was going to get a shot,” at which point “he got aggressive” with the staff and had to be “transferred to a more secure unit.” Id. at 23. K.R. also acknowledged “serious suicide attempts in the past” and a “history of violence” when he believes “people are manipulating or trying to bully him or hurt him.” Id. at 24.

[6] Based on K.R.’s medical history and current symptoms, Dr. Hasan diagnosed him with an unspecified psychosis with the need to rule out possible schizophrenia. Dr. Hasan noted that K.R. arrived at Community positive for cannabis, and cannabis usage makes someone with autism or Asperger's syndrome a higher risk for psychosis. Dr. Hasan thus concluded that K.R. needed to get “clean from the drugs” so K.R.’s mental health could be more properly assessed. Id. at 23. He also concluded that K.R. lacks insight into his own condition. And he concluded that K.R. was gravely disabled.

[7] Accordingly, Community filed a petition for K.R.’s involuntary temporary commitment. After an evidentiary hearing, the court granted Community's petition. This expedited appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[8] On appeal, K.R. argues that Community failed to present sufficient evidence to support his commitment. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a civil commitment, we consider “only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the judgment” to determine if a reasonable fact-finder could have found the necessary statutory elements proven by clear and convincing evidence. J.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 256 N.E.3d 1260, 1270 (Ind. 2025). In doing so, we will not reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of the witnesses. Id.

[9] Indiana Code section 12-26-2-5(e) (2025) provides that a trial court may order a person's involuntary civil commitment where a health care provider demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the person is “mentally ill and either dangerous or gravely disabled” and that the “detention or commitment of that individual is appropriate.” Here, the trial court found K.R. to be mentally ill and gravely disabled and found his commitment to be appropriate; K.R. challenges only the trial court's finding that he is gravely disabled.

[10] Indiana Code section 12-7-2-96 defines “gravely disabled” in relevant part as

a condition in which an individual, as a result of mental illness, is in danger of coming to harm because the individual:

* * *

(2) has a substantial impairment or an obvious deterioration of that individual's judgment, reasoning, or behavior that results in the individual's inability to function independently.

[11] Our Supreme Court has recognized that sufficient evidence of a substantial impairment exists when a person suffers from “active paranoid delusions.” J.F., 256 N.E.3d at 1271. The Court has further held that sufficient evidence of an inability to function independently exists where there is evidence that the individual has placed him- or herself at the risk of harm; the individual lacks insight into his or her paranoia; and the individual has a history of hospitalizations that would likely continue if untreated. Id.

[12] We conclude that the record here demonstrates that K.R. is gravely disabled under Indiana Code section 12-7-2-96. First, Community demonstrated that K.R. has a substantial impairment. Dr. Hasan's testimony made clear that K.R. was suffering from active paranoid delusions. K.R. referred to himself as “Jesus Christ,” and K.R. had to be transferred to a more secure unit at Community after he became “aggressive” with staff members whom K.R. felt were trying to “intimidate[ ]” him into getting a shot. Tr. pp. 22-23.

[13] Second, Community demonstrated that K.R. has an inability to function independently. C.W. testified that K.R. had indicated that he was going to walk into traffic, which is consistent with K.R.’s own recognized history of suicidal ideation. Dr. Hasan testified that K.R. lacks insight into his mental illness, noting in particular that K.R. “does not recognize that he has psychotic symptoms” and that K.R. “refuses” medication because “[h]e does not feel that he needs any treatment at this time.” Id. at 23-24. And Dr. Hasan testified that, if untreated, K.R.’s history of hospitalizations would likely continue. Id. at 27. Community therefore presented sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that K.R. is gravely disabled.

[14] Still, K.R. asserts that the evidence is insufficient because Dr. Hasan's testimony was not about K.R. “at the time of the hearing.” Appellant's Br. at 7. We disagree. Dr. Hasan's testimony was not regarding remote-in-time occurrences; it was regarding K.R.’s present condition as informed by K.R.’s medical history. We likewise reject K.R.’s assertion that Dr. Hasan's assessment of likely future consequences of inaction is “speculative.” Id. A medical expert may testify to likely future consequences from medical treatment or the lack thereof. See, e.g., Estate of Hunt v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Henry Cnty., 526 N.E.2d 1230, 1233-34 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied.

[15] K.R.’s other arguments on appeal seek to piecemeal the record or to have our Court reweigh the evidence that was before the trial court, neither of which is consistent with our standard of review. We reject those arguments accordingly, and we affirm the trial court's order for K.R.’s temporary commitment.

[16] For all of these reasons, we affirm K.R.’s temporary commitment.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   K.R. has pursued this expedited appeal in accordance with our Supreme Court's ongoing Marion County Expedited Mental Health Appeals Pilot Project.

Mathias, Judge.

Weissmann, J., and Robb, Sr.J., concur.