Crystal Palladino, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Crystal Palladino appeals the trial court's award of credit time following her guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine, as a Level 6 felony, and her admission to being a habitual offender in Cause Number 79D04-2312-F6-1261 (“the instant cause”). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On October 12, 2022, the State charged Palladino with several counts in Cause Number 79D06-2210-F6-1094 (“F6-1094”) and alleged that she was a habitual vehicular substance offender (“HVSO”). That same day, Palladino was released to community corrections.

[3] On December 21, 2023, during a search of Palladino's residence, officers found drugs and other contraband. Accordingly, on December 22, the State charged Palladino in the instant cause with several drug-related felonies and alleged that she was a habitual offender. In addition, the State filed a motion to terminate Palladino's pretrial release in F6-1094. The court ordered Palladino to remain in custody without bond under F6-1094 until her plea hearing and ordered her into direct placement through community corrections and set a bond in the instant cause.

[4] On February 23, 2024, Palladino pleaded guilty in F6-1094 to operating a vehicle while intoxicated, as a Level 6 felony; violating driving conditions, as a Class C misdemeanor; and possession of methamphetamine, as a Level 6 felony. In addition, she admitted to being an HVSO. On April 3, the court sentenced Palladino in that cause number to an aggregate sentence of 730 days, enhanced by 1095 days for the HVSO enhancement. But the court ordered that she serve 610 days in the Department of Correction, which the court found had been completed; 850 days on community corrections; and 365 days suspended to probation. Palladino began her term on community corrections on April 4.

[5] Thereafter, on April 9, Palladino pleaded guilty in the instant cause to possession of methamphetamine, as a Level 6 felony, and admitted to being a habitual offender. Then, on April 8, 2025, the State filed a motion to revoke Palladino's bond in the instant cause after it filed new charges against her. Based on the same new charges, the State also filed a motion to revoke Palladino's probation in F6-1094. The court revoked her bond in the instant cause and ordered her to serve 112 days in the Department of Correction or county jail in F6-1094.

[6] On May 9, the court sentenced Palladino in the instant cause to 365 days on the felony conviction, enhanced by 1095 days for the habitual offender adjudication. The court ordered the sentence for the underlying felony to run consecutive to the sentence for the underlying felonies in F6-1094 but ordered the habitual offender enhancement to run concurrently to the HVSO enhancement in F6-1094. The court then awarded Palladino credit time for thirty-three days of time served and thirty-three days of good time. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Palladino contends that the court erred when it calculated her credit time. It is well settled that “ ‘time spent in confinement before sentencing applies toward a prisoner's fixed term of imprisonment.” Glover v. State, 177 N.E.3d 884, 885-86 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 784 (Ind. 2004)). “Because pre-sentence jail time credit is a statutory right, trial courts have no discretion in awarding or denying that credit.” Id. at 886.

[8] Here, the trial court awarded Palladino thirty-three days of credit for time served in the instant cause, which reflects the time she spent in confinement between April 7 and May 9, 2025. On appeal, Palladino contends that she is also entitled to credit time from the time she was arrested in the instant cause on December 21, 2023, through the date of sentencing, May 9, 2025. She maintains that she was “continually incarcerated[ ] or on pretrial release” for that entire period and was thus entitled to credit time. Appellant's Br. at 10. However, it is the appellant's burden to show that the trial court's calculation of credit time is erroneous. See Harding v. State, 27 N.E.3d 330, 332 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). And Palladino has not met that burden.

[9] First, while we acknowledge that Palladino was either incarcerated or on pretrial release from the time she was arrested in December 2023, the court apparently gave her credit for that time served. Indeed, when the court sentenced Palladino in F6-1094, it sentenced her to 610 days in the Department of Correction ¹ but found that “said term of incarceration ha[d] been completed by” Palladino. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 190. And Palladino gives no other explanation for how those 610 days had been served, other than the time she was incarcerated prior to sentencing.

[10] Palladino acknowledges that “the court in F6-1094 gave [her] pretrial credit for 610 days” and “also noted ‘said term of incarceration ha[d] been completed[.]” Appellant's Br. at 14-15 (quoting Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 190). Thus, she seems to concede that the court already applied her credit time in F6-1094. Nonetheless, Palladino argues that “all of the pretrial credit time should also be applied” to F6-1261. Id. at 15 (emphasis added). Stated differently, Palladino maintains that, even though the credit time was applied in F6-1094, the court should have also awarded her the same credit time to her sentence in the instant cause.

[11] However, “when a person has been incarcerated in connection with multiple pending matters and the trial court ultimately imposes consecutive sentences, the credit time cannot be applied against each of the underlying sentences.” Paul v. State, 177 N.E.3d 472, 476 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quotation marks and brackets omitted). Rather, the court must apply the credit time only once. Id. Here, because the court ordered the sentences for the underlying felony convictions in F6-1094 and the instant cause to run consecutively, per the terms of the plea agreements, the court was able to apply the credit time only for the period between December 21, 2023, and April 7, 2025, once. And the court applied it to F6-1094. As such, Palladino was not entitled to have the credit time applied to the instant cause.

[12] Still, Palladino contends that, because the court ordered the habitual offender and HVSO enhancements to run concurrently, the court was required to apply the credit time to the sentences in both causes because “[i]mposition of concurrent habitual sentences means dual application of pretrial credit.” Appellant's Br. at 17. However, while we acknowledge that the trial court was required to order the habitual enhancements to run concurrently, see, e.g., Venters v. State, 8 N.E.3d 708, 710 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), the trial court here clearly applied the credit time to the underlying sentence in F6-1094, which was a sentence consecutive to the underlying sentence in the instant case. And Palladino has not directed us to any authority to support the proposition that credit time must be applied to multiple underlying, consecutive sentences even where the habitual enhancements are ordered to run concurrently.²

Conclusion

[13] Because the trial court ordered the sentences for the underlying felonies to run consecutively, the court was able to give Palladino credit only for her time served between December 21, 2023, and April 7, 2025, to one sentence. And the court applied it to the underlying sentence in F6-1094. It is of no moment that the court ordered the habitual enhancements to run concurrently because the court applied the credit time to one of the underlying, consecutive sentences. As such, the court did not err when it declined to apply it again to her sentence in the instant cause. We therefore affirm the trial court.

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State contends that the trial court “should have ordered all 1,095 days of the enhancement in F6-1094 to be served in the DOC because they were nonsuspendable.” Appellee's Br. at 11. However, the State does not ask that we remand the matter to the trial court or take any action other than affirming the court's order.

2.   Palladino states that, if “we treat each of the sentences here as having two parts (underlying and habitual) then we drift into the hybrid (partially consecutive/partially concurrent) sentences which are prohibited.” Appellant's Br. at 17. However, Palladino makes no argument that the court's sentences—which ordered the sentences on the underlying felony offenses to run consecutively and the habitual enhancements to run concurrently—is improper. She merely argues that, if we do not apply the credit time to both sentences for the underlying felonies, even though they were ordered to run consecutively, we would in effect be creating an improper hybrid sentence. We do not agree.

Bailey, Judge.

Tavitas, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.