MATHES v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Joyce F. Mathes appeals the seventeen-year aggregate sentence that was imposed following her convictions for burglary, a Level 4 felony, and robbery, a Level 5 felony. Mathes claims that the sentence is inappropriate under Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B) in light of the nature of the offenses and her character because she “was a [nearly] 60-year-old-woman with substance abuse issues and a minor criminal history,” and her co-defendant received a lesser sentence. Appellant's Brief at 4, 7.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On March 11, 2023, Mathes met with her friend, Jessica Shockley, and sold her a quantity of heroin and fentanyl. At some point, the two talked about needing money and how the maintenance company Shockley worked for had recently fired her. Shockley mentioned how they could steal money from M.D., who lived at a residence in Brownsburg that she had previously cleaned. Shockley told Mathes that M.D. kept cash in a kitchen drawer and described how they could break into her house and take the money. Mathes told Shockley that they could split the money and that she would find them a ride to M.D.’s residence.

[4] On March 13, Mathes arranged for Jennifer Morris and Frederick Wessel—two individuals whom she had provided methamphetamine and heroin in the past—to drive her and Shockley to M.D.’s house. Later that same day, Mathes, Morris, Wessel, and a minor passenger—Wessel and Morris's daughter—picked up Shockley in a red van. While on the way to M.D.’s, Mathes produced a pistol and handed it to Shockley, along with a white jacket and a Covid mask to wear when she entered M.D.’s residence.

[5] When they arrived at M.D.’s, Shockley exited the van and entered the house through an unlocked garage service door that led to the kitchen. Shockley encountered sixty-eight-year-old M.D., sitting at the counter watching a show on her phone. At that point, M.D. asked, “Who are you? What are you doing?” Transcript Vol. II at 153. Shockley did not respond, pushed past M.D., and took approximately $1700 in cash from a kitchen drawer. M.D. then yelled to her husband that they were “being robbed.” Id.

[6] M.D. reached out and grabbed Shockley's coat. In response, Shockley struck M.D.’s arm, pulled out the gun that Mathes had given her, and pointed it at M.D. Shockley then grabbed M.D.’s purse and ran outside. M.D. watched Shockley get into the van and saw it speed away. Inside the van, Shockley gave one stack of cash to Mathes and another to Wessel.

[7] M.D. immediately called 911 and provided the dispatcher with a description of Shockley and the vehicle. Officer Kevin Hunstman of the Brownsburg Police Department received a notice from dispatch to watch for an “older red van” that had been involved in a home invasion. Id. at 201, 204. Moments later, Officer Huntsman saw a van matching that description pull into a Lowe's parking lot and he, along with Officer April Hyde, initiated a “high-risk felony stop.” Id. at 204. Shockley exited the passenger side of the van and ran across the parking lot. Officer Hyde pursued Shockley on foot and ordered her to stop. While running, Shockley yelled, “they made me do it.” Id. at 196. Shockley eventually stopped and was taken into custody, along with Mathes, Morris, Wessel, and the minor passenger. When Mathes was searched, police officers found $777 stuffed in her bra and $204 and M.D.’s debit card in one of her back pockets.

[8] The State charged Mathes with Level 2 felony burglary, Level 3 felony armed robbery, Level 3 felony robbery resulting in bodily injury, and Level 6 felony theft. Following a jury trial that commenced on October 29, 2024, Mathes was found guilty of Level 4 felony burglary as a lesser-included offense, Level 5 felony robbery as a lesser-included offense, and Level 6 felony theft. The State dismissed the armed robbery charge because the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on that count.

[9] The Hendricks County Probation Department prepared a presentence investigation report (PSI) and noted that Mathes had a prior conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering another person, a Class A misdemeanor. Also, when the PSI was prepared, Mathes had pending charges for Level 6 felony possession of a narcotic drug, Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe, Class A misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.

[10] Fifty-eight-year-old Mathes reported to the interviewing probation officer that she began drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana when she was eleven or twelve years old and had used cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine. Mathes indicated that she began using methamphetamine in 2020, and that she used it “on and off” until her arrest on the instant charges. Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 180. Mathes also reported that she started using heroin in 2016 and injected it daily until her arrest. Mathes told the probation officer that she was not addicted to heroin or methamphetamine and that she did not need substance abuse treatment.

[11] At Mathes's sentencing hearing on February 3, 2025, M.D. explained that she and her husband did not feel safe in their home and that they were going to move because of the robbery. M.D. testified that she could not sleep and that she no longer invited people into her home because she did not trust anyone. Mathes testified at the hearing that she did not know what Shockley was going to do after entering M.D.’s home, and she expressed remorse for “what Shockley put [M.D.] through.” Transcript Vol. IV at 92-93.

[12] The trial court determined that there was “plenty enough to aggravate a sentence” and identified Mathes's criminal history, the harm done to M.D., M.D.’s age, the nature and circumstances of the crime, and the fact that the crime was committed in the presence of a child under the age of eighteen as aggravating circumstances. Id. at 104-05. The trial court found no mitigating factors, remarked that Mathes was not a “credible individual,” and determined that the evidence established that Mathes was “up to [her] neck in the planning and participation of [the] offense ․ [and] knew exactly what was going on.” Id. at 103.

[13] The trial court vacated Mathes's conviction for theft in light of double jeopardy concerns and sentenced Mathes to twelve years for burglary and five years for robbery. Mathes was ordered to serve the sentences consecutively to each other at the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC) for an aggregate sentence of seventeen years with two years suspended to probation.

[14] Mathes now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[15] Mathes argues that her aggregate sentence was inappropriate when considering the nature of the offenses and her character. Pursuant to App. R. 7(B), we may revise a sentence “if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, [we find] the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Our determination “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).

Our review is deferential to the trial court's decision, and our goal is to determine whether the appellant's sentence is inappropriate, not whether some other sentence would be more appropriate. We consider not only the aggravators and mitigators found by the trial court, but also any other factors appearing in the record. The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating [her] sentence [is] inappropriate.

George v. State, 141 N.E.3d 68, 73-74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (internal citations omitted), trans. denied.

[16] When considering the nature of the offense, we first look to the advisory sentence for the crime. McHenry v. State, 152 N.E.3d 41, 46 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). When a sentence deviates from the advisory sentence, we consider whether “there is anything more or less egregious about the offense committed by the defendant that makes it different from the ‘typical’ offense accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory sentence.” Holloway v. State, 950 N.E.2d 803, 806-07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Rich v. State, 890 N.E.2d 44, 54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied).

[17] In this case, Mathes was convicted of burglary, a Level 4 felony. The sentence for a Level 4 felony ranges from two to twelve years with an advisory sentence of six years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5. She was also convicted of robbery, a Level 5 felony. The sentence for a Level 5 felony ranges from one to six years, with an advisory sentence of three years. I.C. § 35-50-2-6(b). As the sentences were ordered to run consecutively to each other, the seventeen-year aggregate sentence was one year less than the maximum sentence that the trial court could have imposed.

[18] Here, the evidence established that Mathes was instrumental in organizing a crime of violence. She preyed upon Shockley's lack of financial resources and participated in a plan for Shockley to break into M.D.’s home and steal her money. Mathes arranged for the transportation to M.D.’s and handed Shockley a gun to be used during the commission of the crimes. Mathes's actions demonstrated that she was a driving force behind the premeditated and violent robbery.

[19] Despite these circumstances, Mathes contends that her sentence is inappropriate because neither she nor her accomplices caused M.D. any “lasting physical harm.” Appellant's Brief at 9. Notwithstanding Mathes's claim, the mere absence of physical harm resulting to the victim does not require a lesser sentence. See Neale v. State, 826 N.E.2d 635, 638 (Ind. 2005). In short, nothing about the nature of the offenses that Mathes committed warrants a reduced sentence.

[20] When analyzing a defendant's character, we examine a broad consideration of her qualities, life, and conduct. Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91, 100 (Ind. 2021). One relevant fact is the defendant's criminal history and “even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character.” Moss v. State, 13 N.E.3d 440, 448 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[21] The record shows that Mathes has a prior conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering another person, and she has a nearly life-long history of drug abuse. Mathes has sold drugs in the past, and she was charged with several drug-related offenses while this case was pending. Indeed, the trial court may consider arrests and pending charges in the context of evaluating the character of a defendant. Vermillion v. State, 978 N.E.2d 459, 468 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Also, despite years of substance abuse, Mathes has never pursued treatment, and she told the probation officer at the PSI interview that she “does not need treatment.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 180. Mathes's criminal history, her ongoing commission of criminal offenses, and her failure to seek treatment for her drug issues do not speak well of her character. See, e.g., Bryant v. State, 802 N.E.2d 486, 501 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the trial court properly identified the defendant's failure to obtain treatment for substance abuse as an aggravating factor), trans. denied.

[22] Mathes also contends that her sentence is inappropriate because she received a lengthier sentence than Shockley's fifteen-year sentence. This court is not precluded from comparing sentences “among those convicted of the same or similar crimes.” Dean v. State, 222 N.E.3d 976, 991 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. When claiming that one's sentence is inappropriate based on the sentence of another, however, it is the defendant's burden to persuade us that the sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate. Id.

[23] We cannot adequately compare the sentences in this instance because there is no information in this record about Shockley's case other than the fact that she pled guilty to Level 2 felony armed robbery and that she was sentenced to fifteen years of incarceration. There is nothing that we can glean from the record about Shockley's character and the extent of her criminal history. To be sure, the trial court may well have imposed a lesser sentence because of Shockley's decision to plead guilty. See, e.g., Trueblood v. State, 715 N.E.2d 1242, 1257 (Ind. 1999) (observing that defendants who plead guilty save “valuable judicial time and resources” and their guilty pleas can be identified as a mitigating circumstance). On the other hand, Mathes chose to exercise her right to proceed to trial, and the evidence established that she planned the crimes, obtained transportation for the robbery, provided the gun that Shockley used to intimidate M.D., and blamed Shockley for the crimes. Mathes has failed to meet her burden that the sentence was inappropriate on this basis.

[24] Finally, Mathes contends that the imposition of consecutive sentences was inappropriate because “this was one episode of criminal conduct.” Appellant's Brief at 11.¹ Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(c) limits the trial court's sentencing discretion for convictions that arise out of a single episode of criminal conduct if one of those offenses is not a crime of violence. As burglary is a crime of violence, consecutive sentences were permissible. See I.C. § 35-50-1-2(a)(15). In light of the nature of Mathes's offenses and her character, as discussed above, we do not believe that consecutive sentences were inappropriate.

[25] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We note that Mathes is not contending that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering consecutive sentences that would call upon us to employ a different analysis. Rather, it is apparent that Mathes is arguing that the imposition of consecutive sentences resulted in an aggregate sentence that, in her opinion, is excessive.

Altice, Chief Judge.

May, J. and Foley, J., concur.