Lawrence Gerard Briggs, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Lawrence Gerard Briggs (“Briggs”) appeals, following a jury trial, his conviction for Level 6 felony theft.¹ Briggs argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused Briggs’ tendered jury instruction. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it refused Briggs’ tendered jury instruction.

Facts

[3] Bootz Manufacturing (“Bootz”) is a company that operates a manufacturing plant (“the plant”) in Evansville. Bootz employed an engineering and purchasing supervisor (“the supervisor”), who supervised multiple manufacturing plants and distribution facilities, including the plant. In December 2023, Bootz employees removed multiple materials, including exhaust hoods and ductwork, from the plant's roof in order to install a new furnace. The northern side of the plant's exterior included a private road. Employees drove trucks on that road to access the plant, load the trucks with materials, and leave for other Bootz facilities. This area also contained wooden pallets, multiple scrap hoppers, and semitrailers used by employees for staging. Employees had left the removed exhaust hoods along the northern side of the plant's exterior wall, roughly fifty yards from one of the scrap hoppers. They also left along the northern exterior of the plant, a piece of square, metal ductwork. There were no barricades or signs prohibiting trespassing in the area, and some of the plant's windows were missing. The plant's parking lot was adjacent to this area.

[4] On December 13, 2023, employees were working at the plant, and there were multiple cars in the parking lot. Sometime between 10:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m., an employee notified the supervisor by radio that “there was someone removing articles from the backside of [the plant].” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 22). The supervisor went to the north side of the plant and saw a red truck leaving the property with “part of an exhaust hood” in its bed. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 23). The supervisor recognized this exhaust hood as one of the exhaust hoods that had recently been removed from the plant's roof. The supervisor notified a local salvage company with whom Bootz had a relationship and explained that someone might be coming in with some of the plant's property. The supervisor also called the police to report the theft of the plant's property.

[5] While on the phone with the police, the supervisor saw the red truck return to the plant. The supervisor, accompanied by another employee, approached the driver of the red truck, who was later identified as Briggs. Soon after, an Evansville Police Department officer and his partner (“ the police officers”) arrived on the scene. Briggs told the police officers that he had taken materials from the plant's property. He then showed the officers salvage yard receipts for the ductwork and exhaust hood that he had taken from the plant on two separate trips. Briggs was cooperative with the police officers. The supervisor told the police officers that Briggs did not have permission to take the plant's property, and the police officers arrested Briggs.

[6] The State charged Briggs with Class A misdemeanor theft and filed an enhancement to a Level 6 felony theft charge based on a prior conviction. In September 2024, the trial court held a jury trial. In his opening statement, Briggs argued that he had “not intend[ed] to steal” from the plant. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 17). During the State's case, the trial court admitted bodycam footage of the area in which Briggs had taken the plant's property. The footage depicted at least two dozen cars in the adjacent parking lot.

[7] During the jury trial, the supervisor testified that workers at the plant had been installing a new furnace and that, for the purposes of that installation, portions of ductwork and exhaust hoods had been removed from the plant's roof around a week prior to Briggs taking them. The supervisor also testified that he had not given anyone permission to take the ductwork or exhaust hood from the property. Additionally, the supervisor testified that the area was private property. The supervisor testified that the ductwork had been “weathered” and left in a staging area next to the plant. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 43). The supervisor also testified that there had been about fifty employees working on the day that Briggs had taken the plant's property. Additionally, the supervisor testified that, after he had seen that the items Briggs had taken had been smashed by the salvage yard, the plant had decided not to use the items.

[8] Briggs did not testify at trial. Before closing arguments, the State and Briggs discussed jury instructions with the trial court in its chambers and off the record.  ² The chronological case summary provides that an “Instruction Conference [was] held outside the presence of the jury.” (App. Vol. 2 at 10). During this conference, Briggs tendered a proposed instruction identical to the pattern jury instruction for the defense of mistake of fact. The proposed instruction provided that:

It is an issue whether the Defendant mistakenly committed the acts charged.

It is a defense that the Defendant was reasonably mistaken about a matter of fact if the mistake prevented the Defendant from:

[intentionally] [knowingly] [recklessly] committing the acts charged

[or]

[committing the acts charged with specific intent to (specify specific intention for crime)]. The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was not reasonably mistaken.

(App. Vol. 2 at 34) (italics and brackets included in the original).

[9] In support of his proposed instruction, Briggs cited to the fact that some of the windows on the plant had been broken, which he argued supported the conclusion that the materials that Briggs had taken had been abandoned. In response, the State noted that there had been a number of cars in the adjacent parking lot, which negated any idea that the materials had been abandoned. The trial court, after hearing the parties’ positions, stated that “it did not believe that there was evidence to support instructing the jury” with Briggs’ proposed jury instruction. (App. Vol. 2 at 116).

[10] During closing arguments, Briggs again argued that there was no evidence that Briggs “knew that it was Bootz’ property[,]” and thus, he did not knowingly or intentionally take it. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 79). The trial court instructed the jury with the following relevant instructions:

COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 4

The crime of Theft as charged is defined by statute as follows:

A person who knowingly or intentionally exerts unauthorized control over the property of another person, with the intent to

deprive the other person of any part of its value or use, commits Theft, a Class A Misdemeanor.

Before you may convict the Defendant, the State must have proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

1. The Defendant

2. Knowingly or intentionally

3. Exerted unauthorized control

4. Over the property of Bootz ․

5. With the intent to deprive Bootz ․ of any part of its value or use thereof

If the State failed to prove each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the Defendant not guilty.

COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 5

A person engages in conduct knowingly if, when he engages in the conduct there is a high probability that he is aware of his conduct.

A person engages in conduct intentionally if, when he engages in conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.

COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 6

When, specific intent is a material element of the crimes charged, it must be proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. In laymen's terms, intent means a person's purpose or state of mind at the time he committed the alleged criminal act. Since purpose and/or intent are subjective facts, the State is not required to make proof of specific intent by direct evidence. Therefore, in order to determine his purpose and/or intent, you may look to all of the surrounding circumstances, including what was said and done at the time of the alleged criminal act. A determination of the defendant's intent may be arrived at by the jury from a consideration of the defendant's conduct and from the facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged criminal act.

(App. Vol. 2 at 61-63).

[11] At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Briggs guilty of Class A misdemeanor theft. Briggs admitted that he had a prior theft conviction, and the trial court elevated his conviction to a Level 6 felony. At his sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Briggs to a two (2) year sentence, with nine (9) months executed at the Department of Correction and fifteen (15) months suspended to probation.

[12] Briggs now appeals.

Decision

[13] Briggs argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused his proposed jury instruction. Instructing a jury is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. Patterson v. State, 11 N.E.3d 1036, 1040 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). In reviewing a trial court's decision to give or refuse tendered jury instructions, we consider: (1) whether the instruction correctly states the law; (2) whether there is evidence in the record to support giving the instruction; and (3) whether the substance of the tendered instruction is covered by other instructions. Chambers v. State, 734 N.E.2d 578, 580 (Ind. 2000), reh'g denied. The purpose of jury instructions “is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict.” Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Ind. 2001) (cleaned up). “A defendant is only entitled to a reversal if he affirmatively demonstrates that the instructional error prejudiced his substantial rights.” Washington v. State, 840 N.E.2d 873, 888 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (cleaned up), trans. denied.

[14] Briggs specifically argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to give his proposed mistake of fact instruction. We disagree.

[15] First, we note that Briggs’ proposed instruction was the pattern instruction based on Indiana Code § 35-41-3-7, which provides that “[i]t is a defense that the person who engaged in the prohibited conduct was reasonably mistaken about a matter of fact, if the mistake negates the culpability required for commission of the offense.” Thus, Briggs’ proposed instruction tracked the language of the statute and was a correct statement of the law.

[16] We have addressed a similar argument to Briggs’ argument in Barton v. State, 936 N.E.2d 842 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. In Barton, the State charged Barton with Class C felony failure to return to the scene of an accident causing death after he had struck a pedestrian with his truck, called 911 on his cellphone without identifying himself, and fled the scene. Barton tendered a proposed instruction for mistake of fact, and the trial court denied that instruction.

[17] On appeal, Barton argued that he did not knowingly commit the charged offense and asserted that there had been two mistakes of fact that negated the culpability for the offense. Barton, 936 N.E.2d at 854. We noted that, for mistake of fact to be a valid defense, three requirements must be satisfied: “(1) the mistake must be honest and reasonable; (2) the mistake must be about a matter of fact; and (3) the mistake must negate the culpability required to commit the crime.” Id. We also explained that honesty is a subjective test dealing with what the defendant actually believed and that reasonableness is an objective test for ascertaining what a reasonable person situated in similar circumstances would do. Id. We further explained that in order to conclude that the trial court has abused its discretion in refusing to give a proposed mistake of fact instruction, we must find some evidence of both honesty and reasonableness of the alleged mistake. Id.

[18] Ultimately, our Court decided that it “need not decide the reasonableness of [Barton's] alleged mistakes of fact” because the substance of the proposed mistake of fact instruction had been covered by other instructions. Id. Specifically, our Court noted that the trial court had covered the same substance as the mistake of fact instruction by instructing the jury on the elements of the offense, the requirement that the State prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt, the intent necessary under the offense, and their definitions. Id. Our Court held that, because the substance of the mistake of fact instruction was covered by other instructions, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused Barton's proposed instruction. Id. at 854-55.

[19] Here, the case before us is similar to Barton. Briggs proposed a mistake of fact instruction, and the trial court rejected it. On appeal, Briggs argues, in part, that his mistake of fact is reasonable. But, like we did in Barton, we need not decide the reasonableness of Briggs’ mistake of fact because the substance of his proposed mistake of fact instruction was covered by the trial court's other instructions. Specifically, the trial court instructed the jury on instruction number four that it must find that the State had proven every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and specifically listed every element of the charged crime of theft. Further, in jury instruction five, the trial court defined knowingly and intentionally. Finally, in jury instruction six, the trial court defined specific intent. Considering these instructions in their entirety, we conclude that these instructions covered the substance of Briggs’ proposed instruction.³ See Barton, 936 N.E.2d at 854-55 (holding that it was unnecessary to review the reasonableness of an alleged mistake of fact where the substance of a proposed mistake of fact jury instruction was covered by other instructions when the other instructions instructed the jury that the State needed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, every element of the offense, including his requisite intent and the definition thereof). See also O'Connell v. State, 970 N.E.2d 168, 173-74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that “[e]ven if an instruction is a correct statement of the law and finds some support in the evidence, a trial court may in its discretion refuse a tendered instruction if it is covered in substance by other instructions”) (footnote omitted). Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to give Briggs’ proposed instruction. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Indiana Code § 35-43-4-2.

2.   In January 2025, Briggs’ appellate attorney filed, with the trial court, a motion to supplement the record. In his motion, filed pursuant to Appellate Rule 31, Briggs included a joint statement from the State and Briggs’ trial attorney that included a recollection of what had occurred during the instruction conference. The trial court issued an order granting Briggs’ motion and supplementing the record with the joint statement made by the trial attorneys, and we refer to that statement of evidence in our statement of facts. We are troubled by the fact that the instruction conference was held off the record and take this opportunity to caution trial courts against this practice. Indiana Trial Rule 51(C) provides that the court “shall note all instructions given, refused or tendered, and all written objections submitted thereto, shall be filed in open court and become a part of the record. Objections made orally shall be taken by the reporter and thereby shall become a part of the record.” Indiana Trial Rule 74(A) provides that the judge shall “arrange for the audio recording of all hearings and trials in all case types. The recording shall include all oral evidence and testimony, including both questions and answers, all rulings of the judge in respect to the admission and rejection of evidence and objections thereto, and any other oral matters occurring during the hearing.” These rules suggest that instruction conferences are hearings that need to be held on the record, and the fact that Briggs’ attorney had to reconstruct the record to adequately brief the appeal is precisely why a hearing on the record is the better practice.

3.   Briggs makes a conclusory assertion that the substance of his proposed instruction was not covered by other instructions. However, Briggs provides no cogent argument pointing to any cases or authorities that support his contention. Thus, he has waived the argument on appeal. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).

Pyle, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.