IN RE: The Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of B.S. (Minor Child); (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Chief Judge Altice and Judge DeBoer concur.

Statement of the Case

[1] C.S. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's order that terminated her parental relationship with her twenty-two-month-old daughter, B.S. (“B.S.”). Mother argues that the trial court's order terminating her parental rights is clearly erroneous. Concluding that the trial court's order terminating Mother's parental rights is not clearly erroneous, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court's order terminating Mother's parental rights is clearly erroneous.

Facts

[3] Mother is the parent of B.S., who was born in March 2023. B.S. was born with a cleft palate and required feeding through a gastrointestinal tube (“G-Tube”). When B.S. was ten days old, DCS filed a petition alleging that she was a child in need of services (“CHINS”) (“the March 2023 CHINS petition”). The petition alleged that although B.S. was medically ready for discharge from the hospital, Mother, who suffers from cognitive disabilities, had been “unable to learn feeding techniques for the proper care of a baby with a cleft pal[ate].” (App. Vol. 2 at 71). In addition, the petition alleged that Mother did not “pick up on signs of stress from [B.S.] when [B.S.] [was] feeding which [was] necessary to make needed accommodations in feeding technique.” (App. Vol. 2 at 71). The petition also alleged that Mother lived with her father (“paternal grandfather”) but did not want to return to his home with B.S. According to the petition, Mother had alleged that paternal grandfather had sexually abused her in the past. The petition further alleged that Mother did not know where she and B.S. would live when B.S. was released from the hospital. In addition, the petition alleged that B.S.’s father was unknown.

[4] Following the filing of the March 2023 CHINS petition, DCS removed B.S. from Mother's care and placed B.S. in foster care. During the April 2023 initial hearing, Mother denied that B.S. was a CHINS. However, one month later, in May 2023, Mother and DCS entered into a facilitated agreement (“the Agreement”), which the trial court approved. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Mother admitted that B.S. was a CHINS. In addition, Mother agreed to: (1) participate in home-based case management services; (2) complete a parenting assessment and follow all recommendations; (3) participate in supervised visits with B.S.; (4) participate in a psychological evaluation; (5) meet B.S.’s basic needs; and (6) abstain from the use of illegal substances. Mother also agreed to a DNA test for B.S. In June 2023, DCS moved three-month-old B.S. to a second foster home because the initial foster mother was having difficulty managing B.S.’s medical needs.

[5] Following an October 2023 review hearing, the trial court issued an order noting that Mother had been participating in services, including supervised visits with B.S. However, Mother had “not yet demonstrated the ability to care for [B.S.] without supervision.” (App. Vol. 2 at 62). Further, Mother had tested positive for methamphetamine in July, August, and September 2023. Mother also twice tested positive for methamphetamine in October 2023.

[6] In addition, in October 2023, DCS received B.S.’s DNA test results, which revealed that paternal grandfather is B.S.’s father (“Father”). In November 2023, DCS filed an amended CHINS petition (“the amended CHINS petition”), which named Father as B.S.’s father. The petition further alleged that: (1) Father had been charged with two counts of Level 5 felony incest; (2) there was a no-contact order in place prohibiting Father from contacting Mother; and (3) there was not a no-contact order in place prohibiting Father from seeing B.S. The amended CHINS petition did not include any additional allegations against Mother.

[7] The trial court held the initial hearing on the amended CHINS petition in November 2023. According to the trial court's Chronological Case Summary (“the CCS”), Mother was sent notice of the hearing. During the hearing, which Mother did not attend, the trial court advised Father of the allegations in the CHINS petition. The trial court also advised Father of his rights, including his right to be represented by counsel. In addition, the trial court advised Father of the dispositional alternatives available to the trial court if it adjudicated B.S. to be a CHINS and the potential for parental participation. At Father's request, the trial court appointed counsel to represent Father, and Father denied that B.S. was a CHINS.¹ The trial court's order on the initial hearing did not mention Mother.

[8] During the ensuing months, Mother inconsistently participated in services. When Mother struggled with attending parenting classes, DCS referred Mother to individualized one-on-one sessions with a homebased case manager to help Mother with life skills, including finding low-income housing. However, Mother often became frustrated during the sessions because there were certain topics that she did not want to discuss. Mother also inconsistently attended supervised visits with B.S. During the visits, Mother was unable to correctly operate the G-Tube to feed B.S. Mother's last visit with B.S. was in March 2024.

[9] At some point, Mother participated in a psychological assessment, and the assessor recommended inpatient mental health treatment because Mother was exhibiting signs of psychosis. After spending five days in an inpatient treatment center, Mother was discharged for financial reasons. Mother subsequently participated in psychological evaluations in March and April 2024. Both evaluators recommended that Mother participate in an inpatient treatment program. However, Mother did not believe that she needed another inpatient treatment program at that time. In addition, Mother continued to test positive for methamphetamine during the pendency of the CHINS proceedings. Her last positive drug test was in June 2024.

[10] In July 2024, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental relationship with B.S. The trial court heard the facts as set forth above during the September 2024 termination hearing. In addition, DCS family case manager Matthew Franklin (“FCM Franklin”) testified that B.S. had been “born due to incest” and had “all the genetic issues.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 29). FCM Franklin also testified that B.S., who had already had three surgeries for her cleft palate, would need additional surgeries before she would be able to be fed with a spoon. Further, according to FCM Franklin, B.S. had recently had a liver transplant. FCM Franklin recommended the termination of Mother's parental relationship with sixteen-month-old B.S. because Mother could “not take care of [B.S.] at th[at] time due to the medical issues with [B.S.] and [Mother]’s mental health status.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 28-29). When DCS asked FCM Franklin if, in his opinion, “there [was] anything that DCS had to offer that it didn't offer in trying to get [Mother]․ to the point ․ where she could safely parent [B.S.][,]” FCM Franklin responded that there was not. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 40). FCM Franklin further testified that B.S.’s foster mother, with whom B.S. had been placed since she was three month old, was meeting B.S.’s exceptional medical needs.

[11] CASA Caitlin McGuire (“CASA McGuire”) also recommended the termination of Mother's parental relationship with B.S. When asked if she “believe[d] that [Mother] [was] able to safely care for [B.S.] even with the instruction hospitals give[,]” CASA McGuire responded, “․ no, not at this time.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 61).

[12] In January 2025, the trial court issued an order terminating Mother's parental relationship with B.S. The trial court specifically found, in relevant part, that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that had resulted in B.S.’s removal would not be remedied and that termination was in B.S.’s best interests.

[13] Mother now appeals.

Decision

[14] Mother argues that the trial court's order terminating her parental rights is clearly erroneous. We disagree.

[15] We recognize that “[a] parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.” In re Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016) (cleaned up). “[A]lthough parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law provides for the termination of these rights when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities.” In re A.P., 882 N.E.2d 799, 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), reh'g denied. Involuntary termination of parental rights is the most extreme sanction a court can impose, and, therefore, “termination is intended as a last resort, available only when all other reasonable efforts have failed.” Id.

[16] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, this Court will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. R.S., 56 N.E.3d at 628. We consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom that support the judgment and give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. K.T.K. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Dearborn County Office, 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013).

[17] Where, as here, the trial court's order contains specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, we engage in a two-tiered review. In re A.G., 6 N.E.3d 952, 957 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and then, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. Findings are clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences to be drawn therefrom that support them. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the juvenile court's conclusions or the conclusions do not support the resulting judgment.² Id.

[18] In addition, as a general rule, appellate courts grant latitude and deference to trial courts in family law matters. Matter of D.P., 72 N.E.3d 976, 980 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). “This deference recognizes a trial court's unique ability to see the witnesses, observe their demeanor, and scrutinize their testimony, as opposed to this court[ ] only being able to review a cold transcript of the record.” Id.

[19] INDIANA CODE § 31-35-2-4 provides, in relevant part, that DCS must allege as follows:

(c) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

(d) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:

* * * * *

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4.³ If the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4 are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a). DCS must prove the alleged circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231.

[20] Here, Mother first argues that the trial court's order terminating her parental relationship with B.S. is clearly erroneous because DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that had resulted in B.S.’s removal would not be remedied. We disagree.

[21] “Upon review of whether the conditions that resulted in removal will be remedied, [we] engage[ ] in a two-step analysis.” K.E. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, 39 N.E.3d 641, 647 (Ind. 2015). First, we identify the conditions that lead to removal, and second, we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id. The second step of the analysis requires judgment of the parent's fitness at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. Id. Changed conditions are balanced against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect. Id. The services offered to the parent and the parent's response to those services can also be evidence demonstrating that conditions will be remedied. Id.

[22] Here, our review of the record reveals that DCS removed B.S. from Mother because Mother was not able to safely parent B.S. or care for B.S.’s exceptional medical needs. Although DCS provided Mother with services that were designed to assist her in learning to care for and safely parent B.S., Mother never demonstrated the ability to do so. Both FCM Franklin and CASA McGuire specifically testified that, at the time of the termination hearing, Mother was not able to safely parent B.S. FCM Franklin further testified that DCS had exhausted the services available to help Mother learn to safely parent B.S. The totality of this evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in B.S.’s removal would not be remedied.

[23] Mother further argues that the trial court's order terminating her parental relationship with B.S. is clearly erroneous because DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the termination of Mother's parental relationship with B.S. was in the child's best interests. Again, we disagree.

[24] In determining whether the termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. In re Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. In so doing, the court must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the child involved. Id. Termination of the parent-child relationship is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. In re R.S., 774 N.E.2d 927, 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. The trial court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that his or her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235.

[25] In addition, a child's need for permanency is a central consideration in determining the child's best interests. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. 2009), reh'g denied. Further, this Court has previously held that the recommendations of the service providers to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that had resulted in the child's removal would not be remedied, is sufficient to show clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. In re J.S., 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

[26] Here, our review of the record reveals that during the eighteen-month pendency of the CHINS proceedings, Mother never demonstrated the ability to care for and safely parent B.S. Mother's inability to care for and safely parent B.S. threatens B.S.’s physical and emotional development. In addition, Mother regularly used methamphetamine during the pendency of the CHINS proceedings. Such drug use also poses a threat to B.S.’s physical and emotional development. Further, both FCM Franklin and CASA McGuire recommended the termination of Mother's parental relationship with B.S., and we have just determined that the totality of this evidence in this case supports the trial court's conclusion that DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that had resulted in B.S.’s removal would not be remedied.

[27] The totality of this evidence also supports the trial court's conclusion that DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence that the termination of Mother's parental rights was in B.S.’s best interests. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's judgment terminating Mother's parental relationship with the B.S. is not clearly erroneous.⁴

[28] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Because Father denied that B.S. was a CHINS, the trial court held factfinding and dispositional hearings in January 2024. In May 2024, Father pleaded guilty to two counts of Level 5 felony incest, and the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate sentence of six years in the Department of Correction. Father subsequently executed a consent to B.S.’s adoption.

2.   In a one-sentence argument, Mother challenges nine findings of fact in the trial court's order terminating her parental relationship with B.S. Mother specifically contends that the evidence does not support these findings. However, beyond this generalized claim, Mother does not develop her argument or include any citations to the record or legal authority. An appellant who fails to support her arguments with appropriate citations to the record and legal authority waives those arguments for our review. Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023). Because Mother has failed to develop her arguments and include citations to the record to support them, Mother has waived appellate review of this argument. Waiver notwithstanding, we have thoroughly reviewed the evidence in this case and have determined that the evidence supports the challenged findings of fact.

3.   The legislature amended Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4 effective March 11, 2024. Because DCS filed the termination petition in this case in July 2024, the amended version of the statute applies here. Additionally, we note that the legislature further amended Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4 during the 2025 legislative session, and that amendment became effective July 1, 2025. The 2025 amendment does not apply to this case.

4.   Mother also argues that the trial court and DCS violated her due process rights because DCS failed to provide Mother with notice of the filing of the amended CHINS petition, which named Father as B.S.’s father. However, our Indiana Supreme Court has held that a party on appeal may waive a constitutional claim, including a claimed violation of due process rights, by raising it for the first time on appeal. In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016). Here, because Mother is raising this issue for the first time on appeal, she has waived appellate review of it. See id. Waiver notwithstanding, we find no error. In support of her argument that her due process rights were violated, Mother directs us to INDIANA CODE § 31-34-10-2, which provides that the trial court must hold a hearing on a CHINS petition within ten days of the filing of the petition and that the child's parent must be provided with notice of that hearing. Here, the CCS indicates that Mother was sent notice of the initial hearing on the amended CHINS petition. (App. Vol. 2 at 39, November 14, 2023, entry).Mother further argues that DCS violated her due process rights because it failed to demonstrate that it complied with the Americans with Disabilities Act (“the ADA”) in administering her services. However, Mother has waived appellate review of this issue because she raises it for the first time on appeal. See N.G., 51 N.E.3d at 1173. We further note that Mother's due process argument does not extend beyond conclusory language that DCS failed to comply with the ADA. Specifically, Mother fails to identify any particular service that she needed or how DCS could have tailored services to her needs. Nor does she point to a particular ADA provision that was violated or a specific action or inaction by DCS that constituted a violation. Mother's failure to develop her argument and include citations to the record and legal authority also results in waiver of this issue on appeal. See Miller, 212 N.E.3d at 657. Waiver notwithstanding, “any alleged noncompliance with the ADA by [DCS] in the provision of family services would be a matter separate and distinct from the operation of our termination statute.” In re E.E., 736 N.E.2d 791, 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

Pyle, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and DeBoer, J., concur.