Khoa D. Lai, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Martin G. Hites and Nancy J. Hites d/b/a Hites Hardwood, Appellees-Defendants (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] More than 15 years after Khoa Lai sued Martin and Nancy Hites to recover on an award from the Indiana Worker's Compensation Board (the “Board”), Lai's complaint was dismissed because he had failed to prosecute his claim. Lai now appeals that dismissal and raises several issues for our review, which we revise and restate as the following single issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing Lai's case pursuant to Trial Rule 41(E).

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On December 8, 2003, the Board ordered the Hiteses, doing business as Hites Hardwood, to “assume[ ] responsibility for the payment or restitution of the statutory medical expenses” of William Johnson, one of Hites Hardwood's employees (the “Award”). Appellant's App. Vol. II at 15. On October 10, 2008, the Board authorized Lai, as one of Johnson's medical providers, to file a certified copy of the Award with a trial court (the “Order”) pursuant to Indiana Code section 22-3-4-9. On November 5, 2008, Lai filed a complaint against the Hiteses, alleging they were “to pay [Lai] for medical product[s] and services provided to ․ Johnson resulting from his work-related injury” but had “failed and/or refused to tender ․ the full amount or any portion of the sum due pursuant to [the] Award.” Id. at 12. Lai attached to his complaint certified copies of the Award and the Order. On December 30, 2008, the Hiteses filed their answer.

[4] After the Hiteses filed their answer, no official action was taken in the case until August 15, 2024, when the trial court sua sponte issued an order setting a show cause hearing pursuant to Trial Rule 41(E).¹ On September 25, Lai filed a motion to vacate that hearing, and on September 26, he filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court vacated the show cause hearing, and the Hiteses filed a motion for the trial court to reconsider this ruling. After a hearing, the trial court granted the Hiteses’ motion to reconsider and dismissed the case “with prejudice pursuant to T[rial] R[ule] 41(E).” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 34. The trial court determined that Lai had failed to take any action on the case for more than 15 years, the Award was a “judgment ․ entered in 2003 through the Worker's Compensation Board,” at least 20 years had passed since the Award had been entered, and Lai had not rebutted the presumption of satisfaction of the Award. Tr. Vol. II at 14. The trial court denied Lai's subsequent motion to correct error, reiterating its determination that he had failed to prosecute his case:

The Court reads Indiana Code § 22-3-4-9 to read [sic] that the Work[er]’s Compensation Board is a judgment which was entered December 8, 2003 and that twenty years have lapsed prior to this Court's sua sponte action on [Trial Rule] 41(E) on August 15, 2024. Further, the Court finds there was no affirmative action taken by [Lai] once the complaint was filed on November 5, 2008 until [he] filed [his] Motion for Summary Judgment on September 25, 2024.

Appellant's App. Vol. II at 60. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Dismissing the Case Pursuant to Trial Rule 41(E)

[5] Lai challenges the trial court's dismissal of his case pursuant to Trial Rule 41(E), which allows for such dismissal when “no action has been taken in a civil case” for 60 days or more. We review a Trial Rule 41(E) dismissal for an abuse of discretion. Foster v. First Merchants Bank, N.A., 235 N.E.3d 1251, 1254 (Ind. 2024) (citing Babchuk v. Ind. Univ. Health Tipton Hosp., Inc., 30 N.E.3d 1252, 1254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)). “A court abuses its discretion if its decision either ‘misinterprets the law or clearly contravenes the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.’ ” Id. (quoting Smith v. Franklin Twp. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 151 N.E.3d 271, 273 (Ind. 2020)).

[6] Before moving to the merits of Lai's arguments, we observe that the Hiteses did not file an appellees’ brief, so we will reverse the trial court's judgment if Lai's brief presents a case of prima facie error. See Salyer v. Washington Regular Baptist Church Cemetery, 141 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Front Row Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 758 (Ind. 2014)). “Prima facie error in this context means ‘at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.’ ” Id. (quoting Front Row Motors, 5 N.E.3d at 758).

[7] We also note that this case arises from a Worker's Compensation claim. Indiana's Worker's Compensation Act, Ind. Code §§ 22-3-1-1 to -12-5, “serves as the exclusive remedy for an employee who sustains injuries by accident which arise out of and in the course of employment.” Nishikawa Standard Co. v. Van Phan, 703 N.E.2d 1058, 1059 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (citing I.C. § 22-3-2-6; Campbell v. Eckman/Freeman & Assocs., 670 N.E.2d 925, 929 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied). Under the Act, a trial court has “limited jurisdiction”—it “is authorized merely to enter the award of the Board as its own judgment when it receives an application to do so under Indiana Code [section] 22-3-4-9.” Id. at 1059–60 (citing Cox v. Worker's Comp. Bd. of Ind., 675 N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (Ind. 1996)).

[8] Lai specifically argues the trial court erred for the following reasons: (a) the Award is not a judgment; (b) the 20-year expiration period for a judgment has not yet run because no judgment has been entered in this case; and (c) Lai did not have an affirmative duty to ensure the trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the Award pursuant to Indiana Code section 22-3-4-9. We address each argument in turn.

a. The Award Is Not Yet a Judgment

[9] First, Lai asserts that the plain language of Indiana Code section 22-3-4-9 demonstrates that the Award is not a judgment. Indiana Code section 22-3-4-9 provides in relevant part as follows:

[A]ny party in interest may file in the circuit or superior court of the county in which the injury occurred a certified copy of the memorandum of agreement approved by the [worker's compensation] board, or of an order or decision of the board, or of an award of the full board unappealed from, or of an award of the full board affirmed upon an appeal, whereupon said court shall render judgment in accordance therewith and notify the parties. Such judgment shall have the same effect and all proceedings in relation thereto shall thereafter be the same as though said judgment had been rendered in a suit duly heard and determined by said court.

I.C. § 22-3-4-9(a) (emphases added).

[10] The Indiana Supreme Court has previously interpreted Indiana Code section 22-3-4-9’s nearly identical predecessor,² holding that “an award of the [Worker's Compensation] Board is in legal effect the same as a finding or verdict,” so once the award holder files a certified copy of that award in the appropriate court, it is “as much the clear legal duty of the judge of that court to render judgment in accordance with the award as it would be to render judgment upon a finding or verdict.” State ex rel. Maines v. Scott Cir. Ct., 203 Ind. 572, 576, 181 N.E. 523, 524 (1932) (emphasis in original) (citing Grant Coal Mining Co. v. Coleman, 204 Ind. 122, 130–31, 179 N.E. 778, 781 (1932), reh'g denied). In other words, a Worker's Compensation award is only “evidence of a liability; the judgment of the court is required and provided for, to enforce the liability,” Coleman, 204 Ind. at 131, 179 N.E. at 781 (quoting Brown v. George A. Fuller Co., 159 N.W. 376, 377 (Mich. 1916)), because “only a court has power to render judgments,” Coleman, 204 Ind. at 130, 179 N.E. at 781.

[11] Based on the foregoing, we must conclude that the Award is not a judgment because the record indicates that no court has ever taken any action to make it a judgment.³ The trial court therefore erred by determining the Award was a judgment.

b. The 20-Year Expiration Period Does Not Apply to the Award

[12] Second, Lai contends that because the Award is not a judgment and because the trial court has not rendered a judgment in accordance therewith, the 20-year expiration period for a judgment has not yet run. Indiana Code section 34-11-2-12 provides that “[e]very judgment and decree of any court of record ․ of Indiana ․ shall be considered satisfied after the expiration of twenty (20) years.” Although this statute imposes an expiration date on a judgment, it does not “indicate an intention to utterly destroy [a] judgment[ ] after the lapse of 20 years.” Chitwood v. Guadagnoli, 230 N.E.3d 932, 938 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting U.S. Bank Tr. Nat'l Ass'n as Tr. of Am. Homeowner Pres. Tr. Series 2015 A+ v. Dugger, 193 N.E.3d 1015, 1019 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022)), trans. not sought. Instead, it creates a presumption that the judgment has been satisfied, which the judgment holder may rebut with evidence of nonpayment. Est. of Wilson v. Steward, 937 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Lewis v. Rex Metal Craft, Inc., 831 N.E.2d 812, 818–19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)).

[13] Here, as discussed above, the Award has never been rendered a judgment, so the 20-year expiration period does not apply. See I.C. § 31-11-2-12. And even if the Award had been rendered a judgment in 2003, as the trial court determined it had been, Lai would not be barred from seeking satisfaction thereof. See Est. of Wilson, 937 N.E.2d at 830 (citing Lewis, 831 N.E.2d at 818–19). The trial court therefore erred by concluding that the 20-year expiration period applied to the Award and that Lai had not rebutted the presumption that the Hiteses had satisfied the Award.

c. Even if the Trial Court Was Required to Render Judgment in Accordance with the Award, Lai's Failure to Ensure it Did so for More than 14 Years Is Unjustified

[14] Third, Lai argues that pursuant to Indiana Code section 22-3-4-9, the trial court was required to enter judgment in accordance with the Award when he filed the complaint, and he had no duty to ensure the trial court did so. In other words, Lai argues that the trial court erred by dismissing this case because the delay was created by the trial court and he is not responsible therefor. Here, even if we assume without deciding that the trial court was required to render judgment in accordance with the Award pursuant to Indiana Code section 22-3-4-9, this still does not excuse Lai's failure to ensure the trial court entered said judgment for more than a decade.

[15] We generally view Trial Rule 41(E) dismissal “with disfavor” and consider such a dismissal to be an “extreme remed[y] that should be granted only under limited circumstances.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Congress-Jones, 122 N.E.3d 859, 864 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local Union No. 2371 v. Merch. Equip. Grp., 963 N.E.2d 602, 607 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)). Nevertheless, a court “need not impose a sanction less severe than dismissal where the record of dilatory conduct is clear.” Id. (citing Merch. Equip. Grp., 963 N.E.2d at 607).

[16] We balance the following nine factors to determine whether a trial court erred by dismissing a case for failure to prosecute:

(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the degree of personal responsibility on the part of the plaintiff; (4) the degree to which the plaintiff will be charged for the acts of the attorney; (5) the amount of prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay; (6) the presence or absence of a lengthy history of having deliberately proceeded in a dilatory fashion; (7) the existence and effectiveness of sanctions less drastic than dismissal which fulfill the purposes of the rules and the desire to avoid court congestion; (8) the desirability of deciding the case on the merits; and (9) the extent to which the plaintiff has been stirred into action by a threat of dismissal as opposed to diligence on the plaintiff's part.

Congress-Jones, 122 N.E.3d at 864 (citing Belcaster v. Miller, 785 N.E.2d 1164, 1167 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)). “The weight any particular factor has in a case depends upon the facts of that case,” id. (citing Belcaster, 785 N.E.2d at 1167), but “a lengthy period of inactivity may be enough to justify dismissal under the circumstances of a particular case, especially if the plaintiff has no excuse for the delay,” Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co. v. Harris, 985 N.E.2d 804, 814 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Am. Fam. Ins. Co. ex rel. Shafer v. Beazer Homes Ind., LLP, 929 N.E.2d 853, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)).

[17] Length of Delay. Although there is no bright line rule indicating exactly how long of a delay justifies a Trial Rule 41(E) dismissal, a one-year delay appears to be on the excessive side. See Sharif v. Cooper, 141 N.E.3d 1258, 1262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (collecting cases). At the Trial Rule 41(E) hearing, Lai's counsel asserted that discovery and settlement negotiations were ongoing in 2009 and early 2010. As of February 2010, the Hiteses had not yet responded to some of Lai's discovery requests; nothing in the record indicates that Lai sought to compel a response. February 2010 appears to be the last time the parties’ attorneys spoke with one another and performed any work on the case. Thus, Lai allowed this case to languish for more than 14 years.

[18] Reason for Delay. Lai appears to have chosen to let this case languish based on incorrect assumptions and alleged misunderstandings. At the Trial Rule 41(E) show cause hearing, Lai's counsel stated that he “presumed that once [the Award was] filed with the Court, that's a judgment.” Tr. Vol. II at 12. At the subsequent hearing on Lai's motion to correct error, Lai's counsel stated that he “reasonably assumed such judgment had been entered whenever [Lai] filed initially, and [Lai was] satisfied with allowing that judgment to remain as a lien on any real property. It wasn't discovered that there was any question about the judgment having been entered until this Court entered [its] 41(E).” Id. at 31. That is, Lai “believed that [he] had a judgment in place” and that “no further action should've been required.” Id.

[19] Plaintiff's Personal Responsibility. As the Hiteses pointed out at the motion to correct error hearing, Indiana Code section 22-3-4-9(a) expressly requires the trial court to notify the parties once it has rendered judgment in accordance with a Worker's Compensation award, and no such notice was provided in this case; thus, Lai knew or should have known that the Award had not yet been made a judgment. Nevertheless, Lai argues that it was not his responsibility to ensure the trial court fulfilled its statutory obligation of rendering judgment in accordance with Indiana Code section 22-3-4-9. Assuming arguendo that Indiana Code section 22-3-4-9 required the trial court to enter judgment in accordance with the Award, Lai waited more than 15 years to ensure that the trial court had done so. When the trial court did not render judgment shortly after Lai filed the complaint, Lai could have used a myriad of tools to prompt the trial court to do so. Lai chose not to avail himself of those tools and instead chose to sit on his rights.

[20] Plaintiff's Responsibility for Counsel's Acts. Aside from actions generally taken within the scope of the attorney-client relationship, it appears that Lai's counsel did not take any action for which Lai may be held responsible.

[21] Prejudice to Defendant. This is not a case where a lengthy delay may be excused because service was not perfected such that the defendants did not have a lawsuit “hanging over their heads.” See Sharif, 141 N.E.3d at 1262 (concluding 12-month delay “only factors slightly in favor of dismissal” because defendant had not been served); Petrovski v. Neiswinger, 85 N.E.3d 922, 925 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (although a period of 20 months was a “long time,” this factor was only slightly in favor of dismissal because the party “did not know about the lawsuit during this time because he had not been served”). The Hiteses were served with and filed a response to Lai's complaint, so they very much had this case hanging over their heads for more than 14 years.

[22] History of Dilatory Practices. The record is silent regarding whether Lai does or does not have a lengthy history of deliberately proceeding in a dilatory fashion.

[23] Less Drastic Sanctions. For a case that Lai likely could have had reduced to a judgment quickly but instead chose to let sit on the trial court's docket for more than 15 years, a sanction less drastic than dismissal is not effective and does not fulfill the purposes of the rules and the desire to avoid court congestion.

[24] Desirability of Merits Determination. Although we prefer to decide cases on their merits, Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015) (citing Roberts v. Cmty. Hosps. of Ind., Inc., 897 N.E.2d 458, 469 (Ind. 2008)), a case brought pursuant to Indiana Code section 22-3-4-9 does not entail a merits determination. Any decision on the merits was made by the Board or by agreement, and the trial court simply enforces that decision by rendering a judgment in accordance with the Worker's Compensation award. See I.C. § 22-3-4-9; Cox, 675 N.E.2d at 1056 (citing Kuhr v. Willan, 90 Ind. App. 567, 570, 169 N.E. 475, 476–77 (1930)); Maines, 203 Ind. at 576–77, 181 N.E. at 524–25; Coleman, 204 Ind. at 131, 179 N.E. at 781.

[25] Stirred into Action. Once the trial court issued its Trial Rule 41(E) order, Lai did begin prosecuting his claim, namely by requesting the Trial Rule 41(E) hearing be vacated and by filing a motion for summary judgment. But Lai's actions occurred more than 14 years after he had last taken action in this case.

[26] On balance, the length of delay, Lai's reason and personal responsibility therefor, the prejudice to the Hiteses, the ineffectiveness of less drastic sanctions, and the lack of a need for a merits determination in this case all weigh heavily in favor of dismissal. The rest of the factors have minimal or no weight. Consequently, we cannot say that Lai has presented a case of prima facie error. The trial court thus did not abuse its discretion by dismissing this case pursuant to Trial Rule 41(E), and we affirm that decision.

[27] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   “Whenever there has been a failure to comply with these rules or when no action has been taken in a civil case for a period of sixty [60] days, the court, on motion of a party or on its own motion shall order a hearing for the purpose of dismissing such case.” Ind. Trial Rule 41(E).

2.   The prior version of the statute the Indiana Supreme Court interpreted read in relevant part as follows:Any party in interest may file in the circuit or superior court of the county in which the injury occurred, a certified copy of the memorandum of agreement approved by the board, or of an order or decision of the board, or of an award of the full board unappealed from, or of an award of the full board affirmed upon an appeal, whereupon said court shall render judgment in accordance therewith and notify the parties. Such judgment shall have the same effect and all proceedings in relation thereto shall thereafter be the same as though said judgment had been rendered in a suit duly heard and determined by said court.1929 Ind. Acts 560; see also State ex rel. Maines v. Scott Cir. Ct., 203 Ind. 572, 575, 181 N.E. 523, 524 (1932) (quoting 1929 Ind. Acts 536, 560).

3.   Lai also argues that Indiana Trial Rule 41(E) does not apply to post-judgment proceedings. This argument is premised on the Award being a judgment. Because the Award has not been rendered a judgment, we decline to address this argument.

Felix, Judge.

Judges Brown and Scheele concur. Brown, J., and Scheele, J., concur.