IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of G.P. (Minor Child) and K.W. (Mother) and R.P. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] K.W. (“Mother”) and R.P., Jr. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal the trial court's order terminating their parental rights over their minor child, G.P. (“Child”). Parents raise one issue for our review, namely, whether the court clearly erred when it terminated their rights. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born on October 3, 2022. In November, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition alleging that Child is a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) because he “was born drug exposed to illegal substances.” Appealed Order at 2. DCS also alleged that Child's older sibling “was the subject of educational neglect[.]” Id. DCS removed Child from Parents’ care on November 18 and placed him in foster care.

[3] Following a fact-finding hearing, the court adjudicated Child a CHINS on January 18, 2023. Pursuant to a dispositional order, Parents were ordered to: enroll in any recommended programs and complete any assessments; keep all appointments with service providers; not use, consume, manufacture, trade, or sell any illegal controlled substances; complete a substance abuse assessment and follow all treatment recommendations; and submit to a random drug screen “within an hour of the request.” Id. at 7.

[4] DCS put services in place for Parents, but Parents did not fully engage. And Parents continued to use illegal drugs. As a result, on August 1, 2024, DCS filed a petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights over Child. Following a fact-finding hearing on January 23, 2025, the court entered the following findings of fact:

11. Because of ongoing concerns for substance abuse and mental health, DCS implemented several services aimed at addressing these areas, including: psychological evaluations, substance abuse assessments, clinical evaluations, and individual therapy․

12. Both Mother and Father were referred to complete a substance abuse evaluation in early 2023, following the implementation of the Dispositional Order.

13. [Family Case Manager (“FCM”)] McDuffen testified that she made numerous attempts to engage the parents in this service, and that Mother and Father would often miss or reschedule their appointments.

14. The substance abuse evaluations were completed with Associates in Counselling & Psychotherapy (ACP) on March 7, 2023.

15. Mother completed the evaluation but did not fully engage in answering the prompts, so no recommendations could be made from the assessment.

16. Father completed the assessment, and several recommendations were made, including: 1) to engage in individual therapy to cope with anxiety and depression symptoms, 2) to participate in random drug screens to assess compliance, his needs, and any modifications needed to treatment, and 3) to receive a case manager or recovery coach to help navigate support for recovery.

17. Both Mother and Father have been inconsistent with random drug screens administered by DCS.

18. Throughout the life of this case, spanning approximately twenty-eight (28) months, Mother and Father have submitted to only 33 screens.

a. Of those screens, Mother had three (3) positive screens.

b. Father had nine (9) positive screens.

19. However, Mother and Father frequently refused to participate in screens or no showed appointments for random drug tests, resulting in 44 missed screens.

a. FCM McDuffen testified that it appeared the parents would choose when they wanted to screen.

b. FCM McDuffen further testified that she would make attempts to go to the home to screen the parents, as transportation was frequently an issue, but parents would not answer the phone or the door.

c. Pursuant to the Amended Dispositional Order, these missed screens are presumed positive․

20. FCM McDuffen testified that because the parents refused to screen consistently, it was difficult to determine a pattern of use to further tailor services to address substance use.

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22. It wasn't until their third child (X.P.) was born during the pendency of the CHINS case that Mother and Father agreed to participate in Intensive Outpatient Treatment (IOT).

23. In August 2024, X.P. was born drug exposed to illegal substances, including methamphetamine, cocaine, and THC, as well as alcohol.

a. This was during the pendency of the CHINS case and while both Mother and Father were under a Dispositional Order to refrain from the use of illegal substances.

24. At that time, Mother and Father admitted to continued use, and identified “ecstasy” as their drug of choice.

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26. DCS put in a referral for IOT with ACP that the parents began in August of 2024. Sessions took place every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday. The program is intended to take anywhere between six (6) to twelve (12) weeks, depending on treatment needs.

27. Derrick Jack (IOT Instructor with ACP) testified that although attendance was spotty in the beginning, the parents attended over half of the scheduled sessions. Mr. Jack testified that Mother was more reserved during sessions and Father was more verbal․

28. Both parents admitted to ACP personnel that they were using illegal substances while in the program, which was verified by drug screens․

29. Mother and Father did not graduate from IOT and were recommended for a higher level of care due to their continued use.

a. Father was escorted to Tru Healing to begin the intake process.

b. Mother reached out to Sunrise Recovery to inquire about availability.

30. At the time of this Termination hearing, neither parent is enrolled in a higher level of care.

31. Both parents were recommended to complete a psychological evaluation to determine mental health needs.

a. Father completed a psychological evaluation that recommended medication management and individual therapy.

b. Mother never completed a psychological evaluation.

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33. Although it's noted throughout the CHINS case that Mother requested individual therapy on several occasions, she has never participated in the service to the extent that goals could be formulated or recommendations could be made․

34. FCM McDuffen testified that Mother has not been participating in individual therapy and only completed the intake appointment.

35. Prior to visitation being suspended, Mother and Father exhausted the efforts of five (5) separate service providers and were banned from several due to their aggressive behaviors during visits.

36. Visitation with Child was suspended by Court order on April 10, 2024.

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b. Further, in that Order, the Court noted that “There exists no barriers which preclude or prevent Mother and Father from participating in services; services which have been readily offered for well over one year.”

c. In addition to suspending visits, the Court again ordered the parents to bring themselves into full compliance with the Dispositional Order.

37. Visits with Child have never been reinstated.

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47. DCS presented that it made reasonable efforts to keep the family together through the numerous services that have been provided and supports that have been offered to the parents.

48. At the time of this termination hearing, Child has been removed from Mother and Father's care for 2 years, 2 months, and 1 day.

a. Child was 6 weeks old at the time of removal, and is currently 2 years old, and has never known life outside of the foster care system.

49. DCS and [Court-Appointed Special Advocate [(“CASA”)] testified that they agree that Mother and Father should not be afforded more time to prove their ability to parent, and that it is in Child's best interest to have parental rights terminated.

50. This is not to say that Mother and Father have not made progress throughout this case; they have. They appear to be more aware and more cognizant of the underlying issues that both brought them before the Court and which require continuous judicial intervention.

a. For instance, homelessness was an issue when the case began. Mother and Father appear to have had a stable home throughout much of this case.

b. Furthermore, both parents have objectively conducted themselves better while in Court; something that was a point of contention for some time.

51. Additionally, there is no denying that Parents sincerely care for Child and appear to be driven by a genuine desire to maintain a connection with Child.

52. However, despite the numerous accommodations that this Court, DCS and CASA have made for parents, along with the plethora of services offered (which parents have minimally complied with), Parents still continue to face many of the same struggles and barriers to reunification brought on by their own actions.

a. Mother and Father both say that they need more time to come into compliance and complete services, despite having over two years to do so.

53. It is telling to the Court that Parents continue to test positive for illegal substances over four (4) months after this TPR case was filed, when Parents were clearly and undoubtedly aware that the termination of their parental rights with [Child] was a very real possibility.

a. Both Mother and Father offered a very sincere explanation for their continued use, primarily that it was brought on by the continued removal of their children and the stressors associated with that removal.

b. While the Court understands this, both Mother and Father held the keys to restoring visits and reunifying with children; compliance with the Dispositional Order, which included the cessation of illegal drug use.

Id. at 7-18 (emphases in original).

[5] The court then concluded:

8. Mother and Father have either refused or failed to undergo substance abuse treatment and have not demonstrated a willingness or ability to remain sober.

9. Mother and Father continue to test positive for illegal substances, and even admitted during the hearing that they continue to use ecstasy.

10. Mother and Father have not complied with any mental health treatment services and have not addressed the underlying issues related to their substance abuse.

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12. Mother and Father have failed to bring themselves into compliance with the Dispositional Order in the CHINS case and there is a reasonable probability that they will not be able to bring themselves into compliance.

a. Mother and Father both indicated they needed more time to prove their ability to parent, despite numerous intensive services being offered to them for twenty-eight (28) months.

b. Parents could not identify how long it would take to prove sobriety or parenting skills, or what specifically they needed to do in order to be able to accomplish that.

c. The lack of any guidance or specificity, especially when coupled with the history of noncompliance in the case, calls into question the veracity of such claims.

13. There is no significant or consistent progress demonstrated by either parent in resolving the conditions that led to the removal of the Child from their care. The parents have not shown the ability or willingness to make the necessary changes to reunite with the Child.

14. Based on the totality of the circumstances, including the parents’ failure to remedy the conditions of neglect, their ongoing substance abuse, unresolved mental health issues, and inability to provide a safe and nurturing environment for Child, it is clear that the Child's best interests are not being served by continued contact and reunification with Parents.

15․ The CASA and DCS Family Case Manager testified clearly and convincingly that termination of the parent-child relationship between the child and Mother and Father would be in the child's best interests.

Id. at 24-27. As such, the court terminated Parents’ parental rights over Child. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Parents contend that the court clearly erred when it terminated their parental rights as to Child. We begin our review of this issue by acknowledging that “[t]he traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Bailey v. Tippecanoe Cnty. Div. of Fam. & Child. (In re M.B.), 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Schultz v. Porter Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re K.S.), 750 N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where a child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one's own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. Id. at 836.

[7] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS must file a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. As the Indiana General Assembly has provided:

(c) A petition ․must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

(d) A petition ․ must allege the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:

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(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child․

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(7) That the parent:

(A) failed to substantially comply with the child's dispositional decree for a period of at least twelve (12) months following the child's:

(i) removal from the parent's home under IC 31-34-2; or

(ii) adjudication as a child in need of services;

whichever occurred earlier ․; or

(B) is unlikely or unable to substantially comply with the child's dispositional decree.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 (2024). If the court finds that the allegations in the petition are true, “the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a). DCS's “burden of proof in termination of parental rights cases is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’ ” R.Y. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re G.Y.), 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting I.C. § 31-37-14-2).

[8] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Peterson v. Marion Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re D.D.), 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court's judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Judy S. v. Noble Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re L.S.), 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.

[9] Here, in terminating Parents’ parental rights, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon. When a trial court's judgment contains special findings and conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court's decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208.

[10] Here, Parents do not challenge any of the court's findings of fact. Thus, we accept the findings as true. L.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re S.S.), 120 N.E.3d 605, 608 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). On appeal, Parents contend that the trial court erred when it concluded that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or placement outside of their care will not be remedied,¹ that Parents are unlikely to comply with the dispositional order, and that termination is in Child's best interests. However, because Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(d) is written in the disjunctive, we need not address the issue of whether Parents are unlikely to comply with the dispositional order. We address the remaining issues in turn.

Remedy

[11] Parents first challenge the court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal from their care or the reasons for the continued placement outside of their home will not be remedied. To make that determination, the trial court should judge Parents’ fitness to care for the Child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. See E.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re E.M.), 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). However, the court must also “evaluate the parent's habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child[ren].” Moore v. Jasper Cnty. Dep't of Child Servs., 894 N.E.2d 218, 226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted). Pursuant to this rule, courts have properly considered evidence of a parent's prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment. Id. Moreover, DCS is not required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it need establish only that there is a reasonable probability the parent's behavior will not change. Id.

[12] On appeal, Parents argue that the court's findings do not support its conclusion because the findings “focus exclusively on the Parents’ historical failures during the course of the CHINS and termination proceedings.” Appellants’ Br. at 18. And they maintain that, “[a]s the habitual patterns of conduct cited by the trial court rely on only historical failures, they cannot solely form the basis of the termination order.” Id. at 22. In essence, Parents contend that the trial court failed to take into consideration their current circumstances or evidence of changed conditions. We cannot agree.

[13] We first note that the trial court's findings clearly show that the court considered Parents’ present circumstances and their progress. Indeed, the court found that it is “noteworthy that during the Fact-Finding that Father became emotional and appeared to acknowledge his behaviors and their inappropriate nature.” Appealed Order at 14. In addition, the court found that

[t]his is not to say that Mother and Father have not made progress throughout this case; they have. They appear to be more aware and more cognizant of the underlying issues that both brought them before the Court and which require continuous judicial intervention.”

Id. at 17. In particular, the court noted that Parents had resolved their homelessness and improved their conduct during court hearings.

[14] Thus, it is clear that the court took into consideration evidence of changed circumstances, including the fact that Parents have made some progress in certain areas. However, the court also evaluated the Parents’ habitual patterns of conduct. And, as the undisputed findings demonstrate, Parents have a history of substance abuse for which they have not successfully obtained treatment. Indeed, the underlying CHINS proceedings began after Child was born with illegal drugs in his system. Then, despite a dispositional order prohibiting Parents from using drugs, Parents continued to use drugs. They tested positive for illegal drugs several times and failed to screen on more than forty occasions, each of which resulted in a presumptive positive. And, notably Mother gave birth to another child during the pendency of this action who was born drug-exposed. Despite having been given more than two years to engage in services and treat their substance abuse problems, Parents continue to use drugs, including testing positive for illegal drugs four months after the petition to terminate their parental rights was filed, and they have not complied with any mental health treatment.

[15] In other words, this is not a case where the court was relying only on historical evidence to support the termination. Rather, the court carefully balanced the progress Parents had made with the ongoing drug use and lack of participation Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A-JT-1093 | October 24, 2025 Page 17 of 20 in services related to their drug use or mental health and ultimately determined that there is not a reasonable probability that the Parents’ behavior will change. And that conclusion is clearly supported by the unchallenged findings. The trial court did not err when it concluded as such.

Best Interests

[16] Parents next challenge the court's conclusion that termination of their parental rights is in Child's best interests. In determining what is in a child's best interests, a court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality of the evidence. A.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re A.K.), 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). A parent's historical inability to provide “adequate housing, stability, and supervision,” in addition to the parent's current inability to do so, supports finding termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. Id. at 221.

[17] When making its decision, the court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child. See Stewart v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re J.S.), 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “The court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship.” Id. Moreover, this Court has previously held that recommendations of the FCM and CASA to terminate parental rights, coupled with evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. Id.

[18] On appeal, Parents incorporate the same argument they made regarding the remedy prong; that is, that the court's conclusion is not supported by the findings because the findings focus only on historical failures. But, as outlined above, despite some positive improvements, Parents have not shown that they are capable of providing Child with a stable home free from drug use. Parents have had more than two years to participate in services and address their substance abuse, but they have not made any significant progress in addressing their drug use or mental health concerns.

[19] Child needs permanency. At the time of the hearing, Child had been removed from Parents’ care for more than two years, beginning when he was just six weeks old. Both Child's FCM and CASA testified that termination of the parental rights is in Child's best interests. The evidence that the reasons for Child's removal or placement outside of Parents’ care will not be remedied, coupled with the testimony from the FCM and CASA, supports the court's determination that the termination of Parents’ parental rights is in Child's best interests.

Conclusion

[20] The unchallenged findings support the trial court's conclusions that there is a reasonable probability that the reasons for Child's removal and continued placement outside of Parents’ home will not be remedied and that termination of Parents’ parental rights is in Child's best interest. The court therefore did not clearly err when it terminated Parents’ parental rights. We affirm the trial court's order.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Parents contend that the court concluded only that they were unlikely to comply with the dispositional order and that the trial court's conclusion regarding the remedy prong was not “sufficient to articulate the[ ] elements outlined in the statute or the petition to terminate parental rights.” Appellants’ Br. at 17 n.1. We disagree. In its order, the court concluded that there “is no significant or consistent progress demonstrated by either parent in resolving the conditions that led to the removal of the Child from their care” and that Parents “have not shown the ability or willingness to make the necessary changes to reunite with” Child. Appealed Order at 26. While that is not a verbatim recitation of the language of the statute, it is nonetheless a clear conclusion that there is a reasonable likelihood that the reasons for Child's removal or placement outside of Parents’ care will not be remedied. In any event, Parents stated that, even if the conclusions are sufficient, their argument “is equally applicable” to both the remedy prong and the prong regarding the dispositional order. Appellants’ Br. at 17 n.1.

Bailey, Judge.

Tavitas, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.