Ramona Stringer, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Regis Beck, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Hammond-Whiting Care Center, Augusta Omame, Anonymous Ambulance Service, Christopher Chicon, and David Palecek, Appellees-Defendants (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Ramona Stringer sued numerous healthcare providers (the “Providers”) following the death of her brother, Regis Beck. The Providers filed motions for summary judgment, alleging Stringer's claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth by the Indiana Professional Services Statute (the “PSS”); the trial court granted those motions. Stringer now appeals raising the following issue for our review: Whether the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the Providers.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In October 2022, Beck resided at the Hammond-Whiting Care Center (the “Care Center”). On October 29, Beck complained of breathing difficulty, so Augusta Omame, a licensed practical nurse, called Anonymous Ambulance Service, a private ambulance service, to transfer Beck to a hospital emergency room. Christopher Chicon and David Palecek, emergency medical technicians, responded and transported Beck to Methodist Hospital North Lake because the closer St. Catherine Hospital had “no bed[s] available”; they notified the Care Center of the destination. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 84. On November 17, Beck died in the hospital after suffering cardiac arrest. On September 6, 2023, Stringer requested medical records from the Care Center, and she received those records in February or March 2024. On October 25, 2024, Stringer filed a verified petition to appoint herself as an administrator for purpose of collecting damages for Beck's alleged wrongful death, which the trial court granted.

[4] On November 14, Stringer filed her proposed complaint against the Providers,¹ which she amended on December 28. In the amended complaint, Stringer alleged two counts of medical negligence, two counts of wrongful death, and two counts of “General Negligence” for actions or omissions of the Providers occurring on October 29, 2022. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 44, 47. Consequently, the Care Center and Omame (collectively, “Nursing Home”) and Anonymous Ambulance Service, Chicon, and Palecek (collectively, “Ambulance”) separately filed motions for summary judgment, arguing Stringer's complaint was filed outside the applicable statute of limitations period. The trial court granted the Providers’ motions. Stringer appealed both orders, and we consolidated those appeals.

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court Did Not Err by Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of the Providers

[5] Stringer argues the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the Providers. We review summary judgment decisions de novo, Gierek v. Anonymous 1, 250 N.E.3d 378, 384 (Ind. 2025) (citing Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014)), which means we apply the same standard as the trial court, Wohlt v. Wohlt, 245 N.E.3d 611, 615 (Ind. 2024) (citing Red Lobster Rests. LLC v. Fricke, 234 N.E.3d 159, 165 (Ind. 2024)). Summary judgment is proper only “if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). “A fact is ‘material’ if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is ‘genuine’ if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable inferences.” Abbott v. State, 183 N.E.3d 1074, 1079 (Ind. 2022) (quoting Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1003).

[6] We consider only those portions of the pleadings, depositions, and any other matters specifically designated to the trial court by the parties for purposes of the summary judgment motion. T.R. 56(C), (H). We resolve “all factual inferences and all doubts as to the existence of a material issue” in favor of the nonmovant. Zaragoza v. Wexford of Ind., LLC, 225 N.E.3d 146, 151 (Ind. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 285 (Ind. 2012)). In so doing, “we give careful scrutiny to make sure the nonmovant's day in court is not improperly denied.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Siner v. Kindred Hosp. Ltd. P'ship, 51 N.E.3d 1184, 1187 (Ind. 2016)).

[7] “The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of making a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Abbott, 183 N.E.3d at 1079 (emphasis in original) (citing Sargent v. State, 27 N.E.3d 729, 731 (Ind. 2015)). The movant “can make this showing when undisputed evidence affirmatively negates a required element” of the nonmovant's claim. Cmty. Health Network, Inc. v. McKenzie, 185 N.E.3d 368, 377 (Ind. 2022) (citing Siner, 51 N.E.3d at 1187–88). Only if the movant meets this prima facie burden does the burden then shift to the nonmovant to “come forward with contrary evidence showing an issue for the trier of fact.” Abbott, 183 N.E.3d at 1079 (citing Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1003).

[8] The Providers sought summary judgment based on their belief that Stringer filed her complaint outside the applicable statute of limitations. Statute of limitations defenses are “particularly appropriate for summary judgment determination.” Stickdorn v. Zook, 957 N.E.2d 1014, 1021 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. To make a prima facie showing that Stringer's action was commenced outside the applicable statute of limitations, the Providers needed to identify (1) the nature of Stringer's action, so the relevant statute of limitations can be identified, (2) the date Stringer's cause of action accrued, and (3) the date Stringer brought her cause of action, being beyond the relevant statutory period. City of Marion v. London Witte Grp., LLC, 169 N.E.3d 382, 390 (Ind. 2021) (quoting McMahan v. Snap On Tool Corp., 478 N.E.2d 116, 120 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)).

[9] First, we turn to the nature of the plaintiff's action. In the amended complaint, Stringer alleged, separately as to both Nursing Home and Ambulance, one count each of medical malpractice or negligence, wrongful death, and “General Negligence” for actions or omissions of the Providers occurring on October 29, 2022, which, she alleged caused Beck's death. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 44, 47. The “General Negligence” counts allege the same deficient conduct and resulting harm as the medical negligence and wrongful death counts. For example, as to Nursing Home, Stringer alleges that pursuant to the Adult Wrongful Death Statute, Nursing Home caused Beck's death by failing to call 911 or have a policy in place to call the same. See Appellant's App. Vol. II at 44. Despite Stringer's repackaging, the nature of her action is still one that is “based upon professional services rendered or which should have been rendered” falling under the PSS, Ind. Code § 34-11-2-3, in other words, malpractice. “ ‘Malpractice’ means a tort ․ based on ․ professional services that were provided, or that should have been provided, by a health care provider, to a patient.” I.C. § 34-18-2-18. “[I]f death is caused by the malpractice, the malpractice claim terminates at the patient's death, and a wrongful death claim must be filed by the personal representative within two years of the occurrence of the malpractice.” Newkirk v. Bethlehem Woods Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., LLC, 898 N.E.2d 299, 302 (Ind. 2008). The PSS provides as follows:

An action of any kind for damages, whether brought in contract or tort, based upon professional services rendered or which should have been rendered, may not be brought, commenced, or maintained, in any of the courts of Indiana against physicians, dentists, surgeons, hospitals, sanitariums, or others, unless the action is filed within two (2) years from the date of the act, omission, or neglect complained of.

Ind. Code § 34-11-2-3 (emphases added).

[10] Second, Stringer's cause of action accrued when the provision of professional services by the Providers occurred on October 29, 2022. It is undisputed that the last contact the Providers had with Beck was on October 29, 2022. Third, it is undisputed that Stringer brought her cause of action by filing the initial complaint on November 14, 2024—more than two years after the provision of professional services. Accordingly, the Providers have made a “prima facie showing that the action was commenced outside the statutory period.” City of Marion, 169 N.E.3d at 390.

[11] The burden now shifts to Stringer to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists or that the Providers are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In response to the Providers’ motions for summary judgment, Stringer designated the same evidence to support her opposition to each, including the initial and amended complaints, Nursing Home internal progress notes pertaining to Beck, Ambulance transportation notes, a medical record request, and a sworn declaration from Stringer.

[12] At the trial level, Stringer argued that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Nursing Home's decision to call Ambulance directly rather than to call 911 was “professional negligence or simply ordinary negligence or in regards to general negligence on the premises.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 74. Stringer also argued that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Ambulance used “professional judgment” in transporting Beck to the hospital. Id. at 132. These arguments fail. Stringer's own designated evidence shows Beck called Omame to complain of breathing difficulty, so Omame called for an ambulance. Viewed in the light most favorable to Stringer, Omame was offering professional services by examining Beck and calling for help when she determined he needed it. As to Ambulance, Stringer's designated evidence shows Ambulance drove Beck to a farther hospital because the closest hospital did not have beds available. Viewed in a light most favorable to Stringer, Ambulance was offering professional services by transporting Beck to the hospital. Stringer's allegations that Omame and Ambulance should have treated Beck differently do not alter the nature of the claim. Whether an individual acted in accordance with the standard duty of care is the underlying question in every malpractice action. See Rossner v. Take Care Health Systems, LLC, 172 N.E.3d 1248 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (determining whether a claim sounds in general negligence or malpractice depends on whether the “claim is based on the provider's behavior or practices while acting in his or her professional capacity”). Additionally, Stringer's “General Negligence” counts are contemplated by the PSS, which applies to actions of any kind for damages stemming from professional services.

[13] Also at the trial level, but abandoned on appeal, Stringer argued that a later accrual date should be used because she did not know the Providers’ actions or omissions allegedly caused Beck's death “until after being informed of such after the case was reviewed by a healthcare professional.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 76, 134. In certain circumstances, the “date on which the limitations period is activated—the ‘trigger date’ ”—may be deferred, allowing a plaintiff to file more than two years after the alleged malpractice. Overton v. Grillo, 896 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2008). “The trigger date, whether before or after the expiration of the limitations period, is the point at which the plaintiff either knows of malpractice or ‘learns of facts that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should lead to the discovery of the malpractice and the resulting injury.’ ” Id. “If a trigger date occurs before the expiration of the limitations period, the plaintiff's claim will be barred unless filing before the expiration of the two-year period was not possible with reasonable diligence.” Id. (citing Herron v. Anigbo, 897 N.E.2d 444, 449 (Ind. 2008)).

[14] Stringer did not file her complaint within two years of the provision of professional services by the Providers. Stringer's designated evidence shows that Stringer (1) “tried to look for attorneys after ․ Beck's death on November 17, 2022;” Appellant's App Vol. II at 90; (2) requested Beck's medical records on September 6, 2023; (3) received the requested medical records in February or March 2024 and consulted an attorney; (4) “became informed of the negligence;” Id. at 91; and (5) opened an estate. Nursing Home's designated evidence in reply to Stringer's response shows that Stringer petitioned to open Beck's estate on October 12, 2024. Although Stringer was not “informed of the negligence” until July 2024 (still within the limitations period), id., “[a] plaintiff need not be advised of the possibility of malpractice where it should be obvious that it might be present,” Overton, 896 N.E.2d at 503. Here, Stringer suspected and learned of the alleged negligence well within the limitations period, and filing before the two-year period was possible with reasonable diligence. See id. Thus, the trigger date remains October 29, 2022, when the provision of professional services occurred.

[15] Stringer has failed to rebut the Providers’ prima facie showings that no genuine issue of material fact exists concerning whether Stringer filed her action outside the statutory period. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of the Providers, and we affirm those decisions.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Care Center, Omame, Anonymous Ambulance Service, Chicon, and Palek.

Felix, Judge.

Brown, J., and Scheele, J., concur.