Lafayette Anesthesiologists, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Martin G. Hites, et al., Appellees-Defendants (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In 2008, Lafayette Anesthesiologists (LA) filed a complaint for damages against Martin G. and Nancy J. Hites d/b/a Hites Hardwood (collectively, Hites) to recover an award from the Worker's Compensation Board of Indiana (the Board). Sixteen years later, the trial court dismissed the complaint pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 41(E) for failure to prosecute.¹ LA raises several issues on appeal, but the thrust of its argument is that LA was not required to take any action after filing the complaint because Ind. Code § 22-3-4-9 required the trial court to enter judgment on the award issued by the Board upon its filing with the trial court.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] Nine healthcare providers performed medical services for William Johnson after he was injured in May 2001 in the course and scope of employment with Hites Hardwood. Johnson filed a worker's compensation claim against Hites Hardwood. Thereafter, Johnson and Hites Hardwood entered into a stipulated agreement (the Agreement). Martin executed the Agreement on behalf of Hites Hardwood. As relevant here, the Agreement provided:

3. That as a result of [Johnson's] injuries, medical care was provided and medical expenses incurred. The medical expenses total the sum of approximately Sixty Thousand Two Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars ($60,222.00), and are payable to the following healthcare providers:

a) Monticello Fire Department;

b) St. Elizabeth Hospital;

c) Medical Diagnostic Services;

d) White County Memorial Hospital;

e) Anesthesiology Associates;

f) Lafayette Emergency Care;

g) Dr. Khoa Lai;

h) Unity Surgical Center; and

i) Lafayette Radiologists.

4. The Defendant, Hites Hardwood, agrees to resolve all statutory medical expenses incurred by [Johnson], including but not limited to, those listed above. The Defendant shall indemnify and hold harmless [Johnson] from any valid claims made by any health care providers or insurance companies for statutory medical expenses through the date of this Agreement.

Appendix at 9-10.

[4] The Board approved the Agreement and entered its award (the Award) thereon on December 8, 2003, incorporating the Agreement by reference in the Award. Regarding medical expenses, the Award provided: “[Johnson] has incurred the sum of Sixty Thousand Two Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars and Fifty-Eight Cents ($60,222.58) in medical expenses and [Hites Hardwood] assumes responsibility for the payment or restitution of the statutory medical expenses.” Id. at 15. Upon LA's request, the Board, on October 10, 2008, issued an order authorizing LA to file a certified copy of the Award with a trial court.

[5] On November 5, 2008, LA filed a single-count complaint against Hites pursuant to I.C. § 22-3-4-9. LA attached the Agreement and the Award to the complaint and alleged that Hites had failed or refused to provide payment to LA for medical product and services provided to Johnson resulting from his work-related injury. LA claimed that it “ha[d] been damaged in the sum of $3,292.00, accrual of statutory interest in the sum of $1,295.15, and the costs of this action.” Id. at 12. In its prayer for relief, LA requested “judgment against [Hites] for damages in the principal sum of $3,292.00, for accrual of statutory interest in the sum of $1,295.15, for statutory post-judgment interest, for the costs of this action in the sum of $159.00, and for all other relief just and proper in the premises.” Id. at 13.

[6] After Hites answered the complaint in December 2008, the parties engaged in some discovery and settlement discussions in 2009 and early 2010, but the last activity on the CCS was the filing of Hites's answer. On August 15, 2024, the trial court sua sponte set the matter for a show cause hearing on October 4 to determine whether the action should be dismissed for LA's failure to prosecute. The order provided in part: “If no cause is shown at or before the hearing, the Court will enter an order of dismissal of this case pursuant to Trial Rule 41 (E).” Id. at 18.

[7] This prompted LA, on September 25, 2024, to file a motion for summary judgment and a separate motion to vacate the show cause hearing. LA has presented only the later motion to us on appeal. In that motion – the motion to vacate – LA did not explain the reasons for its lengthy delay in failing to prosecute; LA simply asserted, referencing its summary judgment motion, that “it is entitled to judgment in this cause as a matter of law, without further proceedings.” Id. at 19. The next day, the trial court issued an order vacating the show cause hearing and an order directing Hites to respond to the summary judgment motion within thirty days.

[8] Hites responded with a motion asking the trial court to, among other things, reconsider its vacation of the show cause hearing. Hites argued that LA “provided no ‘good cause’ within its Motion to Vacate or Motion for Summary Judgment to explain the incredibly long delay of prosecuting this case of approximately fifteen (15) years and eight (8) months.” Id. at 24.

[9] LA filed a response and argued, for the first time, that T.R. 41(E) was not the proper procedure because the Board had already issued a judgment, the Award, which the trial court was required to enter as its own judgment. Thus, LA claimed, there was nothing to be dismissed for failure to prosecute. LA acknowledged, however, that “a quick review of the file by the Court may have caused confusion in regard to the judgment, as there was no specific monetary award specified in the Board's Award.” Appendix at 30.

[10] On October 22, 2024, the trial court ordered that Hites's motion to reconsider would be addressed at a hearing on January 7, 2025, which would also include a show cause hearing. At the conclusion of this hearing, the trial court granted Hites's motion to reconsider, determined that LA had “failed to show sufficient cause” for its delay, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure to prosecute. Id. at 33.

[11] On January 22, 2025, LA filed a motion to correct error, again arguing that T.R. 41(E) had no application because a judgment had already been entered for LA. Hites disputed that a judgment had been entered. The parties filed written arguments with the trial court and then participated in a hearing on April 29, 2025. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied LA's motion to correct error on two grounds: (1) the Award issued by the Board constituted a judgment on December 8, 2003, and the judgment had expired because twenty years had passed before the court sua sponte set the show cause hearing on August 15, 2024; and (2) LA was unjustified in failing to take any affirmative action for nearly sixteen years after filing the complaint.

[12] LA now appeals. Additional information will be provided below as needed.

Standard of Review

[13] LA contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the case for failure to prosecute. We typically review a trial court's dismissal under T.R. 41(E) for an abuse of discretion. Foster v. First Merchants Bank, N.A., 235 N.E.3d 1251, 1254 (Ind. 2024). “A court abuses its discretion if its decision either misinterprets the law or clearly contravenes the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

[14] In this case, however, Hites chose not to file an appellate brief. Under such circumstances, we will reverse upon a showing of prima facie error, meaning error “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Salyer v. Washington Regular Baptist Church Cemetery, 141 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2020). Where an appellant is unable to meet this burden, however, we will affirm. Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006).

Discussion & Decision

[15] We initially address whether the Award constituted a judgment in and of itself. LA now seems to acknowledge that it did not. See Appellant's Brief at 11 (observing that “the Award is not a judgment[ ] and requires affirmative action from the Trial Court in rendering judgment in accordance with the Board's Award”).

[16] I.C. § 22-3-4-9(a) provides:

Upon order of the [Board] made after five (5) days notice is given to the opposite party, any party in interest may file in the circuit or superior court of the county in which the injury occurred a certified copy of the memorandum of agreement approved by the board, or of an order or decision of the board ․ whereupon said court shall render judgment in accordance therewith and notify the parties. Such judgment shall have the same effect and all proceedings in relation thereto shall thereafter be the same as though said judgment had been rendered in a suit duly heard and determined by said court.

Interpreting a nearly identical predecessor of this statute, our Supreme Court held that “an award of the [ ] Board is in legal effect the same as a finding or verdict; and that a circuit or superior court must, when an award is filed in the proper court, render judgment thereon and in accordance therewith.” State ex rel. Maines v. Scott Cir. Ct., 181 N.E. 523, 524 (Ind. 1932). The Supreme Court also explained in another case:

The statute recognizes that only a court has power to render judgments, in the judicial sense, and seeks to utilize this power for the benefit of those in whose favor awards have been made by the [ ] Board.

The award is evidence of a liability; the judgment of the court is required and provided for, to enforce the liability, since the decisions of the [ ] Board cannot be carried into execution by any action or mandate of the Board.

Grant Coal Mining Co. v. Coleman, 179 N.E. 778, 781 (Ind. 1932). In other words, the Award was not a judgment, and the trial court clearly erred by determining it to be such.

[17] Regardless, the trial court determined alternatively that dismissal was warranted under T.R. 41(E) due to the great length of LA's delay in prosecuting its case.

Courts of review generally balance several factors when determining whether a trial court erred in dismissing a case for failure to prosecute. These factors include: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the degree of personal responsibility on the part of the plaintiff; (4) the degree to which the plaintiff will be charged for the acts of the attorney; (5) the amount of prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay; (6) the presence or absence of a lengthy history of having deliberately proceeded in a dilatory fashion; (7) the existence and effectiveness of sanctions less drastic than dismissal which fulfill the purposes of the rules and the desire to avoid court congestion; (8) the desirability of deciding the case on the merits; and (9) the extent to which the plaintiff has been stirred into action by a threat of dismissal as opposed to diligence on the plaintiff's part.

Bank of Am., N.A. v. Cong.-Jones, 122 N.E.3d 859, 864 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (internal citations omitted). “The weight any particular factor has in a case depends upon the facts of that case. However, a lengthy period of inactivity may be enough to justify dismissal under the circumstances of a particular case, especially if the plaintiff has no excuse for the delay.” Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Harris, 985 N.E.2d 804, 814 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (internal citation and quotations omitted).

[18] Curiously, LA does not address the nine factors listed above or contest the trial court's finding that LA took no affirmative action on its complaint for nearly sixteen years. LA simply argues that upon filing a certified copy of the Award with the trial court, there was nothing left for LA to do because I.C. § 22-3-4-9(a) required the trial court to render judgment in accordance with the Award. LA contends that the trial court's failure to enter judgment was “not an error of [LA] for failure to prosecute, but a[n] error by the Trial Court in failing to enter judgment reflecting the Award[.]” Appellant's Brief at 7-8. In essence, LA blames the delay on the trial court and claims no responsibility for ensuring that the trial court entered judgment on the Award.

[19] Upon the proper filing of a certified copy of an award of the Board in the appropriate trial court, it is “as much the clear legal duty of the judge of that court to render judgment in accordance with the award as it would be to render judgment upon a finding or verdict.” State ex rel. Maines, 181 N.E. at 524. In rendering judgment, a trial court “must accept the final award of the board as its finding, and the judgment must follow such award.” Kuhr v. Willan, 169 N.E. 475, 477 (Ind. Ct. App. 1930). “The court has no authority to modify the award or change its effect.” Id.; see also Cox v. Worker's Comp. Bd. of Ind., 675 N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (Ind. 1996) (observing that trial court is “authorized merely to enter the award or order of the Board as its own judgment when it receives such an application” and “has no jurisdiction to review the decision of the Board”).

[20] In this case, LA's filing with the trial court was not so straightforward. LA appended the certified copy of the Award to its complaint, but instead of requesting entry of judgment on the Award, LA requested judgment for “damages in the principal sum of $3,292.00, for accrual of statutory interest in the sum of $1,295.15, for statutory post-judgment interest, for the costs of this action in the sum of $159.00, and for all other relief just and proper in the premises.” Appendix at 13. An award of the Board, however, is not for damages. See Kuhr, 169 N.E. at 477 (“[A] judgment rendered on an award of the [ ] Board is not a judgment for damages. It is a judgment for compensation.”). And LA's requested relief would not be proper under the statute. See id. (finding trial court violated I.C. § 22-3-4-9 by entering personal judgment for damages in amount different from the Board's award).

[21] Complicating things further is that the Award does not set forth a specific monetary award for LA (or any of Johnson's medical providers), and LA's name is not even listed on the Award or in the Agreement.² Moreover, LA named Nancy in the complaint as a defendant, but Nancy is not mentioned in the Award or the Agreement.

[22] Under the circumstances, the trial court was not obligated to grant the relief sought by LA based solely on the complaint and doing so would have been imprudent.³ More was clearly required of LA to prosecute its case, yet it failed to do so for an inordinate amount of time. LA has failed to establish prima facie error regarding the trial court's dismissal of the complaint under T.R. 41(E).

[23] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   T.R. 41(E) provides:Whenever there has been a failure to comply with these rules or when no action has been taken in a civil case for a period of sixty [60] days, the court, on motion of a party or on its own motion shall order a hearing for the purpose of dismissing such case. The court shall enter an order of dismissal at plaintiff's costs if the plaintiff shall not show sufficient cause at or before such hearing. Dismissal may be withheld or reinstatement of dismissal may be made subject to the condition that the plaintiff comply with these rules and diligently prosecute the action and upon such terms that the court in its discretion determines to be necessary to assure such diligent prosecution.

2.   Anesthesiology Associates might be one in the same as Lafayette Anesthesiologists, but such is not alleged in the complaint.

3.   We note that even if LA had correctly sought judgment on the Award, the trial court would have been required by I.C. § 22-3-4-9(a) to render judgment and notify the parties. When LA did not receive notice of judgment being entered within a reasonable time after filing the Award with its complaint, LA needed to take some action to move the litigation forward rather than wait nearly sixteen years until the trial court scheduled a show cause hearing. “The burden of moving the litigation is upon the plaintiff, not the court.” Belcaster v. Miller, 785 N.E.2d 1164, 1167 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied.

Altice, Chief Judge.

May, J. and Foley, J., concur.