Unity Surgical Center, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Martin G. and Nancy J. Hites d/b/a Hites Hardwood, Appellees-Defendants (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Nine healthcare providers, including Unity Surgical Center, performed medical services for William Johnson after he was injured in the course and scope of employment with Hites Hardwood. To cover his medical expenses, Johnson filed a worker's compensation claim against Hites, and in 2003, the Worker's Compensation Board of Indiana issued a lump sum award in Johnson's favor (Award). Among other things, the Award stated that Johnson incurred a total of $60,222.58 in medical expenses across the nine providers and that Hites “assume[d] responsibility” for the “payment or restitution” of those expenses. App. Vol. II p. 14.

[2] In 2008, Unity sued Hites for “damages,” attaching the Award to its complaint and alleging Hites had failed to pay Unity for its portion of Johnson's medical expenses. Id. at 12. For the next 16 years, however, Unity took no action in the case. And in 2025, the trial court dismissed Unity's complaint for failure to prosecute under Indiana Trial Rule 41(E). Unity appeals, arguing that it was not required to take any action because Indiana Code § 22-3-4-9 required the trial court to enter judgment on the Award upon its filing with the court. Because Unity never requested the entry of such a judgment, we affirm.

Facts

[3] Johnson injured his left hand in May 2001 while in the course and scope of his employment with Hites. Unity was allegedly involved in the following events thereafter:

On or about January 23, 2002, Unity provided medical treatment to Johnson for which Unity subsequently billed Johnson the sum of $6,347.55. On or about October 29, 2002, Unity filed legal action against Johnson in Cause No. 79D06-0210-CC-000311,1 for payment of the medical treatment provided to Johnson, for statutory pre-judgment interest, and for attorney fees. On or about November 20, 2002, counsel for Johnson informed counsel for Unity that Johnson had filed a claim for worker's compensation benefits with the Board. On or about November 10, 2003, Unity filed an Application for Adjustment of Claim for Provider Fee with the Board for $6,347.55. On or about December 8, 2003, by Stipulation of the parties thereto, the Board determined that the medical treatment provided to Johnson by Unity was the result of a work-related accident while in the employ of Hites, and ordered Hites to pay the claim of Unity.

Pl.’s Summ. J. Br., p. 2 (filed Sep. 25, 2024).

[4] As indicated above, Johnson and Hites agreed to written Stipulations related to Johnson's worker's compensation claim. Those Stipulations were filed with the Worker's Compensation Board and stated, in pertinent part:

3. That as a result of [Johnson's] injuries, medical care was provided and medical expenses incurred. The medical expenses total the sum of approximately Sixty Thousand Two Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars ($60,222.00), and are payable to the following healthcare providers:

a) Monticello Fire Department;

b) St. Elizabeth Hospital;

c) Medical Diagnostic Services;

d) White County Memorial Hospital;

e) Anesthesiology Associates;

f) Lafayette Emergency Care;

g) Dr. Khoa Lai;

h) Unity Surgery Center; and

i) Lafayette Radiologists.

4. [Hites] agrees to resolve all statutory medical expenses incurred by [Johnson], including but not limited to, those listed above. [Hites] shall indemnify and hold harmless [Johnson] from any valid claims made by any health care providers or insurance companies for statutory medical expenses through the date of this Agreement.

App. Vol. II, pp. 8-9.

[5] In December 2003, the Worker's Compensation Board ruled in Johnson's favor, approved the Stipulations, and incorporated them by reference into its Award. The Award ultimately stated, in pertinent part:

It is therefore considered ORDERED and ADJUDGED by the Worker's Compensation Board of Indiana that there be awarded [Johnson] as against [Hites] as follows:

1. That [Johnson] has incurred the sum of Sixty Thousand Two Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars and Fifty[-]Eight Cents ($60,222.58) in medical expenses and that [Hites] assumes responsibility for the payment or restitution of the statutory medical expenses.

Id. at 14.

[6] Five years later, in November 2008, Unity filed a complaint against Hites, alleging it had failed to pay Unity for its portion of Johnson's medical expenses pursuant to the Award. The complaint included one count, entitled, “Claim Pursuant to I.C. 22-3-4-9,” and both the Award and the Stipulations were attached as exhibits. Id. at 11 (bold styling omitted). The prayer for relief sought “judgment against [Hites] for damages in the principal sum of $6,347.55,” plus interests and costs. Id. at 12.

[7] Hites answered Unity's complaint, but neither the trial court nor the parties took any action in the case for the next 16 years. Then, in August 2024, the trial court sua sponte issued an order for Unity to show cause why its complaint should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute under Indiana Trial Rule 41(E). Unity moved for summary judgment a month later, prompting the trial court to vacate the show cause hearing. But the hearing was later reset at Hites's request.

[8] After the show cause hearing, the trial court dismissed Unity's complaint for failure to prosecute under Trial Rule 41(E). Unity then filed a motion to correct error, which the trial court denied in April 2025, stating:

The Court reads Indiana Code § 22-3-4-9 to read that the [Award of the] Workman's Compensation Board is a judgment which was entered December 8, 2003 and that twenty years have lapsed prior to this Court's sua sponte action on 41(E) on August 15, 2024. Further, the Court finds there was no affirmative action taken by the Plaintiff once the complaint was filed on November 5, 2008 until they filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on September 25, 2024.

App. Vol. II, p. 59. Unity appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Unity argues that the trial court erred by dismissing its complaint under Trial Rule 41(E).² We typically review trial court's dismissal under that rule for an abuse of discretion. Foster v. First Merchants Bank, N.A., 235 N.E.3d 1251, 1254 (Ind. 2024). Such error occurs where the trial court's judgment is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or where the trial court errs on a matter of law. Id. In this case, however, Hites chose not to file an appellee's brief. Under such circumstances, we may reverse upon a showing of prima facie error, meaning error “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Morton v. Ivacic, 898 N.E.2d 1196, 1199 (Ind. 2008) (citation omitted).

[10] Trial Rule 41(E) states:

Whenever there has been a failure to comply with these rules or when no action has been taken in a civil case for a period of sixty [60] days, the court, on motion of a party or on its own motion shall order a hearing for the purpose of dismissing such case. The court shall enter an order of dismissal at plaintiff's costs if the plaintiff shall not show sufficient cause at or before such hearing. Dismissal may be withheld or reinstatement of dismissal may be made subject to the condition that the plaintiff comply with these rules and diligently prosecute the action and upon such terms that the court in its discretion determines to be necessary to assure such diligent prosecution.

[11] Here, the trial court found that Unity took no action on its complaint for a period of 16 years—far beyond the 60-day threshold required by Trial Rule 41(E). Unity does not contest this finding but instead claims no such action was required of Unity under Indiana Code § 22-3-4-9(a). That statute provides:

Upon order of the worker's compensation board made after five (5) days notice is given to the opposite party, any party in interest may file in the circuit or superior court of the county in which the injury occurred a certified copy of the memorandum of agreement approved by the board, or of an order or decision of the board, or of an award of the full board unappealed from, or of an award of the full board affirmed upon an appeal, whereupon said court shall render judgment in accordance therewith and notify the parties.

Ind. Code § 22-3-4-9(a).

[12] Our Supreme Court has construed Indiana Code § 22-3-4-9(a) as treating an award of the Board “as equivalent to” a trial court's finding or jury's verdict. Grant Coal Mining Co. v. Coleman, 204 Ind. 122, 179 N.E. 778, 781 (1932). Thus, when a party in interest properly files a copy of the award with a trial court, “it [is] as much the clear legal duty of the judge of that court to render judgment in accordance with the award as it would be to render judgment upon a finding or verdict.” State v. Scott Cir. Ct., 203 Ind. 572, 181 N.E. 523, 524 (1932). “The court ․ must accept the final award of the board as its finding, and the judgment must follow such award.” Kuhr v. Willan, 90 Ind. App. 567, 169 N.E. 475, 477 (1930). “The court has no authority to modify the award or change its effect.” Id.

[13] Based on the foregoing principles, Unity asserts prima facie error in the trial court's failure to enter judgment on the Award upon its filing as an attachment to Unity's complaint. We find no such error.

[14] Although the lone count in Unity's complaint bore the title, “Claim Pursuant to I.C. 22-33-4-9,” its prayer for relief did not request entry of judgment on the Award—that is, a judgment in favor of Johnson and against Hites for $60,222.58 in worker's compensation. Rather, Unity's complaint sought a judgment in favor of Unity and against Hites “for damages in the principal sum of $6,347.55.” App. Vol. II, p. 12. On its face, this is not a request for judgment on the Award under Indiana Code § 22-3-4-9. See Kuhr, 169 N.E. at 477 (“[A] judgment rendered on an award of the Compensation Board is not a judgment for damages. It is a judgment for compensation.”). Nor would the requested judgment be proper under that statute. See id. (finding trial court violated Indiana Code § 22-3-4-9 by entering personal judgment for damages in amount different from worker's compensation award).

[15] Trial court judges are not mind readers. We therefore decline Unity's implied invitation to read Indiana Code § 22-3-4-9 as requiring the entry of judgment on a worker's compensation award absent a specific request for such a judgment. See Cox v. Worker's Comp. Bd. of Ind., 675 N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (Ind. 1996) (discussing trial court's authority upon receiving an “application” for judgment under the statute). Unity also does not explain why the trial court's alleged failure to enter judgment on the Award upon the filing of Unity's complaint should excuse Unity's failure to pursue that judgment for the next 16 years.

[16] The purpose of Trial Rule 41(E) is “to ensure that plaintiffs will diligently pursue their claims.” Belcaster v. Miller, 785 N.E.2d 1164, 1167 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citation omitted). And here, Indiana Code § 22-3-4-9 required the trial court to “notify the parties” upon the entry of judgment on the Award. When Unity did not receive this notice within a reasonable time after filing the Award with its complaint, it remained incumbent on Unity to request a hearing, file a motion, or take some other action to pursue the judgment it purportedly sought. “The burden of moving the litigation is upon the plaintiff, not the court.” Id. [17] Because Unity took no action on its complaint for 16 years, the trial court did not err by dismissing Unity's complaint under Trial Rule 41(E). We affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1.   A review of Case No. 79D06-0210-CC-000311 via Indiana's electronic case management system (Odyssey) reveals that, on May 15, 2007, default judgment was entered in favor of Unity and against Johnson for the principal sum of $6,347.55.

2.   Unity also raises several issues stemming from the trial court's finding that “the [Award of the] Workman's Compensation Board is a judgment.” App. Vol. II, p. 59 (emphasis added). Based on the principles set forth below, infra ¶ 12, we agree with Unity's premise that the trial court's finding is erroneous. But we do not address the remaining issues because they have no bearing on a Trial Rule 41(E) dismissal, which is what the trial court ultimately ordered.

Weissmann, Judge.

Bradford, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.