James C. Hughes, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] James C. Hughes was arrested after a short vehicle chase, during which his passenger threw a small quantity of methamphetamine (“meth”) out of the vehicle. Officers later searched his house and discovered larger amounts of meth and paraphernalia, as well as two handguns.

[2] Hughes appeals the fourteen-year sentence the trial court imposed after he pleaded guilty to one count of Level 3 felony possession of meth while in possession of a firearm. He argues that the trial court abused its sentencing discretion. Hughes also asks this Court to exercise its authority to reduce his sentence. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and that Hughes has failed to demonstrate that his sentence should be revised, we affirm

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On the night of September 30, 2024, Corporal Taylor Deffendoll of the Petersburg Police Department attempted to stop a vehicle because it had a broken tail light cover and a nonfunctional license plate light. Hughes was driving the vehicle, and he had a passenger. Hughes initially drove toward the side of the road, but he did not stop. As Corporal Deffendoll followed Hughes’ vehicle, Hughes’ passenger threw a shiny object out of the car.

[4] Hughes ultimately stopped and was detained. Other officers searched the area where Corporal Deffendoll had seen the object land and discovered plastic baggies containing a total of 3.5 grams of meth, along with syringes and pipes. The officers arrested Hughes and his passenger and seized their phones.

[5] On October 2, Corporal Deffendoll requested and received a search warrant to examine Hughes’ cell phone. Among other information, he found text message conversations between Hughes and two other people. Hughes discussed purchasing meth from the people, using slang terms for the substance and the proposed amounts. In Corporal Deffendoll's experience, the amounts Hughes discussed were greater than a person would purchase for personal use.

[6] The corporal also requested and received a search warrant for Hughes’ house, which he and other officers searched on October 2. They found 11.5 grams of meth, along with syringes, pills, and marijuana. They also found a handgun in the kitchen. According to Corporal Deffendoll, the 3.5 grams of meth found during the traffic stop was consistent with personal use, but the 11.5 grams officers found in Hughes’ house was not.

[7] On October 4, the State charged Hughes with Level 2 felony dealing in meth, Level 3 felony possession of meth while in possession of a firearm, Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, Level 5 felony dealing in marijuana, and Level 6 felony maintaining a common nuisance.

[8] On October 21, Hughes’ mother called dispatch to report that she had found more evidence in his house. Corporal Deffendoll met with her and seized two boxes that collectively contained sixteen grams of meth and another handgun.

[9] Next, the State requested and received permission to file an habitual offender sentencing enhancement. The parties negotiated a plea agreement. Hughes agreed to plead guilty to the Level 3 felony, and the State agreed to dismiss the other counts, the sentencing enhancement, and a separate pending criminal case. Sentencing was left to the trial court's discretion.

[10] The court accepted the parties’ agreement and sentenced Hughes to fourteen years. This appeal followed.

Discussion and Decision

I. Mitigating Sentencing Factors

[11] Hughes argues the trial court overlooked several mitigating factors. “Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Hunter v. State, 72 N.E.3d 928, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. “An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id.

[12] “When imposing a sentence for a felony, a trial court must enter a sentencing statement including reasonably detailed reasons for imposing a particular sentence.” Higginson v. State, 209 N.E.3d 15, 24-25 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). Among other circumstances, a trial court abuses its sentencing discretion when its sentencing statement “omits reasons clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration[.]” Id. at 25. But a trial court need not accept a defendant's view of what constitutes a mitigating factor or assign proposed mitigators the same weight as the defendant suggests. Fisher v. State, 264 N.E.3d 696, 707 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). “When a defendant claims a trial court abused its discretion by failing to find a mitigating circumstance, the defendant must establish the claimed mitigator is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Higginson, 209 N.E.3d at 27.

[13] The trial court identified Hughes’ guilty plea as the only mitigating factor. Hughes argues the trial court overlooked his history of cognitive disability. He had a tumor removed from his brain when he was seventeen, and he and his mother both testified that since then he has had problems with impulsivity and emotional control. He receives disability payments.

[14] When determining whether a trial court erred by not finding a defendant's mental illness or disability to be a mitigator, we consider several factors including the extent of any nexus between the disorder or impairment and the commission of the offense. Addis v. State, 212 N.E.3d 183, 186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Weeks v. State, 697 N.E.2d 28, 30 (Ind. 1998)). Hughes presented no evidence that ties his cognitive disability to his commission of the current offense. Without proof of a nexus, this claimed mitigator is not clearly supported by the record. See Addis, 212 N.E.3d at 187 (trial court did not abuse discretion in failing to find defendant's autism spectrum disorder to be mitigating factor; there was no proof of nexus between his disorder and his commission of offenses).

[15] Hughes also claims his traumatic childhood was a mitigating factor, noting that his father was murdered when he was only nine years old. But evidence of a difficult childhood “generally ‘warrants little, if any, mitigating weight.’ ” Lewis v. State, 116 N.E.3d 1144, 1155 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Coleman v. State, 741 N.E.2d 697, 700 (Ind. 2000)), trans. denied.

[16] Next, Hughes argues the trial court should have identified his lengthy history of substance addiction as a mitigating factor, claiming he has used an array of drugs since he was a child. He further argues he has not been afforded treatment opportunities in connection with his prior criminal cases.

[17] The State does not dispute that Hughes began using controlled substances at a young age and has continued doing so for most of his life. But a history of substance abuse can be considered as an aggravating factor rather than a mitigating factor. See, e.g., Hildebrant v. State, 770 N.E.2d 355, 363 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing defendant's longtime use of controlled substances as valid aggravator), trans. denied. In addition, at sentencing Hughes admitted that he had previously sought out inpatient treatment at a rehabilitation facility but chose not to go through with it. Failure to seek treatment does not reflect positively on his character. See, e.g., Caraway v. State, 959 N.E.2d 847, 852 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (trial court did not err in identifying defendant's failure to seek treatment as aggravating factor), trans. denied. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to identify Hughes’ extensive history of substance abuse as a mitigating factor.

[18] Finally, Hughes notes he had arranged for inpatient rehabilitative treatment for his substance addiction while this case was pending, and he claims the trial court should have recognized his willingness to seek help as a mitigating factor. But the trial court, as the assessor of witness credibility, was not obligated to accept at face value that Hughes was ready to seek treatment. See Holmes v. State, 86 N.E.3d 394, 400 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (trial court did not err in rejecting defendant's alleged remorse as mitigating factor; court's determination rested on credibility determination), trans. denied. In summary, the trial court did not err in refusing to accept Hughes’ proffered mitigating factors.

II. Sentence Review Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B)

[19] Hughes argues that his sentence should be reduced, with a portion of it to be served in residential treatment for substance abuse. Article 7, section 6 of the Indiana Constitution authorizes this Court to review and revise sentences. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) implements this authority, stating that this Court may revise a sentence “if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.”

[20] The primary role of appellate review under Rule 7(B) “is to leaven the outliers, not to achieve a perceived correct sentence in each case.” Crum v. State, 239 N.E.3d 858, 861 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). As a result, when conducting our review we do not ask “whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather, the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” Woodcock v. State, 163 N.E.3d 863, 877 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. A grant of relief under Rule 7(B) is reserved “for exceptional cases.” Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 613 (Ind. 2018) (per curiam).

[21] We may look at any factors in the record when assessing the nature of the offense and character of the offender. Madden v. State, 162 N.E.3d 549, 563 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). “The defendant bears the burden of persuading us a revised sentence is warranted.” Crum, 239 N.E.3d at 861.

[22] “The advisory sentence is the starting point our legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Woodcock, 163 N.E.3d at 877. At the time Hughes committed his offense, the advisory sentence for a Level 3 felony was nine years, with a maximum of sixteen years and a minimum of three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5(b) (2014). The trial court sentenced Hughes to fourteen years.

[23] “Our analysis of the ‘nature of the offense’ requires us to look at the nature, extent, heinousness, and brutality of the offense.” Dean v. State, 222 N.E.3d 976, 990 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. To obtain a conviction of Level 3 felony possession of meth while possessing a firearm, the State had to prove Hughes possessed between ten and twenty-eight grams of meth. Ind. Code 35-48-4-6.1(d) (2014). In two visits to his home, officers found over twenty-seven grams of meth, an amount at the upper end of the statutory range. The officers also found marijuana and two handguns.

[24] Hughes describes his possession offense as “victimless.” Appellant's Br. p. 17. We disagree. Meth is a dangerous substance, and his possession of it in large quantities posed a serious health risk to: (1) the officers who searched his home; and (2) his mother, who also looked through his belongings.

[25] Turning to Hughes’ character, our analysis “involves a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities, including the defendant's age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse.” Dean, 222 N.E.3d at 990-91. Hughes was thirty-nine years old at sentencing. His criminal history consists of eight felony convictions and one misdemeanor conviction. He has not been deterred from criminal misconduct by extensive experience with the criminal justice system. To the contrary, his felony convictions include methrelated offenses and a handgun possession offense, demonstrating that he continues to commit the same types of criminal offenses.

[26] Hughes was placed on probation on three prior occasions, and he failed to satisfactorily complete a term of probation once. In addition, at the time he committed the current offense, he had a pending felony case in another county.

[27] Hughes points to his cognitive disability and his history of substance addiction as factors that merit a reduced sentence and placement in substance abuse treatment. But we have already determined that he failed to demonstrate a nexus between his disability and the current offense. And his substance abuse, along with his previous failed attempt to seek treatment, do not necessarily reflect well on his character.

[28] Hughes also points to his guilty plea as a positive circumstance. “A guilty plea is not necessarily a mitigating factor where the defendant receives substantial benefit from the plea or where evidence against the defendant is so strong that the decision to plead guilty is merely pragmatic.” Amalfitano v. State, 956 N.E.2d 208, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. In exchange for Hughes’ guilty plea to the Level 3 felony, the State dismissed four other felonies and an habitual offender sentencing enhancement. The State also agreed to dismiss another pending felony case. Hughes received a substantial benefit from pleading guilty, and we cannot conclude that his plea necessarily reflects positively on his character. Hughes has failed to demonstrate that his sentence is an outlier in need of revision.

Conclusion

[29] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[30] Affirmed.

Baker, Senior Judge.

Bradford, J., and Foley, J., concur.