John J. Lyman, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] John J. Lyman appeals from the trial court's order revoking his direct placement in in-home detention through Vigo County Community Corrections, contending that ordering him to serve eight years in the Department of Correction (DOC) is disproportionately severe in relation to the minor nature of his violations. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in light of Lyman's fifteen substance-abuse violations in an eight-month period of time, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In the early hours of July 3, 2022, Lyman threatened his adult son, Griffin Lyman, that if he did not answer Lyman's phone calls “shits going to get ugly.” Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 30 (probable cause affidavit). Griffin did not answer the call, so Lyman approached Griffin's home, shot at it and a vehicle with a .22 caliber firearm, and then fled the scene. Lyman was intoxicated on alcohol, which he had combined with his mental health medication.

[3] The State charged Lyman with Level 2 felony burglary, Level 4 felony burglary, Level 5 felony criminal recklessness, two counts of Level 5 felony intimidation, and Level 6 felony intimidation. Lyman entered into a plea agreement and pleaded guilty to Level 4 felony burglary, Level 5 felony criminal recklessness, and Level 6 felony intimidation. The remaining charges were dismissed. The trial court sentenced Lyman to concurrent sentences of twelve years for Level 4 felony burglary, six years for Level 5 felony criminal recklessness, and two years for Level 6 felony intimidation. Lyman was to serve eight years on direct placement in community corrections followed by four years suspended to probation.

[4] Nine days later, the State filed a petition to revoke Lyman's placement because he had reported for his intake appointment at community corrections with a BAC of .09. Lyman admitted the violations at an evidentiary hearing. The trial court imposed no sanction and returned him to community corrections.

[5] Five months later, the State filed a petition to revoke Lyman's placement because he had committed fifteen violations in his eight months. Specifically, he failed to contact the drug screen notification system on seven occasions, failed to appear for his drug screen three times, and tested positive for alcohol, well above the testing threshold, on five out of twelve drug screens. Lyman received additional treatment and therapy through Hamilton Center and by attending AA meetings. However, Lyman denied consuming alcohol to his case manager and blamed a dry mouth spray for the test results. Lyman never admitted to or acknowledged having an alcohol addiction.

[6] An evidentiary hearing was held at which Lyman admitted his violations. Vigo County Community Corrections determined that he was no longer an appropriate candidate for the following reasons: (1) he owed $180 in fees; (2) he had multiple violations; (3) he denied consuming alcohol even though he tested positive for it; (4) his mental health issues were more acute than thought and community corrections could not provide adequate services; and (5) he had received conduct reports while in jail. And the parties presented argument as to the appropriate sanction.

[7] The trial court revoked Lyman's eight-year direct placement in community corrections and ordered that he serve that sentence executed in the DOC and participate in Recovery While Incarcerated, followed by his original four-year suspension to probation. The trial court noted that it would consider a sentence modification following Lyman's completion of six years and successful completion of Recovery While Incarcerated. Lyman now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Lyman contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his direct placement in community corrections by failing to consider his efforts at rehabilitation and by imposing a sentence that is disproportionately severe. He notes that he “used his time in jail awaiting resolution of the revocation proceedings to participate in and complete treatment for his alcohol addiction.” Appellant's Br. p. 6. He further claims that by the time of his revocation hearing, he “had demonstrated a sincere change in thinking about his addiction and had secured a place in a sober-living facility.” Id. at 6-7.

[9] “For purposes of appellate review, we treat a hearing on a petition to revoke a placement in a community corrections program the same as we do a hearing on a petition to revoke probation.” Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind. 1999). With that in mind and in that context, we begin with the premise that “[p]robation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). Courts in probation revocation hearings “may consider any relevant evidence bearing some substantial indicia of reliability.” Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 551. It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine the conditions of a defendant's probation and to revoke probation if the conditions are violated. Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. In a sense, all probation requires “strict compliance” because probation is a matter of grace, and once the trial court extends this grace and sets its terms and conditions, the probationer is expected to comply with them strictly. Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 641 (Ind. 2008). “If the probationer fails to do so, then a violation has occurred.” Id. “But even in the face of a probation violation the trial court may nonetheless exercise its discretion in deciding whether to revoke probation.” Id. (citing Clark Cnty. Council v. Donahue, 873 N.E.2d 1038, 1039 (Ind. 2007) (“The probationary scheme is deliberately designed to give trial judges the flexibility to make quick, case-by-case determinations.”)).

[10] Violation determinations and sanctions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013). “An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. We consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment without reweighing that evidence or reassessing the credibility of the witnesses. Woods, 892 N.E.2d at 639 (citing Braxton v. State, 651 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 1995)). “If there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's decision that a defendant has violated any terms of probation, the reviewing court will affirm its decision to revoke probation.” Id. at 639-40.

[11] “Probation revocation is a two-step process. First, the trial court must make a factual determination that a violation of a condition of probation actually occurred.” Id. at 640. Second, if a violation is found, then the trial court must determine the appropriate sanction for the violation. Id. A probation revocation hearing is civil in nature, and the State's burden is to prove the alleged violations only by a preponderance of the evidence. Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 551. Violation of a single term or condition of probation is sufficient to revoke probation. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(a)(1) (2012).

[12] Here, Lyman admitted that he violated the terms of his community corrections placement. So, we turn to the second step, the trial court's sanction determination, which Lyman challenges. “Placement in community corrections is at the sole discretion of the trial court.” Sullivan v. State, 56 N.E.3d 1157, 1160 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Indiana Code section 35-38-2.6-5(b) (2020) specifies that if a person on community corrections “violates the terms of the placement, the prosecuting attorney may request that the court revoke the placement and commit the person to the county jail or department of correction for the remainder of the person's sentence.”

[13] The trial court heard evidence that Lyman completed the drug and alcohol program, the socialization program, and moral reconation therapy in jail. And the court was informed that Lyman had been accepted into Truman House for a three to four month stay. However, the court was aware that Lyman violated the terms of his community corrections program nine days after his sentence was entered by appearing for his intake appointment while intoxicated and after having driven there. The court exercised leniency by imposing no sanction and returning Lyman to community corrections, nevertheless. Then, over the course of five months, Lyman committed more violations such as five failures to contact the drug screen notification system, three positive alcohol screens, and three failures to appear for drug screens. And he failed to acknowledge the severity of his alcohol addiction. He maintained sobriety only after he was placed in jail.

[14] Furthermore, positive screens are hardly mere technical violations. See Overstreet v. State, 136 N.E.3d 260, 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (positive drug screens not mere technical violations of probation), trans denied. Whereas the failure to keep the probation department informed of one's current address, the failure to obtain a substance abuse evaluation, and failure to verify employment with the probation department have been held to be merely technical in nature. See Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 615, 618 (characterizing technical violations). We conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion to order Lyman's placement in the DOC after revoking his placement. See Crump v. State, 740 N.E.2d 564, 573 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (affirming sanction of eight years in DOC for consumption of alcohol while on community corrections placement). Consequently, we affirm the trial court's choice of sanction.

Conclusion

[15] In light of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court's sanction.

[16] Affirmed.

Baker, Senior Judge.

Judges Pyle and Foley concur. Pyle, J., and Foley, J., concur.