Alisha Trice-Walker, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] After a bench trial, Alisha Trice-Walker was found guilty of multiple counts of conspiracy to commit theft and conspiracy to commit welfare fraud, and she was sentenced to 545 days, almost all of which was suspended to probation. Trice-Walker now appeals and raises four issues for our review, which we revise and restate as the following two issues:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence at trial; and

2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Trice-Walker's convictions.

[2] We affirm

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In 2013, Trice-Walker married Steven Johnson. In July 2015, in Cause 49D13-1507-DR-025250 (the “First Divorce Cause”), Trice-Walker filed a petition to dissolve her marriage to Johnson. On February 28, 2017, the First Divorce Cause was dismissed because Trice-Walker had not taken any action therein and had not appeared when ordered to do so.

[4] In December 2015, Johnson applied to receive rental assistance through the Indianapolis Housing Agency (“IHA”) Housing Choice program. The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) provides funds to IHA for the program, and IHA in turn pays rent to landlords on behalf of approved applicants. IHA will not approve a rental unit for assistance if it is owned by an applicant's family member—including the applicant's spouse—unless IHA determines that approving the rental “would provide reasonable accommodation for a family member who is a person with disabilities as defined by existing statutes.” Ex. Vol. I at 113. Johnson did not disclose his marriage to Trice-Walker in his rental assistance application materials.

[5] In May 2016, Johnson submitted a request to use rental assistance to rent 4162 Mellis Drive in Indianapolis. Trice-Walker owned that property. Trice-Walker also signed Johnson's request to use rental assistance for the Mellis residence, and she signed the HUD Housing Assistance Payments Contract. In both documents, Trice-Walker represented that she was not Johnson's family. Thereafter, from September 2018 until December 2019, Trice-Walker received rent subsidy payments from IHA's Housing Choice program totaling more than $7,000 for Johnson's alleged rental of the Mellis Drive property. In December 2019, Johnson filed a notice of his intent to move to California and had his rental assistance transferred there.

[6] In April 2020, Johnson applied for Social Security disability benefits. When applying for such benefits, Johnson was required to disclose his marital status and any income or resources a spouse had; he did not do so. Instead, Johnson disclosed only that he received $60 per month from “Lisha Walker,” who he described as his “sister.” Ex. Vol. I at 176. Trice-Walker submitted a Function Report in support of Johnson's disability benefits application. In this document, she represented herself as his “friend.” Id. at 166. In January 2021, Johnson was approved for disability benefits, and he received back payments starting from May 2020.

[7] After an investigation uncovered that Johnson and Trice-Walker did not disclose their marriage to each other in Johnson's rental assistance and disability benefits paperwork, the State charged Trice-Walker with four counts each of conspiracy to commit theft as Level 6 felonies ¹ and conspiracy to commit welfare fraud as Level 6 felonies ² . Less than two weeks after these charges were filed, in Cause 49D16-2309-DN-007559 (the “Second Divorce Cause”), Trice-Walker filed a petition to dissolve her marriage to Johnson. On November 9, 2023, Trice-Walker and Johnson's marriage was dissolved.

[8] At her bench trial, Trice-Walker testified that she “didn't really know if [she and Johnson] were married or not, because [they] were in Vegas and just kind of a wild time and ․ you know, it was just, it was wild․ [S]o [she did not] remember all the details.” Tr. Vol. II at 124–25. Trice-Walker said she initiated the First Divorce Cause because she “didn't know for sure” that she was married and “didn't take it seriously” because her marriage to Johnson was the result of “compulsive behavior.” Id. at 129. In discussing the rental assistance and disability documentation, Trice-Walker believed that she “filled out the paperwork correctly” because she and Johnson “were not married,” and “wors[t]-case scenario, if [they] were [married], [she] had already covered [herself] by doing the divorce paperwork.” Id. at 135.

[9] The trial court found Trice-Walker guilty of and entered judgment of conviction on two counts of conspiracy to commit theft as Level 6 felonies—one count concerning the rental assistance and one count concerning the disability benefits. The trial court imposed a 545-day sentence, with 543 of those days suspended to probation and ordered Trice-Walker to pay restitution.³ This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

1. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Admitting Certain Evidence at Trial

[10] Trice-Walker claims that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence at trial. We review rulings on admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 858 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864 (Ind. 2012)), cert. denied, 145 S.Ct. 424 (2024). “[W]e may affirm the trial court's decision on any basis supported by the record,” Means v. State, 201 N.E.3d 1158, 1163 (Ind. 2023) (citing Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 190 n.2 (Ind. 2021)), and we will reverse “only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances,” Russell, 234 N.E.3d at 858 (quoting Smith v. State, 754 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ind. 2001)).

[11] Trice-Walker specifically challenges the admission of seven exhibits: 7A, 7B, 7C, 7D, 7E, 7H, and 8.⁴ Exhibits 7A through 7E are all documents that Johnson filled out and submitted in December 2015 in order to receive rental assistance through IHA. Exhibit 7H is a document Johnson filled out and submitted to IHA in December 2019 indicating his intent to move and requesting continued rental assistance. Exhibit 8 is Johnson's records from the Social Security Administration.

[12] At her bench trial, Trice-Walker objected to the admission of all these exhibits except Exhibit 7H based on relevance, and she objected to the admission of Exhibits 7A, 7B, 7C, and 7H as containing inadmissible hearsay. On appeal, Trice-Walker renews these challenges. We first address Trice-Walker's relevance arguments before moving to her hearsay arguments.

a. Relevance

[13] Evidence is relevant if “(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Evid. R. 401. Evidence that is not relevant “is not admissible.” Id. 402.

[14] Trice-Walker alleges that Exhibits 7A, 7B, 7C, 7D, 7E, and 8 were not relevant and therefore inadmissible because they pertained to only Johnson and did not bear Trice-Walker's name or signature. But Trice-Walker was on trial for conspiring with Johnson to commit theft and welfare fraud, and Exhibits 7A, 7B, 7C, 7D, and 7E contain affirmations by Johnson that he had presented true and accurate information as well as misrepresentations of Trice-Walker and Johnson's marital status. Exhibit 8 contains a June 2020 Function Report submitted to the Social Security Administration in which Trice-Walker represented herself as Johnson's friend instead of his wife. Exhibit 8 also includes Johnson's June 2020 application for supplemental Social Security income, and in that application, he listed Trice-Walker as his sister.

[15] As Trice-Walker notes, the State “relied heavily upon the documents”—Exhibits 7A, 7B, 7C, 7D, 7E, and 8—“that Mr. Johnson filled out for benefits.” Appellant's Br. at 31. The State relied on these documents because they were all relevant to explain the application processes Johnson used to gain access to assistance programs and how he and Trice-Walker conspired to exploit those processes for their own gain. Cf. Meadows v. State, 785 N.E.2d 1112, 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (concluding evidence of principal's purchase of magazine and stock for rifles was relevant to show defendant may have purchased firearms for principal), trans. denied. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting any of these exhibits over Trice-Walker's relevance objections.

b. Hearsay

[16] Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered for “the truth of the matter asserted.” Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c). Hearsay is generally not admissible as evidence. Id. 802. There are exceptions to this rule, id. 803, 804, including the business records exception, id. 803(6). Under that exception, a record of an act or event is excluded from the rule against hearsay if the following requirements are met:

(A) the record was made at or near the time by--or from information transmitted by--someone with knowledge;

(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a business, organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit;

(C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity;

(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or another qualified witness ․ ; and

(E) neither the source of information nor the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness

Id.

[17] Trice-Walker does not identify which statements in Exhibits 7A, 7B, 7C, and 7H constitute hearsay. Assuming arguendo that those exhibits do, in fact, contain hearsay, they all qualify for the business records exception.⁵ At trial, Shante Taylor, the Vice President of Rental Assistance for IHA, testified that she is in charge of the Housing Choice program and keeps IHA's records. When presented with Exhibits 7A, 7B, 7C, and 7H, Taylor testified that all four documents were true and accurate copies of the originals; all four documents described the acts, conditions, or events at or near the time they occurred; all four documents were prepared by an IHA or HUD employee in the ordinary course of business; it was the regular practice of IHA or HUD to make those records; and all four documents were kept in the ordinary course of regularly conducted business activity.

[18] Nevertheless, Trice-Walker contends that Exhibits 7A, 7B, 7C, and 7H do not qualify for the business records exception because Taylor “did not have any personal knowledge of the statements made by” Johnson in those documents. Appellant's Br. at 25 (citing Stahl v. State, 686 N.E.2d 89 (Ind. 1997)). Trice-Walker's reliance on Stahl v. State in support of this argument is misplaced. In Stahl, Randy Stahl allegedly used an ATM to withdraw funds from his friend's checking account without the friend's authorization. 686 N.E.2d at 89–91. Before the bank would allow the friend to watch video of the ATM or be reimbursed, it required the friend to complete an affidavit asserting that he did not withdraw or authorize the withdrawal of funds from his checking account. Id. at 91. The friend completed the affidavit and upon watching the video, he identified Stahl as the person who withdrew the stolen funds. Id. At trial, the friend's affidavit was admitted “to prove Stahl's lack of authorization.” Id. The Indiana Supreme Court determined that was error because “the circumstances under which [the friend's] affidavit was given do not establish sufficient indicia of truthfulness,” “there are a variety of circumstances under which there may be a motive to supply an incorrect affidavit of this type,” and the affidavit was “the only evidence showing that Stahl's use of the ATM card was unauthorized.” Id. at 94.

[19] Here, in contrast to the facts in Stahl, Exhibits 7A, 7B, 7C, and 7H were not affidavits that Johnson had to fill out in order to be reimbursed for allegedly stolen funds; those exhibits were documents that Johnson voluntarily completed to obtain rental assistance. This is also not a case where the source of information or the circumstances under which Exhibits 7A, 7B, 7C, and 7H were prepared indicates a lack of trustworthiness. The documents were prepared by IHA and HUD, and while Johnson clearly misrepresented his marital status when filling out those documents, he did so in furtherance of his and Trice-Walker's conspiracy.

[20] Finally, Trice-Walker claims that her trial was fundamentally unfair due to the cumulative errors of admitting the above-described evidence, but because we have concluded that there was no error, we also conclude that there was no cumulative error. We therefore cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Exhibits 7A, 7B, 7C, and 7H over Trice-Walker's hearsay objections.

2. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Trice-Walker's Convictions

[21] Trice-Walker argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to support her convictions for two counts of conspiracy to commit theft. Our standard of review for such a claim is as follows:

“A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Teising [v. State], 226 N.E.3d [780,] 783 [(Ind. 2024)].

Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090–91 (Ind. 2025). We do not reweigh the evidence or reassess witness credibility. Id. at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783).

[22] To support Trice-Walker's convictions for conspiracy to commit theft, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) she and Johnson agreed to knowingly or intentionally exert unauthorized control over property with a value between $750 and $50,000, that property belonged to another person, and that control was exerted with the intent to deprive the other person of any part of that property's value; and (2) Trice-Walker, Johnson, or both performed an overt act in furtherance of that agreement. Ind. Code §§ 35-41-5-2, 35-43-4-2(a)(1)(A).

[23] Trice-Walker specifically argues that the State failed to show she had the requisite mens rea to conspire to commit theft because the State failed to establish that she was married to Johnson. “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b). “A person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” Id. § 35-41-2-2(a).

“Knowledge and intent are both mental states and, absent an admission by the defendant, the jury must resort to the reasonable inferences from both the direct and circumstantial evidence to determine whether the defendant has the requisite knowledge or intent to commit the offense in question.” Stubbers v. State, 190 N.E.3d 424, 432 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. As such, “[k]nowledge or intent may be proven by the defendant's conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which such conduct logically and reasonably points.” Id.

Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1091–92 (alteration in original).

[24] Here, the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict show that in 2013, Trice-Walker married Johnson; they lived together for several years; they often traveled together; and Trice-Walker twice petitioned to dissolve her marriage to Johnson. Furthermore, the trial court specifically discredited Trice-Walker's testimony regarding her alleged belief that she was not married to Johnson:

Ms. Trice-Walker's testimony convinced me that she did believe she was married. No matter her protestations, no matter her explanations, she believed that she was married. Otherwise, she would not have taken the actions that she ended up taking. You don't file for a dissolution if you truly don't believe that you're married. You believed it, you tried to act on it, you finally got it accomplished.

Tr. Vol. II at 158–59. We will not second guess the trial court's credibility determinations or weighing of the evidence, see Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783), so we cannot say the State failed to prove that Trice-Walker believed she was married to Johnson.

[25] With this in mind, Trice-Walker's next argument—that the State did not prove she misrepresented or failed to disclose her marriage to Johnson—also fails. In the paperwork Johnson and Trice-Walker submitted to IHA, neither disclosed their marriage despite clear warnings that separate approval was needed if a family member was to be the applicant's landlord. In the Function Report Trice-Walker submitted for Johnson's disability benefits application, she represented she was Johnson's “friend,” not his spouse. Ex. Vol. I at 166. Nonetheless, Trice-Walker argues that Johnson could have received both rental assistance and disability benefits if they had disclosed their marriage, but the fact remains that they both chose not to disclose their marriage.

[26] Trice-Walker also contends that she did not conspire to commit theft (1) between September 1, 2018, and December 31, 2018, regarding the rental assistance; and (2) between April 20, 2020, and December 31, 2020, regarding the disability benefits. “A conspiracy ‘is complete upon the agreement and the performance of an overt act in furtherance of the agreement.’ ” Owens v. State, 929 N.E.2d 754, 756 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Smith v. State, 655 N.E.2d 532, 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied). Therefore, “the length of time between the overt act and commission of the underlying felony, if ever committed or attempted, is ‘of no significance to the elements of the crime [of conspiracy] itself.’ ” M.T.V. v. State, 66 N.E.3d 960, 965 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Smith, 655 N.E2d at 540).

[27] Regarding Johnson's rental assistance, he submitted his application in December 2015, and Trice-Walker signed the relevant paperwork in May and June 2016. Johnson received rental assistance from September 2018 until December 2019; that is, Trice-Walker received payments during this time period. Regarding Johnson's disability benefits, he submitted his application in April 2020, and Trice-Walker submitted the Function Report in June 2020, wherein she represented she was only Johnson's friend. Johnson began receiving disability benefits in January 2021, with back payments beginning from May 2020.

[28] In weighing the evidence and assessing witness credibility, the trial court determined that (1) the rental assistance conspiracy was ongoing between September 1, 2018, and December 31, 2018, and (2) the disability benefits conspiracy was ongoing between April 20, 2020, and December 31, 2020. See Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783). We thus cannot say the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support Trice-Walker's convictions.⁶

Conclusion

[29] In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting certain evidence at trial, and the State presented sufficient evidence to support Trice-Walker's convictions. We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[30] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code §§ 35-43-4-2(a)(1)(A), 35-41-5-2.

2.   I.C. §§ 35-43-5-7(a)(1) & (b)(1), 35-41-5-2.

3.   Johnson pled guilty to three counts of theft as Class A misdemeanors and received a fully suspended sentence of 360 days.

4.   Trice-Walker also purports to challenge the admission of Exhibit 7I, but she makes no argument in support of that challenge. Trice-Walker has therefore waived for our review any claim regarding the admissibility of Exhibit 7I. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring cogent reasoning).

5.   The State specifically introduced Exhibits 7A, 7B, 7C, and 7H as business records, so we must assume the State offered those exhibits for the truth of the statements contained therein.

6.   Trice-Walker also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the six other counts of which she was found guilty. Although the trial court never specifically announced that Trice-Walker was guilty of those six counts, the trial court did merge those additional counts into the two counts for which it entered a judgement of conviction against her. We need not evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence supporting those six counts because Trice-Walker's two convictions were supported by sufficient evidence such that they are not being set aside or vacated, meaning there is no reason for the six other counts to potentially be reinstated. See Taflinger v. State, 698 N.E.2d 325, 327 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that guilty verdict for a lesser included offense may be reinstated where the conviction for the greater offense has been set aside or vacated); Stubbers v. State, 190 N.E.3d 424, 430–31 (Ind. Ct. App.), trans. denied, 196 N.E.3d 685 (Ind. 2022) (holding that when a defendant is found guilty of a particular count but the trial court does not enter a judgment of conviction thereon, this court “need not address the sufficiency of the evidence to support that count”).

Felix, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and Tavitas concur. Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.