Archie L. Whitest, Jr., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Archie L. Whitest, Jr. appeals his conviction for murder, the finding that he used a firearm in the commission of his offense, and his corresponding sentence. We affirm.

Issues

[2] Whitest raises three issues for our review:

1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut his claim of self-defense.

2. Whether the court committed fundamental error when it instructed the jury on self-defense.

3. Whether the court abused its discretion when it sentenced him.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In March 2024, Whitest and Donald Warren were each living at an Economy Inn hotel. At 11:20 a.m. on March 5, Whitest went to Warren's hotel room and shot Warren three or four times, with anywhere from four to seven seconds passing between the shots.¹ After the final shot, Whitest placed the gun on the ground, left the room, and called the police. During the call, Whitest told police that he had gone to Warren's room to complain about bad drugs that Warren had given him, that Warren had pulled a gun, that he had taken the gun from Warren, and that he had shot Warren. Warren died as a result of gunshot wounds to his shoulder, neck, and head.

[4] Officers with the Fort Wayne Police Department responded to the scene and detained Whitest. Whitest was “calm,” “clear minded,” and “articulate,” and he again stated to police that “a gun was pulled on him” and that he had shot Warren. Tr. Vol. 2 at 176, 186. Whitest also told police that “he was there to buy drugs.” Id. at 186. Officers found “a small amount” of what they believed to be crack cocaine on Whitest's person. Id. at 186. And officers did not observe any injuries on Whitest. During a search of Warren's hotel room, officers found the firearm Whitest had used and observed that the “slide was locked to the rear” and that it was unloaded. Id. at 178. Officers did not find any other firearms in the hotel room. Later testing revealed Warren's fingerprint on the magazine.

[5] Whitest agreed to give a statement to Detective Liza Anglin. During that statement, he said that he had “purchased some drugs” from Warren but that he “wasn't satisfied with the quality,” so he went to Warren's room. Tr. Vol. 3 at 62. He also said that Warren had a gun and that he “snatched” it from Warren's hand. Ex 114 at 4:55. He then stated that he tried to stop Warren from getting another gun, so he shot Warren three times. Whitest also said that, when the gun went off, “it was a done deal, it was like ‘engage,’ it was like ‘execute, execute, execute.’ ” Id. at 7:13-:19. He then told officers that, after the final shot, he “made sure that [Warren] was dead.” Id. at 8:48-:49. When asked why, he responded: “cause.” Id. at 8:58.

[6] The State charged Whitest with murder, a felony, and alleged that he had used a firearm in the commission of the offense. Thereafter, the court held a multiday, bifurcated jury trial in February 2025. During the trial, Detective Anglin testified that she had reviewed surveillance video from outside of Warren's room and that the video had “good audio,” but that there was “no sound of a struggle[.]” Tr. Vol. 3 at 67. And she testified that “there was no evidence of a struggle” because “it didn't look like anything” in the hotel room “had been knocked over.” Id. She further testified that Whitest had walked into Warren's room “without hesitation” and that, even if Warren had pointed a firearm at Whitest, “the threat was done” when Whitest obtained the firearm. Id. at 69-70.

[7] In his defense, Whitest testified that he had allowed Warren to use his car in exchange for crack cocaine but that Warren had given him “poison” instead. Id. at 146. He then testified that, after he took some time to recover, he went to Warren's room and that Warren “immediately” pulled a gun and pointed it at Whitest's head. Id. at 142. Whitest testified that he took the gun from Warren but was concerned that Warren had other guns, so he shot Warren. Whitest acknowledged that he fired three shots “to neutralize the situation.” Id. at 144. He then testified that, when he discovered that Warren had no pulse, he left the hotel room and called the police.

[8] After both parties had presented their evidence, the court instructed the jury on self-defense as follows:

The defense of self-defense is defined by law as follows:

A person may use reasonable force against another person to protect himself from what he reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.

A person is justified in using deadly force, and does not have a duty to retreat, only if he reasonably believes that deadly force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to himself․

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 141.

[9] At the end of the first phase, the jury found Whitest guilty of murder. Then, following the second phase, the jury found that Whitest had used a firearm in the commission of the offense. Thereafter, the court held a sentencing hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court identified as aggravating Whitest's “multi-state[,] multi-county criminal record,” and his “failed efforts at rehabilitation[.]” Tr. Vol. 3 at 235. As for mitigating factors, the court identified Whitest's military service and his remorse. The court then sentenced Whitest to sixty years for murder, enhanced by twenty years for his use of the firearm, for an aggregate sentence of eighty years in the Department of Correction. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Sufficiency of the Evidence

[10] Whitest first contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut his claim of self-defense. Self-defense is a valid justification for an otherwise criminal act. Miller v. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 699 (Ind. 1999). A defendant must establish that he was in a place where he had the right to be, acted without fault, and was in reasonable fear or apprehension of death or great bodily harm. Id. at 699-700.

[11] Once a defendant claims self-defense, the State bears the burden of disproving at least one of the elements of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 700. It may meet its burden by rebutting the defense directly, by affirmatively showing the defendant did not act in self-defense, or by relying on the sufficiency of its evidence in its case-in-chief. Id. Whether the State has met its burden is a question for the trier of fact. Id.

[12] When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to rebut his claim of self-defense, the standard of review remains the same as for any sufficiency of the evidence claim. Id. at 699. We neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses but look solely to the evidence most favorable to the judgment with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id. We will affirm a conviction where such evidence and reasonable inferences are substantial evidence of probative value sufficient to support the judgment. Id.

[13] On appeal, Whitest contends that the evidence demonstrates that he had a right to be at the hotel, that his “actions were purely defensive,” and that he was “clearly fearful of being killed and/or receiving further serious injury” from Warren. Appellant's Br. at 13-14. And he maintains that the State “clearly failed” to rebut that evidence. Id. at 14.

[14] However, the evidence most favorable to the judgment demonstrates that Whitest went to Warren's room to confront him about bad drugs. Whitest entered the room “without hesitation” and then fired multiple shots at Warren. Tr. Vol. 3 at 69. Further, “there was no evidence of a struggle” in the room. Id. at 67. In addition, Whitest fired the first shot, then waited four seconds before firing the second shot, and then waited another seven seconds before firing the third. Stated differently, this was not a case where Whitest fired off three shots in a row; he waited several seconds between each one. And Detective Anglin testified that, even if Warren had presented a threat, “the threat was done” when Whitest obtained the firearm. Id. at 69-70. Then, in Whitest's statement to police, he admitted that, once he fired the first shot, “it was a done deal, it was like ‘engage,’ it was like ‘execute, execute, execute.’ ” Ex. 114 at 7:13-:19. And, when asked why he wanted to make sure that Warren was dead, he responded: “cause.” Id. at 8:58.

[15] That evidence was sufficient to show that, at the time Whitest shot Warren, Warren was no longer in possession of a firearm such that Whitest was no longer in reasonable fear for his own safety. The only contrary evidence came from Whitest's own testimony. But the jury was not required to believe his testimony, even if uncontradicted. See Wood v. State, 999 N.E.2d 1054, 1064 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Whitest's argument on appeal is merely a request for this Court to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. The State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Whitest's claim of self-defense.

Issue Two: Jury Instruction

[16] Whitest next contends that the court erred when it instructed the jury on self-defense. Whitest acknowledges that he did not object to the court's instruction. However, he maintains that the court's instruction amounted to fundamental error.

[17] “The fundamental error exception is extremely narrow and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Mendenhall v. State, 963 N.E.2d 553, 567 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). This exception is available only in “egregious circumstances,” when the claimed error either makes a fair trial impossible or constitutes a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process. Id. “The mere fact that error occurred and that it was prejudicial will not satisfy the fundamental error rule.” Purifoy v. State, 821 N.E.2d 409, 412 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. To constitute fundamental error, a defendant must show greater prejudice than ordinary reversible error. Id.

[18] Here, the court instructed the jury as follows:

The defense of self-defense is defined by law as follows:

A person may use reasonable force against another person to protect himself from what he reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.

A person is justified in using deadly force, and does not have a duty to retreat, only if he reasonably believes that deadly force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to himself․

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 141. However, according to Whitest, the court should have given the following instruction:

A person may use reasonable force against another person to protect himself from what the defendant reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force. A person is justified in using deadly force, and does not have a duty to retreat, only if he reasonably believes that deadly force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to himself, or a third person, or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.

Appellant's Br. at 16 (quoting Indiana Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction 10.0300) (emphasis original to Whitest's Brief).

[19] Whitest maintains that the court's instruction, which failed to include the language regarding the commission of a forcible felony, “incorrectly stated the law,” was “misleading,” and deprived him of a jury that could have arrived “at a just, fair, and correct verdict under the applicable law.” Id. at 17. But other than a bald statement that the incorrect instruction “is a fundamental error,” he does not provide any argument to explain how any error in instructing the jury constituted a blatant violation of basic and elementary principles, caused undeniable harm or potential for harm, or made a fair trial impossible. Id. Stated differently, Whitest has not shown greater prejudice than ordinary reversible error. Purifoy, 821 N.E.2d at 412. As such, he has not met his burden to demonstrate that the instruction amounted to fundamental error.

Issue Three: Abuse of Discretion in Sentencing

[20] Finally, Whitest asserts that the court abused its discretion when it sentenced him.² Sentencing decisions lie within the sound discretion of the trial court. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citation omitted).

[21] A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing if it does any of the following:

(1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all;” (2) enters “a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any—but the record does not support the reasons;” (3) enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration;” or (4) considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.”

Id. (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-91 (Ind.)), clarified on reh'g on other grounds, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007).

[22] The sentencing range for murder is forty-five to sixty-five years, with an advisory sentence of fifty-five years. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3(a). And Whitest faced a possible additional fixed term of five to twenty years for his use of the firearm in the commission of the offense. See I.C. § 35-50-2-11(g). At sentencing, the court identified as aggravating Whitest's “multi-state[,] multicounty criminal record” and his “failed efforts at rehabilitation[.]” Tr. Vol. 3 at 235. As for mitigating factors, the court identified Whitest's military service and his remorse. The court then sentenced Whitest to sixty years for murder, enhanced by twenty years for his use of the firearm in the commission of an offense, for an aggregate sentence of eighty years in the Department of Correction.

[23] On this issue, Whitest first contends that the court failed to identify as mitigators that Warren “initiated the attack,” that Whitest's actions “were done in self-defense,” and that he had “acted under strong provocation.” Appellant's Br. at 19. It is well settled that the finding of mitigating circumstances is within the discretion of the trial court. Rascoe v. State, 736 N.E.2d 246, 248-49 (Ind. 2000). An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating circumstance requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record. Id. at 249. The trial court is not obligated to accept the defendant's contentions as to what constitutes a mitigating circumstance. Id.

[24] Here, Whitest has not demonstrated that his proffered mitigators are significant.³ Indeed, other than his bald statements that the evidence established “that [Warren] had possession of the gun” and that Warren had given Whitest “poison” instead of drugs and then “pulled a gun” on Whitest when confronted, Appellant's Br. at 19, he makes no argument as to why those proffered mitigators are significant, especially in light of the fact that the jury clearly rejected his claims that Warren had initiated the confrontation and that Whitest had acted in self-defense. Nor does Whitest explain why his proffered mitigators are significant in light of his criminal history, which includes nine convictions as an adult in at least two states and several counties within Indiana, several prior placements on probation and community service, and several failed attempts at rehabilitation. Thus, Whitest has not met his burden to show that the court abused its discretion when it did not identify his proffered mitigators.

[25] Whitest also maintains that, while the court found his military service and remorse as mitigators, it “seemingly gave zero weight” to those mitigators. Id. However, that claim is not subject to review. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491 (“Because the trial court no longer has any obligation to ‘weigh’ aggravating and mitigating factors against each other when imposing a sentence, ․ a trial court cannot now be said to have abused its discretion in failing to ‘properly weigh’ such factors.”). The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Whitest.

Conclusion

[26] The State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Whitest's claim of self-defense. In addition, the court did not commit fundamental error when it instructed the jury on self-defense. And the court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Whitest. We therefore affirm his conviction and sentence.

[27] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The forensic pathologist testified that Warren had four wounds but that two of the wounds could have been caused by the same bullet.

2.   While Whitest frames his argument as one under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), the substance of his argument is that the court abused its discretion when it sentenced him. He makes no argument that the nature of the offense or his character supports a revision of his sentence.

3.   The State contends that Whitest “did not raise” any of his proffered mitigators at sentencing. Appellee's Br. at 28. While Whitest's argument may not have been as explicit as it could have been, he argued that Warren “all of the sudden pointed the gun,” that he had acted “to protect [him]self,” and that Warren “kept on coming” at him. Tr. Vol. 3 at 226. As such, we will address his claim.

Bailey, Judge.

Judges Tavitas and Kenworthy concur. Tavitas, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.