IN RE: The Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: B.B. (Minor Child) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] B.H. (Father) appeals the involuntary termination of his parental rights to B.L.B. (Child).¹ Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] Child was born on April 17, 2022. As an infant and young toddler, Child was removed from Mother's care on two occasions due to Mother's substance abuse. Father, who lived in Ohio, was not involved with DCS either time because Mother refused to identify him as Child's father.

[4] In September 2023, Father visited Child at Mother's home and due to Mother's erratic behavior, he believed Mother was using drugs again. Father reported his suspicions to DCS, and DCS initiated an investigation into Child's welfare. Although Mother did not allow DCS to enter her home on the day Father reported the neglect, DCS returned the next day and was able to observe the dirty and cluttered state of Mother's home. To protect Child's welfare, DCS removed Child from Mother's care and placed Child in foster care.² As part of its preliminary investigation, DCS met with Father and obtained a DNA sample to determine Child's paternity.

[5] On September 22, 2023, DCS filed a petition alleging Child was a child in need of services (CHINS). In the petition, DCS alleged that Child was a CHINS due to Father's “inability, refusal, or neglect” to supply Child with “necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision” and that Child needed care, treatment or rehabilitation that Father was unlikely to provide without coercive intervention of the court. Exhibit Vol. at 9. Three days after the petition was filed, the trial court held an initial hearing and found Child to be a CHINS as to Mother. Father failed to appear for the hearing despite having accepted service for the summons to appear. Father missed three other scheduled initial hearings before finally appearing before the court for an initial hearing on April 3, 2024. Between the filing of the CHINS petition and Father's initial hearing, DNA testing confirmed Father's paternity of Child.

[6] Thereafter, the family case manager (FCM) assigned from April 2022 (an earlier CHINS case) to December 2023 arranged for services for Father in Ohio, near where he lived. Specifically, she put in referrals for domestic violence and substance abuse assessments and personally informed Father over the phone about those services. Father, however, did not participate in the assessments and those referrals were eventually closed out. In October 2023, the FCM discussed parenting time with Father, informing him that he needed to contact her to schedule visitation with Child. Father, however, never contacted her. Father's reasons for being unable to visit with child were the distance between his home in Dayton, Ohio and Richmond and his work schedule. According to DCS's records, Father only visited Child twice between April 2022 and December 2023.

[7] The assigned FCM from December 2023 to April 2024, also arranged for services for Father in Ohio, but Father did not engage in those services either. She also tried to set up parenting time for Father and in fact, supervised a two-hour visit between Father and Child on January 4, 2024. After the visit, Father refused to set up a parenting-time schedule, claiming that such would be difficult given his work schedule. Father told the FCM that he would be in touch, but he never reached out. On January 10, 2024, the FCM spoke with Father regarding a child-support hearing and during that conversation, Father did not ask about parenting time. At the end of February, the FCM reached out to Father again, but he still claimed he was unable to set up a parenting-time schedule. He again told her he would be in touch, but he never called. As it turned out, Father's January 4 visit is the last time he has visited with Child. DCS had no further communication with Father until his initial hearing in April 2024.

[8] A new FCM was assigned to Father in April 2024 and, after the initial hearing, she spoke with Father about parenting time. Father again stated he was too busy to set up a schedule and falsely promised to contact them the following day. There was no further communication with Father.

[9] Father failed to appear at another court hearing before appearing at the fact-finding hearing on June 17, 2024. At the fact-finding hearing, Father admitted to the allegations in the CHINS petition and acknowledged that he lived with his sister in Dayton, Ohio, did not have transportation, did not have the financial means to support Child, and needed DCS's financial assistance to access needed services. After adjudicating Child a CHINS, the court set a dispositional hearing for Father for July 8, 2024.

[10] Father failed to attend the dispositional hearing despite having received personal notice thereof. Because the permanency plan was still reunification, the court ordered Father to engage in reunification services, including maintaining weekly contact with DCS, notifying DCS of changes to his living arrangements, keeping all appointments with DCS and service providers, maintaining suitable housing and a stable source of income, visiting with Child, and participating in father engagement services. The court set a review hearing for September 16, 2024.

[11] Between the dispositional hearing and the review hearing, Father did not visit with Child or participate in any services. One service provider reached out to Father several times and left two voicemail messages before finally speaking to Father two weeks later. Father then missed the scheduled meeting without explanation. The service provider was unable to successfully reach Father after the missed meeting. Father eventually contacted the service provider but by that time, the referral for services had been closed.

[12] Father failed to appear for the review hearing on September 16. The court noted Father's failure to visit Child and his lack of participation in any court-ordered services. Due to Father's lack of cooperation, the court found it appropriate to change the permanency plan from reunification to adoption.

[13] On December 23, 2024, DCS filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights to Child. The court held a fact-finding hearing on March 4, 2025. At the hearing, DCS called the two FCMs, a service provider, Child's court appointed special advocate (CASA), and Child's foster placement.

[14] The FCMs each testified that throughout the CHINS proceedings communication with Father was sporadic, Father had only visited with Child three times between April 2022 and April 2024, and Father did not participate in any court-ordered reunification services. Although Father consistently claimed his two jobs and work schedule prevented him from attending meetings or court hearings, visiting with Child, or participating in services, his own testimony revealed that aside from March and April 2024, Father worked only a single job at a time. Father stated that he started working at Burger King in March 2024 and that he stopped working at Conagra in April 2024. Father did not report any other employment aside from these two jobs.

[15] For those periods when Child was detained and removed from Mother's care, DCS placed Child in foster care with maternal grandfather's long-term partner. During those periods when Child was returned to Mother's care, Child's foster placement would babysit Child up to four days a week while Mother worked. Child has continuously been in the care of his foster placement since September 2023. During this time, Child's foster placement has obtained and facilitated behavioral, speech, and occupational therapy for Child. Child's foster placement has attended Mother and Father's dispositional hearings and all the review hearings. DCS's plan for Child is adoption by his foster placement.

[16] During her testimony, Child's CASA recommended termination of Father's parental rights. Although she had never met with Father, CASA explained that her recommendation was based on the fact that Child had spent a majority of his life with his foster placement and that his foster placement can provide Child with a permanent and stable home free from the child-welfare system. She noted that Father has never involved himself in Child's life and has demonstrated that he “is not going to do anything to fix the situation for [Child]” or “do anything that's asked of him to get [Child] in his placement, to be his father.” Transcript at 75.

[17] After DCS presented its evidence, Father testified. He claimed that the two jobs he worked “throughout the course of this CHINS case” left him with no time and energy to participate in services. Id. at 80. He also claimed that his work schedule is what prevented him from seeking custody. In addition to his work schedule, Father also cited memory problems, car troubles, the weather, and “who knows,” as other reasons for missing court hearings and not participating in services. Id. at 104. Father testified that he had seen Child more than twenty times but less than fifty times since he was born and that he stopped visiting with Child because he did not like the conditions that DCS placed on his visits. Father explained:

I just didn't understand the severity of just having to come—go to the library, or over to [the DCS] office, and sit in their little room. I don't want to be around—I want to be around my son, but I don't want to have to sit around them to have to interact with my child. That ain't something I want to do.

* * *

If I could just have some daddy and son time, I mean—I shouldn't have—I'm a grown man. I don't want nobody watching me. I'm not in prison. I've done been there and done that.

Id. at 100.

[18] On March 20, 2025, the court entered its order terminating Father's parental rights. Specifically, the court concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that Child had been removed and under DCS supervision for fifteen of the previous twenty-two months, that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal and placement outside Father's home will not be remedied, that termination of Father's parental rights is in the best interest of Child, and that a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Child exists. Father now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

Discussion & Decision

[19] We recognize that “[a] parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children is ‘perhaps the eldest of the fundamental liberty interests.’ ” In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)). “[A]lthough parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law provides for the termination of these rights when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities.” In re A.P., 882 N.E.2d 799, 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Involuntary termination of parental rights is the most extreme sanction a court can impose, and therefore “termination is intended as a last resort, available only when all other reasonable efforts have failed.” Id.

[20] We have long adhered to a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1230-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

In considering whether the termination of parental rights is appropriate, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. We consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom that support the judgment, and give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. Where a trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the trial court's findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. [Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)]. In evaluating whether the trial court's decision to terminate parental rights is clearly erroneous, we review the trial court's judgment to determine whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.

In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229-30 (Ind. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

[21] Reviewing whether the evidence “clearly and convincingly” supports the findings, or the findings “clearly and convincingly” support the judgment, is not a license to reweigh the evidence. Id. (observing that weighing the evidence under the clear and convincing evidence standard applicable to termination cases is the trial court's prerogative, not ours). Where, as here, a parent does not challenge the trial court's factual findings, we accept all of the trial court's relevant findings as true. See Matter of To.R., 177 N.E.3d 478, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied.

[22] A petition to terminate a parent-child relationship must allege and prove, in relevant part:

the existence of one or more of the following circumstances:

․

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3)-(4) (2024). In addition, DCS must allege and prove:

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of th child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(2)-(3) (2024).

[23] Clear and convincing evidence need not establish a parent's continued custody is wholly inadequate for a child's very survival. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 148. It is instead sufficient to show that the child's emotional and physical development is put at risk by the parent's custody. Id. If the allegations in the petition are found to be true, “the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a).

[24] Father challenges the trial court's conclusion that there was clear and convincing evidence that the conditions resulting in Child's placement outside of Father's care would not be remedied. In this regard, the court concluded:

Father has not participated in any services to remedy the reasons for removal. Father acknowledges this. Since September 21, 2023, Father has had three (3) visits with [Child], with the last visit on January 4, 2024. Father is either too busy or too tired to see [Child], or too tired to complete services to remedy the removal of [Child]. Father has not exhibited a single step to remedy this removal.

Appellant's Appendix at 77. Father maintains that his failure to complete services does not prove that he had not remedied the reasons for Child's removal from his care. However, Father's arguments are essentially requests to reweigh the evidence.

[25] The court acknowledged that Father had established paternity. But that is the only positive step Father made with respect to reunification with Child. The overwhelming evidence is that Father did not maintain contact with DCS, visited with Child three times in a two-year span, and has not even attempted to participate in any court-ordered services. Father blamed his lack of effort on being too busy or too tired, noting that he had three teenage children living with him and his girlfriend. While Father often gave the excuse that he could not visit with Child because his work schedule between two different jobs did not allow for such, his own testimony established that he worked two jobs for just around two of the nearly eighteen months between the filing of the CHINS petition and the termination petition. Moreover, while Father claims that work and distance prevented him from visiting Child or seeking custody, we note that such did not prove to be a barrier during the twenty to fifty visits Father claims to have made prior to the start of the CHINS case.

[26] In his three years of life, Child has never been in Father's care. Even after being twice informed that his parental rights could be terminated, Father did not visit Child a single time. Even with coercive intervention of the court, Father took no steps to change the circumstances that lead to Child's placement outside of his care. The court's unchallenged findings clearly and convincingly support the court's conclusion because they demonstrate that the conditions leading to Child's placement outside Father's care did not change and that Father was unwilling to deal with his parenting issues or cooperate with DCS.

[27] Father also argues that the court erroneously concluded that termination was in the best interests of Child. In this regard, the court concluded:

Due to the totality of the evidence of [Child]’s removal, termination is in [Child]’s best interest. The last time Father saw [Child] was January 4, 2024. Father is not bonded with [Child]. Father has not attempted visits with [Child]. Father has not sought out services to reunify with [Child]. [Child] has been in foster placement ․ for most of [Child]’s life. For [Child]’s health, safety, and well-being, it is in the best interest for the parent child relationship to be terminated.

Appellant's Appendix at 77.

[28] When making a best-interest determination, a trial court must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parent's interests to those of the child, with the child's need for permanency being a central consideration. See Matter of Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019). We recognize that “the right of parents to raise their children should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the children.” In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1151 (Ind. 2016). This is because termination is intended as a last resort, available when all other reasonable efforts have failed. Id. at 1151-52.

[29] Here, it is clear that there is no relationship between Father and Child and that Father made little effort to establish a relationship. Father visited Child only three times in the latter two of his three years of life. Father has made no effort to provide for Child or be a part of Child's life. Child's CASA was of the opinion that Child needed permanency and that such could best be provided by the adoption of Child by his foster placement. Informing CASA's opinion was Father's complete lack of effort in participating in services and his token effort toward establishing a relationship with Child. Father's attempt to diminish the credibility of Child's CASA is merely a request to judge the credibility of witnesses, a task we will not engage in on appeal. We agree with Child's CASA and the court that Child deserves permanency and that termination of Father's parental rights is in Child's best interest.

[30] Judgment affirmed.

Pyle, J. and DeBoer, J., concur.

FOOTNOTES

1.   B.B. (Mother) executed a consent to adoption of Child and thus does not participate in this appeal. We therefore confine our discussion to the circumstances as they relate to Father.

2.   DCS did not place Child with Father because he had not yet established paternity of Child, nor did he request custody when he reported the neglect.

Altice, Chief Judge.

Judges Pyle and DeBoer concur.