Gregory S. Ebler, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Gregory Ebler entered into a plea agreement pursuant to which his aggregate sentence in three separate criminal causes was capped at 22 years. The trial court terminated his direct placement in community corrections in the first cause, resulting in 580 sentencing days being executed in the Vigo County Jail instead of work release; revoked his direct placement and suspended sentence in the second cause, resulting in a 6-year sentence; and imposed a 16-year sentence in the third cause. Ebler now appeals and raises one issue for our review: Whether the trial court imposed a sentence in excess of the 22-year cap set by the plea agreement.

[2] Because the trial court's order exceeded the maximum 22-year sentence permitted by the October 2022 Plea Agreement, we reverse and remand with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] This is Ebler's second appeal of his aggregate sentence stemming from several of his criminal causes.¹ In January 2020, Ebler reached a plea agreement disposing of an alleged probation violation in Cause 84D01-1601-F4-000083 (the “First Dealing Cause”),² and of new charges of possession of methamphetamine and being an habitual offender in Cause 84D01-1907-F2-002919 (the “Possession Cause”). As to the First Dealing Cause, Ebler admitted to violating his probation, and as to the Possession Cause, Ebler pled guilty and admitted to being a habitual offender. For the probation violation in the First Dealing Cause, the trial court revoked and executed Ebler's six-year suspended sentence, ordering Ebler to serve five of those years on work release and the last year on home detention. For the conviction and enhancement in the Possession Cause, the trial court sentenced Ebler to a total of ten years, with the first four years executed on home detention and the last six years suspended to probation. The trial court ordered Ebler to serve his sentence in the First Dealing Cause before serving his sentence in the Possession Cause.

[4] While serving the executed time in work release, on August 31, 2022, Ebler was arrested and charged with another dealing offense. In October 2022, Ebler reached a plea agreement (the “October 2022 Plea Agreement”) disposing of alleged placement violations in the First Dealing and Possession Causes and disposing of his new charges in Cause 84D01-2209-F2-003230 (the “Second Dealing Cause”). Pursuant to that plea agreement, Ebler admitted to violating the terms of his placement and probation in the First Dealing and Possession Causes, and he pled guilty to dealing in methamphetamine as a Level 2 felony and admitted to being a habitual offender in the Second Dealing Cause. The plea agreement stated that Ebler's sentences in all three causes would be served consecutively, his aggregate sentence would “not exceed twenty-two (22) years,” and the trial court otherwise had discretion in sentencing him. 1st Appeal Appellant's App. Vol. II at 116.

[5] In November 2023, the trial court accepted the October 2022 Plea Agreement and took Ebler's sentence under advisement. In January 2024, the trial court sentenced Ebler to more than 22 years executed at the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”). Then in March 2024, Ebler filed a plea agreement (the “March 2024 Plea Agreement”) that was nearly identical to the October 2022 Plea Agreement—the only difference was that the March 2024 Plea Agreement capped Ebler's sentence at 26 years rather than 22 years. That same day, without holding a hearing, the trial court issued an order sentencing Ebler to an aggregate sentence of 26 years.

[6] Ebler appealed the trial court's March 2024 sentencing order, arguing that the October 2022 Plea Agreement controlled. We agreed with Ebler, so we “reverse[d] and remand[ed] with instructions for the trial court, without holding a hearing, to sentence Ebler to a term consistent with the October 2022 [P]lea [A]greement.” Ebler v. State, 260 N.E.3d 247, No. 24A-CR-1027, slip op. at ¶ 17 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (mem.), trans. not sought.

[7] On remand, the trial court sentenced Ebler as follows:

In [the First Dealing Cause], the Court finds the defendant in violation of the direct placement in this matter, and terminates the balance of the direct placement as of November 8, 2023. The defendant is entitled to credit for time served in this matter in the Vigo County Jail from July 27, 2019 through June 24, 2020, for three hundred thirty-four (334) actual days, plus one hundred eleven (111) good time days, in work release from June 25, 2020 through August 30, 2022, for seven hundred ninety-seven (797) actual days, together with good time credit of two hundred sixty-six (266) days, in the jail from August 31, 2022 through November 8, 2023, for four hundred thirty-five (435) actual days, together with good time credit of one hundred forty-five (145) days, for a total credit of two thousand eighty-eight (2,088) days.

․

In [the Possession Cause], the Court revokes the four (4) years of the direct placement, and two (2) years of the suspended sentence, for a total revocation of six (6) year[s], which shall be fully executed in the [DOC]․

Consecutive in [the Second Dealing Cause], the defendant is sentenced to [the DOC] for a term of imprisonment of ten (10) years on Count 1, which is enhanced by six (6) years on the Habitual Offender status, for a total of sixteen years, which shall be fully executed in the [DOC]․

The aggregate sentence is twenty-two years, which shall be executed in the [DOC].

2d Appeal Appellant's App. Vol. II at 39–40 (emphases in original). Ebler now appeals this new sentencing order.

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court Erred by Failing to Include in Its Calculation of Ebler's Aggregate Sentence the 580 Days of Total Credit Time Ebler Had Earned in the First Dealing Cause

[8] Ebler contends the trial court's most recent sentencing order exceeded the 22-year cap imposed by the October 2022 Plea Agreement. We review a trial court's sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 269 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), as amended (July 10, 2007), decision clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is ‘clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.’ ” Id. (quoting Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490).

[9] Where, as here, the trial court approves a plea agreement, that agreement is binding on the defendant, the State, and the trial court. Davis v. State, 217 N.E.3d 1229, 1232 (Ind. 2023) (citing Archer v. State, 81 N.E.3d 212, 215–16 (Ind. 2017)), as modified (Oct. 3, 2023). When a plea agreement sets forth a sentencing cap, the trial court retains “some degree of discretion in imposing a sentence ․ up to the sentencing cap stated in the terms of the agreement.” Rodriguez v. State, 129 N.E.3d 789, 794 (Ind. 2019) (citing Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1078 (Ind. 2006)).

[10] Ebler specifically contends his new aggregate sentence exceeds 22 years because the 2,088 days of total credit time he earned in the First Dealing Cause counts toward his aggregate sentence. In interpreting the October 2022 Plea Agreement, we apply contract law principles. See Davis, 217 N.E.3d at 1232 (citing Berry v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1243, 1247 (Ind. 2014)). Accordingly, we ascertain the parties’ intent at the time the plea agreement was made based on the language used to express their rights and duties. See Ryan v. TCI Architects/Eng'rs/Cont'rs, Inc., 72 N.E.3d 908, 914 (Ind. 2017) (citing First Fed. Sav. Bank of Ind. v. Key Markets, Inc., 559 N.E.2d 600, 603 (Ind. 1990)). We look at the plea agreement as a whole and accept an interpretation thereof that harmonizes all its provisions. See id. (citing Kelly v. Smith, 611 N.E.2d 118, 121 (Ind. 1993)). We give a plea agreement's clear and unambiguous language its ordinary meaning. See id. (citing WellPoint, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 29 N.E.3d 716, 721 (Ind. 2015), opinion modified on reh'g, 38 N.E.3d 981 (Ind. 2015)). We construe a plea agreement to not render any words, phrases, or terms ineffective or meaningless. See id. (citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Riddell Nat. Bank, 984 N.E.2d 655, 658 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied).

[11] The October 2022 Plea Agreement allowed the trial court to modify Ebler's sentences (e.g., modify the placement into a community corrections program and modify the suspended time) for the First Dealing Cause and the Possession Cause, and it is the modification of Ebler's sentences in those two causes that should be factored into the trial court's calculation of Ebler's aggregate 22-year sentence. The trial court should have included in its calculation of Ebler's aggregate sentence the total credit time Ebler had earned in the First Dealing Cause, to the extent that total credit time had not already been applied prior to Ebler committing the offenses giving rise to the Second Dealing Cause. In other words, Ebler's total credit time of 580 days—the total credit time he earned from September 1, 2022 (the day he was moved from work release to the Vigo County Jail), to November 8, 2023—must be included in his aggregate sentence.³ To be sure, Ebler should also be credited for all the time he had served prior to committing the offense in the Second Dealing Cause to ensure he is released from prison at the appropriate time; however, when reviewing this plea agreement, Ebler should receive credit toward the 22-year cap for the time he spent in jail after the commission of the Second Dealing Cause offense. In other words, the credit time Ebler was receiving for serving time in Work Release prior to committing the offense in the Second Dealing Cause should not be credited toward the 22-year aggregate sentence. To award Ebler an additional 1,508 days, as he is requesting, would allow him to be credited for time he was already supposed to be serving prior to August 31, 2022, when he committed the offense giving rise to the Second Dealing Cause. In sum, Ebler should receive credit of 580 days toward the 22-year cap for the time he spent in jail after August 31, 2022. We reverse and remand for the trial court to prepare an amended sentencing order and abstract in accordance with this opinion.

[12] Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   References to the record in the first appeal are denoted by “1st Appeal.” References to the record in the current appeal are denoted by “2d Appeal.”

2.   In June 2017, in the First Dealing Cause, Ebler pled guilty to one count of dealing in methamphetamine as a Level 4 felony, admitted to being a habitual offender, and was sentenced to a total of 12 years, with six years executed at the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”) and the other six suspended to probation.

3.   We recommend that plea agreements combining multiple criminal causes into one document and one aggregate sentence be used with caution, particularly where, as here, the defendant is serving executed time in a community correction setting and awaiting probation time. The better practice in this case would have been to deal with each cause separately.

Felix, Judge.

Judges May and Foley concur. May, J., and Foley, J., concur.