Matthew Stephen Coleman, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Matthew Stephen Coleman (“Coleman”) appeals the trial court's order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his previously suspended sentence. Coleman argues that the petition to revoke his probation was not timely filed. Concluding that the petition to revoke Coleman's probation was timely filed, we affirm the trial court's judgment. Further, we take judicial notice of the proceedings that occurred in this case while the appeal was pending, hold that the trial court's order modifying Coleman's sentence is void under Appellate Rule 8, and remand for the trial court to revisit the sentence modification issue.

[2] We affirm and remand.

Issue

Whether the petition to revoke Coleman's probation was timely filed.

Facts

[3] In December 2019, Coleman pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to Level 6 felony theft and Class A misdemeanor theft. The plea agreement provided that any executed sentence would be equal to time served, his sentences would run consecutively, and that he would serve a one (1) year period of probation for each conviction. For Coleman's Level 6 felony theft conviction, the trial court imposed a two-and-one-half (21/212) year sentence, with two (2) days executed and the remainder suspended to probation, and it ordered him to serve one (1) year on probation. For Coleman's Class A misdemeanor conviction, the trial court imposed a one (1) year suspended sentence and ordered him to serve one (1) year on probation. The trial court ordered Coleman to serve his sentences consecutively, resulting in an aggregate period of two (2) years on probation. Additionally, the trial court ordered Coleman to serve forty-eight (48) hours with the community corrections work crew and to pay over $6,000 in restitution.

[4] Coleman began serving his probation on December 17, 2020.¹ Additionally, Coleman signed the terms and conditions of his probation (“the probation terms and conditions document”) in January 2021.

[5] On December 8, 2022, the probation department filed a petition to revoke Coleman's probation, alleging that he had violated the terms of his probation by: (1) failing to pay restitution; and (2) failing to serve his forty-eight hours with the community corrections work crew. That same day, the trial court issued a summons for Coleman to appear for a revocation hearing. At an April 2023 factfinding hearing, the State moved to admit the terms and conditions of probation document, which provided that Coleman's probation began on December 17, 2020. The trial court admitted the document, and the probation officer (“the probation officer”) testified that Coleman had signed the probation terms and conditions document in January 2021. During the hearing, Coleman did not challenge the timeliness of the revocation petition. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that Coleman had violated the terms of his probation. The trial court extended Coleman's probation by one (1) year. The trial court also ordered Coleman, as an additional term of his probation, to pay a minimum of $200 a month in restitution.

[6] On January 18, 2024, the probation department filed a second petition to revoke Coleman's probation, alleging that he had violated the terms of his probation by: (1) failing to meet with his probation officer; and (2) failing to pay restitution. That same day, the trial court issued a warrant for Coleman's arrest. After his arrest, Coleman was released on his own recognizance. In March 2024, the probation department amended its revocation petition, alleging that Coleman had violated his probation by committing new offenses of Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana and Class C misdemeanor driving while intoxicated.

[7] In June 2024, the trial court held a factfinding hearing. During this hearing, the State moved to admit the same probation terms and conditions document, and the trial court admitted it. During the hearing, Coleman did not challenge the timeliness of the revocation petition. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that Coleman had violated the terms of his probation. Specifically, the trial court found that Coleman had violated the terms and conditions of his probation by: (1) failing to meet with his probation officer; (2) failing to pay restitution; and (3) committing new offenses. In October 2024, the trial court issued an order revoking Coleman's probation. Specifically, the trial court ordered Coleman to serve the remainder of his previously suspended sentence from his Level 6 felony theft conviction, and it terminated his probation from his Class A misdemeanor conviction. Coleman's appointed appellate counsel timely appealed the trial court's revocation order. The notice of completion of clerk's record was filed on December 3, 2024.

[8] On appeal, Coleman argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to serve his previously suspended sentence. Specifically, he contends that the petition to revoke his probation was not timely filed. The State also filed a brief in this appeal arguing that the petition to revoke was timely filed. Coleman's appeal was fully briefed and transmitted to our Court in March 2025.

[9] Our review of the chronological case summary (“CCS”) reveals that, in July 2025, while this appeal was pending, Coleman filed, with the trial court, a pro se motion for sentence modification.² In Coleman's motion, he noted that he had already served 712 of the 908 days that the trial court had ordered him to serve upon the revocation of his probation, and he requested the trial court to modify his sentence to time served. Coleman also noted that he was represented by appellate counsel in this pending direct appeal. The trial court held a hearing on August 4, 2025. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted Coleman's motion, modified his sentence to time served, and ordered Coleman's immediate release from the county jail.³ The CCS also reveals that the trial court gave Coleman a copy of the order in open court and that, the following day, the trial court sent the order to the probation department, the prosecutor, and Coleman's appellate attorney. Neither the trial court nor the parties notified our Court of the order.

Decision

[10] Given the unique procedural history of this case, we start our analysis with the timeliness issue briefed by the parties on appeal and then turn to the propriety of the proceedings that occurred while the appeal was pending.

[11] On appeal, Coleman argues that the petition to revoke his probation was not timely filed. “[A] trial court's sentencing decisions for probation violations are reviewable using the abuse of discretion standard.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007) (citing Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied). An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.

[12] Probation revocation is a two-step process. Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008). First, the trial court must make a factual determination that the State has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation of a condition of probation has occurred. Hardy v. State, 975 N.E.2d 833, 835 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). If a violation is proven, then the trial court must determine if the violation warrants revocation of the probation. Id.

[13] “Once a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed.” Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. “If this discretion were not [given] to trial courts and sentences were scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges might be less inclined to order probation to future defendants.” Id. Upon determining that a probationer has violated a condition of probation, the trial court may continue the person on probation, extend the person's probation for not more than one year, or order execution of all or part of the previously suspended sentence. See IND. CODE § 35-38-2-3(h).

[14] Coleman's sole contention on appeal is that the probation department did not timely file the petition to revoke his probation. We disagree.

[15] Indiana Code § 35-38-2-3(a) provides that a trial court may revoke a person's probation if:

(1) the person has violated a condition of probation during the probationary period; and

(2) the petition to revoke probation is filed during the probationary period or before the earlier of the following:

(A) One (1) year after the termination of probation.

(B) Forty-five (45) days after the [S]tate receives notice of the violation.

Indiana Code § 35-38-2-3(c) provides that the “issuance of a summons or warrant tolls the period of probation until the final determination of the charge.”

[16] Coleman specifically argues that the petition to revoke his probation was not timely filed.  ⁴ In support of this contention, he cites to Trammell v. State, 45 N.E.3d 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[17] In Trammell, the defendant argued that the alleged violations of his probation did not occur during his probationary period. In that case, our Court concluded that “on the face of the record, Trammell's probationary period had ended well before he was alleged to have violated probation.” Trammell, 45 N.E.3d at 1216. We noted that “there still must be evidence from which the trial court can determine that an alleged violation occurred within the probationary period.” Id. at 1217. Because our Court could, based on the record before it, come to no other conclusion other than that Trammell's alleged violations occurred outside of his probationary period, we held that the trial court had abused its discretion when it revoked Trammell's probation. Id.

[18] The facts before us are distinguishable from Trammell. Here, our review of the record reveals that Coleman began serving his probation on December 17, 2020 and signed the terms and conditions of his probation in January 2021. Just under two years later, on December 8, 2022, the probation department filed a petition to revoke Coleman's probation, and the trial court issued a summons for Coleman. In April 2023, the trial court found that Coleman had violated the terms of his probation and extended Coleman's probation by another year. In January 2024, less than one year after April 2023, the probation department filed another petition to revoke Coleman's probation, and the trial court issued a warrant for Coleman's arrest. In June 2024, the trial court found that Coleman had violated his probation. Pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 35-38-2-3(c), a summons or warrant tolls the probationary period until the trial court makes a final determination. See also Hilligoss v. State, 45 N.E.3d 1228, 1230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (explaining that, pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 35-38-2-3(c), the defendant's probationary period had been tolled for two periods of time for two separate probation revocation petitions from the issuance of a summons or warrant until the final determination of the charge). Here, Coleman's probation was tolled from December 2022 until the trial court's determination in April 2023 and again from January 2024 until the trial court's determination in June 2024. We conclude that, on the face of the record, the petition to revoke Coleman's probation was timely filed and affirm the trial court's order revoking Coleman's probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his suspended sentence.  ⁵

[19] Having affirmed the trial court's order, we now turn our attention to the propriety of the proceedings that occurred while Coleman's appeal was pending. We recognize that Appellate Rule 8 provides that our Court “acquires jurisdiction on the date the Notice of Completion of Clerk's Record is noted in the Chronological Case Summary.” Once an appeal is perfected, a trial court loses subject matter jurisdiction over the case, and a judgment made when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction is void. See Conroad Associates, L.P. v. Castleton Corner Owners Ass'n, Inc., 205 N.E.3d 1001, 1005 (Ind. 2023) (explaining that “once judgment is entered, an appeal is filed, and the clerk's record is complete, Appellate Rule 8 divests the trial court of jurisdiction to act upon the judgment appealed from until the appeal has been terminated”) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This rule serves an important purpose in that it facilitates the orderly presentation and disposition of appeals and prevents the confusing and awkward situation of having the trial and appellate courts simultaneously reviewing the correctness of the judgment.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

[20] Here, the Notice of Completion of Clerk's Record was filed on December 3, 2024. Therefore, as a general rule, the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the case after December 3, 2024. See id. “However, there are situations in which a trial court may retain jurisdiction and act notwithstanding an appeal.” Bradley v. State, 649 N.E.2d 100, 106 (Ind. 1995), reh'g denied. For example, a trial court may retain jurisdiction to reassess costs, correct the record, enforce the judgment, but “a trial court is not permitted to intermeddle with the subject-matter of the appeal.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Additionally, “[a]side from these circumstances, Appellate Rule 37 enables litigants to hurdle Rule 8’s jurisdictional fence by providing a mechanism for the trial court to regain jurisdiction while an appeal is pending.” Conroad, 205 N.E.3d at 1005.

[21] The trial court's sentence modification order does not fall into one of the exceptions and is interrelated to the matter on appeal. Thus, we hold that the trial court's order modifying Coleman's sentence is void. See id. Accordingly, we remand the case back to the trial court so that it may revisit the sentence modification motion and issue an order that is not void.

[22] Affirmed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Coleman had been serving a sentence in Cass County before he began his probation.

2.   Indiana Appellate Rule 27 provides that the “[r]ecord on [a]ppeal shall consist of the [c]lerk's [r]ecord and all proceedings before the trial court or administrative agency, whether or not transcribed or transmitted to the Court on [a]ppeal.” Pursuant to Appellate Rule 27, we take judicial notice of the CCS and Coleman's motion. See also Stafford v. Stafford, 256 N.E.3d 595, 597 n.1-2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (taking judicial notice of relevant pleadings and orders in the record but not included in the record on appeal).

3.   Pursuant to Appellate Rule 27, we also take judicial notice of the trial court's order granting Coleman's motion.

4.   Coleman argues that the State did not timely file its petition to revoke his probation because the “first probation violation was not filed until three years after sentencing” and the trial court had ordered Coleman to serve a two-year term on probation. (Coleman's Br. 11). But, the State argues, and we agree that, Coleman's challenges to the timeline of events prior to the trial court's April 2023 order are not properly before us because the trial court's April 2023 order was a final appealable order pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 35-38-2-3(l). INDIANA CODE § 35-38-2-3(l) provides that “[a] judgment revoking probation is a final appealable order.” The State argues that because Coleman did not timely file a notice of appeal pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 9(A), he has forfeited his right to appeal the trial court's April 2023 order and cannot argue that the initial petition to revoke was untimely. Indiana Appellate Rule 9(A)(5) provides that “[u]nless the Notice of Appeal is timely filed, the right to appeal shall be forfeited[.]”

5.   Coleman also argues that the petition to revoke was related to conduct that the State “knew was occurring as it happened” and, thus, the State should have filed the petition within forty-five days. However, because we have held that the petition to revoke was filed during the probationary period, we need not address this argument. See I.C. § 35-38-2-3(a)(2).

Pyle, Judge.

Judges Bradford and Kenworthy concur. Bradford, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.