IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of A.F. (Mother) and L.B. (Father) and L.F. (Minor Child) A.F. (Mother) and L.B. (Father) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A.F. (“Mother”) and L.B. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal the termination of their parental rights to one of their children. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and Father are the parents of L.F. (“Child”), born in December 2019. Parents have another child, J.F., who was born in December 2022 during these proceedings.

[3] In September 2021, the Department of Child Services (DCS) received a report that Mother was using illegal drugs around Child and had left Child with a friend so she could enter rehab. A DCS family case manager (FCM) visited the friend's home and found that it smelled of marijuana and there were “marijuana remnants” within reach of Child. Ex. p. 34. When DCS contacted Mother, she admitted that she and Father used methamphetamine in their home while Child was present. Mother also had a history of leaving Child with inappropriate caregivers—Child suffered a burn on her leg when left with a family friend with whom Mother would use methamphetamine. Due to the lack of a safe, drug-free home, DCS removed Child and placed her with Mother's ex-husband, S.F., and his wife, where she has since remained. Mother and S.F. have a child together (Child's half-brother), of whom S.F. also has custody.

[4] On October 1, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was in need of services (CHINS). In November, upon admissions by Parents, the trial court adjudicated Child to be a CHINS. By that time, Parents were both homeless. The following month, the court issued a dispositional order requiring Parents to, among other things, maintain safe and stable housing, complete a substance-abuse assessment and any resulting recommendations, submit to random drug screens, and attend visitation.

[5] At the outset, Parents only partially complied with the dispositional order. They participated in home-based casework and visitation, although Father didn't attend all scheduled visits. Father also didn't submit to drug screens or complete a substance-abuse assessment. By July 2022, Mother was in substance-abuse treatment at Volunteers of America (VOA). She produced negative drug screens and progressed to only partially supervised visits. But in September, Mother left the VOA and moved in with Father, so her visitation was changed back to fully supervised. Just a few weeks earlier, Father was arrested and charged with domestic battery against another woman, “which ma[de] Mother's recent decision to move in with Father so concerning.” Mother's App. Vol. 2 p. 18. After leaving the VOA, Mother relapsed. She missed 16 drug screens and had a positive screen for THC. She also missed visits, so the visitation provider unsuccessfully discharged her.

[6] In November 2022, Mother moved back into the VOA. She graduated from inpatient treatment in February 2023 and moved into the VOA's sober-living facility, the Legacy House. All her drug screens were negative until May, when she tested positive for codeine. Then, at the beginning of June, Mother left the Legacy House and didn't return. Mother also stopped drug screening and attending visitation. At the time, J.F. was in Mother's care, so DCS removed him and filed a CHINS petition. See id. at 52. For his part, Father spent time in jail for invasion of privacy after violating the protective order between him and the victim of his August 2022 domestic battery. He continued to only partially comply with the dispositional order and eventually told his home-based caseworker that he no longer wanted to receive services or visit Child. Due to Parents’ noncompliance, the trial court changed the permanency plan to reunification with a concurrent plan of adoption. Shortly thereafter, DCS petitioned to terminate Parents’ parental rights to Child.

[7] Mother returned to the VOA in July 2023 and resumed visitation. She successfully completed treatment at the VOA and then moved to Heart Rock Recovery in December. J.F. was placed back with Mother on a trial visit. Over the next several months, Mother engaged in programming at Heart Rock and produced negative drug screens. But she was later put on a “behavior contract” for breaking curfew and other rules. Id. at 20. One time, Mother missed curfew because she was with Father, whose drug screens had been positive.

[8] In May 2024, after holding a fact-finding hearing, the trial court denied the termination petition, finding that DCS had failed to meet its burden. But the court warned, “Child needs permanency and she needs it soon. Although Mother has demonstrated through the course of the CHINS action that she is willing to reengage in substance abuse treatment when needed, the Child cannot continue to be included in that cycle. The cycle of substance abuse must stop now.” Id. at 62-63.

[9] Mother was discharged from Heart Rock in June because she continued breaking the rules. She then moved to Oxford House, but she relapsed and was discharged for testing positive for marijuana. Mother became homeless and, in addition to marijuana, used crack cocaine. In July, DCS filed a second CHINS petition as to J.F. and placed him with S.F. and his wife. Around the same time, Mother returned to the VOA. DCS put in a referral for therapeutic supervised visitation for Father, and he resumed visits but “struggle[d] with engagement with [Child].” Id. at 21.

[10] In August 2024, DCS filed a second termination petition. Mother again completed treatment at the VOA and moved to House of Ruth and Naomi, a sober-living facility, in November. By that time, Father was attending all his visits with Child but wasn't engaging in any other services. He was on probation in his domestic-battery case, and a notice of probation violation was filed due to his failure to submit to drug screens and to complete a batterer's intervention program as ordered.¹ See Ex. p. 216.

[11] The termination hearing began on December 5. Mother testified that she'd relapsed “4 or 5” times throughout the proceedings. Tr. p. 9. Father admitted that he hadn't successfully completed any services offered by DCS. His home-based caseworker testified that they'd set goals of “stability and sobriety,” but Father “has[n't] made any progress” on those goals. Id. at 36. Throughout the CHINS and termination proceedings, Father only submitted to drug screens when court ordered. This amounted to seven screens, all of which were positive.

[12] The hearing continued on January 30, 2025. FCM Jamie Oberle opined that Mother's substance abuse is still a barrier to reunification because although she “do[es] well” when she's at the VOA or in a sober-living facility, she has “a repeated pattern” of leaving and “either becoming homeless or going back to [Father] and relapsing.” Id. at 75. FCM Oberle didn't believe Mother had “developed the skills to be able to do [well] ․ [o]utside of a facility that's ․ holding her accountable.” Id. at 63. As for Father, he told FCM Oberle that he wouldn't participate in any services other than visitation, and he doesn't believe he has a substance-abuse problem. FCM Oberle recommended termination and didn't “believe if parents were given more time to complete their services that they would reunify with [Child].” Id. at 74. Michelle McGill, Child's court-appointed special advocate (CASA), opined that termination is in Child's best interests because “[t]here's been too many chances” for Parents to reunify with Child, and “it's been long enough.” Id. at 113.

[13] The final day of the termination hearing was February 6. At that time, Mother was still living at House of Ruth and Naomi and had no plans to move out or find her own housing. She testified that she hadn't had a positive drug screen in seven months. Following the hearing, the trial court terminated Parents’ parental rights to Child.

[14] Parents now separately appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[15] Parents contend there is insufficient evidence to support the termination of their parental rights. When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013). Rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the trial court's judgment. Id. When a trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the court's findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. Id. To determine whether a judgment terminating parental rights is clearly erroneous, we review whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings and whether the findings support the judgment. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016). DCS must prove the allegations in a termination petition by clear and convincing evidence. See Ind. Code § 31-34-12-2.

I. Father has waived his challenges to the trial court's findings of fact

[16] First, Father challenges several of the trial court's findings of fact. Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no evidence to support them, either directly or by inference. In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[17] Father challenges the portions of Findings 7, 10, 11, 15, and 18 “about the negative quality of Father's visits with [Child].” Father's Br. p. 14. He doesn't argue that there is no evidence in the record to support these findings; rather, he contends that the trial court improperly based them on hearsay evidence— namely, the records from the underlying CHINS case. Thus, he claims that these findings are erroneous because “[t]he trial court did not have any non-hearsay evidence before it that would support” them. Id. But Father did not object to the admission of the CHINS records during the termination hearing. See Tr. pp. 60-61. Because Father acquiesced to the admission of these records below, he cannot now argue that the court erred in relying on them in making its findings of fact. Father has waived these challenges for our review. See Johnson v. State, 734 N.E.2d 530, 532 (Ind. 2000) (“Failure to object at trial waives any claim of error and allows otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence to be considered for substantive purposes and to establish a material fact at issue.”).

II. The trial court did not err in concluding the statutory requirements for termination were satisfied

[18] Parents both argue that DCS failed to meet the statutory requirements for termination. Here, DCS filed its termination petition under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4. A petition under that section must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c) (2024).² As to the first requirement, DCS alleged, and the trial court found, the existence of the following circumstances in subsection (d):

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months ․ ; and

(B) despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family ․, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

See Mother's App. Vol. 2 pp. 21, 28, 65. Parents challenge both of the trial court's conclusions under subsection (d) and the court's conclusion that termination is in Child's best interests.

A. Conditions Remedied

[19] In determining whether there is a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in a child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, the trial court engages in a two-step analysis: first, the court identifies what conditions led to the child's placement and retention outside the home, and then it determines whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will not be remedied. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231. This second step requires the court to judge a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, considering evidence of changed conditions and balancing any recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014).

[20] Child was removed and remained outside Parents’ care due to the lack of a safe, drug-free home. Over the course of the proceedings, Mother demonstrated a “repeated pattern” of doing well at the VOA and in sober-living facilities but then relapsing after leaving the facilities. See In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 50 (Ind. 2019) (“[S]imply going through the motions of receiving services alone is not sufficient if the services do not result in the needed change.”), reh'g denied. When Mother left the facilities, she'd either become homeless or go back to Father. Each time she relapsed she “disengage[d] in the case and her daughter's visitation.” Mother's App. Vol. 2 p. 27. One relapse came just a month after the trial court's warning in denying the first termination petition that “[t]he cycle of substance abuse must stop now.” Although Mother completed treatment at the VOA for a fourth time in November 2024 and hadn't tested positive for drugs in seven months at the time of the last day of the termination hearing, she was in the controlled environment of a sober-living facility—she was still living at House of Ruth and Naomi and had no plans to find her own housing. But as the trial court noted, “Each time Mother gets more freedom and less accountability, she relapses ․” Id. While we commend Mother's work toward sobriety, she hasn't shown an ability to stay sober on her own. The trial court was within its discretion to give more weight to Mother's history of substance abuse and relapse than to her recent sobriety. See E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643 (“Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.”).

[21] For his part, Father didn't successfully complete any services offered by DCS and made no progress on his goals of stability and sobriety in home-based casework. In the three-and-a-half years since the CHINS petition was filed, Father never completed a substance-abuse assessment or treatment. He refused to drug screen unless court ordered and only submitted seven screens, all of which were positive. Father told FCM Oberle that he doesn't think he has a substance-abuse problem and that he wouldn't participate in any services other than visitation. He was inconsistent in attending visits, “struggle[d] with engagement with [Child],” and eventually had to be referred for therapeutic supervised visitation. He also picked up two criminal cases during the proceedings and spent time in jail, on probation, and on home detention.

[22] The evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability Parents will not remedy the conditions that resulted in Child's removal and continued placement outside the home. Because Section 31-35-2-4(c)(1) requires the existence of only one circumstance in subsection (d), we need not address the other circumstance alleged. See In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

B. Best Interests

[23] Deciding whether termination is in a child's best interests requires the trial court to look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the child. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. Central among these interests is the child's need for permanency, as “children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.” Id. We have held that recommendations by both the case manager and child advocate, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[24] Here, FCM Oberle and CASA McGill both recommended termination. And as explained above, Parents haven't shown an ability to provide a stable, drug-free environment for Child. While this evidence alone is sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion, permanency is a central consideration in determining Child's best interests. Child, now five, has been removed from Parents since September 2021. Since then, Child has lived with S.F. and his wife—along with her two brothers—to whom she is bonded and who wish to adopt her. As CASA McGill put it, Parents have had “many chances” to reunify with Child, and “it's been long enough.” The trial court was not required to wait on Parents any longer. See Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. The evidence supports the court's conclusion that termination is in Child's best interests.

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   On January 23, 2025, Father admitted to the probation violations, and the trial court there revoked his probation and placed him on home detention through Marion County Community Corrections. Father was successfully discharged from community corrections on March 10.

2.   Section 31-35-2-4 was amended effective July 1, 2025, several months after the termination order was issued in this case. See Pub. L. No. 179-2025, § 25. None of the parties argue that this amendment has any bearing on the proceedings.

Vaidik, Judge.

Judges Mathias and Pyle concur. Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.