Cynthia Jo Wallace, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Cynthia Jo Wallace (“Wallace”) appeals—and the State cross-appeals—the interlocutory order partially granting and partially denying Wallace's motion to suppress evidence obtained following a traffic stop. Wallace claims all evidence derived from the traffic stop should be suppressed, whereas the State cross-appeals, claiming that none of the evidence should be suppressed. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On March 27, 2023, the State charged Wallace with the following offenses related to a traffic stop conducted on March 26, 2023: Count 1 – Level 6 felony obstruction of justice,¹ Count 2 – Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement,² Count 3 – Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated (“OVWI”),³ Count 4 – Class A misdemeanor OVWI endangering a person,⁴ Count 5 – Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana,⁵ Count 6 – Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia,⁶ and Count 7 – Level 6 felony unlawful possession or use of a legend drug.⁷

[3] On April 18, 2023, Wallace filed a motion to suppress evidence derived from the traffic stop pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Wallace argued that law enforcement lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop and that all evidence obtained therefrom must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. The trial court held a suppression hearing on May 15, 2023.

[4] At the suppression hearing, Reserve Sergeant Aaron Stronczek (“Sergeant Stronczek”) of the Geneva Police Department testified that, at approximately 4:00 a.m. on March 26, 2023, he clocked Wallace's vehicle traveling 25 m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h. zone in the town of Geneva. Sergeant Stronczek believed he observed Wallace's tires crossing the white fog line. At that point, Sergeant Stronczek—who was driving a marked police vehicle—turned his vehicle around and began following Wallace. Sergeant Stronczek further testified that he observed Wallace turn at multiple intersections, such that Wallace drove her vehicle in a circular route. Sergeant Stronczek believed he had grounds for a traffic stop on the basis that Wallace was going below the posted speed limit at 4:00 a.m. when the roads were clear, he saw “unsafe lane movement,” and she appeared to be trying to “avoid law enforcement” by driving in a circle. Tr. Vol. II pp. 7–8, 10–11, 13–14. Dashcam footage, admitted into evidence, captured the movements of Wallace's vehicle leading up to the traffic stop.

[5] At the hearing, Wallace's position was that all evidence derived from the traffic stop was subject to suppression because, under the state and federal constitutions, Sergeant Stronczek lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop. The trial court asked the parties to put together proposed orders that addressed the “new crime exception” to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 20. The court directed the parties to two cases involving the exception—C.P. v. State, 39 N.E.3d 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied, and Wright v. State, 108 N.E.3d 307 (Ind. 2018)—which stand for the proposition that, “notwithstanding a strong causal connection in fact between an illegal search or seizure by law enforcement and a defendant's response, if the defendant's response is itself a new and distinct crime, then evidence of the new crime is admissible notwithstanding the prior illegality.” C.P., 39 N.E.3d at 1182.

[6] In the State's proposed order, the State maintained that the traffic stop was lawful. The State also addressed the new crime exception, arguing that during the traffic stop Wallace “became aggressive and defiant in her responses” and her behavior “escalated to resisting law enforcement officers physically” and “refusing to comply with a signed search warrant for her blood.” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 48–49. The State appeared to draw these factual assertions from the officer narrative attached to the probable cause affidavit. Compare id. (proposed order) with id. at 16–18 (officer narrative). The officer narrative indicated that Wallace forcibly resisted multiple requests to exit the vehicle; she was arrested for—among other things—resisting law enforcement; and a vehicle inventory search revealed, among other things, “narcotics and a prescription medication that was not in Wallace's name.” Id. at 18. The officer narrative further indicated that law enforcement obtained a warrant to search Wallace's blood and that Wallace “refused to comply with the search warrant.” Id. The State argued that, if the court determined the traffic stop was unlawful due to a lack of reasonable suspicion, the court should apply the new crime exception and “allow the admission of evidence supporting the charges of resisting law enforcement, obstruction of justice, possession of paraphernalia, possession of marijuana, and unlawful possession or use of a legend drug.” Id. at 50.

[7] On May 24, 2023, the trial court signed an order partially granting the motion to suppress evidence. The order indicated that the trial court reviewed the dashcam footage and determined the footage contradicted Sergeant Stronczek's account of unsafe lane maneuvers, with the court finding that “Wallace did not swerve and there is no evidence of her moving across the fog line.” Id. at 55. The court looked to the remaining evidence potentially justifying the traffic stop, which was that Wallace was driving ten miles under the speed limit at 4:00 a.m. and, while Sergeant Stronczek followed, made multiple turns so as to drive in a circular route through town. The court found that Sergeant Stronczek lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop, noting that “[t]raffic was not impeded by [Wallace's] driving” and “the driving behavior of Wallace was just as much an indication of someone who [was] unsure of their driving directions as it [was] of impaired behavior.” Id. The court added that “[Wallace] committed no traffic infractions” to otherwise justify the traffic stop and that “simply turning left a few times is not enough to justify the intrusion of a police stop.” Id.

[8] Due to a lack of reasonable suspicion to support the traffic stop, the trial court granted Wallace's motion to suppress “evidence obtained directly related to the police stop,” which the trial court determined affected all counts except Count 1 – Level 6 felony obstruction of justice and Count 2– Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. The trial court concluded that “[b]oth of these [counts] allege new crimes” and “[e]vidence obtained related to these offenses is not suppressed.” Id. at 56. Wallace perfected an interlocutory appeal. The State cross-appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] The parties challenge the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress. At a suppression hearing challenging the constitutionality of a warrantless search or seizure, the State bears the burden of proving that the search or seizure was constitutional. Edwards v. State, 759 N.E.2d 626, 630 (Ind. 2001). When reviewing a suppression ruling, we do not reweigh the evidence and consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the ruling. State v. E.R., 123 N.E.3d 675, 679 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). However, we review de novo the legal question of whether, in light of the facts favorable to the judgment, the United States Constitution or the Indiana Constitution necessitated suppressing the evidence. See id.; State v. Jones, 191 N.E.3d 878, 883 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied.

I. Traffic Stop

[10] We begin by addressing the State's contention on cross-appeal that the trial court erred in partially granting Wallace's motion to suppress evidence. The State claims the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, and therefore, did not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. We resolve the State's claim under the Fourth Amendment, concluding the stop was not justified and so the trial court did not err in suppressing evidence from the stop.⁸

[11] The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. “To encourage compliance with the Fourth Amendment, the evidence seized in violation [thereof] must be excluded at trial unless an exception to this ‘exclusionary rule’ applies.” Shotts v. State, 925 N.E.2d 719, 723 (Ind. 2010) (citing Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139–40 (2009)). A traffic stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. E.g., Marshall v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1254, 1259 (Ind. 2019). For a traffic stop to be reasonable, the stop must be supported by at least reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot. Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 367 (Ind. 2014). A police officer has reasonable suspicion when the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officer, together with reasonable inferences arising from those facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur. Crabtree v. State, 762 N.E.2d 241, 246 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). The reasonable suspicion inquiry is objective rather than subjective, ultimately turning on whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe the seizure was appropriate. Clark v. State, 949 N.E.2d 252, 265 (Ind. 2013).

[12] In partially granting the motion to suppress, the trial court reviewed the dashcam footage and determined the footage contradicted Sergeant Stronczek's account of unsafe lane maneuvers, finding that the footage “does not appear to indicate any swerving or erratic driving on the part of Wallace and it is impossible to tell from the angle of the police car versus the direction and angle of Wallace's car whether or not the vehicle crossed the fog line.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 54–55. The court stated: “In this situation it is clear that ․ Wallace has not committed any traffic infractions and there is no indication that her driving behavior has amounted to reasonable suspicion[.]” Id. at 55. The trial court looked to the remaining evidence potentially justifying the traffic stop, which was that Wallace was driving ten miles under the speed limit at 4:00 a.m. and that, while Sergeant Stronczek followed, Wallace made multiple left turns so as to drive in a circular pattern through the small town of Geneva. In determining that Sergeant Stronczek lacked an objectively reasonable basis for the traffic stop, the trial court noted that “the speed of Wallace's vehicle did not impede traffic or cause any other issues of legal consequence” and that “the driving behavior of Wallace was just as much an indication of someone who [was] unsure of their driving directions as it [was] of impaired behavior.” Id. at 54, 55.

[13] On appeal, the State does not allege that Wallace committed a traffic infraction that would support the stop, but rather that there was reasonable suspicion that Wallace was impaired. The State points out that “an officer's determination of reasonable suspicion may be based on ‘common sense conclusions about human behavior.’ ” Appellee's Br. p. 14 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). The State argues as follows: “Sergeant Stronczek was entitled to use his common sense to infer that Wallace—who was driving well below the posted speed limit, had made an ‘unsafe lane movement’ by swerving over the fog line, and appeared to be attempting to ‘avoid law enforcement’ by driving in a circle—was impaired.” Id. (quoting Tr. Vol. II p. 14). We note, however, that the trial court rejected the officer's characterization of Wallace's lane movements, relying instead on contradictory evidence—the dashcam footage—which it determined “d[id] not appear to indicate any swerving or erratic driving on the part of Wallace” with it “impossible to tell from the angle of the police car versus the direction and angle of Wallace's car whether or not the vehicle crossed the fog line.” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 54–55. With the State bearing the burden of proving the stop was constitutional, the court concluded that “Wallace did not swerve” and that “there [was] no evidence of her moving across the fog line.” Id. at 55.

[14] In conducting appellate review, we do not reweigh evidence and must consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the ruling on Wallace's motion to suppress. See, e.g., E.R., 123 N.E.3d at 679. Applying this standard, we conclude that the evidence favorable to the ruling—i.e., that Wallace drove ten miles under the speed limit at 4:00 a.m. and made multiple left turns, ultimately driving in a circular pattern while a police vehicle followed—would not cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that Wallace was impaired while operating her vehicle. Thus, we agree with the trial court that the stop was not justified under the Fourth Amendment. We therefore affirm that portion of the order suppressing evidence derived from the traffic stop itself.

II. New Crime Exception

[15] We turn to Wallace's contention that the trial court erred in failing to suppress all evidence derived from the traffic stop, including evidence that Wallace forcibly resisted when law enforcement asked her to get out of her vehicle and later refused to comply with a warrant to search her blood. The exclusionary rule generally prohibits the admission of evidence obtained through unreasonable searches and seizures. Wright, 108 N.E.3d at 313–14. However, both state and federal jurisprudence recognize exceptions to the exclusionary rule, among them, an exception known as the new crime exception. Id.

[16] The new crime exception allows for the admission of “evidence that defendants committed new and distinct crimes in response to illegal searches or seizures by law enforcement[.]” C.P., 39 N.E.3d at 1183. This exception provides that, “notwithstanding a strong causal connection in fact between an illegal search or seizure by law enforcement and a defendant's response” to that illegal search or seizure, “if the defendant's response is itself a new and distinct crime, then evidence of the new crime is admissible notwithstanding the prior illegal[ ]” search or seizure. Id. at 1182. To determine whether the new crime exception applies, courts must examine (1) the proximity in time between the unlawful police conduct and the discovery of the evidence at issue; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and, “most importantly,” (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the unlawful police conduct. Wright, 108 N.E.3d at 316.

[17] Here, Wallace's forcible resistance to officers’ commands to exit the vehicle and her subsequent refusal to comply with a warrant constituted new and distinct crimes committed after the initial stop. See Ind. Code §§ 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1) (criminalizing resisting law enforcement), 35-44.1-2-2(a)(2)(A) (criminalizing obstruction of justice). The narrative supporting the probable cause affidavit— upon which both Wallace and the State rely— indicates that Wallace's resistance and refusal were not the inevitable product of the unlawful stop but instead independent criminal conduct. Considering the proximity in time between the illegal police conduct and the discovery of the evidence at issue, we note that Wallace's resistance occurred relatively soon after the stop. However, in the intervening minutes, Wallace became aggressive and confrontational in response to routine roadside procedures to obtain her driver's license, proof of insurance, and car registration. Moreover, the record is not indicative of flagrant police conduct in that Sergeant Stronczek testified to his subjective belief that he had reasonable suspicion and there was no indication that the officer was aggressive in carrying out the routine procedures. Based on the foregoing, it appears Wallace's criminal conduct was not the product of police exploitation of the unlawful stop but rather Wallace's independent choices to resist commands and subsequently decline to comply with the search warrant.

[18] In the end, the suppression doctrine is designed to deter police misconduct, not to protect defendants who elect to commit new criminal offenses during what is later ruled an unlawful search or seizure. Wright, 108 N.E.3d at 314 (noting that rigid application of the exclusionary rule—“no matter what”—would “choke out” the deterrent purposes of the rule); C.P., 39 N.E.3d at 1180–83. Under the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to suppress evidence derived from the traffic stop inasmuch as that evidence is subject to the new crime exception.

[19] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the ruling on the motion to suppress, which suppressed evidence derived from the traffic stop itself while otherwise declining to suppress evidence fitting within the new crime exception.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-2(a)(2)(A) (2022).

2.   I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1) (2021).

3.   I.C. § 9-30-5-2(a) (2001).

4.   I.C. § 9-30-5-2(a), (b) (2001).

5.   I.C. § 35-48-4-11(a)(1) (2018).

6.   I.C. § 35-48-4-8.3(b)(1) (2015).

7.   I.C. §§ 16-42-19-13 (2021), 16-42-19-27(a) (2019).

8.   The State does not challenge the trial court's determination that, if reasonable suspicion was lacking, evidence should be suppressed as it related to Counts 3 through 7, the OVWI and drug-related counts.

Foley, Judge.

Judges Kenworthy and Scheele concur. Kenworthy, J. and Scheele, J., concur.