Timothy Marcus Mayberry, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Indiana Department of Correction, Appellee-Defendant (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Timothy Mayberry, an active pro se litigant, was charged excessive fees by the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC) for the litigation-related mailings he made in 2022 while he was incarcerated for murder. Mayberry sued DOC in small claims court to recover what he alleged was $800 in overcharges plus additional damages of more than $9,000 related mostly to his emotional distress. The small claims court entered judgment for Mayberry in the amount of $199.37 and otherwise denied his claims.

[2] Mayberry appeals, claiming that he is entitled to greater damages based on his indigency, that the State improperly introduced evidence of settlement negotiations, and that the trial court erred in requiring the case to be tried by affidavit, rather than transporting Mayberry to the hearing. We reverse and remand to the trial court to enter a judgment noting that Mayberry is not indigent but is entitled to judgment for $199.37 based on DOC's acknowledgment that Mayberry was overcharged in contravention of DOC policy.

Facts

[3] In 2022, Mayberry was incarcerated at the Miami Correctional Facility, where he was serving a 60-year sentence for murder. Since his incarceration, Mayberry has initiated a number of lawsuits in which he is representing himself. Between August 2022 and December 2022 (the period relevant to this appeal), Mayberry submitted multiple parcels of legal mail to DOC staff for delivery via U.S. mail.

[4] By statute, DOC must provide indigent prisoners with free stationery, envelopes, and postage for legal correspondence. DOC defines an offender as indigent if the offender has a trust account balance of less than $15 on the day of the mailing request and lacks a total of more than: (1) $15 credited to the trust account in the preceding 30 days or (2) $90 credited to the trust account in the prior 180 days.

[5] During the relevant period of Mayberry's mailings, he never fell below the threshold to be considered indigent under DOC policy. He received over $250 in deposits to his trust account, including: $87.70 for “July State Pay” on August 22, 2022; $114.40 for “August State Pay” on September 21, 2022; $25.00 in resident deposits on September 26, 2022; and additional deposits in October and November 2022. Appellee's App. Vol. II, pp. 85-96. But Mayberry's trust account statements show he was charged amounts for legal mail postage even when his account balance was $0 in contravention of DOC policy.

[6] Mayberry eventually sued DOC in small claims court. Alleging negligence, he sought damages of $10,000 comprised of: (1) $427.65 for commissary purchases allegedly related to his legal mailings; (2) $291.03 for legal postage costs; (3) $65.00 for manila and No. 10 envelopes he purchased; and (4) mental and emotional damages. Mayberry appears to have calculated these amounts based on his mistaken view that he was indigent and entitled to free legal mailings.

[7] On July 12, 2024, the trial court directed the parties to submit evidence by affidavit—rather than in person in court—without objection from Mayberry. In their respective submissions of evidence, the parties disagreed as to whether Mayberry was indigent. But DOC conceded that Mayberry was improperly charged for legal mailings when he had a zero balance in his trust account.

[8] The court ultimately entered judgment for Mayberry, finding he was indigent and owed $199.37—a figure that DOC does not dispute on appeal. The court also found Mayberry “failed to meet his burden of proof regarding all other claims.” Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 12. Mayberry appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Mayberry challenges the award of damages as inadequate on the grounds that he was indigent and therefore should not have been charged for any legal mailings. He also claims other damages. When, as here, the judgment rests solely on documentary evidence, the review is de novo. Eagle Aircraft, Inc. v. Trojnar, 983 N.E.2d 648, 657 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006)). We will affirm the judgment if it is supported by the evidence. Id.

[10] Because the trial court erred in finding Mayberry was indigent, we reverse and remand with instructions to correct this finding. But given DOC's acknowledgment—without effective refute from Mayberry—that it owes Mayberry $199.37 in legal mailing charges, we conclude that the record supports this part of the judgment.

I. Mayberry Was Not Indigent

[11] Under Indiana Code § 11-11-7-2, DOC “shall provide an indigent confined person with free stationery, envelopes, postage, and notarial services for legal correspondence.” This statute does not define “indigent.” But DOC Policy 00-01-102 defines an indigent prisoner as one “who has a Trust Fund account balance of less than $15.00 ․ on the day of the [legal mailing] request and has not had a total of more than $15.00 credited to the Trust Fund account ․ in the preceding 30 days or credits of more than $90.00 in the last 180 days.” DOC Policy 00-01-102 generally allows non-indigent prisoners to be charged for legal mailings but not when their trust account balances are zero.

[12] The record establishes that Mayberry received the following deposits to his trust account during the relevant period:

* $87.70 for “July State Pay” on August 22, 2022, resulting in a balance of $59.65.

* $114.40 for “August State Pay” on September 21, 2022, resulting in a balance of $73.13.

* $25.00 for “Resident Deposit” on September 26, 2022, resulting in a balance of $88.13.

* $69.60 for “September State Pay” on October 24, 2022, resulting in a balance of $50.36.

* $55.00 for “Resident Deposit” on October 27, 2022, resulting in a balance of $94.36.

* $54.60 for “October State Pay” on November 28, 2022, resulting in a balance of $5.75.

Appellee's App. Vol. II, pp. 77-96.

[13] At the time of each disputed mailing request, Mayberry either: (1) had a trust account balance exceeding $15; or (2) more than $15 credited to his account during the prior 30 days or more than $90 credited to his account in the prior 180 days. See id. Therefore, he was never indigent under DOC Policy 00-01-102.

[14] The trial court, without explanation, concluded that Mayberry was indigent. Based on our de novo review of this record, this conclusion was erroneous. Mayberry's claimed damages of about $800 in overcharges is based on his erroneous assertion that he was indigent and entitled to free postage at all times As this is not the case, he is not entitled to such damages. Nonetheless Mayberry is still entitled to reimbursement for the legal mailing charges to his trust account made in violation of DOC policy. DOC does not dispute on appeal that Mayberry is entitled to a judgment totaling $199.37.

II. Mayberry's Additional Claims Lack Merit

[15] Mayberry raises a variety of subsidiary claims, none of which we find persuasive.

Trial by Affidavit

[16] Mayberry first asserts that the trial court violated his right to due process in failing to conduct an in-person trial.¹ He also claims the trial court, when calculating damages, erred by failing to consider the effects of inflation and his tax liability on any recovery. Mayberry does not dispute that he is raising these issues for the first time on appeal. An appellant generally waives an appellate claim under such circumstances, and Mayberry offers no persuasive basis for deviating from that course here. See Pearman v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 108 N.E.3d 342, 350 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).

[17] We reject Mayberry's claim that the alleged errors are so fundamental that waiver does not preclude appellate review. The fundamental error doctrine is extremely narrow and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles of due process that make a fair trial impossible. Johnson v. Wait, 947 N.E.2d 951, 959 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); Lehman v. State, 926 N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). The doctrine has been applied only in limited situations in civil cases such as those involving liberty interests or parental rights. Johnson, 947 N.E.2d at 959. Mayberry fails to establish that his negligence-based claim for money damages falls within that narrow category of case.

[18] Nor has Mayberry established any blatant due process violation in the court's failure to award damages related to taxes and inflation that Mayberry never sought or in its decision to conduct trial by affidavit. A prisoner does not have an absolute right to be present at a civil case hearing as a matter of federal due process. Niksich v. Cotton, 810 N.E.2d 1003, 1008 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); see, e.g., In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 922 (Ind. 2011) (finding prisoner did not have an absolute constitutional right to appear at termination of parental rights hearing involving prisoner's child); Brown v. State, 781 N.E.2d 773, 786 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming dismissal of prisoner's civil claim for failure to prosecute when prisoner was denied permission to appear in person).

[19] Submission of the case through documentary evidence may be an acceptable alternative when the prisoner is not present. See Niksich, 810 N.E.2d at 1008.

“[T]he trial court has wide discretion in selecting [this alternative] after evaluating the prisoner's need to be present against concerns of expense, security, logistics, and docket control.” Id. Given that alternative forms of adjudication are available in civil cases involving prisoners, Mayberry does not show the trial court's decision to employ such an option here constituted a blatant violation of basic principles of due process. He also does not identify any due process right to consideration of taxes or inflation when calculating damages. He therefore has not established fundamental error.  2

Additional Damages

[20] To the extent that Mayberry also is seeking emotional damages, such damages are recoverable in negligence-based actions only when a party satisfies the modified-impact rule or bystander rule, neither of which applies here to Mayberry's claim of mailing overcharges. See Cmty. Health Network, Inc. v. McKenzie, 185 N.E.3d 368, 379 (Ind. 2022) (explaining that the modified-impact rule requires that the plaintiff personally sustain a physical impact and that the bystander rule requires that the plaintiff contemporaneously perceive a loved one's negligently inflicted death or serious injury).

[21] We also find that Mayberry has waived his claim for unspecified additional damages based on DOC's alleged theft of funds from his trust account. His arguments on this issue lack cogency or citation to applicable authority and provide no basis for such damages. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring an appellant's brief contain supporting cogent argument and citations to authority).

Prejudgment Interest

[22] Contrary to Mayberry's claim, he is not entitled to prejudgment interest from DOC, a state entity. See Ind. Code § 34-51-4-4 (specifying that the prejudgment interest statute “does not impose liability for prejudgment interest on the state or any political subdivision”).

Evidence of Settlement Negotiations

[23] Finally, Mayberry argues that DOC violated Indiana Evidence Rule 408 by mentioning settlement discussions in its evidentiary response, which stated: “[DOC] contacted [Mayberry] to discuss potential resolution of this matter [of the overcharges], which Plaintiff denied.” Appellee's App. Vol. II, p. 81. Although Small Claims Rule 8(A) specifies that rules of evidence do not apply in a small claims action, it creates an exception for evidentiary rules, such as Rule 408, “relating to ․ offers of compromise.” Evidence Rule 408 bars admission of settlement-offer evidence “to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim” or for certain impeachment purposes except when exempted by the rule. Evid. R. 408(a)-(b).

[24] No violation of Evidence Rule 408 occurred here. Even if DOC's statement about settlement qualified as “evidence” for purposes of Rule 408, this statement was not presented “to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim” or for impeachment purposes and therefore would not be barred by the rule. By the time DOC made this challenged reference in its response, DOC had already specified the evidence of overcharges on which the judgment rested. Thus, DOC's reference to settlement negotiations merely informed the court what it already knew: that Mayberry believed he was entitled to more than DOC was conceding it owed to him.

Conclusion

[25] We reverse the trial court's finding that Mayberry was indigent at the time of the disputed legal mailings. We remand with instructions to enter a judgment noting that Mayberry is not indigent but is entitled to judgment for $199.37 based on: (1) DOC's acknowledgment showing that Mayberry was overcharged in contravention of DOC policy and is due that amount; and (2) Mayberry's failure to prove any other damages.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Citing Hill v. Duckworth, 679 N.E.2d 938, 939-940 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), the trial court ruled that it had no authority to transport Mayberry to the court for trial. In Hill, a panel of this Court ruled that a trial court cannot secure the presence of a prisoner litigant at a civil action unrelated to the case that resulted in the prisoner's incarceration. Id.Our Supreme Court appears to have adopted a less stringent rule in Niksich v. Cotton, 810 N.E.2d 1003 (Ind. 2004), which involved an incarcerated small claims plaintiff. The Niksich Court noted that the right of a party to be present is not absolute and that a party's presence may not be required under extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 1008. “An incarcerated plaintiff may present such circumstances,” according to the Court. Id. (emphasis added). Given the Court's use of “may” and its ruling that the trial court had discretion to determine the method of presentation of evidence by the parties, Niksich does not appear to preclude an order transporting a prisoner for appearance at a civil case in which the prisoner is a party. Id.Such transports of incarcerated litigants already occur in some CHINS and termination of parental rights cases, although imprisoned parents in such cases lack an absolute right to appear. See In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 922-23 (Ind. 2011) (ruling that trial courts have discretion to determine whether an incarcerated parent may attend a termination of parental rights hearing, although such courts should balance various enumerated factors in doing so).

2.   DOC does not respond to Mayberry's claim of fundamental error. Mayberry claims he need only show prima facie error to prevail. See Hacker v. Holland, 575 N.E.2d 675, 676 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (“An appellee's failure to respond to an issue raised by an appellant is akin to failure to file a brief, and subjects the appellee to reversal upon the appellant's showing of prima facie error on that issue.”). We conclude that Mayberry's fundamental error claim fails even under a prima facie error standard.

Weissmann, Judge.

Judges Bradford and DeBoer concur. Bradford, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.