IN RE: J.C. (Minor Child) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] K.G. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's order that adjudicated her eight-year-old daughter, J.C. (“J.C.”), to be a child in need of services (“CHINS”). She argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to continue the CHINS factfinding hearing. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the trial court's judgment.¹

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Mother's motion to continue the CHINS factfinding hearing.

Facts

[3] Mother is the parent of J.C., who was born in July 2016. In August 2024, DCS received two reports that J.C. was the victim of educational neglect. DCS investigated the reports, and on September 5, 2024, DCS filed a petition alleging that J.C. was a CHINS because of educational neglect. The petition specifically alleged that J.C., who was in the third grade at a Noblesville school, had missed fifty-six (56) days of kindergarten, sixty-five (65) days of first grade, and forty-three (43) days of second grade. The petition also alleged that J.C. had only attended three days of third grade and had not attended school for one month. In addition, the petition alleged that J.C. had not turned in any of the school work that had been sent home for her to complete, that she was failing math and reading, and that there were already concerns that J.C. would need to repeat the third grade the following year. According to the petition, Mother had admitted that J.C. had not been attending school but had reported that J.C.’s absences had been due to illness. However, according to the petition, Mother had refused to provide the name and contact information for J.C.’s physician so that the school could confirm J.C.’s illness.

[4] Nearly two weeks later, on September 17, 2024, the trial court held a CHINS initial hearing. At the hearing, DCS’ counsel told the trial court that Mother had refused to give DCS her address and had refused to allow DCS access to J.C. According to DCS’ counsel, DCS had planned to do an in-home CHINS. However, DCS's counsel explained that DCS would be unable to do the in-home CHINS if DCS did not know Mother's address or have access to J.C. DCS’ counsel asked the trial court to order Mother to provide DCS with both her address and access to J.C.

[5] The trial court asked Mother if she had “an address that [she] want[ed] to provide[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 10). Mother responded that she did not. The trial court told Mother: “Okay, so here's the thing. You have to provide DCS with an address. If you don't want to provide them with an address, they can't assess the safety of your home.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 10). The trial court further asked Mother, who was not yet represented by counsel, where she and J.C. were currently residing. Mother responded that that was a matter that she should discuss with possible representation. The trial court asked Mother if she had a home, and Mother responded that she did. Mother further told the trial court that J.C. did not feel comfortable talking to a DCS case manager and that Mother had “provided a multitude of doctors’ notes at the school.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 11). According to Mother, she had “proof to counteract what[ ] [was] being claimed” in the CHINS petition. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 11).

[6] The trial court also noted that J.C. was sitting outside the courtroom during the hearing and asked Mother if DCS could speak with J.C. after the hearing. Mother responded, “I am going to say no․ I don't force her to do things she's not comfortable with and because there's the legality of the nature surrounding it, I really need some direction on how to go about it from an outside party[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 12).

[7] The trial court told Mother that if she did not provide DCS with her address, there was a chance that DCS could file an amended CHINS petition because DCS was unable to assess the safety of Mother's home. The trial court further told Mother that it was going to set a review hearing for September 27, 2024. In addition, the trial court told Mother that it wanted Mother to provide an address for J.C. and that it wanted J.C. to attend school. The trial court again asked Mother if she would allow a DCS case manager to speak with J.C. at that time. Mother responded that she would “work on that before the hearing on the 27th and provide all of the information that [the trial court had] requested.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 15).

[8] On September 25, 2024, two days before the scheduled review hearing, the guardian ad litem (“the GAL”) filed an emergency motion for review of placement and a request that J.C. be removed from Mother's home. The GAL attached to her motion a letter from the superintendent of Noblesville schools (“the superintendent”). The letter listed J.C.’s poor attendance rates for the past three years and explained that J.C.’s most recent standardized testing results revealed that J.C. was in the first percentile for math and the sixteenth percentile for reading. According to the superintendent, the school had been unable to implement educational interventions for J.C. because of her attendance issues.

[9] In addition, the GAL attached to her motion a chronological case summary, which revealed that Mother had recently been charged with Level 5 felony domestic battery with bodily injury to a person under fourteen years of age and Level 6 felony domestic battery committed in the presence of a child less than sixteen years old. The charges arose from acts that Mother had allegedly committed against a child who lived in the house where Mother and J.C. allegedly lived.

[10] At the September 27, 2024 hearing, the trial court heard testimony in support of the GAL's petition. Also, at the hearing, after learning that J.C. had not yet returned to school and that Mother had not provided DCS with her home address, the trial court stated, in part, as follows:

Okay. So [Mother], I have serious concerns for [J.C.] here. We have a pattern and a history of not sending her to school, not supporting her education. Her test scores are representative of all that school that she has missed․ I have safety concerns. You have not provided or you refuse to provide an address to [the DCS family case manager], it was provided by someone else. And you're contesting that you do live at that address. You may live at other addresses around, I don't know where you live. But I find that your testimony that you presented today is not credible.

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 98-99).

[11] The trial court told Mother that it was going to grant the GAL's motion to detain J.C. In addition, the trial court noted that although Mother had previously stated that she had planned to retain private counsel, Mother was not represented in court that day. The trial court asked Mother if she wanted the trial court to appoint counsel for her, and Mother responded that she did. After the trial court had appointed counsel for Mother, the following colloquy between the trial court and Mother ensued:

THE COURT: [Mother], is [J.C.] here with you today?

[MOTHER]: No.

THE COURT: Where is [J.C.] currently located?

[MOTHER]: With a friend.

THE COURT: Okay. And what address is that?

[MOTHER]: I don't have it. I will need to get it and provide it.

THE COURT: How are you going to pick her up? Ma'am, if you don't know the address, how are you going to pick her up?

* * * * *

THE COURT: ․ Ma'am, where is [J.C.] currently located? Ma'am, are you going to refuse to answer the questions?

[MOTHER]: I'm not really refusing, I just don't have a good answer for that.

* * * * *

THE COURT: All I need to know is where is [J.C.] currently located?

[MOTHER]: In Hamilton County.

* * * * *

THE COURT: That is not her specific location. Where did you take [J.C.] this morning? Ma'am, why are you on your phone at this time? Ma'am, why are you on your phone? Please call for a deputy. Ma'am, put your phone down. Put your phone down, ma'am. Ma'am, put your phone down now.

[MOTHER]: Okay.

* * * * *

THE COURT: Ma'am, I need a specific location of your daughter. Where is your daughter currently located?

[MOTHER]: In Noblesville.

(Tr. Vol. at 102-104).

[12] Mother subsequently told the trial court that J.C. was located at maternal grandmother's home in Noblesville. The trial court asked Mother if she had just texted maternal grandmother and asked her to remove J.C. from the residence, and Mother responded that she had not done that. The trial court told Mother that it was going to authorize DCS to immediately detain J.C. and set the matter for an additional hearing on September 30, 2024. In addition, the trial court asked Mother if she had any questions. Mother told the trial court that she had “doctors’ notes stating that [J.C.] c[ould] miss school.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 106). The trial court told Mother that she would have the chance to present evidence at the factfinding hearing and that Mother should consult with her attorney.

[13] Mother was represented by counsel at the September 30, 2024, hearing. At the beginning of the hearing, the trial court told the parties that it had scheduled the hearing to confirm that DCS had located J.C. and detained her. DCS confirmed that it had just detained J.C. within the previous hour. After confirming that DCS had detained J.C., the trial court ended the hearing.

[14] At the beginning of the October 17, 2024 CHINS factfinding hearing, Mother's counsel asked the trial court “for a last minute emergency continuance.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 114). Specifically, Mother's counsel explained as follows:

The basis for [the continuance] is that there are some medical records from Eskenazi and [J.C.’s] neurologist that we think would have some bearing to explain the absences leading up to this point. We do not have those records yet. We would like to request a continuance so that we can maybe subpoena those records and finalize and get that evidence directly to us.

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 114). DCS’ counsel and the GAL objected to a continuance, and the trial court denied Mother's oral motion.

[15] At the hearing, the superintendent testified that J.C. had attended only three of forty-five scheduled school days that year. In addition, the superintendent testified that J.C. had attended 67% of scheduled school days in kindergarten, 53% of scheduled school days in first grade, and 72% of scheduled school days in second grade. The superintendent also testified that the typical school year is 180 days, and once a student misses 10% of scheduled school days, “it's considered excessive and a real concern and schools need to be ․ taking potential steps to correct that.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 126). Further, the superintendent testified that, in addition J.C.’s excessive absences, J.C. frequently arrived at school late and left school early.

[16] The superintendent also testified that J.C.’s standardized test results placed her in the first percentile for math and the sixteenth percentile for reading. Based on these test results, the superintendent had concerns that J.C. was “being left behind her peers academically[.]” (Tr. Vol 2 at 128).

[17] When asked if he had received any medical documentation regarding J.C.’s absences, the superintendent testified as follows:

The only medical documentation that I can recall seeing personally was ․ an alleged doctor's note that came in early this school year when we started having concerns with absences this year. But the concern ․ was that it had been, when the scan or picture of that had been taken to send to us[,] parts of it had been intentionally covered making it unable to verify ․ you know, we had concerns with its legitimacy I guess is what I'm trying to say.

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 139).

[18] J.C.’s DCS family case manager (“the FCM”) testified that Mother had told him that when J.C. was in kindergarten, J.C. had been hit on the head with a snowball during recess. The FCM further testified that Mother had told him when J.C. was in kindergarten or first grade, J.C. had been hit on the head with an iPad. According to the FCM, Mother had told him that that these incidents had caused J.C. to suffer from either long-term concussions or cluster migraines. In addition, the FCM testified that Mother had told him that “she believed that [J.C.] was owed from the school the right to do online schooling[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 162). When asked if Mother had provided him with any medical records to substantiate J.C.’s medical condition, the FCM responded as follows:

I have seen one document after the initial hearing that I was able to view that [Mother] let me see while she held it that did state cluster migraine, had [J.C.]’s name at the top of the medical form․ And I believe it was from 2022 or 2023.

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 163). Mother did not testify at the factfinding hearing.

[19] In November 2024, the trial court issued an order finding that J.C. was a CHINS. The order noted that Mother had requested a continuance at the outset of the hearing, that DCS’ counsel and the GAL had objected to the continuance, and that the trial court had denied it.

[20] Mother now appeals.

Decision

[21] Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to continue the CHINS factfinding hearing. We disagree.

[22] We review a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to continue for an abuse of discretion. In re K.W., 12 N.E.3d 241, 243-44 (Ind. 2014). We will reverse a trial court only for an abuse of that discretion. Smith v. Smith, 136 N.E.3d 656, 658 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (cleaned up). “A trial court abuses its discretion when it reaches a conclusion which is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts or the reasonable and probable deductions which may be drawn therefrom.” Id. at 659 (cleaned up).

[23] “An abuse of discretion may be found on the denial of a motion for a continuance when the moving party has shown good cause for granting the motion.” Id. at 658-59 (cleaned up). However, “[n]o abuse of discretion will be found when the moving party has not shown that [s]he was prejudiced by the denial.” Id. at 659 (cleaned up).

[24] There are no “mechanical tests” for determining whether a request for a continuance was made for good cause. Matter of M.S., 140 N.E.3d 279, 285 (Ind. 2020) (cleaned up). Rather, the decision to grant or deny a continuance turns on the circumstances present in a particular case. Id.

[25] “[A]mong the things to be considered on appeal from the denial of a motion for continuance, we must consider whether the denial of a continuance resulted in the deprivation of counsel at a crucial stage in the proceedings.” F.M. v. N.B., 979 N.E.2d 1036, 1040 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (cleaned up). We also consider whether the record demonstrates dilatory tactics on the part of the movant designed to delay coming to trial. Id. at 1041. In addition, “[t]he party seeking a continuance must show that ․ she is free from fault.” In re B.H., 44 N.E.3d 745, 748 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Further, “[a] continuance requested for the first time on the morning of trial is not favored.” Lewis v. State, 512 N.E.2d 1092, 1094 (Ind. 1987).

[26] When a trial court denies a party's motion for a continuance, there is a strong presumption that the trial court properly exercised its discretion. B.H., 44 N.E.3d at 748. In addition, this Court has previously recognized that delays in the adjudication of a child case “impose significant costs upon the functions of government as well as an intangible cost to the lives of the children involved.” In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 17 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (cleaned up), trans. denied.

[27] Here, Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to continue the factfinding hearing because she showed good cause for granting the motion. She specifically contends that she had requested the continuance “to allow her to obtain medical records critical to defending against the Department's allegations of educational neglect.” (Mother's Br. 6). According to Mother “[t]hese records were directly relevant to refuting the Department's claim that J.C.’s absences over multiple school years constituted educational neglect, as outlined in the CHINS petition.” (Mother's Br. 6).

[28] However, our review of the evidence reveals that during the September 2024 initial hearing, Mother told the trial court that she had provided several doctors’ notes to the school and that she had proof to refute the allegations in the CHINS petition. Ten days later, at the September 2024 review hearing, Mother again told the trial court that she had doctors’ notes excusing J.C. from school. The trial court told Mother that she would have the opportunity to present that evidence at the factfinding hearing. However, at the beginning of the October 2024 factfinding hearing, Mother asked for an emergency continuance to “maybe subpoena” medical records that she claimed to have already had. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 114). Mother has failed to show that her motion to continue was made for good cause.

[29] We further note that throughout the proceedings, Mother demonstrated dilatory tactics by refusing to give DCS and the trial court both her address and access to J.C. Indeed, the trial court scheduled an additional hearing for the sole purpose of verifying that DCS had been able to locate and detain J.C. In addition, although Mother claimed that she had given several doctors’ notes to school personnel, the superintendent testified that he had seen only one alleged note that did not appear to be legitimate. Further, the FCM testified that he had only seen one alleged note that appeared to be one or two years old. Mother has also failed to show that she was free from fault.

[30] We further note that Mother was represented by counsel at the factfinding hearing. Accordingly, the trial court's denial of her motion to continue the hearing did not result in the deprivation of counsel at a crucial stage in the proceedings.

[31] Based on these facts and circumstances, and in light of the strong presumption that the trial court properly exercised its discretion, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Mother's motion to continue the CHINS factfinding hearing.

[32] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Department of Child Services (“DCS”) was unable to locate J.C.’s father.

Pyle, Judge.

Chief Judge Altice and Judge DeBoer concur. Altice, C.J., and DeBoer, J., concur.