Lakesha Norington, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Lakesha Norington,¹ proceeding pro se, appeals the trial court's denial of her Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. The judgment from which Norington sought relief is a 2004 criminal case for which Norington is serving a sixty-year sentence. Because Trial Rule 60(B) is not an appropriate procedural mechanism for challenging criminal convictions or sentences, the trial court had no choice but to deny Norington's motion without addressing the merits, and we accordingly affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In April 2004, Norington pled guilty to Class B felony robbery ² in Cause Number 49G05-0307-FB-111827 and to Class C felony burglary ³ and Class A felony involuntary manslaughter ⁴ in Cause Number 49G05-0309-MR-155245. Norington v. State, No. 49A04-0702-CR-112, 873 N.E.2d 205, at *1 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2007) (mem.). The trial court sentenced Norington to consecutive sentences of twelve years for robbery, eight years for burglary, and forty years for voluntary manslaughter. Id. We affirmed Norington's sentence on direct appeal. Id. at *3-*4.

[3] Norington filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied on March 25, 2009. Norington v. State, 49A05-1707-PC-1966, 102 N.E.3d 352, at *1 (Ind. Ct. App. May 22, 2018) (mem.), trans. denied. Norington did not appeal the post-conviction court's denial of that petition. Id. at *1.

[4] In July 2017, Norington filed a “Petition to File Belated Motion to Correct Error.” Id. (quoting appellate record). The post-conviction court denied this petition, stating that Norington must seek permission from the Indiana Court of Appeals to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief. Id. at *1. Norington appealed, and we affirmed the post-conviction court's judgment, finding that Norington's attempt to file a belated motion to correct error was procedurally unavailable and that successive post-conviction review was prohibited without authorization from the Court of Appeals. Id. at *2-*3.

[5] On January 29, 2025, Norington filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B), challenging the trial court's 2004 sentencing order. Norington claimed the trial court did not have statutory authority to impose consecutive sentences and requested the court issue a new sentencing order imposing concurrent sentences. On January 30, 2025, the trial court denied Norington's motion without written explanation. On February 13, 2025, Norington filed a Notice of Appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[6] We note initially that Norington proceeds pro se. “It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys, and thus they are required to follow procedural rules.” Martin v. Brown, 129 N.E.3d 283, 284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (italics in original). Pro se litigants receive no special consideration because of their self-represented status. Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014).

[7] Norington challenges the trial court's denial of Norington's motion for relief from judgment under Trial Rule 60(B). We review the grant or denial of a Trail Rule 60(B) motion for relief for an abuse of discretion. In re Paternity of P.S.S., 934 N.E.2d 737,741 (Ind. 2010). Norington argues the consecutive sentences imposed when Norington was sentenced in 2004 were not permitted by the sentencing statutes and should be modified. However, Trial Rule 60(B) is not available for challenging a criminal sentence. See Van Meter v. State, 650 N.E.2d 1138, 1139 (Ind. 1995) (affirming denial of motion for relief because defendant required to use post-conviction procedures). In Van Meter, our Indiana Supreme Court explained:

Generally, our Trial Rules govern procedure and practice in civil cases only. We established the special procedures set out in the Indiana Post-Conviction Rules to facilitate review of criminal convictions and sentences. Criminal defendants may not circumvent these procedures by seeking remedies under the civil law. As our Post-Conviction Rule 1 says: “Except as otherwise provided by this rule, it comprehends and takes the place of all other common law, statutory, or other remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the conviction or sentence and it shall be used exclusively in place of them.”

Id. at 1138 (internal citations omitted). Post-Conviction Rule 1 continues to contain that language, see P-C.R. 1(1)(b), and Van Meter remains valid precedent. We accordingly hold the trial court had no authority to address the merits of Norington's Trial Rule 60(B) motion for relief from a criminal sentence.

Conclusion

[8] The trial court properly denied Norington's Trial Rule 60(B) motion for relief from judgment without addressing the merits of Norington's claim because Trial Rule 60(B) is not a procedural mechanism for challenging the validity of a criminal sentence. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[9] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State notes Norington's legal name remains “Shawntrell.” (Appellee's Br. at 4 n.1) (citing Norington v. State, No. 24A-MI-2026, *2 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan 31, 2025), trans. denied. We acknowledge the State's assertion of legal fact. However, our standard practice is to identify the parties on appeal as they appear on our docket and/or in the appealed order, and we follow that practice herein.

2.   Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 (2003).

3.   Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1 (2003).

4.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3 (2003).

May, Judge.

Judges Mathias and Bradford concur. Mathias, J., and Bradford, J., concur.