IN RE: L.R.C. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A.G. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's determination that two of her children are children in need of services (CHINS). Mother argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the adjudications. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and J.R. (“Father”) have three children: L.R.C., born in October 2017, T.C.G., born in September 2018, and E.C.G., born in January 2022. Father does not participate in this appeal.

[3] In August 2024, Mother, Father, and the children moved from Louisiana to Indianapolis. On August 27, Mother and Father were fighting in the living room of their home while the children were upstairs in the playroom. Mother called 911 on her cell phone, but Father grabbed the phone and smashed it on the ground. Father “[s]oftly slapped [Mother] in the face” with his right hand and then “slapped” her cheek “with all his strength” with his left hand. Tr. p. 38. He then put his hands around Mother's throat. Mother pushed Father off her and used the children's iPad to call 911, but the call was disconnected.

[4] About an hour later, police were dispatched to a domestic disturbance at the home. Officer Brian Molina saw that Mother's “cheeks [we]re really red, both sides,” and it was “obvious to [him] that she had been battered.” Id. at 33. Father told Officer Molina that Mother “must have slapped herself.” Id. at 37. Officer Molina arrested Father and while searching him incident to arrest found Mother's phone, which was cracked. Mother told Officer Molina that Father had a warrant for his arrest in Louisiana due to another incident of domestic violence in July that left Mother with a dislocated knee. Officer Molina gave Mother information to file a protective order, but Mother never did.

[5] After Father was released from jail, Mother let him come back to the home. As a result, on September 3, DCS removed the children. Two days later, DCS filed petitions alleging that the children are CHINS. Regina Bishop was assigned as the permanency family case manager (FCM). Mother described the August domestic-violence incident to FCM Bishop as “a 1 off situation” that was “stress related.” Id. at 82. But FCM Bishop later learned of the July incident in Louisiana, and Mother told her the children were present during it. Mother explained to FCM Bishop that she and Father broke up after the July incident but then got back together when the family moved to Indianapolis.

[6] Mother underwent a domestic-violence assessment with Hailey Huizar. When Huizar asked Mother if the children were exposed to domestic violence in the home, Mother originally said she “didn't think so” but then said that “[L.R.C.] has overheard it, and there was 1 instance where he was crying because he had heard everything.” Id. at 73. As a result of the assessment, Huizar recommended domestic-violence education, home-based therapy, and home-based case management. Mother didn't complete the domestic-violence education because she “did not feel that she needed to do it” and was going to “wait ․ and see if it was court ordered to do it.” Id. at 74.

[7] In October or November, Father moved to Texas. Around the same time, Mother's and Father's relationship ended. Mother told FCM Bishop she had no plans to get back together with Father. But Father was “open” to reuniting and told FCM Bishop “there's no hard feelings” between him and Mother. Id. at 84. Father came home for Thanksgiving, and DCS granted him temporary permission to see the children in person, believing that he would return to Texas. But without informing DCS, Father moved back to Indianapolis. Mother also didn't tell DCS that Father intended to stay in Indianapolis.

[8] The fact-finding hearing began on December 20. Mother testified that she didn't think she and Father would get back together but acknowledged that they'd broken up and gotten back together before. Mother admitted that the children were in the house during the August 2024 domestic-violence incident and that there was another incident in July while they were living in Louisiana. She testified that these were the only two incidents of domestic violence between her and Father and that “[h]e's not a danger to [her].” Id. at 30.

[9] The fact-finding hearing continued on February 27, 2025. Huizar testified that Mother “is minimizing the domestic violence” between her and Father, which could pose problems both in their co-parenting relationship and for the children. Id. at 75. Huizar said Mother made “very little or no progress” in the services offered. Id. She opined that Mother needs to continue services “[b]ecause if we don't address it now ․ [i]t's just gonna keep happening.” Id. at 76. FCM Bishop similarly testified that Mother “continues to minimize the issue of domestic violence.” Id. at 83. FCM Bishop said that, regardless of whether Mother and Father get back together or remain separated, it's important for them to participate in domestic-violence education to break their cycle of domestic violence. She explained that “the children are still privy to ․ experiencing trauma from parents ․ participating in domestic violence,” so the domestic violence “needs to be resolved to reduce that trauma for the children and parents.” Id. at 85. FCM Bishop also testified that therapy would be beneficial to the children. She explained that DCS put in referrals for therapy, but the children hadn't started because there's a shortage of therapists for children.

[10] The final day of the fact-finding hearing was March 4. Mother testified again as part of her own case. By that time, Mother still wasn't participating in domestic-violence education. She said she'd attended therapy, but she and Huizar “didn't talk a lot about domestic violence.” Id. at 105. Mother again explained the two domestic-violence incidents between her and Father and admitted that the children were in the home during the July 2024 incident.

[11] At the end of the hearing, the trial court found that the children are CHINS. On March 21, the court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law.¹ The next month, the court held a dispositional hearing and issued an order setting forth various requirements for Mother.

[12] Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[13] Mother contends the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's determination that T.C.G. and E.C.G. are CHINS. (Mother does not challenge the court's adjudication as to L.R.C.) We will reverse a CHINS adjudication only upon a showing that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012). When the court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review: first, we determine “whether the evidence supports the findings,” and then we determine whether “the findings support the judgment.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014), reh'g denied. We consider only the evidence that supports the court's decision and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and we will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. Id. at 1286-87.

I. The error in one of the trial court's findings of fact does not warrant reversal

[14] Mother contends that several of the trial court's findings of fact are unsupported by the evidence. We will not set aside the court's findings unless they are clearly erroneous. In re D.P., 213 N.E.3d 552, 558 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. Findings are clearly erroneous when the record lacks any evidence or reasonable inferences to support them. Id.

[15] Mother first challenges Finding 8, which states, “On August 27, 2024 a domestic violence incident took place between [Father] and [Mother] in their home while the children were present.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 167. Mother's own testimony supports this finding. She testified that on August 27, 2024, Father slapped her and grabbed her neck, and the children were in the home at the time. Mother's assertion that “[n]othing in the record indicates any of the children witnessed or overheard violence or argument,” Appellant's Br. p. 14, has no bearing on this finding because the trial court didn't find that the children witnessed or overheard the incident. Finding 8 is not clearly erroneous.

[16] Mother next contests Finding 24, which states, “In July, 2024 a domestic violence incident took place between [Father] and [Mother] while the children were present.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 168. Mother claims that “[n]o evidence in the record indicates [E.C.G.] or [T.C.G.] were present in the place where this incident occurred.” Appellant's Br. p. 14. But Mother herself testified that the children “were in the house” during this incident, albeit in a different room. Tr. p. 108. And when FCM Bishop was asked if Mother “t[old] [her] the children were present during ․ [t]he July incident,” FCM Bishop said yes. Id. at 90. Finding 24 is not clearly erroneous.

[17] Mother also challenges Finding 27: “Hailey Huizar testified that [Mother] told her that initially she did not think that the children saw or heard any of the fighting between her and [Father] but then admitted that [L.R.C.] cried when he saw the fighting.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 168. Huizar testified that Mother told her L.R.C. “has overheard” domestic violence between Mother and Father, and one time, L.R.C. “was crying” because he “heard everything.” But as Mother points out, Huizar didn't testify that Mother told her L.R.C. “saw the fighting.” This portion of Finding 27 is erroneous. But such error does not warrant reversal because, as explained further below, the rest of this finding and the unchallenged findings support the trial court's CHINS determinations. See D.P., 213 N.E.3d at 561 (“Superfluous findings, even if erroneous, cannot provide a basis for reversible error.”). We also note that this finding concerns only L.R.C., not E.C.G. or T.C.G., and Mother is not challenging the court's determination as to L.R.C.

[18] Finally, Mother challenges Finding 39, which states, “The future living situation for [Father] and [Mother] as to whether they plan on living together is still undetermined, however they do plan on co-parenting the children.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 169. Mother testified that she didn't think she and Father would get back together, but she admitted that they'd broken up and gotten back together before, including after the July 2024 domestic-violence incident. When Father was released from jail for the August domestic violence, Mother let him back into the home. After Father moved to Texas, he came back to Indianapolis for Thanksgiving, but neither Father nor Mother told DCS that Father intended to stay in Indianapolis. Although Mother told FCM Bishop she had no plans to reunite with Father, Father was “open” to reuniting and told FCM Bishop “there's no hard feelings” between him and Mother. And FCM Bishop testified that Mother and Father “still co-parent.” Tr. p. 85. This evidence sufficiently supports Finding 39. This finding is not clearly erroneous.²

II. The trial court's CHINS adjudication was not clearly erroneous

[19] Mother also contends there is insufficient evidence to establish the statutory requirements for a CHINS adjudication as to T.C.G. and E.C.G. DCS alleged the children are CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, which provides:

A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

An adjudication under this statute “requires three basic elements: that the parent's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child, that the child's needs are unmet, and (perhaps most critically) that those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion.” S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287.

[20] There is sufficient evidence that Mother's actions and inactions have seriously endangered T.C.G. and E.C.G. Mother has shown an inability and refusal to provide the children with a home free from domestic violence. See In re D.P., 72 N.E.3d 976, 982 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (“[A] parent's failure to protect children from being exposed to domestic violence may support a CHINS finding.”). In the span of about a month, two incidents of domestic violence occurred between Mother and Father while the children were in the home (albeit in different rooms). During the second incident, Father smashed Mother's phone to keep her from calling 911. After Father got out of jail for this incident, Mother let him back into the home, which resulted in DCS removing the children. FCM Bishop explained that “the children are still privy to ․ experiencing trauma from parents ․ participating in domestic violence,” so the domestic violence “needs to be resolved to reduce that trauma for the children and parents.” FCM Bishop also testified that the children would benefit from therapy and that DCS put in referrals, but there weren't any therapists available. Mother contends DCS failed to meet its burden because it didn't present distinct evidence of each child's mental condition, but we agree with DCS that “[t]he fact that [T.C.G. and E.C.G.] were in the home on at least two occasions when Parents had domestic altercations shows that their mental conditions were endangered.” Appellee's Br. p. 19; see In re A.B., 245 N.E.3d 644, 650 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (“Unquestionably, children are endangered by domestic violence in their home even when the children do not witness a specific violent incident.”).

[21] The evidence also establishes that T.C.G.’s and E.C.G.’s needs are unmet and are unlikely to be met without State coercion. Huizar and FCM Bishop both testified that Mother “minimiz[es]” the issue of domestic violence between her and Father. Indeed, Mother testified that Father isn't a danger to her and told FCM Bishop the August 2024 domestic-violence incident was “a 1 off situation” that was “stress related.” After that incident, Officer Molina gave Mother information on how to file a protective order against Father, but she never did. Although Huizar recommended domestic-violence education based on Mother's assessment, Mother refused to participate and said she would “wait ․ and see if it was court ordered to do it.” Mother made “very little or no progress” in her recommended services, and Huizar opined that Mother needs to continue services “[b]ecause if we don't address it now ․ [i]t's just gonna keep happening.” See id. at 651 (“The pattern of domestic violence between Parents, and Mother's denials that she was the victim of domestic violence, are evidence that the coercive intervention of the court is necessary to ensure that Parents receive counseling and therapy to assist them in providing a safe home for the children free from domestic violence.”).

[22] Mother has not shown that the CHINS adjudication was clearly erroneous.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother takes issue with the fact that the trial court's conclusions of law state, “The child is in need of services” and, “The child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation the child is unlikely to receive,” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 170, but “the court did not say which of the three children it meant by ‘child,’ ” Appellant's Br. p. 11. Although the court's order includes all the children's names and all three cause numbers, see Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 167, the order was docketed three times—once in each of the three CHINS cases, see id. at 10, 22, 34 (Mar. 21, 2025 CCS entries). We assume that each use of “child” in the orders corresponds with the cause number under which that order was filed (e.g., in the order filed under Cause No. 49D16-2409-JC-8653, “child” refers to E.C.G.).

2.   The trial court's order containing its findings of fact and conclusions of law begins, “COMES NOW the Marion County Department of Child Services, by counsel, Daniel Rothenberg, and submits Proposed Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 167. Mother points out that none of the CHINS chronological case summaries show that DCS filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. See id. at 10, 22, 34. But in the Odyssey case-management system, the dockets for all three cases show that DCS submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on March 18, 2025. We are unsure why these discrepancies exist between the Odyssey dockets and the chronological case summaries.Mother contends “[t]he fact that the State's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law is absent from the record should undermine the Court's confidence that the trial court made a considered judgment in this case.” Appellant's Br. p. 14. But as just explained, most of Mother's challenges to the findings of fact are without merit, and the one error in the court's findings does not warrant reversal. And the unchallenged findings of fact are accurate. The uncertainty surrounding DCS's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law does not change our determination that the trial court's findings support the judgment.

Vaidik, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.