BROWN v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Jacob Brown appeals his convictions for Level 6 felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated (“OWI”) causing endangerment and Level 6 felony operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent (“ACE”) of 0.15 or more. He contends on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting his blood-test results and that his convictions violate the prohibitions against double jeopardy. For its part, the State contends that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence but concedes that Brown's convictions violate the prohibitions against double jeopardy. To correct this violation, the State argues that Brown's conviction for operating a vehicle with an ACE of 0.15 or more should be vacated. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence but that Brown's conviction for operating a vehicle with an ACE of 0.15 or more should be vacated, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court with instructions to vacate Brown's conviction for operating a vehicle with an ACE of 0.15 or more.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] At 2:53 p.m. on December 18, 2024, emergency personnel were dispatched to the intersection of 65th and Oakland in Indianapolis to “check the welfare” of an unconscious individual in a vehicle. Tr. Vol. II p. 134. When emergency personnel arrived, Brown, the only occupant of the vehicle, was slumped over the steering wheel unconscious, the key was in the ignition, the vehicle was in drive, and Brown's foot was on the brake pedal. Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Anthony Beikman arrived at the scene and observed a “heavily intoxicated” and “very belligerent” Brown. Tr. Vol. II p. 135. Officer Beikman observed that “[t]he odor of alcohol was very present,” Brown had “glassy eyes, red eyes,” and Brown's “manual dexterity was shot.” Tr. Vol. II p. 135. Even after being roused, Brown “was not very responsive” to questions and “declined to take a field sobriety test” and was placed under arrest. Tr. Vol. II pp. 128, 135. A subsequent search of Brown's vehicle revealed “several” empty liquor bottles. Tr. Vol. II p. 151. “There was one (1) small bottle in the driver's seat. There was a few in the driver's floorboard, and there was a multitude in the passenger seat floorboard and under the seat.” Tr. Vol. II p. 151. Most of the bottles were 100 ml “99” brand vodka bottles. Tr. Vol. II p. 153.

[3] Brown consented to having his blood tested for the presence of alcohol and was transported to Eskenazi Hospital to have his blood drawn. Officer Beikman followed the ambulance carrying Brown to the hospital, where he observed Forensic Nurse Examiner Christina Vanduyn draw two vials of Brown's blood. After Nurse Vanduyn had labeled the blood vials with Brown's identifiers, she placed the two vials in a blue bag and immediately handed the vials of Brown's blood to Officer Beikman. After Nurse Vanduyn had handed the vials of blood “directly to” Officer Beikman, he sealed the vials in a yellow evidence envelope. Tr. Vol. II p. 179. The envelope was labeled with a unique case number as well as Brown's name. Officer Beikman immediately took the blood vials directly to the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department's (“IMPD”) secure property room, which can only be accessed by law enforcement and authorized personnel, and placed the evidence in that property room.

[4] After the vials of Brown's blood had been placed in the secure evidence room, the Marion County Crime Laboratory followed protocol by having an agency representative bring the evidence to the lab, log it into the lab's computer system, and secure it in their evidence vault. Blood samples “usually come in a sealed yellow evidence envelope” when brought to the laboratory for testing. Tr. Vol. II p. 167. On December 20, 2024, two days after the blood draw, Whitney Thomas, a forensic scientist with the Indianapolis Marion County Forensic Services Agency, retrieved the evidence from the secure evidence vault and tested it. When Thomas retrieved the vials of blood, they were in a sealed evidence envelope marked with the unique case number. Thomas “would have indicated in [her] notes if there was something strange with the blood, if it wasn't sealed” but instead noted that the vials had been “refrigerated and that there was no evidence [that the vials had not been] sealed correctly[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 177. Testing revealed that Brown's “ethyl alcohol concentration of the, of the blood was .241 grams per one hundred (100) milliliter[s].” Tr. Vol. II. p. 170.

[5] The State charged Brown with Count I, Level 6 felony OWI causing endangerment; Count II, Level 6 felony operating a vehicle with an ACE of 0.15 or more; and Count III, Level 6 felony OWI.¹ During the first phase of Brown's bifurcated trial, Brown objected to the admission of State's Exhibit 2, i.e., the laboratory certificate of analysis, claiming that the State had failed to establish a sufficient chain of custody for the blood samples. Brown's objection was based on the two-day gap between extraction and testing and an alleged discrepancy between Nurse Vanduyn's testimony, i.e., that she had put the vials in a blue bag before handing the samples to Officer Beikman, and Officer Beikman's testimony that, upon receiving the samples, he had placed them in a yellow evidence envelope. The trial court initially sustained the objection, but after the State presented additional foundational evidence regarding the chain of custody, admitted Exhibit 2 over Brown's objection.

[6] The jury found Brown guilty as charged, and after Brown waived jury for the enhancement phase, the trial court found that Brown had a prior conviction for OWI and enhanced the convictions to Level 6 felonies. The trial court vacated the conviction for Count III on the ground that it was a lesser-included offense of Count I and imposed a fully-suspended aggregate 910-day sentence.

Discussion and Decision

I. Admission of Evidence

[7] The admission of evidence is a matter that we generally “leave to the discretion of the trial court.” Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259–60 (Ind. 2013). “We review these determinations for abuse of that discretion and reverse only when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights.” Id. at 260. “We will not reweigh the evidence and will resolve all conflicts in favor of the trial court's ruling.” Schnitzmeyer v. State, 168 N.E.3d 1041, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Furthermore, “we will not reverse the decision to admit or exclude evidence if that decision is sustainable on any ground.” Carpenter v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1075, 1078 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[8] Brown contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the results from the tests on the sample of his blood that had been taken at the hospital shortly after he had been found passed out in his vehicle. In raising this contention, Brown argues that the State failed to establish a sufficient chain of custody. For its part, the State argues that the chain of custody was sufficient and, alternatively, that with respect to Count I, even if it had been error to admit the test results, any error was harmless.

[9] It is well established in Indiana that an exhibit is admissible if the evidence regarding its chain of custody strongly suggests the exact whereabouts of the evidence at all times. That is, in substantiating a chain of custody, the State must give reasonable assurances that the property passed through various hands in an undisturbed condition.

Culver v. State, 727 N.E.2d 1062, 1067 (Ind. 2000) (internal citations omitted).

For fungible items such as blood and drugs, an adequate foundation is laid when the whereabouts of an exhibit is shown from the time it came into the possession of the police. A proper foundation for the introduction of such physical evidence is established if a witness is able to identify the item, and the item is relevant to the disposition of the case. The State can lay an adequate foundation by providing a reasonable assurance that the evidence was undisturbed as it passed from the custody of one person to the next. If the State presents evidence that strongly suggests the exact whereabouts of the evidence at all times, that is sufficient.

Mateo v. State, 981 N.E.2d 59, 66–67 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (internal citations omitted), trans. denied.

[10] “[T]he State need not establish a perfect chain of custody whereby any gaps go to the weight of the evidence and not to admissibility.” Culver, 727 N.E.2d at 1067. “[M]erely raising the possibility of tampering with the evidence is an insufficient challenge to chain of custody.” Cockrell v. State, 743 N.E.2d 799, 809 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Furthermore, “[t]here is a presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers.” Murrell v. State, 747 N.E.2d 567, 572 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied.

[11] In relation to the chain of custody of the blood sample, Officer Beikman testified that he had been present and had observed Nurse Vanduyn draw the blood. After Nurse Vanduyn had labeled the blood vials with Brown's identifiers, she had immediately given the two vials of Brown's blood to Officer Beikman. Officer Beikman testified that after Nurse Vanduyn had handed the vials of blood “directly to” him, he had sealed them in a yellow envelope. Tr. Vol. II p. 179. The yellow evidence envelope had also been labeled with the unique case number as well as Brown's name. Officer Beikman had immediately taken the blood vials directly to IMPD's secure property room, which can only be accessed by law enforcement and authorized personnel, and placed the evidence in that property room.

[12] The Marion County Crime Laboratory had then followed protocol by having an agency representative bring the evidence to the lab, log it into the lab's computer system, and secure it in their evidence vault. Whitney Thomas, a forensic scientist with the Indianapolis Marion County Forensic Services Agency, testified that blood samples “usually come in a sealed yellow evidence envelope” when brought to the laboratory for testing. Tr. Vol. II p. 167. On December 20, 2024, two days after the blood draw, Thomas had retrieved the evidence from the secure evidence vault and tested it. When Thomas had retrieved the vials of blood, they were in a sealed evidence envelope marked with the unique case number. Thomas testified that so long as the vials had been sealed and stored correctly, she would not have expected to see a change in the blood-alcohol concentration in a forty-eight-hour period. She further testified that she “would have indicated in [her] notes if there was something strange with the blood, if it wasn't sealed” and that her notes indicated that the vials had been “refrigerated and there was no evidence of it not being sealed correctly[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 177.

[13] Brown's challenge to the chain of custody of his blood sample is based upon the two-day delay in testing and the alleged discrepancy between Nurse Vanduyn's testimony that she had placed the vials of Brown's blood in a blue bag before turning it over to Officer Beikman, who testified that he had placed the vials of blood in a yellow evidence envelope after Nurse Vanduyn had handed them directly to him. Initially, we note that we do not find there to be a discrepancy between Nurse Vanduyn's and Officer Beikman's testimony. When read together, their testimony establishes that Nurse Vanduyn had completed the blood draw, sealed the vials, and placed them in a blue bag before immediately handing the samples to Officer Beikman who had then placed the samples in an IMPD yellow evidence envelope. The samples had remained in this yellow evidence envelope until they were tested by Thomas two days later. Furthermore, as for the two-day delay in testing, Thomas testified that so long as the vials had been sealed and stored correctly, which they appeared to have been, she would not have expected to see a change in the blood-alcohol concentration in a forty-eight-hour period. Brown's challenges to the chain of custody of the blood samples does nothing more than raise the mere possibility of tampering with the evidence, which is insufficient to support a challenge to the chain of custody. Cockrell, 743 N.E.2d at 809.

[14] In any event, even if the evidence had been insufficient to establish the chain of custody of Brown's blood samples, we conclude, with respect to Count I, that any error in the admission of Exhibit 2 was, at most, harmless as it was merely cumulative of other evidence of intoxication.

An error in admitting evidence does not require reversal unless it affects the substantial rights of a party. The improper admission of evidence is harmless error when the conviction is supported by such substantial independent evidence of guilt as to satisfy the reviewing court that there is no substantial likelihood that the questioned evidence contributed to the conviction. The erroneous admission of evidence may also be harmless if that evidence is cumulative of other evidence admitted.

Pelissier v. State, 122 N.E.3d 983, 988 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (internal quotation and citations omitted), trans. denied.

[15] In order to prove that Brown had committed Count I, the State merely needed to prove that Brown had operated a vehicle while intoxicated in a manner that endangers a person. Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2. Endanger means “to bring into danger or peril of probable harm or loss.” Webster's Third New International Dictionary 748 (Phillip Babcock Gove et al. eds., G. & C. Merriam Company 1964). The unchallenged evidence establishes that when emergency personnel arrived to check on Brown, who was the only occupant of the vehicle, he was slumped over the steering wheel unconscious, the key was in the ignition, the vehicle was in drive, and his foot was on the brake pedal. One may reasonably infer that passing out behind the wheel of a vehicle, with the vehicle in drive, endangers both the individual and others. Officer Beikman also observed Brown and found him to be “heavily intoxicated” and “very belligerent[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 135. “The odor of alcohol was very present,” Brown had “glassy eyes, red eyes,” and Brown's “manual dexterity was shot.” Tr. Vol. II p. 135. Even after being roused, Brown “was not very responsive” to questions. Tr. Vol. II p. 128. A subsequent search of Brown's vehicle revealed “several” empty liquor bottles. Tr. Vol. II p. 151. “There was one (1) small bottle in the driver's seat. There was a few in the driver's floorboard, and there was a multitude in the passenger seat floorboard and under the seat.” Tr. Vol. II p. 151. Most of the bottles were 100 ml “99” brand vodka bottles. Tr. Vol. II p. 153. These facts were sufficient to prove that Brown had operated a vehicle while intoxicated in a manner that had endangered either himself or others.²

II. Double Jeopardy

[16] “Substantive double jeopardy claims come in two principal varieties: (1) when a single criminal act or transaction violates a single statute but harms multiple victims, and (2) when a single criminal act or transaction violates multiple statutes with common elements and harms one or more victims.” Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227, 247 (Ind. 2020). The Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256 (Ind. 2020), implicates the former scenario and its decision in Wadle implicates the latter. We review questions relating to double jeopardy de novo. Id. at 237.

[17] Wadle set forth a multi-step analysis to evaluate substantive double jeopardy claims that arise when, as here, a single criminal act implicates multiple statutes with common elements. The first step is to determine whether the statutes, either explicitly or by unmistakable implication, allow for multiple punishments. If the statutes allow for multiple punishments, there is no double jeopardy violation, and our inquiry ends. If the statutes are unclear, we apply our included-offense statutes. If either offense is included in the other, either inherently or as charged, we then consider whether the defendant's actions are so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction. If the facts show only a single crime, judgment may not be entered on the included offense.

Garth v. State, 182 N.E.3d 905, 920 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (internal citations and quotation omitted), trans. denied.

[18] Brown contends that his convictions for Level 6 felony OWI (Count I) and Level 6 felony operating a vehicle with an ACE of 0.15 or more (Count II) violate the prohibitions against double jeopardy. The State concedes that the two convictions violate the prohibitions against double jeopardy and acknowledges “that remand with instructions to vacate the conviction on Count II is appropriate.” Appellee's Br. p. 16. On remand, we instruct the trial court to vacate Brown's conviction for Count II.

[19] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and we remand with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Counts I and II were initially charged as Class A misdemeanors and Count III was initially charged as a Class C misdemeanor. All three charges were elevated to Level 6 felonies by virtue of Brown having previously been convicted of operating a vehicle while intoxicated during the seven years prior to the instant charges being filed.

2.   For the reasons stated in subsection II of this memorandum decision, we need not discuss Count II.

Bradford, Judge.

Weissmann, J., and DeBoer J., concur.