SANCHEZ v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Andres Sanchez (“Sanchez”), pro se, appeals the trial court's order denying his motion for jail time credit. Sanchez argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for jail time credit. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Sanchez's motion for jail time credit.

Facts

[3] In July 2009, a jury convicted Sanchez of three counts of Class A felony child molesting for acts committed against his two stepdaughters (individually, “first stepdaughter” and “second stepdaughter”). Two of Sanchez's convictions were related to acts of child molesting committed against first stepdaughter and the third conviction was related to an act of child molesting committed against second stepdaughter.

[4] In September 2009, the trial court issued a sentencing order (“September 2009 sentencing order”), in which the trial court imposed a forty (40) year sentence for each of Sanchez's three Class A felony convictions. The trial court ordered the sentences for the two convictions relating to first stepdaughter to be served concurrently to each other and consecutively to the sentence for the conviction relating to the second stepdaughter, resulting in an aggregate eighty (80) year sentence. The trial court's order specified that Sanchez had “796 days credit for time spent in custody awaiting disposition of this matter, together with 796 days good-time credit.” (Supp. 2 App. Vol. 2 at 2).¹ In the abstract of judgment, the trial court also noted Sanchez's presentence credit time with the following notation: “No. of days confined prior to sentencing – 796[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 31).

[5] Sanchez filed a direct appeal, and our Court affirmed Sanchez's aggregate sentence. See Sanchez v. State, No. 20A04-0912-CR-720 (Ind. Ct. App. June 15, 2010), trans. granted. Our Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, revised Sanchez's aggregate sentence, and remanded for resentencing. See Sanchez v. State, 938 N.E.2d 720, 723 (Ind. 2010). Specifically, the Indiana Supreme Court revised Sanchez's sentences for his two convictions relating to first stepdaughter to the advisory term of thirty (30) years for each conviction and ordered that those sentences be served concurrently to each other and to the forty (40) year sentence for his conviction relating to the second stepdaughter, resulting in an aggregate forty (40) year sentence. Id.

[6] Thereafter, in February 2011, the trial court issued an order and amended its September 2009 sentencing order as instructed by the Indiana Supreme Court (“February 2011 amended sentencing order”). Specifically, the trial court ordered Sanchez to serve “thirty (30) year sentences to be executed at the Indiana Department of Correction with respect to Counts I and II, and a sentence of forty (40) years executed at the Indiana Department of Correction with respect to Count III.” (App. Vol. 2 at 33). The trial court's order also provided that “[i]n all other respects” the September 2009 sentencing order was “affirmed” and remained the same. (App. Vol. 2 at 33). In the amended abstract of judgment, the trial court noted Sanchez's presentence credit time with the following notation: “No. of days confined prior to sentencing – 796[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 32).²

[7] Twelve years later, on February 22, 2023, Sanchez filed a pro se motion for jail time credit.³ In Sanchez's motion, he asserted that, in September 2009, the trial court had sentenced him to forty years and had awarded him 796 days of presentence jail time credit but zero days of corresponding earned credit time. He further stated that, pursuant to Indiana Code § 35-50-6-3,⁴ he was entitled to an additional 796 days of credit time. Sanchez requested the trial court to “issue an amended abstract of judgment reflecting the correct number of days of earned credit time [he] [wa]s entitled to” and to send the amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Correction “for proper adjustment to [his] sentence[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 28-29).

[8] Subsequently, in March 2023, the probation department filed a memorandum to address Sanchez's credit time issue. In the memorandum, the probation department noted that relevant records showed that Sanchez had “received the 796 days good time credit at sentencing.” (Supp. App. Vol. 2 at 9). Additionally, the probation department noted that the Department of Correction's records showed that Sanchez “had been deprived of 60 days of good time credit in 2017, with 30 days restored in 2019.” (Supp. App. Vol. 2 at 9).

[9] The trial court then held a hearing on Sanchez's motion in July 2023.⁵ The trial court directed Sanchez to file a memorandum to support and explain his motion for jail time credit.

[10] When Sanchez filed his memorandum, he acknowledged that the trial court had awarded him 796 days of credit for the time spent in custody awaiting sentencing, but he argued that the trial court needed to issue an amended abstract of judgment that specifically set forth the associated earned or good time credit. Sanchez also asserted that the Department of Correction had incorrectly calculated his earliest release date as being in August 2027 instead of April 2025. Sanchez attached the following documents to his memorandum: (1) the 2011 amended abstract of judgment, which specified that Sanchez had been confined 796 days prior to sentencing; (2) a March 2021 “offender information system sentence detail” printout, which related to one of Sanchez's thirty-year sentences and showed that Sanchez had “jail time credit” of 796 days; and (3) an “offender information system current classification” printout, which was dated April 6, 2023 and showed that his earliest release date was August 4, 2027. (Supp. App. Vol. 2 at 7-8) (quotes modified from uppercase to lowercase). Sanchez acknowledged that the offender information system form “clearly show[ed]” that he was entitled to 796 days for “actual time in confinement,” but he asserted that it did not grant him his good time credit. (Supp. App. Vol. 2 at 4). He also asserted that he felt that his release date calculation was incorrect.

[11] Thereafter, in September 2023, the trial court issued an order denying Sanchez's motion for jail time credit. In its order, the trial court noted that the parties had agreed that Sanchez had been in custody for 796 days prior to the date of his sentencing hearing. The trial court concluded that “Sanchez [had] presented the Court with no evidence to establish that he had not been given credit for 796 days of good-time credit at sentencing.” (App. Vol. 2 at 27). Thus, the trial court denied Sanchez's motion for jail time credit.⁶

[12] Sanchez now appeals.

Decision

[13] At the outset, we note that Sanchez has chosen to proceed pro se. It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. Evans v. State, 809 N.E.2d 338, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Thus, pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so. Id. “We will not become a party's advocate, nor will we address arguments that are inappropriate, improperly expressed, or too poorly developed to be understood.” Barrett v. State, 837 N.E.2d 1022, 1030 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.

[14] On appeal, Sanchez argues that the trial court's denial of his motion for jail time credit was erroneous because the trial court's amended abstract listed Sanchez's 796 days spent in presentence confinement but did not expressly designate the corresponding 796 days of earned or good time credit. Sanchez also contends that the Department of Correction did not apply his 796 days of presentence credit time and incorrectly computed his release date.

[15] Initially, we note that Sanchez's motion for jail time credit is “tantamount to a motion to correct erroneous sentence.” See Brattain v. State, 777 N.E.2d 774, 776 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that a motion for credit for time served was tantamount to a motion to correct erroneous sentence). We review a trial court's denial of a motion to correct erroneous sentence for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the trial court's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Davis v. State, 978 N.E.2d 470, 472 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

[16] An inmate who believes that he has been erroneously sentenced may file a motion to correct the sentence pursuant to Indiana Code § 35-38-1-15. Neff v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1249, 1250-51 (Ind. 2008). A statutory motion to correct erroneous sentence “may only be used to correct sentencing errors that are clear from the face of the judgment imposing the sentence in light of the statutory authority.” Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 787 (Ind. 2004). “Such claims may be resolved by considering only the face of the judgment and the applicable statutory authority without reference to other matters in or extrinsic to the record.” Fulkrod v. State, 855 N.E.2d 1064, 1066 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). “Use of the statutory motion to correct sentence should thus be narrowly confined to claims apparent from the face of the sentencing judgment, and the ‘facially erroneous’ prerequisite should henceforth be strictly applied[.]” Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 787.

[17] “[A] motion to correct an erroneous sentence may only arise out of information contained on the formal judgment of conviction, and not from an abstract of judgment.” Neff, 888 N.E.2d at 1251. See also Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 794 (explaining that “the ‘sentence’ that is subject to correction under [a motion to correct erroneous sentence] means the trial court's judgment of conviction imposing the sentence and not the trial court's entries on the Department of Correction's abstract of judgment form”). In the case where a defendant's judgment of conviction or sentencing order does not set forth the corresponding presentence credit time, our Indiana Supreme Court adopted an “appellate presumption” that “[s]entencing judgments that report only days spent in presentence confinement and fail to expressly designate credit time earned shall be understood by courts and by the Department of Correction automatically to award the number of credit time days equal to the number of pre-sentence confinement days.” Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 792.

[18] Here, the trial court's September 2009 sentencing order set out Sanchez's sentences for his three convictions and specifically set out that Sanchez had “796 days credit for time spent in custody awaiting disposition of this matter, together with 796 days good-time credit.” (Supp. 2 App. Vol. 2 at 2). The trial court's February 2011 amended sentencing order amended Sanchez's sentences for his convictions pursuant to our supreme court's directive and also explained that “[i]n all other respects” the September 2009 sentencing order was “affirmed” and remained the same. (App. Vol. 2 at 33). In the amended abstract of judgment, the trial court noted Sanchez's presentence credit time with the following notation: “No. of days confined prior to sentencing – 796[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 32)

[19] Sanchez challenges only the trial court's amended abstract of judgment. However, our Indiana Supreme Court has explained that “a motion to correct sentence may not be used to seek corrections of claimed errors or omissions in an abstract of judgment.” Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 794. Because a motion to correct erroneous sentence is not the appropriate vehicle to challenge a claimed error in an abstract of judgment, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Sanchez's motion. See id. (holding that there was no error in denying the defendant's motion to correct erroneous sentence when he sought to correct the abstract of judgment and not the judgment of conviction).⁷

[20] Turning to Sanchez's argument that the Department of Correction failed to apply his earned presentence credit time and incorrectly computed his release date, we note that our supreme court has recognized that “[i]t is, of course, possible that a prisoner could accidentally be deprived of earned credit time toward his sentence” and that “[t]he presumption in Robinson has the effect of treating such an accident as merely an administrative error that can be addressed by the Department of Correction ․ easily and efficiently through its offender grievance process.” Young v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1253, 1254 (Ind. 2008). When an offender asserts that the Department of Correction has “mistakenly fail[ed] to give an offender earned credit time, the offender must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking relief from a court.” Neff, 888 N.E.2d at 1252. “[T]o present such a claim to a court, [the offender] must show what the relevant DOC administrative grievance procedures are[ ] and that they have been exhausted at all levels.” Young, 888 N.E.2d at 1254 (emphasis added). “[A] petition for post[-]conviction relief is the proper vehicle for raising a credit-time claim after administrative remedies have been exhausted.” Ellis v. State, 58 N.E.3d 938, 940 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Young v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1255, 1256-57 (Ind. 2008)), trans. denied. Indeed, “all manner of claims of sentencing errors (other than those that do not require consideration of matters outside the face of the sentencing judgment), are addressed via post-conviction relief proceedings.” Young, 888 N.E.2d at 1256 (citing Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 787).

[21] Here, Sanchez's allegations of error regarding the Department of Correction are not appropriate for a motion to correct erroneous sentence because the alleged errors are not clear from the face of the judgment. See Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 787. Instead, the proper vehicle for Sanchez to raise any credit-time claim regarding the Department of Correction is a post-conviction proceeding in which he must show: (1) what the relevant Department of Correction administrative grievance procedures are; and (2) that they have been exhausted at all levels. See Young, 888 N.E.2d at 1254; Young, 888 N.E.2d at 1256-57; Ellis, 58 N.E.3d at 940 n.1. Sanchez summarily asserted that his administrative remedies had been exhausted, but he failed to set forth the relevant Department of Correction's administrative grievance procedure, which was required to present such a claim. See Young, 888 N.E.2d at 1254. Because Sanchez has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion, we affirm the trial court's judgment. See, e.g., id. (holding that “a petitioner must show what the relevant DOC administrative grievance procedures are[ ] and that they have been exhausted at all levels”); Young, 888 N.E.2d at 1257 (explaining that if the inmate “hopes to prevail on his [credit-time] claim after he has properly presented it to the Court via post-conviction procedures” he would have to “show in the first place what the relevant DOC administrative grievance procedures are[ ] and then that he has exhausted them at all levels”).⁸

[22] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Sanchez filed three separate appendices on different dates: (1) an initial appendix filed in August 2024, which we will refer to as (App. Vol.); (2) a second appendix filed in October 2024, which we will refer to as (Supp. App. Vol.); and (3) a third appendix filed in December 2024, which we will refer to as (Supp. 2 App. Vol.). Additionally, the State filed an appendix, which we will refer to as (Appellee App. Vol.).

2.   We note that, contained in Sanchez's appendix following the page containing the February 2011 amended sentencing order, he has included various documents that are not file stamped and that do not contain an exhibit stamp; thus, it is unknown if these documents were presented to the trial court. See (App. Vol. 2 at 34-45). These documents included the following documents: (1) a Department of Correction change of commitment form, dated March 1, 2011, noting that the trial court had amended Sanchez's sentencing in February 2011 and that Sanchez's jail time credit remained at 796 days; (2) a correctional facility law library form that provided an example of how to calculate an inmate's estimated release date; (3) three Department of Correction printouts relating to credit time calculations; and (4) Department of Correction requests for interview and grievance forms, in which Sanchez requested 796 days of good time presentence credit time.

3.   We note that the copy of Sanchez's motion for jail time credit that he included in his appellate appendix does not contain a file stamped date, but the chronological case summary indicates the filing date.

4.   Indiana Code § 35-50-6-3, which applies to a person who committed an offense prior to July 1, 2014, provides, in relevant part, that a “person assigned to Class I earns one (1) day of good time credit for each calendar day ․ the person is ․ confined awaiting trial or sentencing.” I.C. § 35-50-6-3.

5.   The transcript from the July 2023 meeting is not included in the record on appeal. On April 12, 2024, our Court issued an order, noting that Sanchez had failed to make arrangements for the payment of the transcript and that the appeal would proceed without the transcript.

6.   In its order, the trial court noted that Sanchez had filed his motion for jail time credit in the current cause and in his post-conviction cause 20C01-1901-PC-3, and the trial court denied Sanchez's motion in that post-conviction cause as well.

7.   Moreover, even if the trial court's judgment of conviction or sentencing orders had failed to expressly designate credit time earned for Sanchez's presentence confinement, the Robinson presumption would have applied and been “understood by courts and by the Department of Correction automatically to award the number of credit time days equal to the number of pre-sentence confinement days.” See Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 792.

8.   The trial court noted that Sanchez also filed his motion for jail time credit under his post-conviction cause, and the trial court denied his motion under that cause. Sanchez did not appeal the trial court's order under that cause. If Sanchez's post-conviction proceeding is no longer pending, then he would be required to follow the procedure outlined in Post-Conviction Rule 1(12) for filing a successive post-conviction petition.

Pyle, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.