A.B. (Mother) and A.C. (Father of K.C.), Appellants-Respondents v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A.B. (Mother) and A.C. (K.C.’s father) separately appeal the trial court's order adjudicating K.B., K.C., and I.T. children in need of services (CHINS). Mother contends the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony related to the children's school records and argues the CHINS determinations were clearly erroneous. K.C.’s father does not dispute K.C.’s CHINS adjudication but argues the trial court erred by concluding that he created a CHINS condition requiring the court's coercive intervention. We affirm the CHINS adjudications of K.C. and I.T., and reverse as to K.B.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother has three daughters: K.B. (born March 28, 2008), K.C. (born June 25, 2014), and I.T. (born December 18, 2015). K.B.’s father is R.B.; K.C.’s father is A.C.; and I.T.’s father is J.T., who is deceased.

[3] In 2017 and 2021, the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) received allegations that Mother was neglecting some of her children. These allegations were never substantiated. In March 2023, DCS substantiated allegations of neglect after K.B. attempted suicide and tested positive for illegal drugs.

[4] In May 2023, Mother began participating in an informal adjustment program. She tested positive for methamphetamine throughout the informal adjustment, and DCS closed it as unsuccessful in December 2023. That month DCS filed CHINS petitions for the children, but the trial court denied these petitions the next month.

[5] In May 2024, Mother's boyfriend, J.G., was shot and killed in the driveway of the family home during a drug deal gone bad. K.B. was not home when J.G. was killed, but K.C. and I.T. were. I.T. may have seen some of the events surrounding J.G.’s death. Mother gave each child an urn with J.G.’s ashes and, on a separate occasion, withdrew K.B. from school to attend a hearing in the resulting murder case.

[6] On October 12, 2024, DCS received a report of neglect involving deplorable home conditions and Mother's drug use. The report stated that K.B. had shown law enforcement pictures and videos she had recently taken of the home depicting moldy unwashed dishes with maggots on them, piled up laundry, and what appeared to be methamphetamine left out in the home. Mother blamed the condition of the home on K.B.’s failure to do her chores and indicated that she let the mess build up to teach K.B. a lesson. When Family Case Manager (FCM) Britteny Morehouse-Braswell visited the home, it met DCS's minimum standards but was still in poor condition.

[7] Around the time of the October report, Mother and K.B. had a physical altercation. Mother grabbed K.B.’s hands and tried to put her into the closet where her bed was located. Mother admitted to FCM Morehouse-Braswell that “she did kind of push K.B. up off her bed,” and the physical altercation resulted in a scratch on K.B.’s forehead. Transcript at 119.

[8] On November 12, 2024, DCS filed a petition alleging the children were CHINS and removed the children under an emergency detention order. At the November 15 initial hearing, FCM Morehouse-Braswell testified that DCS could not implement a safety plan for the children because of Mother's unwillingness to admit she used methamphetamine despite testing positive numerous times. She also explained that K.C.’s father (A.C.) believed it would be in K.C.’s best interests to be placed with maternal grandmother because he did not have a relationship with K.C. K.C.’s father participated in the hearing and agreed to K.C.’s placement with maternal grandmother because they had a bond. At the end of the hearing, the trial court approved the children's removal and placement outside the home. I.T. and K.C. were placed with their maternal grandmother. K.B. was ordered to remain in the custody of her father (R.B.) who had been awarded temporary physical custody pursuant to an October 2024 order from another court.

[9] On January 3, 2025, the trial court held a fact-finding hearing on the CHINS petitions. FCM Stephen Kidd testified that he had referred Mother to Centerstone for a substance use assessment, but she objected, preferring to use a different provider. However, after complications with that provider, FCM Kidd made a new referral to Centerstone on December 19, 2024. As of the fact-finding hearing, Mother had not completed the assessment, having expressed “problems with [Centerstone's] confidentiality.” Id. at 133. From March 2023 on, Mother demonstrated a pattern of missing multiple drug screens or failing to call in to determine whether she needed to submit to random drug screens. She also tested positive for methamphetamine on seven occasions during that time, including on October 12 and 21, 2024.

[10] DCS supervisor Douglas Chastain testified that he observed Mother when she submitted to a drug screen on December 19, 2024. She had “extremely dilated” pupils, spoke rapidly, and “her hands were shaking.” Id. at 175. He believed Mother was “probably coming down from using meth.”¹ Id. at 175-76.

[11] Mother alternated between denying she used methamphetamine and claiming she could not remember if she had used the drug around the dates of her positive screens. She denied having any substance abuse problem and testified, “I don't know if I have ever used it. I can tell you, most definitely, I do not use methamphetamine or any other drugs.” Id. at 79.

[12] Over Mother's objection, FCMs Morehouse-Braswell and Kidd testified about information they had learned from reviewing the children's school records. The children “had missed a good amount of school” in 2024. Id. at 118. K.B. and K.C. were failing classes, and K.B. was enrolled in a credit recovery program to graduate high school on time.

[13] Mother admitted K.B. and K.C. had experienced some difficulties in school, but she was not asked about the children's absences. She testified about a tutoring grant that K.C. received and the logistical difficulties of getting her to the program because of K.C.’s placement outside of Mother's home. Mother also acknowledged the “unique situation” of J.G.’s death. Id. at 80. She believed K.B. was especially impacted by the death. And while Mother claimed to have identified a provider through which the younger children could receive “age-appropriate grief counseling for children of victims[,]” as of the date of the fact-finding hearing, they had yet to attend. Id. at 80.

[14] K.B. began living with her father in September 2024. At some point, K.B. returned to Mother's home after she “demanded that K.B. come home[,]” but within a week K.B. returned to her father's home. Id. at 93. K.B.’s father obtained temporary physical custody from the Monroe Circuit Court and had a petition for permanent custody pending at the time of the fact-finding hearing. K.B.’s father testified that Mother's abrasive conduct and demands for visitation on very short notice made it difficult to coordinate her parenting time. While she lived with her father, K.B. was on probation for delinquency and tested positive for THC. But once she attended individual therapy, began testing negative for illegal substances, and her father paid her overdue probation fees, K.B.’s probation was terminated early. Given K.B.’s history of drug use as a teenager, her father had concerns about Mother's “continued drug use” and her failure to admit she had a drug problem. Id. at 94, 101. Mother had a hard time getting out of bed and K.B.’s father and FCM Morehouse-Braswell worried that she suffered from depression; they believed these issues negatively affected her ability to care for the children. K.B.’s father confirmed her educational struggles but testified that her attendance and performance had improved since she moved in with him. He also thought she was adjusting to her new home environment well.

[15] As for K.C., Mother testified that her father had not seen her since 2017. In that year, the Monroe Circuit Court granted Mother sole physical and legal custody over K.C. K.C.’s father admitted to FCM Morehouse-Braswell that he had not been involved in his child's life.

[16] At the end of the fact-finding hearing, the court ruled from the bench that DCS had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that all three children were CHINS. On January 16, the court entered written findings of fact and made the following conclusions of law in support of its judgment:

The Court concludes that DCS has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that pursuant to I.C. 31-34-1-1, the (“Minor Children”), are children need of services [sic]. The Minor Children's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered due to the actions of the Minor Children's Mother and Fathers. Mother has used illegal substances and has not sought substance use treatment. Mother cannot explain her positive drug screens and was not forthright with an explanation as to how she has had so many over the last two years. Mother's illegal substance use has been detrimental to her ability to care for the minor children. The minor children's education has been negatively affected, in particular their attendance and Mother acknowledges this; the home conditions have been negatively affected; moreover, the minor children lack appropriate supervision and care because Mother is using illegal substances. [K.B.’s father] has been unable to ensure [K.B.’s] safety while she is in Mother's care and [he] concedes the child is a child in need of services. [K.C.’s father] has been unable or unwilling to protect [K.C.] from Mother's neglect in Mother's home.

Mother denies having substance use addiction and as a result, refuses to accept or participate in services to address her substance use addiction or mental health. The Court further concludes that the actions of the Minor Children's Mother and Father(s) have created a CHINS condition for the Minor Children (i.e. are detrimental to the well-being of the Minor Children), and the Court has serious concerns that such actions and conditions have not been remedied, and will not be, in the absence of Court intervention.

Lastly, the Court concludes that the Minor Children's physical and/or mental condition is seriously endangered as a result of the inability and neglect of their parents to supply them with the necessary needs, care, including educational support, and appropriate supervision.

Accordingly, the Court finds DCS has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the Minor Children need care that is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the Court. For these reasons, the Court finds that it is in the best interests of the Minor Children that the Court adjudicate them, Children in Need of Services.

Mother's Appendix Vol. 2 at 42.

[17] The court entered a dispositional order on January 29 and Mother and K.C.’s father now appeal the court's CHINS order.

Discussion and Decision

[18] In a CHINS proceeding, “the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code.” In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012) (quoting In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010)). “When reviewing a trial court's CHINS determination, we do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility.” In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577-78 (Ind. 2017). “Instead, we consider only the evidence that supports the trial court's decision and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.” Id. at 578 (quoting In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014), reh'g denied). Where, as here, a trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions thereon, “we apply the two-tiered standard of whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment.” S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287. When findings of fact are not challenged, “we simply determine whether the unchallenged findings are sufficient to support the judgment.” In re A.M., 121 N.E.3d 556, 562 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. We reverse a CHINS determination only if it is clearly erroneous. K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1253. “A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or ‘if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.’ ” D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 578 (quoting Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997)).

[19] Here, DCS alleged that the children were CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, which required it to prove:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent ․ to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent ․ is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent ․ to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

In other words, “[t]he statute contains three basic elements: (1) the parent's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child; (2) the child's needs are unmet; and (3) those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion.” In re N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

1. Mother's Appeal

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[20] Mother argues that DCS presented insufficient evidence to support the trial court's determination that the children were CHINS. She begins by arguing that the trial court erred by admitting inadmissible hearsay when it permitted FCMs Braswell-Morehouse and Kidd to testify about the children's school attendance and performance records. See Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c) (defining “hearsay” as a statement “not made by the declarant while testifying” that is offered for “the truth of the matter asserted”); Evid. R. 802 (“Hearsay is not admissible unless these rules or other law provides otherwise.”). While we typically review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, we decline to pass upon the merits of Mother's evidentiary argument because she cannot show prejudicial error. See Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A) (providing that no error in a trial court's ruling is grounds for reversal unless it affects the parties’ substantial rights). As we describe below, even in the absence of this evidence, DCS proved the children's physical or mental conditions were seriously impaired or endangered by Mother's conduct or neglect. Thus, the probable impact of any error in the admission of this evidence was sufficiently minor such that our confidence in the trial court's judgment is not undermined. See Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 492 (Ind. 2023) (discussing Appellate Rule 66(A)’s probable impact test), reh'g denied, cert. denied.

[21] Next, Mother disputes two of the trial court's factual findings. She challenges the part of Finding 45 in which the court determined that her drug use had “detrimentally affected [ ] home conditions[.]” Mother's App. Vol. 2 at 40-41. Mother does not make a causation argument related to her drug use and points only to testimony that “the conditions in her home never dropped below DCS's own minimum standards.” Mother's Br. at 12; see Tr. at 115, 146. However, such testimony did not prevent the trial court from finding that Mother's home was in suboptimal condition during DCS's involvement. In fact, the evidence shows the home was in “deplorable” shape in October 2024 and remained in “poor” condition when DCS visited. Tr. at 115. Mother herself acknowledged the home was in “poor condition” for some time. Id. at 165.

[22] Mother also challenges Finding 48, which indicates she exposed the children to illegal substance use or impairment in the home. Id. at 41. Mother argues “[t]here was no testimony presented that [she] ever used methamphetamine in the presence of her children, nor was there evidence that [she] was impaired while caring for her children.” Mother's Br. at 12. However, K.B. showed law enforcement a picture “of what appeared to be methamphetamine” found in the home. Tr. at 115. Moreover, given Mother's many positive drug tests, propensity to miss drug screens, and failure to admit to any methamphetamine use, the trial court could infer that she exposed the children to her drug use or impaired state in the home.

[23] Neither Finding 45 nor Finding 48 are clearly erroneous. Thus, Mother's challenges are nothing more than a request that we reweigh the evidence, and we will not do so.²

[24] Outside of her challenges to these findings, Mother does not clearly challenge any of the essential elements of the CHINS adjudication. Nevertheless, we find that this case resembles In re D.P., 213 N.E.3d 552 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. In that case, a special needs child was adjudicated a CHINS after his parents failed to adequately supervise him, tested positive for methamphetamine, denied their positive tests, lacked insight into the effect their drug use had on their ability to parent effectively, and refused to cooperate with DCS. Id. at 554-56. On appeal, a panel of this Court distinguished cases involving a single incident of drug use. See In re S.M., 45 N.E.3d 1252, 1253, 1255-56 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (finding the mother's single positive drug screen for marijuana at the child's birth did not support CHINS adjudication when the mother was sober during the CHINS case, insightful about her past marijuana use, and there was no evidence showing the children were seriously endangered or coercive intervention was necessary); In re Ad.M., 103 N.E.3d 709, 713-14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (finding insufficient evidence of serious endangerment where the mother tested positive for marijuana twice during the CHINS case and the case manager testified she could not see how the mother's drug use had impacted the children). In addition to noting the parents’ failure to acknowledge their problematic drug use and refusal to cooperate with DCS, the D.P. panel found evidence of neglect beyond mere drug use and that the trial court could infer the parents used methamphetamine while caring for the child. 213 N.E.3d at 560. In affirming the CHINS adjudication, the panel summarized the case as one involving “untreated methamphetamine use of unknown frequency and duration endangering a special-needs child's safety and well-being.” Id. at 562. The panel further noted that methamphetamine is a different drug than marijuana and presents unique dangers for the children of users. Id. at 561.

[25] Likewise, despite testing positive for methamphetamine many times in the year and eight months before her children were ultimately removed, Mother did not admit to any methamphetamine use, and she denied she had a substance use problem. See Tr. 71-79. She claimed she could not recall whether she had taken methamphetamine around the dates she tested positive and did not know why she was testing positive. At the time of the fact-finding hearing, Mother had not completed a substance use assessment in part because she refused to cooperate with DCS's preferred provider. Moreover, the court found the testimony of the DCS supervisor reliable that just days before the fact-finding hearing Mother showed physical symptoms of “coming down from using meth.” Id. at 176; see Mother's App. Vol. 2 at 38.

[26] The trial court could reasonably infer that Mother's unacknowledged and untreated drug use resulted in her inability or unwillingness to provide necessary, care, supervision, and educational support for the children. The court could also infer that Mother had endangered the children by exposing them to her use of illegal substances or impairment in the home. Furthermore, there was additional evidence of abuse or neglect, such as physical altercations in the home, Mother having a hard time getting out of bed to care for the children, and her failure to provide the children with appropriate mental health care after her boyfriend was murdered at the family home. “A court need not ‘wait until a tragedy occurs to intervene.’ ” D.P., 213 N.E.3d at 562 (quoting In re A.H., 913 N.E.2d 303, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)).

[27] For these reasons, we conclude that DCS sufficiently proved the children's physical or mental conditions were seriously endangered by Mother's methamphetamine use and neglect of their various needs, and that K.C. and I.T. were unlikely to have those needs met without the coercive intervention of the court. However, we explain below that the court's adjudication of K.B. as a CHINS was clearly erroneous because her custodial circumstances at the time of the fact-finding hearing did not necessitate the coercive intervention of the court.

B. Temporary Custody

[28] Mother separately argues that the trial court erred in adjudicating K.B. a CHINS in light of K.B.’s father's temporary custody of K.B. throughout the CHINS proceedings.³ She asserts that these circumstances fit squarely within the holding of In re N.C., 72 N.E.3d 519 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). We agree.

[29] In that case, DCS made allegations about the mother's conduct in its CHINS petition and noted that N.C.’s father was a noncustodial parent. Id. at 520-21. After CHINS proceedings were initiated, father was awarded temporary custody of N.C. and the child began living with him. Id. at 521. At the fact-finding hearing, there were no allegations against father, yet N.C. was adjudicated a CHINS along with mother's other children involved in the proceedings. Id. at 521-22.

[30] On appeal, a panel of this Court reversed the trial court's CHINS adjudication as to N.C. because DCS failed to prove the “coercive intervention of the court was necessary to ensure N.C.’s well-being.” Id. at 526. The panel found that father's temporary custody of N.C. had alleviated the necessity of coercive intervention by the time of the fact-finding hearing. Id. at 525. Although domestic violence and substance abuse may have been occurring in mother's home, “N.C. was no longer in that home.” Id. The panel reiterated that even though father had admitted a CHINS condition (i.e., endangerment) existed, the necessity of coercive intervention is a separate element DCS is required to prove. Id. at 525-26. Finally, the panel disagreed with DCS's argument that the coercive intervention of the court remained necessary because father's custody was only temporary, noting that N.C. would not be returned to mother's care without her first obtaining a court order permitting such an arrangement. Id. at 526.

[31] Similarly, in this case, DCS's CHINS petition made no substantive allegations against K.B.’s father. The petition acknowledged he had received temporary physical custody of K.B. in October 2024 and stated that “[K.B.’s father] is unable to provide a safe and stable home for his child that is free from neglect, and which has a sober caregiver while she is in [Mother's] home.” Mother's App. Vol. 2 at 53 (emphasis added). At the November 15 initial hearing, the trial court continued K.B.’s placement with her father without any objection from DCS—a tacit acknowledgment that he was providing a suitable home and appropriate care for K.B. See Tr. at 30.

[32] Subsequently, at the fact-finding hearing, K.B.’s father was questioned as if he was a witness against Mother and no allegations were made regarding his parental fitness. In fact, the evidence showed that since moving into her father's home, K.B.’s school attendance and performance had improved, she was successfully refraining from using marijuana, and she was adapting well to her new home. The trial court's CHINS order did not make negative findings against K.B.’s father yet concluded that he “has been unable to ensure [K.B.’s] safety while she is in Mother's care[.]” Id. at 20. Like in N.C., this conclusion is logically flawed as a basis for imposing the coercive intervention of the court because K.B.’s father—not Mother—was the custodial parent during the CHINS proceedings.

[33] And while the trial court found, and DCS argues, that K.B.’s father agreed K.B. was a CHINS, his acknowledgment was made solely to ensure he would continue to serve as K.B.’s placement while his request for permanent custody was pending. See Tr. at 185 (“We do have concerns over [K.B.] being in the care of Mother, and if it protects K.B. and keeps K.B. with [her father] we would ․ ask the court to find this to be a child in need of services so that placement can be maintained with [K.B.’s father] while we're waiting on [a final custody] order.”). However, N.C., as well as the basic principle that the trial court must consider the child's status and the conditions present at the time of the fact-finding hearing, dictate that the coercive intervention of the court was not necessary given her father's temporary custody of K.B. and the absence of any allegations against him.⁴ See D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 580-81 (noting the coercive intervention element protects against unwarranted State intrusions into the family life and holding DCS failed to prove the parents required coercive intervention at the time of the fact-finding hearing). Thus, the trial court committed clear error in adjudicating K.B. a CHINS.

2. K.C.’s Father's Appeal

[34] K.C.’s father asks us to reverse the trial court in part, arguing that its conclusions that he created a CHINS condition for K.C. were clearly erroneous and prejudicial to his substantial rights. However, he does not dispute the limited findings the trial court made about him, and he does not dispute the court's judgment adjudicating K.C. a CHINS.

[35] “[T]he purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect children, not punish parents.” N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 106. A corollary of this principle is that a CHINS adjudication is not a determination of parental fault but rather a determination that a child needs services which are unlikely to be provided without court intervention. Id. at 105. Indiana's appellate courts have consistently observed that “the acts or omissions of one parent can cause a condition that creates the need for court intervention.” Id.; see also K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1255; N.E., 228 N.E.3d at 476; In re D.P., 72 N.E.3d 976, 981 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).

[36] Due to his general noninvolvement with K.C. and inability “to control or affect [the] situation[,]” K.C.’s father urged the trial court not to determine that he had caused a CHINS condition for K.C. See Tr. at 183-84. In its order following the hearing, the trial court made the following unchallenged findings as to K.C.’s father:

22. Mother and [K.C.’s father] are subject to a custody order in which Mother has sole legal and physical custody of [K.C.]

23. [K.C.’s father] does not visit with [K.C.] or take part in the decisions regarding [K.C.’s] welfare.

․

50. [K.C.’s father] does not have custodial rights to provide proper supervision and care for [K.C.] to ensure her safety.

K.C.’s Father's App. Vol. 2 at 16-17, 19; see Tr. at 86 (Mother testifying K.C.’s father had not seen K.C. since 2017). And while the court's conclusions primarily referred to Mother's conduct, it also concluded the following:

The Minor Children's physical mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered due to the actions of the Minor Children's Mother and Fathers․ [K.C.’s father] has been unable or unwilling to protect [K.C.] from Mother's neglect in Mother's home.

․ The Court further concludes that the actions of the Minor Children's Mother and Father(s) have created a CHINS condition for the Minor Children[.] ․

Lastly, the Court concludes that the Minor Children's physical and/or mental condition is seriously endangered as a result of the inability and neglect of their parents to supply them with the necessary needs, care, including educational support, and appropriate supervision.

K.C.’s Father's App. Vol. 2 at 20 (emphasis added).

[37] K.C.’s father argues that his “minimal[ ] involve[ment]” in K.C.’s life was “simply not enough” for the trial court “to conclude that [he] created a CHINS condition.” K.C.’s Father's Brief at 23. He points to two cases in making this assertion: In re S.A., 15 N.E.3d 602 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), aff'd on reh'g, trans. denied, and In re M.P., 162 N.E.3d 585 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). These cases do not support his position.

[38] In S.A., a mother and father had a son together and father was absent for most of the first two years of their son's life while he was serving on active duty in the military. 15 N.E.3d at 605. About two years into their son's life, DCS received a report that mother was neglecting the son and habitually using heroin. Id. Soon after, DCS filed a CHINS petition on those grounds, among others. Id. The trial court adjudicated the son a CHINS consistent with mother's admissions, but father requested a fact-finding hearing. Id. at 606. Before the fact-finding hearing, he was discharged from the military, moved to Indianapolis, obtained employment, made and maintained contact with DCS and his son's court-appointed special advocate, and began consistently visiting with his son. Id. After the trial court held the hearing, made findings related to father's lack of prior parental involvement, and continued the son's CHINS adjudication, the father appealed. Id. at 606-07, 611.

[39] A panel of this Court reversed, finding in part that “the State's intrusion into parental rights should be limited to instances ‘where parents lack the ability to provide for their children, not merely where they encounter difficulty in meeting a child's needs.’ ” Id. at 611 (quoting S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287) (emphasis in original). Thus, evidence of the father's prior non-involvement was not sufficient to show he was unlikely to meet the son's needs absent coercive court intervention when he was “present ․ and willing to parent” his son at the time of the fact-finding hearing. Id. at 612.

[40] M.P. involved a similar situation in which the CHINS petition was primarily premised on abuse and neglect in the home where the children resided with mother. 162 N.E.3d at 587-88. At the time of the CHINS hearing, the children's father, although living in Georgia, had reinitiated regular contact with them after a substantial period of non-involvement, was financially providing for them, sought custody or placement, and was gainfully employed and had adequate housing. Id. The mother admitted the children were CHINS and the trial court adjudicated them as such and made findings related to father's prior lack of relationship with the children. Id. at 588-89.

[41] On appeal, the panel cited S.A. and found that DCS had not proven the coercive intervention of the court was necessary because the record revealed the “[f]ather was willing to provide a safe and stable living environment” at the time of the fact-finding hearing. Id. at 592 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the panel reversed the CHINS adjudication. Id. at 593.

[42] This case is not like S.A. or M.P. Unlike the fathers’ prior lack of involvement in S.A. and M.P., which both fathers had remedied by the time of their respective fact-finding hearings, K.C.’s father never reinitiated contact with K.C., took no steps to remove K.C. from the neglectful situation by seeking custody of her, and did not want to serve as her placement. Additionally, whereas our Court in S.A. and M.P. considered the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's finding that the coercive intervention of the court was necessary and reversed the ultimate judgment adjudicating the children CHINS, K.C.’s father agrees she is a CHINS but would prefer the trial court's conclusions not mention that he contributed to the adjudication. Given the holdings in S.A. and M.P. and the prevailing principle that a CHINS adjudication “is not a determination of parental fault[,]” we cannot find the trial court committed clear error by concluding that K.C.’s father was unable or unwilling to protect K.C. from neglect and was therefore involved in creating the CHINS condition. S.A., 15 N.E.3d at 608.

Conclusion

[43] For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that DCS met its burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that K.C. and I.T. are CHINS, but failed to prove the same as to K.B. We therefore affirm the CHINS adjudications of K.C. and I.T. and reverse and remand to the trial court to vacate the CHINS adjudication of K.B.

[44] Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court sustained Mother's objection to FCM Kidd testifying about the results of the December 19 drug screen. However, in its subsequent order, the court found: “Chastain observed Mother on December 19, 2024 at the Lawrence County DCS office with dilated pupils, speaking quickly, and her hands were shaking when she submitted to a random drug screen. [ ] Chastain was concerned Mother was “coming down” from using methamphetamine. The Court finds [ ] Chastain's testimony reliable and his concerns understandable.” Mother's Appendix Vol. 2 at 38.

2.   Mother also directly challenges the following conclusion: “Mother's illegal substance use has been detrimental to her ability to care for the minor children. The minor children's education has been negatively affected, in particular their attendance and Mother acknowledges this[.]” Mother's App. Vol. 2 at 42. She frames this conclusion as asserting that she acknowledged her drug use affected the children's education and argues this cannot be squared with the fact that she did not admit to any methamphetamine use. In context, we believe this conclusion simply asserts that Mother acknowledged some attendance issues, not that she acknowledged those issues were caused by her drug use. However, Mother did not acknowledge any attendance issues, so this conclusion is clearly erroneous to that extent. Ultimately, whether mother acknowledged any attendance issues has no bearing on our resolution of this case and the trial court's conclusion to that effect was harmless error. See Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A).

3.   While DCS notes that K.B.’s father admitted K.B. was a CHINS, it does not argue that Mother is not the proper party to raise this argument.

4.   Pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 201(b)(5), “[w]e may take judicial notice of any records of a court of this state.” J.K. v. T.C., 25 N.E.3d 179, 180 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (taking judicial notice of information available on statewide protective order database not in the record presented on appeal). From our review of the Odyssey case records database, we take judicial notice that on March 4, 2025, the Monroe Circuit Court granted K.B.’s father sole legal and primary physical custody of K.B. in Cause No. 53C04-1201-DR-19. This provides further support that he was properly caring for K.B. while he had temporary custody throughout the CHINS proceedings.

DeBoer, Judge.

Chief Judge Altice and Judge Pyle concur. Altice, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.