BAKER v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Nathan Baker appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, contending the court erred by rejecting his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2015, Baker murdered two men, broke into their homes and stole guns, and stole a vehicle from one of the men. The State charged Baker with two counts of murder, two counts of Level 4 felony burglary, two counts of Level 6 felony theft, and one count of Level 6 felony auto theft. A jury found Baker guilty as charged. The trial court vacated the two theft convictions and sentenced Baker on the remaining five convictions to an aggregate 133-year sentence.

[3] Baker challenged his convictions and sentence on appeal, arguing that the court abused its discretion by permitting the State to introduce his confession at trial, that the court abused its discretion when it sentenced him, and that his sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate. Finding no error, this Court affirmed Baker's convictions and sentence, and thereafter our Supreme Court denied his petition to transfer. See Baker v. State, No. 18A-CR-2744 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2019) (mem.), trans. denied.

[4] Baker subsequently petitioned for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Baker now appeals that denial.

Discussion and Decision

[5] To prevail in the appeal of a post-conviction proceeding, the petitioner must establish clear error by showing that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. Ingalls v. State, 213 N.E.3d 544, 548 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). In our review, we accept the post-conviction court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, though we do not defer to its legal conclusions. Id.

[6] Baker contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call certain witnesses at sentencing who could provide positive character evidence. Our analysis of Baker's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is guided by a two-part test. First, he must establish that counsel's performance was deficient. Black v. State, 7 N.E.3d 333, 338 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Such deficiency is established by a showing that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel's errors were so serious that the defendant was denied the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Id. (quoting Kubsch v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1138, 1147 (Ind. 2010)).

[7] Second, Baker must prove that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Black, 7 N.E.3d at 338. This part of the test requires proof that counsel's errors were so serious that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial. Ingalls, 213 N.E.3d at 548.

[8] A presumption exists that counsel's performance is effective, and a defendant must present strong and convincing evidence to overcome this presumption. Id. A failure to satisfy either part of the test will cause the claim to fail, and most ineffective assistance claims can be resolved by a prejudice inquiry alone. State v. Pearson, 191 N.E.3d 892, 898 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).

[9] We first note that trial counsel called two witnesses on Baker's behalf at sentencing. Counsel also asked the court to take judicial notice of the reports of both Dr. Henderson-Galligan and Dr. Shaal regarding Baker's intellectual functioning and argued several mitigating circumstances, including that: (1) the crime was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur; (2) there are substantial grounds to excuse or justify the crime; (3) Baker acted under strong provocation; (4) Baker is likely to respond affirmatively to probation or short term imprisonment; (5) Baker's character and attitude indicate that he is unlikely to commit another crime; (6) Baker's confession was the key to the State's case; and (7) Baker has a low IQ. Trial Tr. Vol. VI, pp. 67-71.

[10] At the hearing on Baker's post-conviction petition, Baker acted as his own counsel and questioned his trial counsel as follows:

Q Do you recall preparing for my sentencing hearing?

A Yes.

Q Do you recall whether you attempted to track down any character witnesses for me?

A I don't remember at this time. And you would have better information than I, because at your request, and by order of the Court, I sent the banker's boxes with all of your case materials to you at the Department of Corrections[sic].

Q Do you recall whether you spoke to Carol Sims (phonetic), Ashlyn Joel (phonetic), Jerry Schultz (phonetic), Richard Diamond (phonetic) as potential character witnesses?

A I don't remember off the top of my head, no. I don't recall at this time.

Q Did you have a strategic reason for not calling any character witnesses like Carol Sims, Ashlyn Joel, Jerry Schultz, Richard Diamond, to testify as character witnesses at my sentencing?

A Well, the facts of the case that were adduced at trial, your prior criminal history, and the circumstances of the -- as outlined in the presentence report led me to believe that telling Judge Ellis that you were a nice person probably wasn't going to be given any mitigating weight.

Q Okay. Is it possible it was an oversight on your part that you did not contact any of these potential character witnesses for my sentencing?

A I suppose possibly. I don't recall specifically right now.

Tr. Vol. 2, p. 16.

[11] When an ineffective assistance of counsel allegation is premised on counsel's failure to present witnesses, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to offer evidence as to who the witnesses were and what their testimony would have been. Lowery v. State, 640 N.E.2d 1031, 1047 (Ind. 1994). Baker has not done this. Although he named four character witnesses at the post-conviction hearing, he provided no further information about them and made no mention of what they would have said had they testified.

[12] Moreover, even assuming for the sake of argument that trial counsel was deficient as alleged, Baker must also demonstrate that counsel's failure to call these witnesses at sentencing prejudiced him. “The dispositive question in determining whether a defendant is prejudiced by counsel's failure at sentencing to present mitigating evidence is what effect the totality of the omitted mitigation evidence would have had on the sentence.” McCarty v. State, 802 N.E.2d 959, 967 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Baker has provided neither information as to the substance of the omitted witnesses’ testimony nor argument as to its effect on his sentence in order to show he was prejudiced by counsel's alleged failure to call these witnesses.

Conclusion

[13] We conclude that Baker has failed to satisfy his burden of showing that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel's error was so serious that he suffered prejudice as a result. The post-conviction court properly denied Baker's petition for post-conviction relief on this issue.

[14] Affirmed.

Robb, Senior Judge.

Mathias, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.