IN RE: J.S. and I.S. (Minor Children) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] M.J.W. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's adjudication of two of her children, J.S. and I.S. (collectively, “Children”), as children in need of services (“CHINS”).¹ Mother raises the following restated issues: (1) Is the CHINS adjudication supported by sufficient evidence?; and (2) Is the dispositional order contrary to law? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] J.S. was born in September 2011 and I.S. was born in October 2012 to Mother and Jo.S. (“Father”).² In the fall of 2024, J.S. was in seventh grade and I.S. was in fifth grade. Children resided with Mother, whose work schedule required her to leave home hours before the boys got on the school bus each morning.

[3] In the first two months of the 2024–25 school year, I.S. missed 15 days. Mallory Thompson, a social worker at I.S.’s school, reached out to Mother multiple times. When she initially spoke to Mother, Mother said she did not know I.S. was missing school because she goes to work early and is not at home to know whether he gets on the bus. They created a plan for the school to call Mother every day I.S. was not there. Thompson, the school registrar, and I.S. developed an incentive program for I.S. to attend regularly. And Mother “talked about getting care from someone like paying them to do the mornings.” Tr. Vol. 1 at 34. I.S. had already been referred to a school-based mental health agency because attendance had been a concern for several years, but his weekly therapy sessions occurred only when he was in school. I.S. told Thompson “he didn't like to come to school[;] it was boring[.]” Id. at 37.

[4] Angela Gullier, a social worker at J.S.’s school, spoke with Mother in September about his absences. Mother said she had hired a babysitter but J.S. was sneaking out the window to avoid going to school. J.S. told Gullier “he doesn't like school and he just doesn't want to come.” Id. at 44. Gullier said the school tries “to motivate him, we have someone from probation who comes and meets with the kids, ․ [J.S. has] also met with the counselor about why he doesn't want to come to school[.] [H]e just cho[o]ses not to.” Id. at 46. Gullier said, “[W]e have a ․ grace period [and] do try to work with the families[,]” but ultimately Gullier reported J.S. for truancy under the compulsory school attendance law. Id. at 49.

[5] On the evening of October 2, Officer Dylan Armstrong of the Anderson Police Department responded to a runaway report Mother made. Mother told Officer Armstrong that Children “had not attended school[,] weren't currently home[, and] were seen downtown around ․ 12:30 to 1:00 p.m.” Id. at 55–56. Officer Armstrong observed Mother “seemed a little lethargic [and] confused at times” and he believed she might be under the influence. Id. at 56. While Officer Armstrong was still on the call, Children returned home. They gave conflicting stories about where they had been.

[6] DCS Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Katrina Davis did an assessment when a report was made that I.S. was not attending school. J.S. was added to the assessment later when a second report was generated after J.S. was seen out of school. FCM Davis talked with Children's schools, got their attendance records, and spoke with Mother. During FCM Davis’ initial contact with Mother, Mother said she had asked Children's uncle to help get them to school. FCM Davis reported Mother's “speech was slurred and sluggish.” Id. at 65. “[S]he was very slow” and FCM Davis did not know “if [Mother] wasn't understanding [or] if she was under the influence.” Id. Mother did not allow FCM Davis into the home at that time, so a second caseworker made an appointment to visit another day. He noted the home was “very bare” and offered Mother information on food pantries and other resources for getting more food in the home. Id. at 66. Mother later said she was not going to cooperate with DCS and stopped speaking with FCM Davis. Concerned about lack of supervision, school absences, and insufficient food in the home, FCM Davis recommended opening a case “to help the family out.” Id. at 64.

[7] On October 9, 2024, DCS filed a petition alleging Children were CHINS based on lack of supervision, educational neglect, and lack of food in the home. With respect to educational neglect, the petition referenced the compulsory school attendance law, which states in part that it is unlawful for a parent to fail, neglect, or refuse to send their child to school for the full term required by the law. Ind. Code § 20-33-2-28 (2005). The trial court held an initial hearing a week later at which Mother denied the allegations of the petition. Children remained in Mother's care.

[8] On October 16, Mother submitted a drug screen that returned positive for THC. FCM Davis requested the screen because of her previous interaction with Mother and because “use of drugs might be a part of the reason why she was not supervising the children properly[.]” Tr. Vol. 1 at 67.

[9] On December 16, the trial court held a factfinding hearing on the CHINS petition. By the time of the factfinding hearing, I.S. had been absent or tardy 27 times, including three times the week before. He was failing multiple classes. J.S. had missed 29 days and was failing all his classes. Children's school social workers, Officer Armstrong, and FCM Davis testified to the facts described above.

[10] Mother also testified. She first became aware Children were skipping school when the schools called her after they had missed 15 days. She asked Children's uncle to get them on the school bus in the mornings because she had to leave for work before they got up, but they were still missing school. The uncle reported Children left the house as if going to the bus but then snuck back in after he left. Mother tried hiring other people to come over but that did not work either. Then Mother started calling the school every day to see if Children were there, and if not, she would go find them or send someone else to find them and take them to school. She said she personally left work to take them to school “at least six” times. Id. at 79. Mother agreed Children had to go to school and their absences were “a lot.” Id. at 83. Although she talked to Children about “the seriousness of this[,]” she did not think “they understood yet because they wasn't the ones getting in trouble for it.” Id. at 81. She thought they were starting to take attendance more seriously because I.S. started playing basketball and could not miss more than five days to stay on the team, and J.S. was involved with juvenile probation because of the truancy allegation.

[11] Mother said one time she went to the gas station and bought “some relaxation candy” that unknown to her contained THC because she was stressed about Children skipping school. But she stated she does not use “illegal THC.” Id. at 86. Mother had not reached out to the school for tutoring or behavioral assessments because she did not know she had to. She explained,

I've been trying to meet with DCS, work, and take care of my kids, come to court every day, I'm going through a divorce, not only this court for this, but I'm dealing with a lot. I'm trying my hardest and I feel like it's hard for you guys to understand because you're not dealing with what I'm dealing with.

Id. at 89. She acknowledged she “actually need[s] some help,” but thought she could figure out the school attendance issues without DCS involvement. Id. at 84.

[12] The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon adjudicating the Children as CHINS based on Mother's failure “to adequately supervise her children and verify their attendance at school.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 30. The trial court found Mother's “use of THC more likely than not played a role in her lack of supervision of the children[.]” Id. And the trial court found “Mother has been unwilling to properly address her children's educational needs which require[s] intervention.” Id. at 31.

[13] DCS filed its predispositional report on January 22, 2025, and the trial court held a dispositional hearing a few days later. The parties presented evidence about what services were appropriate to address the reasons for the CHINS action. FCM Krystiana Jackson, who prepared the predispositional report, testified one of the specific recommendations was for the family to participate in family-centered therapy. FCM Jackson explained DCS believed family-centered therapy would help communication between Mother and Children, which would in turn strengthen their relationship so “the kids would want to take on the responsibility that is them going to school.” Tr. Vol. 1 at 96. FCM Jackson reported Children's school attendance for the new semester was “very on and off.” Id. J.S. was doing better, but I.S. was still missing “the majority of school.” Id. DCS also recommended Mother complete a parenting assessment because if the kids are not going to school, it suggests a lack of parental engagement.

[14] Mother specifically objected to family counseling because “we don't necessarily know if it's going to resolve ․ the underlying issue of the kids not going to school” and to a parenting assessment because it would not “provide any assistance to her.” Id. at 100–01.³ DCS responded that family counseling would help Mother “understand and engage differently” and a parenting assessment could examine why she struggles to discipline Children and help her learn how to get them to go to school. Id. at 101. The trial court noted Mother's objection but accepted the recommendations, stating “both the therapy and parenting assessment ․ could be beneficial in this case[.]” Id. at 102. The trial court entered its written dispositional order on January 28.

Sufficient evidence supports the CHINS adjudication.

[15] A CHINS adjudication focuses on the needs and condition of the child. In re N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 476 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). “The purpose of a CHINS adjudication is not to punish the parent, but to provide proper services for the benefit of the child.” In re W.H., 254 N.E.3d 549, 554 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). In a CHINS proceeding, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012); see I.C. §§ 31-34-1-1 to -11 (describing circumstances under which a child is a CHINS); I.C. § 31-34-12-3 (1997) (imposing preponderance standard). When reviewing a CHINS adjudication, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577–78 (Ind. 2017). Rather, “[w]e consider only the evidence that supports the trial court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.” K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1253. We reverse a CHINS determination only if it is clearly erroneous. D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 578. Clear error is “that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Masters v. Masters, 43 N.E.3d 570, 575 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Egly v. Blackford Cnty. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1992)).

[16] Here, DCS alleged Children were CHINS under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1, which requires DCS to prove:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent ․ to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision; ․ and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

“The statute contains three basic elements: (1) the parent's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child; (2) the child's needs are unmet; and (3) those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion.” N.E., 228 N.E.3d at 475 (citing In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014)).

[17] First, Mother argues one of the findings in the order adjudicating Children as CHINS is not supported by the evidence.⁴ We review a CHINS determination accompanied by findings of fact under a two-tiered standard of review: first, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 578. “Findings are clearly erroneous when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” W.H., 254 N.E.3d at 554. Yet a single erroneous finding of fact does not necessarily constitute reversible error, particularly when the remaining findings adequately support the trial court's ultimate determination. In re D.P., 213 N.E.3d 552, 561 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. We accept unchallenged findings as true. See M.M. v. A.C., 160 N.E.3d 1133, 1135 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

[18] Mother challenges part of the following finding:

12. The Court finds mom's sobriety and use of THC more likely than not played a role in her lack of supervision of the children based on the following evidence:

a. Testimony of Officer Dillon Armstrong that on October 2, 2024 when he interacted with mother he was concerned about her sobriety during the interaction based on his experience and training. He stated she was lethargic and confused by simple questions. He testified on cross examination that her lethargic actions [were] not the actions of a manic mother with missing children and that he has encountered manic parents and her actions were in contrast to how a concerned parent who was manic would act.

b. Testimony of FCM Katrina Davis that during her interaction with mother she also appeared under the influence and had trouble comprehending questions.

c. A positive drug screen for THC collected on 10/16/2024.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 30.⁵

[19] Mother claims the word “manic” does not appear in the transcript and there is no evidence about Officer Armstrong's encounters with other parents. It is true Officer Armstrong did not use the word “manic” or specifically compare Mother's demeanor to that of other parents he encountered who had reported a runaway child. But on cross-examination by Mother's attorney, he testified:

Q․ Had she found her kids at that point?

A. No.

Q. Okay. So, she was a little frantic.

A. I wouldn't say frantic.

Q. I mean as a ․ parent you would be frantic if your kids were missing correct[?]

A․ [T]hat's not what I was getting[,] that's why it raised [impairment] to that concern.

Tr. Vol. 1 at 57–58. The trial court's finding is a reasonable characterization of this exchange, in that “manic” and “frantic” both describe a state of heightened emotion or behavior, and Mother's counsel referred to other parents. Even so, for purposes of Mother's argument about the CHINS adjudication, we will disregard the challenged sentence as not directly supported by the evidence. But we will consider the remainder of Finding 12 as it is unchallenged.

[20] Next, Mother argues the CHINS adjudication as a whole was not supported by sufficient evidence. With respect to her actions or inactions, Mother alleges there was no evidence “of anything [she] did or was able to but failed to do having a negative impact” on Children. Appellant's Br. at 13. She points to her own testimony that she used a THC product only once and claims her one positive drug screen did not show an illegal level of THC. Mother also points to her own testimony that she was taking steps to ensure Children were going to school and claims it was undisputed, as there was “no evidence that she could do any more than she was doing[.]” Appellant's Br. at 18.

[21] Mother's arguments are an invitation to reweigh the evidence which we reject. First, Mother's argument about whether the drug test showed a “legal” or “illegal” amount of THC is irrelevant. The issue is whether Mother's substance use impaired her ability to supervise Children and contributed to their educational neglect.⁶ The trial court found that in addition to Mother's positive test for THC, Officer Armstrong and FCM Davis believed Mother was impaired on separate occasions. These findings support the court's conclusion that Mother's substance use more likely than not contributed to her failure to supervise Children and ensure they attended school.

[22] Second, Mother claims she was actively addressing Children's educational needs by asking other people to get them on the bus, calling the school to see if they were there, and getting them there late if necessary. But Children missed several days before Mother knew they were not attending school regularly. They continued to miss days after she found out. And in the three weeks before the factfinding hearing, Children missed “close to seven (7) days” of school. Tr. Vol. 1 at 83. The trial court found J.S. had 29 unexcused absences in the fall semester and was failing all his classes, and I.S. had 25 unexcused absences and was failing two of his four classes (and had a “D” in another). The evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that Mother failed to ensure Children attended school as required by law.

[23] As for the need for court intervention to ensure Children receive their education, Mother deflected blame onto the schools for not reaching out to her sooner or “trying to help [her] figure it out,” but she did not proactively seek any assistance from Children's schools through tutoring or behavioral assessments. Id. at 84. The trial court found there was no evidence Mother was imposing consequences for Children's failure to attend school or for their failing grades. Mother acknowledged she needed help but believed she could “get this figured out” without DCS. Id. at 85. Yet even after learning Children were not regularly attending school, Mother was unable to correct the issue. When determining whether a child is a CHINS under Section 31-34-1-1, and particularly when determining whether the coercive intervention of the court is necessary, the court “should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.” S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290. Here, the family's condition had not improved, supporting the trial court's conclusion that court intervention was required because Mother “has been unwilling to properly address her children's educational needs.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 31.

[24] The trial court's unchallenged findings support its decision to adjudicate Children as CHINS because Mother is unable or unwilling to provide Children with necessary education on her own.

The dispositional order is not contrary to law.

[25] Mother contends the dispositional order is contrary to law because it fails to include statutorily required findings of fact, claiming it “merely said what [Mother] was to do or not do and refers to the predispositional report.” Appellant's Br. at 7. Mother claims the order does not say why Mother “should be required to do those things [and] does not say why those things would solve the problem of [Children] not wanting to go to school[.]” Id. at 10. She also argues one of the findings from the predispositional report incorporated into the dispositional order is clearly erroneous.

[26] If a court finds that a child is a CHINS, the court must, among other things, order a predispositional report and schedule a dispositional hearing. I.C. § 31-34-11-2(a)(2)–(3) (2015). The predispositional report must contain a statement of the child's needs for care, treatment, rehabilitation, or placement and a recommendation for that care. I.C. § 31-34-18-1(a) (2008); see also I.C. § 31-34-18-6.1 (2019) (additional content requirements). At the dispositional hearing, the court should consider, in part, alternatives for the care, treatment, rehabilitation, or placement of the child and the necessity, nature, and extent of the parent's participation in the child's program of care. I.C. § 31-34-19-1(a) (2015). Following the dispositional hearing, the court must enter a dispositional order with written findings and conclusions concerning a child's needs, the need for parental participation, efforts to reunify the family, services offered, and reasons for the disposition. I.C. § 31-34-19-10(a) (2015). The court may incorporate a finding or conclusion from the predispositional report as a written finding in the decree. I.C. § 31-34-19-10(b). An order requiring a parent to engage in particular services is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re R.G., 130 N.E.3d 1171, 1181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

[27] The dispositional order states:

The children having been found to be [CHINS] the Court, after reviewing the Predispositional Report(s) and hearing statements and evidence presented to the Court regarding the disposition of this cause, finds:

The needs of the children for care, treatment, or rehabilitation are: To ensure the children have a safe and stable home where their educational needs are met.

Participation by the parent ․ in the plan for the children is necessary to: To ensure the children have a safe and stable home where their educational needs are met.

Based on the information presented in the Predispositional Report(s) and provided at the hearing, the Court makes the following dispositional orders ․

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 10.

[28] These statements either make the required findings directly or indicate the court incorporated findings contained in the predispositional report. See W.H., 254 N.E.3d at 557–58 (holding similar findings in a dispositional order were sufficient because they incorporated findings from the predispositional report). The predispositional report included information about the reasons for DCS involvement, services offered, and reasonable efforts made; and recommended Children remain in Mother's home under DCS wardship while they all receive family services. Contrary to Mother's argument, the dispositional order contains the required findings.

[29] Mother challenges two of the findings in the predispositional report. In the section relaying the reasons for DCS involvement, the report states:

Mother is not taking steps to ensure the children attend school. The children are often seen walking around town with mother not knowing their whereabouts when they are not in school.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 35. Mother claims these findings are clearly erroneous because she testified she is taking steps to ensure Children attend school, and there was evidence of only one occasion on which Children were seen in town during school hours. Mother's argument as to her efforts to ensure Children's attendance is a request to reweigh the evidence in her favor, which we will not do. Even after Mother first learned of Children skipping school, they continued to do so. And although DCS agrees with Mother's challenge to the statement Children are “often” seen in town, that single erroneous finding is not grounds for reversal because the other unchallenged findings support the trial court's CHINS disposition. See D.P., 213 N.E.3d at 561.

[30] Mother also challenges what is required of her under the parental participation order as being unrelated to curing educational neglect. Trial courts have “broad discretion” in imposing requirements for parents to participate in programs and services, but “the requirements must relate to some behavior or circumstances ․ revealed by the evidence.” K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1258 (quotation omitted). This is because “forcing unnecessary requirements upon parents whose children have been adjudicated as CHINS could set them up for failure” and risks termination of their parental rights. In re A.C., 905 N.E.2d 456, 464–65 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). But Mother does not challenge any specific requirement. Standard dispositional requirements are items generally considered necessary to fulfill parental obligations. See I.C. § 31-34-20-3(a)(1) (2022) (stating the court may order the parent to “[o]btain assistance in fulfilling the obligations as a parent”). Although those requirements may be considered boilerplate, Mother does not show they are unnecessary, and we will not become an advocate for her by considering each requirement on our own. See Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (reminding an appellate court “will not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion arguments on [the appellant's] behalf”). Moreover, the necessity of the two requirements recommended by DCS and specifically challenged at the hearing—a parenting assessment and family-focused therapy—was shown by testimony at the dispositional hearing.

[31] In sum, Mother has failed to show the dispositional order is contrary to law.

Conclusion

[32] The CHINS adjudication was supported by the evidence, and the dispositional order was not contrary to law.

[33] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother also has one older and one younger child. Neither of those children is involved in these proceedings.

2.   Father did not appear at the factfinding or dispositional hearings and does not participate in this appeal.

3.   Mother generally objected to all the recommendations because “she doesn't believe that [DCS] should be involved.” Id. at 100.

4.   Unlike the dispositional order, “no statute expressly requires formal findings in a CHINS fact-finding order.” S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287. Findings are only required if a party requests them under Trial Rule 52(A). Here, neither party made a Trial Rule 52(A) request, but the trial court entered findings sua sponte. To the extent Mother invokes Trial Rule 52(A), see Appellant's Br. at 11, she has stated no claim for relief.

5.   The trial court's conclusions include a similar statement: that Children need care, treatment, or rehabilitation they are not receiving and that is unlikely to be provided without the coercive intervention of the court because Children “are not attending school and failing most or all of their classes. Mother's use of THC and being observed to be under the influence more likely than not contribute to her lack of supervision of her children.” Id. at 31.

6.   For this same reason, Mother's reliance on In re Ad.M. is misplaced. See Appellant's Br. at 16–17 (citing 103 N.E.3d 709 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)). The panel in that case reversed because DCS alleged the children were CHINS based on the mother's marijuana use and the presence of marijuana in her home but presented no evidence of endangerment because of it. Id. at 714. Here, the CHINS finding was not based directly on Mother's substance use but on educational neglect to which Mother's substance use contributed.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Judges Foley and Scheele concur. Foley, J., and Scheele, J., concur.