BELL v. BELL (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Brothers Steven I. Bell (“Steven”) and David C. Bell (“David”) were co-trustees of the Trust of Charles R. Bell and Louise E. Bell (Trust). The Trust held numerous assets, including 60% of Bell Auto Sales, Inc. (Bell Auto), and various real estate properties in Steuben County. When the Trust settlors died, Steven and David were to receive equal distributions of the Trust.

[2] Disputes arose, and the trial court eventually removed Steven as co-trustee and ordered David to file an accounting. Although the trial court gave Steven opportunities to object to the accounting that David filed and to David's request for attorney fees, Steven remained silent. But when the court approved that accounting and ordered Steven to pay David's attorney fees, Steven appealed without having presented to the trial court any of the issues that he raises on appeal. Finding Steven has waived all his appellate claims, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Facts

[3] Charles R. Bell (“Charles”) and Louise E. Bell (“Louise”) (collectively, the “Settlors”) executed a Trust Agreement in 2018, creating the Trust and naming their sons Steven and David as co-trustees thereof. The Trust Agreement provided for equal distribution to Steven and David upon the death of both Settlors. Louise died in October 2018, and Charles passed away two months later.

[4] Upon the Settlors’ deaths, the Trust included a 60% share in Bell Auto. Steven and David each individually owned 20% shares of the company, and both worked there at Charles’ death. The brothers’ disputes over trust administration began shortly after David's departure from Bell Auto in approximately April 2022.

[5] The next month, David's attorney issued formal written demands to Steven for Trust documentation, including tax returns for Bell Auto for fiscal years 2018-2021. In a letter to David's counsel dated May 28, 2022, Steven expressed his opposition to liquidating jointly-owned assets, stating: “At this time I have no desire to liquidate any assets co-owned by me and my brother, and will make any attempt to do so as difficult as possible.” Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 33.

[6] In August 2022, David petitioned to remove Steven as a co-trustee and requested attorney fees. He filed a second petition in March 2023. Five months after that second filing, the parties entered into a Mediated Settlement Agreement (Settlement). In August 2023, the trial court issued an order noting the successful mediation and ordering the parties to file a joint motion to dismiss David's petition within 60 days.

[7] No dismissal was filed. Instead, on March 1, 2024, David petitioned the court to approve and enforce the mediated Settlement. Three days later, the court approved the Settlement, ordered the parties to implement its terms, and scheduled a status hearing. The status hearing was continued several times. In the meantime, David filed a third petition to remove Steven as co-trustee, alleging that Steven was thwarting the sale of Trust assets that the Settlement specified should be sold.

[8] In May 2024, the parties filed a “Stipulation” in which they agreed that they would take certain actions related to the disposition of Trust assets and that the hearing on David's third petition to remove Steven as co-trustee would be vacated. The court approved the Stipulation, ordered the parties to comply with its terms, and ordered David to file a status report within 60 days.

[9] Steven did not appear at a status hearing on June 24, 2024. The trial court set a status hearing for October 1. Steven did not appear at that hearing either, but his attorney did. During the hearing, Steven's counsel addressed the status of trust administration and proposed a timeline for discovery and a final accounting. Steven's counsel specifically proposed:

If [David] has a line item [in the final accounting] that Steve objects to, maybe I have ten days to make an objection to it and if we need a hearing then we need a hearing. If not, then I think it's pretty much put to rest.

Tr. Vol. II, p. 5.

[10] During this hearing, David requested attorney fees, and his counsel presented time records with acknowledged inaccuracies regarding billing rates. When the court asked about a timeline for Steven to respond to corrected billing records, Steven's counsel stated that a week would be “more than adequate.” Id. at 33.

[11] On October 2, 2024—the day following the status hearing—the trial court issued an order appointing David as the sole Trustee to “serve the best interest of accomplishing the terms of the mediated settlement agreement.” Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 70. The court ordered David to “file accounting within forty-five (45) days” and granted Steven “ten (10) days to file any objection to David's final accounting.” Id. The order reiterated that any objection by Steven to David's attorney fees request should be filed by October 9. On October 3, 2024, David filed his counsel's amended time records that reflected the correct billing rate.

[12] On October 9, without any objection filed by Steven, the trial court entered its order requiring Steven to pay David's attorney fees of $45,069.60, as David requested. Steven moved to stay the order but did not object to the award in that motion. Instead, he “move[d] the court to award [David's counsel's] attorney fees until final distribution of the trust is made.” Id. at 85.

[13] David opposed the stay and filed a “Trustee's Interim Account of Trust Administration and Proposed Distribution” (the Accounting) on November 15, 2024, within the court's 45-day deadline. David noted in the Accounting that two of Bell Auto's obligations totaling about $250,000 remained undetermined and therefore undistributed. David alleged that “it is in the best interest of the Trust and the beneficiaries to treat this filing as an interim account, to hold back the sum of $200,000 for any unknown and as-yet undetermined liabilities, but proceed to make distribution of other assets on hand in the Trust.” Id. at 89. David requested the trial court order that “a supplemental and final account of the trust administration, reflecting the resolution of the presently-indeterminate liabilities of Bell Auto Sales, Inc., be filed with this Court no later than January 15, 2025.” Id. at 90.

[14] By order dated November 15, 2024, the trial court denied Steven's motion for stay and gave Steven until November 25, 2024, “to file with this Court either a consent to or a written objection to the interim account and to the interim distribution which it proposes.” Id. at 97. The order specified: “In the absence of any such objection, this Court may, without further hearing, enter an Order which directs the trustee to proceed with such distributions.” Id. The order also required David, on or before January 15, 2025, to file “a supplementary final accounting which reflects the resolution of the liabilities of Bell Auto Sales, Inc., which remain indeterminate as of the date of this Order, and the proposed final distribution of the Trust assets.” Id.

[15] Steven filed neither a consent nor an objection to the Accounting. Given Steven's inaction, the trial court entered a December 6, 2024 order approving the Accounting and authorizing David to proceed with the Accounting's proposed distributions. The court directed David, on or before January 15, 2025, to file a supplementary final accounting reflecting a solution to the remaining outstanding liabilities of Bell Auto noted in the Accounting. The court certified the order as a final appealable order under Indiana Trial Rule 54(B).

[16] Before David filed the supplemental accounting required by the December 6, 2024 order, Steven initiated this appeal. No further action has been taken in the underlying proceeding.

Discussion and Decision

[17] Steven raises a variety of claims relating to the validity of the Accounting and the requirement that Steven pay David's attorney fees. We affirm, finding all these claims waived by Steven's failure to object to or otherwise bring these issues to the attention of the trial court, despite having ample opportunity to do so.

[18] Although the parties suggest a standard of review applicable to findings of fact and conclusions of law, that standard does not apply here. The orders in dispute do not include formal findings or conclusions. A general judgment standard applies to issues upon which there are no findings. Butler Univ. v. Estate of Verdak, 815 N.E.2d 185, 190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017); J.L.L. v. Madison Cty. Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 628 N.E.2d 1223, 1225 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). A general judgment will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Butler Univ., 815 N.E.2d at 190-91.

[19] Steven challenges the propriety of the Accounting, attacking its lack of verification, its inclusion of the attorney fees awarded to David and against Steven, and its alleged conflict with the terms of the mediated Settlement. Steven also contends that the trial court erred in allegedly failing to give him 20 days to object to the Accounting as required by statute. He alternatively claims that the allegedly defective Accounting never triggered the period for objection.¹ He also asserts that his failure to object to the Accounting did not relieve the trial court of the duty to ensure the accuracy of the Accounting before approving it.

[20] Steven raises all these claims for the first time on appeal. Issues never presented to the trial court are generally waived. Commitment of T.S. v. Logansport State Hosp., 959 N.E.2d 855, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). “[T]his rule of waiver in part protects the integrity of the trial court in that the trial court cannot be found to have erred as to an issue or argument that it never had an opportunity to consider.” Id. “Conversely, an intermediate court of appeals is not the forum for the initial decision in a case.” Id.

[21] To preserve a claim for review, the litigant must object to the trial court's ruling and state the reasons for that objection. Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 651 (Ind. 2018). “This gives the court an opportunity to cure the alleged error, which, in turn, ‘can result in enormous savings in time, effort and expense to the parties and the court, including avoiding an appeal and retrial.” Id. (quoting State v. Daniels, 680 N.E.2d 829, 835 (Ind. 1997)). In addition, if the trial court overrules the objection, the appellate court benefits from a sufficiently developed record on which to base its decision. Id. This rule of waiver is “designed to promote fairness ‘by preventing a party from sitting idly by,’ ostensibly agreeing to a ruling ‘only to cry foul’ when the court ultimately renders an adverse decision.” Id. (quoting Hale v. State, 54 N.E.3d 355, 359 (Ind. 2016)).

[22] This is what happened here. Steven agreed to a 10-day period for objecting to the Accounting but now claims that he should have been given 20 days to object pursuant to statute. The trial court actually waited 21 days to approve the Accounting—one day beyond the statutory objection period—but Steven failed to act even before the deadline that he now espouses. On appeal, he complains—for the first time—that the trial court's approval of the Accounting was premature. He also claims a myriad of defects in the Accounting that he never bothered to point out to the trial court, despite having the opportunity to do so.

[23] As to the attorney fees award, Steven similarly agreed to a deadline of October 9, 2024, for filing his objection to David's claim for attorney fees. Steven filed no objection by that date, prompting the trial court to immediately grant the attorney fees request. Even in his motion to stay that ruling, Steven never challenged the merits of the attorney fee award. Now, for the first time, Steven challenges that award and its incorporation within the Accounting.

[24] Steven had the opportunity to raise to the trial court all the issues and sub-issues that he now presents for the first time on appeal—notably, the adequacy of the Accounting, whether the Accounting's alleged defects rendered it null or lengthened the period for objections, whether the Accounting violated the Settlement, whether the trial court was obligated to reject the Accounting, and whether the Accounting properly incorporated the attorney fees award. By remaining silent as to these issues until this appeal, he has waived them all. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

affirmed

FOOTNOTES

1.   Steven cites no authority establishing this proposition.

Weissmann, Judge.

[25] Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.