Martaes Lewaun Beverly, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Martaes Lewaun Beverly appeals his conviction for Class A misdemeanor battery, arguing the trial court erred in removing a juror for cause. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In April 2024, the State charged Beverly with Level 5 felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury. A jury trial was held in December 2024. During jury selection, Juror D. said he was a retired police officer and knew several of the police officers involved in this case. He explained that because police officers sign probable-cause affidavits and “swear[ ] on [their] name and honor,” he would “start from the side of the officer.” Tr. Vol. 1 p. 92.

[3] In contrast, Juror R. said he didn't “trust police” and that, “being a person of color, we don't trust them[.]” Id. at 82. Juror R. asked if there would be witnesses other than police officers, and the prosecutor said there would be “a couple of civilian witnesses.” Id. Juror R. then responded, “If you asking me can I be fair and balanced, oh yeah. If he did it, oh yeah, I could put him in jail, no problem. But if it's just policemen, no, no, no, no.” Id. The prosecutor asked Juror R. if that meant he would give less weight to the testimony of police officers, and he answered, “You know what's going on in this country. You - Yeah, I would not believe any policeman in this world.” Id. at 83. He continued, “Regardless of what they say. They could stand on a stack of bibles and I wouldn't believe them.” Id. Juror R. said he knew this would “kick [him] off the jury,” but he wanted to “tell the truth” that “[a]ll police collude together” and are “not honest.” Id. at 83-84.

[4] After the first round of questioning, the parties discussed challenges for cause. The State moved to strike Juror R. because of his “strong feelings on police officers.” Id. at 105. Defense counsel objected. Beverly then moved to strike Juror D. based on his “personal knowledge of the officers involved in the case” and “believing one category of witnesses over the other.” Id. at 108. The State objected. The trial court believed the parties had valid grounds to strike each juror for cause, but it gave them an opportunity to rehabilitate the jurors. During that attempt, Juror R. said “most policemen lie” “[o]n all occasions.” Id. at 111. He also said that he would need evidence from someone other than a police officer to find a defendant guilty.

[5] The trial court said nothing it heard had changed its mind about striking both jurors for cause but allowed the parties to “make any argument for the record.” Id. at 113. The following exchange then occurred between the trial court and defense counsel:

[Trial court]: All right. Anything else that you want to say in the argument about the merits of the motion to exclude?

[Defense counsel]: No, No. I mean I - Well actually, yes. I think, again, that we have the same issue on both jurors. Is one -

[Trial court]: It's an interesting juxtaposition, isn't it?

[Defense counsel]: Yes, one's a negative and one's positive, but both need further evidence in order to convict or to not convict. So I think it's the same analysis. It's either both or both aren't, I'd argue.

Id. at 113-14 (emphasis added). The court removed both jurors for cause:

We have two (2) jurors kind of with opposite presumptions about categorical testimony. And I think that it's fair to expect that jurors who come in, um, will not have an automatically elevated or decreased opinion of credibility on an entire class of witnesses. And both witnesses have voiced that they do have a categorical different weighting that they would give to a police officer. One pretty much lower, one somewhat higher, unless either one is convinced otherwise. And I think that's not the way the law works. You can't have jurors who walk in and say automatically I'm gonna believe these folks until someone gives me a reason not to, or automatically I'm not gonna believe any thing [sic] they say unless someone else says the same thing they said, and then I might believe they were telling the truth. That's just not how it works.

Id. at 114-15.

[6] The jury found Beverly guilty of Class A misdemeanor battery as a lesser-included offense, and the trial court sentenced him to one year (time served).

[7] Beverly now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Beverly contends the trial court erred in removing Juror R. for cause. We review a trial court's decision to remove a juror for cause for an abuse of discretion. Oswalt v. State, 19 N.E.3d 241, 245 (Ind. 2014), reh'g denied. “The trial court has the unique position to observe and assess the demeanor of prospective jurors as they answer the questions posed by counsel,” and we give “substantial deference” to its decision. Id. (quotation omitted).

[9] A party can challenge a juror for cause if they are “biased or prejudiced for or against the defendant.” Ind. Code § 35-37-1-5(a)(11); see also Ind. Jury Rule 17(a)(8) (“The court shall sustain a challenge for cause if the prospective juror ․ is biased or prejudiced for or against a party to the case[.]”). Indeed, a juror is incompetent—and thus cannot serve—if their views would “prevent or substantially impair” their ability to be impartial. Crossland v. State, 256 N.E.3d 517, 525 (Ind. 2025). “Put differently, a juror is incompetent if she is biased.” Id.¹

[10] Here, the evidence shows that Juror R. was biased or prejudiced against the State. He explained that police officers lie “[o]n all occasions,” that he wouldn't believe a police officer even if they were standing on a stack of Bibles, and that he would need evidence from someone other than a police officer to find a defendant guilty. See Lindsey v. State, 916 N.E.2d 230, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (affirming removal of a juror for cause because the juror could not be fair and impartial based on his comments during jury selection about police), trans. denied. Although defense counsel sought to rehabilitate Juror R., his views were largely unchanged and did not sway the trial court. Moreover, defense counsel essentially conceded below that the court should either keep both Juror D. and Juror R. or remove them both, and the court chose removal for both. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in removing Juror R. for cause.

[11] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Beverly notes that he is “not mak[ing] a Batson claim in this appeal.” Appellant's Br. p. 10.

Vaidik, Judge.

Judges Tavitas and Felix concur. Tavitas, J., and Felix, J., concur.