Wayne A. Smith, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Wayne Smith was convicted of a series of crimes following three violent incidents involving his on-again, off-again girlfriend, Andrea Hairopoulos. Smith appeals, arguing that the trial court violated his due process rights by requiring him to wear hand-to-waist shackles during his bench trial without making an adequate record of why the restraints were necessary. He also claims the State presented insufficient evidence to support his convictions for burglary, domestic battery, and criminal recklessness. We affirm.

Facts

[2] From 2021 to 2023, Smith and Hairopoulos were in a tumultuous romantic relationship. Smith's infidelity and constant accusations that Hairopoulos, too, was unfaithful led to heated arguments and repeated breakups between them. But Smith's excuses and apologies, combined with Hairopoulos's capacity for forgiveness, always resulted in the couple's reconciliation.

[3] During a breakup in October 2022, Smith sent Hairopoulos “threatening” text messages that caused Hairopoulos to try to hide her whereabouts from Smith. Tr. Vol. II, p. 242. At the time, Hairopoulos was living with her sister in Elkhart and working as an in-home health care aide for two individuals: one who resided on Sunnyfield Place in South Bend, and another who resided on Denver Avenue in Goshen. Because Smith lived in South Bend, Hairopoulos would park in the garage of the Sunnyfield Place residence whenever she worked there.

[4] Hairopoulos worked a shift at the Sunnyfield Place residence on October 12, 2022. Upon her arrival, Hairopoulos parked in the garage, entered the home, and locked the door behind her. Moments later, she heard someone walking on the porch outside. Hairopoulos peeked out the window and saw Smith, who shouted: “B***h, I know you're in there. I told you I would get you.” Id. at 243. Smith then threw an iron porch chair at the home's bay window, smashing it. Hairopoulos called 911 and filed a police report, but nothing ever came of the incident.

[5] Two days later, on October 14, 2022, Hairopoulos worked a shift at the Denver Avenue residence. During this shift, Smith sent Hairopoulos text messages in which he threatened to put her in a “funeral home” and “cause injuries specifically to [her] face” so she would require a “closed casket.” Tr. Vol. III, pp. 10-11. Smith also suggested that he knew Hairopoulos's location, which prompted Hairopoulos to turn off all the lights in the home and call 911 from her cellphone. Smith, however, was already lurking outside.

[6] While Hairopoulos was on the phone with the 911 dispatcher, Smith forced his way through the back door of the Denver Avenue residence. Once inside, he ran toward Hairopoulos, grabbed her, and threw her to the ground, shouting: “B***h, who's going to protect you now?” Id. at 14. Hairopoulos assumed a fetal position and covered her face with her arms while Smith “stomp[ed] and punch[ed]” her in the head, shoulder, arm, and side. Id. at 15.

[7] Though Hairopoulos's cellphone was knocked from her hand during Smith's attack, the 911 call remained connected, and police were dispatched to the scene. Before they arrived, however, Smith stopped attacking Hairopoulos, took her phone, and fled through the back door. The phone was never recovered.

[8] Hairopoulos suffered scratches on her neck, knots on her head, ear pain, and prolonged hearing loss from Smith's attack. Some of her acrylic fingernails were ripped off as well, causing pain in her hands. Hairopoulos described the pain from her injuries as “bad.” Id. at 16. She rated it as 6 or 7 on a scale of 1 to 10, with the caveat that she had birthed six children. In addition to her injuries, the birthstones of three of those children were dislodged from the ring Hairopoulos was wearing during the attack.

[9] Nothing immediately came of the October 14, 2022 incident, and Smith and Hairopoulos resumed contact a month later. On November 17, Smith reached out to Hairopoulos via Facebook Messenger to wish her a happy birthday. Smith also sent apologetic messages, telling Hairopoulos that he loved her and repeatedly asking for forgiveness. Smith explained that he “lost it” when he and Hairopoulos last broke up and was suffering daily as a result. Exhs. p. 35.

[10] Hairopoulos thanked Smith for the birthday wishes, but when Smith asked her to call him, Hairopoulos stated: “You stomped 3 of my kids (sic) birthstones out of my ring Poppy.” Id. at 37. Smith responded with surprise and repeated apologies, offering to replace the damaged ring. Hairopoulos told Smith that she did not want him to “replace anything,” but Smith replied: “[I know] u don't but it's my wrong doing (sic) that made that happen.” Id.

[11] Smith and Hairopoulos reconciled soon after their Facebook Messenger exchange. But by February 2, 2023, they were broken up again. On that date, Smith sent Hairopoulos threatening text messages while she was living with a friend on Broadway Boulevard in Elkhart. Hairopoulos told Smith to leave her alone and suggested he start over by moving to Atlanta, where most of his family lived. Smith, however, wanted revenge. He told Hairopoulos she had “pushed too far this time” and warned that she had no idea what he was planning. Id. at 38. He also stated: “[On my momma] I'll be f**king somebody s**t up tonight [on my momma] watch [I'm gonna do it].” Id.

[12] Hairopoulos pleaded with Smith, “Just stop,” but he refused to back down. Id. at 42. Smith further threatened: “[On my momma] ima make u pay this time ․ I ain't got s**t to lose.” Id. at 42-43. And when Hairopoulos told Smith she was not scared of him, he replied: “U not gone be scared till u hear them shoots (sic) [on my momma] watch [I'm gonna do it].” Id. at 45. Finally, Smith stated: “Yup going straight to Elkhart [laughing but very, very serious].” Id.

[13] Less than two hours after receiving Smith's threatening messages, Hairopoulos heard gunshots outside the Broadway Boulevard residence where she was staying. Hairopoulos called 911, and police were dispatched to the scene. The responding officers found four shell casings in the roadway, bullet holes in the home's garage door and siding, and a bullet fragment on the floor of the garage.

[14] Smith was eventually arrested and charged with six crimes across two cases. No charges were filed for the October 12, 2022 incident on Sunnyfield Place. But for the October 14 incident on Denver Avenue, the State charged Smith with Level 3 felony burglary, Level 6 felony domestic battery, Level 6 felony intimidation, and Class A misdemeanor theft. For the February 2, 2023 incident on Broadway Boulevard, the State separately charged Smith with criminal recklessness and stalking, both Level 5 felonies.

[15] Smith's two cases were consolidated for bench trial, and Smith remained in jail until his trial date. At trial, Smith appeared in jail clothes while wearing both ankle and hand-to-waist shackles. Smith's defense counsel objected to Smith being required to wear the hand-to-waist shackles during trial, arguing that Smith needed to assist in his defense by taking notes. The trial judge deferred to a sheriff's deputy, who advised that his supervisor had ordered Smith to remain shackled. The trial judge then took a recess to discuss the issue with the head of court security.

[16] Once back on the record, the following exchange occurred between the trial judge and Smith's defense counsel:

THE COURT: All right. So [Defense Counsel], I did have the opportunity to speak with Jason Jones, who is the head of the court security officers. And Officer Jones was able to articulate to the Court concerns that he had in this instance and (sic) removing the shackles. So I'm not going to order that. I'm not going to supersede Officer Jones, who is in charge of that.

Um, counsel, if you wish to, you know, maybe briefly discuss that in chambers, I'm willing to do that. I can assure you I'm not going to be persuaded, but I'm happy to provide some explanation if you would like that.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, I'm going to make a record, if I can. Uh, Mr. Smith is a copious note taker. He has -- every time I've met with Mr. Smith, he writes out different case -- cases, different matters that he wants me to read and look at. He's been very involved in terms of his defense with writing things to me. Uh, I have been in trial in this courtroom, and I've never had a client with their arms shackled where they couldn't write notes. So I know it is possible for defendants to be in this courtroom without a belly chain and without their arms shackled. Uh, I do believe that this is just an inappropriate manner of restraining him. You know, put him on his ankles so he can't run. Or whatever they do with other defendants. But he is a copious note taker, and he wants -- wanted me to bring him paper and a pen for this event, and his arms can barely reach over the table to be able to write. And, uh, I think this is a very inappropriate situation for him to be shackled like this.

Tr. Vol. II, pp. 8-9.

[17] The bench trial proceeded, and the court found Smith guilty as charged. The court later sentenced Smith to a total of 23 years imprisonment.

Discussion and Decision

[18] Smith raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues that the trial court erred by requiring him to wear hand-to-waist shackles without making an adequate record of why the restraints were necessary. Second, he claims the State presented insufficient evidence to support his convictions for burglary, domestic battery, and criminal recklessness. We find that Smith invited the alleged error in the trial court's record regarding his hand-to-waist shackles and that sufficient evidence supports his challenged convictions. We therefore affirm.

I. Smith Invited the Alleged Error in the Record of Why Hand-to-Waist Shackles Were Necessary

[19] The due process guarantees of the United States Constitution's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments “prohibit the use of physical restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial.” Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 629 (2005). We review a trial court's determination that restraints are necessary under an abuse of discretion standard. French v. State, 778 N.E.2d 816, 820 (Ind. 2002). To facilitate this review, our Supreme Court has held that “the facts and reasoning supporting the trial judge's determination that restraints are necessary must be placed on the record.” Id. (citing Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179, 1193 (Ind. 2001)).

[20] Smith claims the trial court abused its discretion by failing to place on the record its rationale for requiring him to wear hand-to-waist shackles during trial. The record, however, shows that Smith's defense counsel declined the court's offer to explain its reasoning, thereby inviting the alleged error of which he now complains.

[21] The invited error doctrine precludes a party from benefiting on appeal from “an error that [the party] commits, invites, or which is the natural consequence of [their] own neglect or misconduct.” Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946, 975 (Ind. 2014) (citation omitted). “A party invites an error when it takes an affirmative action that is part of a deliberate, well-informed trial strategy.” McKee v. State, 228 N.E.3d 1081, 1082 (Ind. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the record shows that Smith's defense counsel played an active role in the trial court's alleged omission.

[22] When defense counsel initially objected to Smith wearing hand-to-waist shackles during trial, the trial court took a recess to consult with Officer Jones, the head of court security. Upon returning, the court explained to defense counsel that Officer Jones had articulated concerns and persuaded the court that Smith's hand-to-waist shackles were necessary.¹ The court then offered to provide defense counsel with a detailed explanation of its reasoning in chambers, which counsel immediately disregarded. Instead, defense counsel stated: “Well, I'm going to make a record, if I can.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 9. He then made a lengthy objection on the record, arguing that Smith was “a copious note taker” and emphasizing that the shackles prevented Smith from taking notes. Id.

[23] Defense counsel's choice to forgo the trial court's explanation for why hand-to-waist shackles were necessary contributed to the very record inadequacy that Smith alleges on appeal. The invited error doctrine therefore precludes Smith from benefitting from the alleged error. Accordingly, we do not review Smith's due process claim.

II. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Smith's Challenged Convictions

[24] When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005). We consider only the probative evidence supporting the verdict and any reasonable inferences which may be drawn from this evidence. Id. We will affirm if the probative evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence could have allowed a reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[25] Smith challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for burglary, domestic battery, and criminal recklessness. Because his burglary and domestic battery convictions both arise from the incident at the Denver Avenue residence and have overlapping facts, we address them together.

A. Burglary and Domestic Battery Convictions

[26] “A person who breaks and enters the building or structure of another person, with intent to commit a felony or theft in it, commits burglary, a Level 5 felony.” Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1. “However, the offense is ․ a Level 3 felony if it results in bodily injury to any person other than a defendant.” Id. § 1(2). Here, the State specifically alleged that Smith broke into and entered the Denver Avenue residence with intent to commit “Domestic Battery Resulting in Moderate Bodily Injury.” App. Vol. II, p. 19. The State also alleged that Smith committed a domestic battery resulting in moderate bodily injury to Hairopoulos once inside the home.

[27] “[A] person who “knowingly or intentionally ․ touches a family or household member ² in a rude, insolent, or angry manner ․ commits domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor.” Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1). However, the offense is a Level 6 felony if it “results in moderate bodily injury to a family or household member.” Id. § 1.3(b)(3). “ ‘Moderate bodily injury’ means any impairment of physical condition that includes substantial pain.” Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-204.5.

[28] Smith challenges his burglary and domestic battery convictions on three alternative grounds. First, he claims the State failed to prove he was the one who broke into the Denver Avenue residence on October 14, 2022. Second, he claims the State failed to prove he broke into the home with intent to commit domestic battery resulting in moderate bodily injury therein. And third, he claims his domestic battery of Hairopoulos once inside the home did not result in moderate bodily injury. All three claims fail.

[29] The State presented sufficient evidence to prove that Smith was the one who broke into the Denver Avenue residence on October 14, 2022. “[A] conviction can be sustained on the testimony of a single witness, even where the evidence is uncorroborated.” Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 135 (Ind. 2016). Here, Hairopoulos specifically testified that Smith kicked in the home's back door and attacked her inside. And this testimony was corroborated by the Facebook messages Smith sent to Hairopoulos a month later. In these messages, Smith apologized for his actions and took responsibility for breaking Hairopoulos's ring during the October 14 attack.

[30] The State also presented sufficient evidence to prove that Smith broke into the Denver Avenue residence with intent to commit domestic battery resulting in moderate bodily injury therein. Prior to the break-in, Smith sent Hairopoulos text messages in which he effectively threatened to kill her and mutilate her face. These threats show Smith's intent to touch Hairopoulos in a “rude, insolent, or angry manner” and to cause her “substantial pain.” Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1), (b)(3) (defining felony domestic battery); Id. § 204.5 (defining moderate bodily injury).

[31] Additionally, the State presented sufficient evidence to prove that Smith's acts of domestic battery inside the Denver Avenue residence resulted in moderate bodily injury to Hairopoulos. As previously stated, the Indiana Criminal Code defines “moderate bodily injury” to mean “any impairment of physical condition that includes substantial pain.” Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-204.5. Such an injury falls somewhere between basic “bodily injury,” which is defined to include “any ․ physical pain,” and “serious bodily injury,” which is defined to include “extreme pain.” Id. §§ 29, 292(3).

[32] “[T]here is no bright-line test to distinguish between [levels of pain].” Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 142 n.17 (Ind. 2012). But “evaluating a degree of pain is a concept that jurors can understand.” Smith v. State, 167 N.E.3d 378, 383 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Vaillancourt v. State, 695 N.E.2d 606, 608, 610 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)). And “we entrust to the jury the task of applying its ‘experiences in life’ and ‘common sense’ as it ‘takes into account all of the facts and circumstances’ in a given case.” Id. (quoting McAlpin v. State, 80 N.E.3d 157, 163 (Ind. 2017)).

[33] Here, Hairopoulos testified that Smith “stomp[ed] and punch[ed]” her in the head, causing knots on her head, ear pain, and prolonged hearing loss. Tr. Vol. III, p. 1. Some of her acrylic fingernails were also ripped off during the attack. And Hairopoulos rated the pain she endured as 6 or 7 on a scale of 1 to 10. From this evidence, a factfinder could reasonably conclude that Hairopoulos suffered substantial pain and, thus, moderate bodily injury from Smith's domestic battery.

B. Criminal Recklessness Conviction

[34] “A person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally performs an act that creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person commits criminal recklessness ․ a Class A misdemeanor.” Ind. Code § 35-42-2-2(a). However, the offense is a Level 5 felony if “it is committed by shooting a firearm into an occupied motor vehicle, an inhabited dwelling, or another building or place where people are likely to be present.” Id. § 2(b)(2)(A).

[35] Smith claims the State failed to prove that he was the one who fired the gunshots into the Broadway Boulevard residence on February 2, 2023. He emphasizes the lack of any direct evidence placing him at the scene. But “[a] verdict may be sustained on circumstantial evidence alone if that evidence supports a reasonable inference of guilt.” Jones v. State, 250 N.E.3d 1062, 1084 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

[36] Here, the evidence showed that Smith sent Hairopoulos threatening text messages on the night of the shooting. These included the statements: “I'll be f**king somebody s**t up tonight [on my momma] watch [I'm gonna do it]”; “[On my momma] ima make u pay this time ․ I ain't got s**t to lose”; and “U not gone be scared till u hear them shoots (sic) [on my momma] watch [I'm gonna do it].” Exhs. pp. 41-45. Smith then indicated that he was “going straight to Elkhart,” which is where the Broadway Boulevard residence was located. Id. at 45. Less than two hours later, the gunshots rang outside the home.

[37] From this evidence, a factfinder could reasonably infer that Smith was the one who fired the gunshots into the Broadway Boulevard residence.

Conclusion

[38] Finding Smith invited the alleged error in the trial court's record of why hand-to-waist shackles were necessary and that sufficient evidence supports Smith's convictions for burglary, domestic battery, and criminal recklessness, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Though Officer Jones's concerns were not expressed on the record, Smith had a lengthy criminal history including convictions for escape and resisting law enforcement by both force and flight.

2.   “An individual is a ‘family or household member’ of another person if the individual ․ is dating or has dated the other person ․ [or] is or was engaged in a sexual relationship with the other person.” Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-128 (a)(2)-(3).

Weissmann, Judge.

Judges Bailey and Brown concur. Bailey. J., and Brown, J., concur