SCHRODER v. HEIMLICH (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Kent Schroder (“Father”) and Patrice Heimlich ¹ (“Mother”) (collectively, “Parents”) are the biological parents of two minor children (the “Children”). Parents divorced in December 2018 and agreed to joint legal and physical custody of the Children and a two-week rotating parenting-time schedule. Subsequently, the trial court granted Mother's petition to modify custody, awarding her sole legal and primary physical custody of the Children and providing Father with parenting time consistent with the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines. Nearly four years later, Father filed a motion to modify custody, parenting time, and child support. The trial court denied Father's motion, and Father now appeals, raising two issues for our review, which we revise and restate as the following single issue: Whether the trial court clearly erred by denying Father's motion to modify.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Parents married in 2013; their first child was born that same year, and their second child was born in 2015. In May 2018, Mother filed a petition to dissolve the marriage. In December 2018, Parents’ marriage was dissolved by a final decree, which incorporated their Marital Settlement Agreement (the “Agreement”). Under the Agreement, Parents agreed to share joint legal and physical custody of the Children and exercise parenting time on a two-week rotating schedule. Among other things, the Agreement provided that the Children would be homeschooled, and no child support would be paid. The Agreement also addressed Parents’ share of the Children's medical and homeschooling expenses.

[4] In October 2019, Mother returned to the court requesting that issues of custody, parenting time, and child support be modified (“Mother's Petition to Modify”). Mother specifically requested sole legal and primary physical custody of the Children and for the trial court to “recalculate[ ]” the child support obligation. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 21. In January 2020, the trial court granted Mother's Petition to Modify, finding that a substantial change had occurred in the custody factors listed under Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8. Specifically, the trial court found in relevant part as follows:

[T]he Court finds that the current custody and parenting time orders are no longer in the [C]hildren's best interests. Specifically, Father has not exercised his parenting time with his children as previously agreed, and his living situation in the [motel], and now out of a camper are unstable and concerning for the safety and well-being of the [C]hildren. Further, the parties have been unable to co-parent regarding education and medical decisions for the [C]hildren. Mother has been the primary parent caring for the [C]hildren, has a stable living situation, and is in a better position to provide for the [C]hildren.

Appellant's App. Vol. II at 23. Accordingly, the trial court awarded Mother sole legal and primary physical custody of the Children and ordered Father's parenting time to be in accordance with the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines, including holidays and extended parenting time.

[5] Nearly four years later, on December 28, 2023, Father filed a motion to modify all child-related issues (“Father's Motion to Modify”). Appellant's App. Vol. II at 26. Father alleged that since the trial court entered its January 2020 order, “there has been a substantial change” in one or more of the Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8 custody factors such that the “current custody and parenting time orders are no longer in the [C]hildren's best interests.” Id.

[6] In December, the hearing on Parents’ pending motions was held. Evidence was presented that, at that time, Father was living in a home in Bluffton, Indiana, which he rented from his mother. He had been living in the home since June or July 2024. Father testified that he does not pay the electricity bill monthly but instead “let[s] it go two months and then pay[s] it sometimes.” Tr. Vol. I at 140. Regarding parenting time, Father picked up the Children and dropped them off because he had “moved away” from Decatur to Bluffton. Id. at 107. Evidence was also presented that in 2023, Father asked Mother “repeatedly” to allow him to move to the State of Washington with the Children, id. at 127, and “expected [the] Children to fly alone and spend 50% of their time in Washington,” id. at 180.

[7] Evidence was presented that Parents disagreed on the medical decisions for the Children and that joint legal custody would spark more arguments between Parents. Father testified that he was unhappy with Mother's decision to allow M.S. to undergo general anesthesia for dental care. Mother testified that she was “concerned that [Father] would want [the C]hildren to undergo medical procedures without proper anesthesia when it [was] recommended by the doctors” and that she was “concerned that, in the past, [Father] had restricted [Mother's] and the [C]hildren's access to dentists.” Tr. Vol. I at 165–66. She also testified that Father “view[ed] orthodontics as cosmetic when it is actually much more than that.” Id. at 166.

[8] Evidence was also presented that Parents disagreed on the Children's homeschooling. The Children were homeschooled through Braintree, an online public-school program, but Father did not agree with the Children participating in that program. Mother agreed that if the trial court awarded Parents joint legal custody, it would “create a dispute about what type of homeschooling should be done.” Tr. Vol. I at 168.

[9] Since January 2020, when the trial court issued its order granting Mother's Petition to Modify, Father had been exercising more parenting time than the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines prescribed. However, Mother testified that she had concerns about the trial court increasing Father's parenting time and did not believe it was in the Children's best interests. For example, Mother told the trial court that when she texted Father about the Children not showering at his home, Father messaged Mother that he “hadn't had a shower in months with no problems or odors.” Ex. Vol. II at 183.

[10] Mother also had concerns about Father's mental health. Father could not remember his son's birthday and had to send a text message to Mother to confirm the date. During the hearing, Father told the trial court that he had been diagnosed with ADHD and prescribed medication for it, but decided unilaterally to stop taking the medication because he believed “[t]here was no longer a need” to take it. Tr. Vol. I at 125.

[11] On December 23, 2024, the trial court issued its order on all pending issues, concluding in relevant part as follows:

3. [Father's] Motion to Modify Custody is denied, as [Father] failed to demonstrate a substantial change in one or more of the [custody] factors under Indiana Code 31-17-2-8. ․ Mother shall maintain sole legal and primary physical custody of the [C]hildren.

4. ․ Father's Motion to Modify Parenting Time is denied. [Father] shall continue to have parenting time with respect to the [C]hildren pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines including holidays and extended parenting time.

Appellant's App. Vol. II at 16. The trial court granted Mother's request for sanctions and attorneys’ fees based on Father's repeated failure to comply with discovery requests. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court Did Not Clearly Err by Denying Father's Petition to Modify Custody

[12] Father argues that the trial court erred by denying his petition to modify custody. The trial court here entered findings and conclusions sua sponte, so we review the “issues covered by the findings with a two-tiered standard of review that asks whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment.” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016) (citing In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014)). We review any issue not covered by the findings “under the general judgment standard,” which means we will affirm “on any legal theory supported by the evidence.” Id. at 123–24 (citing S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287).

[13] Our review is also guided by the following considerations unique to family law cases:

[T]here is a well-established preference in Indiana “for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.” In re Marriage of Richardson, 622 N.E.2d 178 (Ind. 1993). Appellate courts “are in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of the evidence.” Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002) (quoting Brickley v. Brickley, 247 Ind. 201, 204, 210 N.E.2d 850, 852 (1965)). “On appeal it is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by appellant before there is a basis for reversal.” Id. “Appellate judges are not to reweigh the evidence nor reassess witness credibility, and the evidence should be viewed most favorably to the judgment.” Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011) (citations omitted).

Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124. Furthermore, we accept as true any findings not challenged on appeal. See R.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)).

[14] Father argues the trial court erred by declining to modify custody from Mother having sole legal and primary physical custody of the Children back to the shared custody arrangement under the Agreement. Indiana Code section 31-17-2-21 provides that a trial court “may not modify a child custody order unless: (1) the modification is in the best interests of the child; and (2) there is a substantial change in one (1) or more of the factors that the court may consider under [Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8].” Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8 provides that the trial court is to consider all relevant factors, including, as relevant here, the Parents’ wishes, the Children's adjustment to their home, and the mental and physical health of all individuals involved. Importantly, “[t]he party seeking to modify custody bears the burden of demonstrating the existing custody should be altered.” Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124 (citing Lamb v. Wenning, 600 N.E.2d 96, 98 (Ind. 1992)).

[15] Father specifically claims that the trial court applied a double standard when it refused to modify custody in his favor. Father contends that “[f]or the same reason” the trial court found a “substantial change” in January 2020, and “modified [Parents’] agreed custody and parenting time arrangement,” the trial court likewise “should have found there was a substantial change in 2024 when the initial conditions giving rise to substantial change were reversed.” Appellant's Br. at 14. Father's bald assertion that there has been a substantial change is insufficient to require a modification. And while Father correctly notes that “improvements in the non-custodial home are [a] proper consideration[ ] under the [statutory] modification standard,” Bryant v. Bryant, 693 N.E.2d 976, 979 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Joe v. Lebow, 670 N.E.2d 9, 19 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)), “evidence of a child's improving condition with the noncustodial parent will not by itself support a custody modification,” Collyear-Bell v. Bell, 105 N.E.3d 176, 185 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). The trial court did not clearly err by concluding that there was no substantial change in any of the Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8 factors.

[16] Next, Father argues that the trial court erred by failing to enter a specific finding regarding the Children's best interests to support its determination that custody should not be modified. Because the trial court determined there had not been a substantial change in any of the Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8 factors, the trial court did not need to make a best-interests determination. See I.C. § 31-17-2-21(a) (allowing a court to modify custody only if there is a substantial change in circumstances and that modification is in child's best interests). Consequently, we cannot say the trail court erred by not entering findings and conclusions regarding the Children's best interests.

[17] In this case, the evidence supporting the trial court's determination clearly shows that Parents cannot agree on decisions regarding the Children's educational and medical needs, and they have profoundly different views regarding the role that Western medicine should play in the Children's healthcare. The Children have been in the same custodial arrangement since January 2020, and Mother has provided the Children with a stable home environment.

[18] Based on the foregoing, we cannot say the trial court clearly erred by denying Father's petition to modify custody. We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Formerly known as Patrice Schroder.

Felix, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.