IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of T.L. (Father) and M.S. (Mother) and B.S. and S.L. (Minor Children) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] T.L. (“Father”) and M.S. (“Mother”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal the termination of their parental rights to two of their children. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Father and Mother are the parents of B.S, born in August 2020, and S.L., born in August 2022. Parents each have a history of involvement with the Department of Child Services (DCS) in connection with children from prior relationships. DCS became involved in this case in September 2022, when B.S. was two and S.L. was one month old, after receiving a report of domestic violence in the home and lack of hygiene and safe sleeping conditions. A DCS family case manager (FCM) visited the home and spoke with Parents separately, and both denied physical violence. The following month, police were called to the home for domestic violence, and officers “observed marks on [Mother's] face.” Ex. Vol. 3 p. 208. Father was arrested and charged with Level 6 felony domestic battery committed in the presence of a child under 16.

[3] DCS tried to work with Mother to create a safety plan for herself and the children, but Mother “indicated that she would not participate in any services or engage with DCS.” Id. As a result, DCS removed the children on October 12 and placed them in foster care, where they have since remained. The next day, DCS filed a petition alleging the children were in need of services (CHINS). In January 2023, upon admissions by Parents, the trial court adjudicated the children to be CHINS. In its dispositional decree, the court ordered Parents to, among other things, maintain safe and stable housing, refrain from domestic violence, complete parenting and domestic-violence assessments and any resulting recommendations, and attend visitation.

[4] At first, Parents mostly complied with the dispositional decree. Mother participated in individual therapy through Aspire, attended supervised visitation, and completed domestic-violence services. She also participated in parenting education but said “it was stupid” and “did [not] seem to be willing to take in any information.” Tr. pp. 92, 96. Father completed an intake with Cummins Behavioral Health and was recommended to participate in individual therapy and random drug screens, which he did. Father also completed domestic-violence services, although he wasn't consistent in attending those appointments or visitation.

[5] By the summer of 2023, Parents’ compliance declined. Father was referred for intensive outpatient treatment at Cummins after repeatedly testing positive for marijuana, but he attended only five of the fourteen sessions. Mother missed several therapy appointments and was discharged from parenting education for “being aggressive.” Ex. Vol. 4 p. 31. Parents attended visitation but fought with each other in front of the children, and one visit had to be ended early because of their fighting. Parents began unsupervised visitation in September, but later that month, the court changed Father's visits back to supervised because he'd continued testing positive for drugs and was unsuccessfully discharged from all services with Cummins for lack of engagement. The court also modified the dispositional decree to require Father to submit to random drug screens and complete a substance-abuse assessment and any recommended treatment.

[6] Parents’ noncompliance continued into 2024. Between October 2023 and April 2024, Father missed 23 random drug screens. He'd been referred to Aspire for individual therapy but was discharged after testing positive for methamphetamine. Mother was “unreceptive” to continuing individual therapy, so she was also discharged from Aspire with a recommendation that she be referred to a provider with a higher level of care. Id. at 53. During visits, Mother “became aggressive” with FCM Amber Hedges, including screaming profanity at Hedges in front of the children. Id. at 45. Additionally, the children were “dirty and smell[ed] of urine” after visits with Mother. Id. at 54. Parents began home-based casework with Noble Transitions in April. At one session, the caseworker asked about their history of domestic violence, and Mother “got really frustrated and ․ walked out.” Tr. p. 52. Father also started doing his visitation through Noble Transitions, but his attendance was inconsistent. By July, Father was canceling visits at least once a week, so Noble Transitions closed his referral. Parents were also unsuccessfully discharged from home-based casework in July due to canceling appointments.

[7] In May 2024, DCS moved to modify Mother's visitation to supervised because Father had been at her unsupervised visits with the children even though he was not to be present. The court granted the motion in August and ordered Parents to undergo new domestic-violence assessments before the September review hearing. Accordingly, DCS put in new referrals for Parents for domestic-violence services. But just a few weeks after the referral, Father was arrested and charged with Class A misdemeanor domestic battery against Mother. Father had previously entered a pretrial diversion agreement for his Level 6 felony domestic-battery charge from October 2022, but the trial court there reinstated the case in light of the new charge. In September, Mother was granted a protective order against Father due to the domestic violence. A week later, Father violated the protective order and was charged with invasion of privacy.¹ That same month, Parents were evicted from their apartment. On September 13, Family and Community Partners took over Parents’ supervised visitation, but Mother was discharged on September 18 for “being aggressive,” and Father was discharged because he was in jail. Id. at 147.

[8] DCS petitioned to terminate Parents’ parental rights in October 2024. The fact-finding hearing began on December 16. The children's foster father testified that the children are sometimes “physically dirty” when they come home from visits with Mother or Father—they would be “sticky,” S.L. would have an overly full diaper or diaper rash, and “on a few occasions they've come home with flea bites.” Id. at 21, 22. The children's foster home was a pre-adoptive placement, and their foster father testified that he and his wife were willing to adopt the children.

[9] The remainder of the hearing was held on January 17, 2025. FCM Hedges testified that Father hadn't submitted a drug screen since August 2024 or started domestic-violence services after DCS put in the second referral. She also noted that Father had completed a virtual drug-recovery program in November 2024 but “he's not following up with his aftercare.” Id. at 154. She explained that Mother had to restart her domestic-violence services because she'd missed too many appointments, including one that morning. FCM Hedges testified that Mother was living with a friend at the time but was working with her home-based caseworker to secure permanent housing.

[10] Father testified that he was enrolled in aftercare for his drug-recovery program. He acknowledged that he hadn't started domestic-violence services but said he planned to complete it after he finished aftercare. He said that he'd been sober since March 2024 but admitted that he hadn't submitted any drug screens since August 2024. When asked why he hadn't, Father said, “I've given enough drug screens in my time over this whole course.” Id. at 206. Father admitted that he'd been homeless since being evicted in September 2024 and was looking for employment. He explained that he was living in a friend's backyard at the time, but living there was “not a good situation” and wasn't his “long-term plan.” Id. at 202, 205.

[11] In February 2025, the trial court terminated Parents’ parental rights.

[12] Parents now separately appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[13] Parents contend there is insufficient evidence to support the termination of their parental rights. When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013). Rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the trial court's judgment. Id. When a trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the court's findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. Id. To determine whether a judgment terminating parental rights is clearly erroneous, we review whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings and whether the findings support the judgment. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016). DCS must prove the allegations in a termination petition by clear and convincing evidence. See Ind. Code § 31-34-12-2.

I. The trial court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous

[14] Parents each challenge some of the trial court's findings of fact. Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no evidence to support them, either directly or by inference. In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

A. Father's challenges

[15] Father challenges Findings 51 and 52: “Father is unemployed” and “Father is homeless.” Father's App. Vol. 2 p. 20. Father's own testimony supports these findings. At the fact-finding hearing, Father acknowledged that he was “currently not employed” and said he was “currently looking.” Tr. p. 214. He testified that he'd been homeless since being evicted in September 2024 and was living with a friend, but that wasn't his “long-term plan.” The fact that Father “had employment and housing for much of the CHINS and TPR cases,” Father's Br. p. 10, doesn't render these findings erroneous. The trial court didn't find that Father had never had a job or housing, only that he was unemployed and homeless at the time. Findings 51 and 52 are not clearly erroneous.

B. Mother's challenges

[16] Mother first contests Finding 22, which states, “Mother was discharged from services through Family and Community Partners in September 2023 due to aggressive behavior.” Father's App. Vol. 2 p. 17. FCM Hedges testified at the fact-finding hearing that Mother was discharged from Family and Community Partners on September 18, 2024, “due to being aggressive.” Tr. p. 147. Although the trial court said September 2023 in its finding, we infer that this was a typographical error and that the court was referring to the September 2024 discharge. And in any event, Mother's challenge to this finding isn't based on the date. Instead, she points to her own testimony that she wasn't being aggressive and claims that the service provider's definition of aggression “may be unreasonable.” Mother's Br. p. 27. This is merely a request for us to reweigh the evidence, which we do not do. See K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229. Finding 22 is not clearly erroneous.

[17] Mother also disputes the following portion of Finding 35: “Mother has exhibited a pattern of failing to complete Court Ordered services to assist with reunification, failing to cooperate with services to enhance her parenting abilities, [and] failing to fully address her own mental health needs and[/]or aggressive behaviors ․” Father's App. Vol. 2 p. 18. She claims this finding is “contradictory” to other findings because “the Court also listed a number of services Mother did complete or was engaged in at the time of the termination trial.” Mother's Br. p. 27. We find no contradiction. While Mother completed some services, she failed to cooperate with many others. Mother said parenting education was “stupid,” didn't seem “willing to take in any information,” and was eventually discharged for “being aggressive” with the provider. Mother also “became aggressive” with FCM Hedges during visits, including screaming profanity at her in front of the children. Mother was unreceptive to individual therapy and was discharged from Aspire with a recommendation that she be referred somewhere that could provide a higher level of care. Mother was also unsuccessfully discharged from home-based casework for canceling appointments. As mentioned above, she was discharged from Family and Community Partners for “being aggressive.” And by the time of the fact-finding hearing, Mother had to restart her domestic-violence services because she'd missed too many appointments. This evidence establishes a pattern of Mother failing to complete or cooperate with services and to fully address her mental-health needs and aggressive behaviors. Finding 35 is not clearly erroneous.

II. The trial court did not err in concluding there is a reasonable probability that Parents will not remedy the conditions that led to the children's removal and continued placement outside the home

[18] Parents also argue that DCS failed to meet the statutory requirements for termination. Here, DCS filed its termination petition under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4. A petition under that section must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c) (2024).² As to the first requirement, DCS alleged, and the trial court found, the existence of the following circumstance in subsection (d):

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

See Father's App. Vol. 2 pp. 10, 22. Parents don't challenge the trial court's conclusions that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the children and that termination is in the children's best interests, so we address only the court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability the conditions that resulted in the children's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied.³

[19] In determining whether there is a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in a child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, the trial court engages in a two-step analysis: first, the court identifies what conditions led to the child's placement and retention outside the home, and then it determines whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will not be remedied. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231. This second step requires the court to judge a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, considering evidence of changed conditions and balancing any recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). “Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.” Id.

[20] The children were removed due to domestic violence between Parents. In the more than two years between the removal and the termination fact-finding hearing, Parents never remedied their issues with domestic violence. While Parents did visitation together at the beginning of the CHINS case, they fought with each other in front of the children. When Parents’ home-based caseworker asked them about their history of domestic violence, Mother “got really frustrated and ․ walked out.” Although Parents both completed domestic-violence services, they clearly did not benefit from those services because the domestic violence continued. See In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 50 (Ind. 2019) (“[S]imply going through the motions of receiving services alone is not sufficient if the services do not result in the needed change.”), reh'g denied. In August 2024, the trial court ordered Parents to complete new domestic-violence assessments, but just a few weeks after DCS put in the referrals, Father was charged with Class A misdemeanor domestic battery against Mother. When Mother was granted a protective order against Father due to the domestic violence, he violated it a week later. By the time of the fact-finding hearing, Father still hadn't started his additional domestic-violence services. Though Mother had begun hers, she'd had to restart because she'd missed too many appointments, including one the morning of the hearing.

[21] In addition to domestic violence, a reason for the children's continued detention was Parents’ inability to provide suitable living conditions. This case began after DCS received a report of domestic violence and a lack of hygiene and safe sleeping conditions. The unsuitable conditions continued throughout the proceedings. The children's foster father testified that the children sometimes came home from visits with Mother or Father dirty or sticky. After some visits, S.L. had an overly full diaper or diaper rash, and on occasion, the children had flea bites. The children also “smell[ed] of urine” after visits with Mother. Additionally, Parents hadn't secured stable housing. In September 2024, Parents were evicted from their apartment, and Father had been homeless since then. At the time of the fact-finding hearing, he was living in his friend's backyard, which he acknowledged was “not a good situation.” Mother was also living with a friend at the time.

[22] The children also remained outside the home because of Father's drug use. Father began intensive outpatient treatment at Cummins but attended only five of the fourteen sessions and was eventually unsuccessfully discharged for lack of engagement. He was also discharged from individual counseling with Aspire for testing positive for methamphetamine. Shortly after Parents began unsupervised visitation, the trial court changed Father's visits back to supervised because of his discharge from Cummins and positive drug screens. Even after the court modified the dispositional decree to require Father to submit to random drug screens and complete substance-abuse treatment, Father continued testing positive for drugs and missed at least 23 screens. Although Father completed drug counseling in November 2024, FCM Hedges testified that he wasn't following through with the aftercare. And while Father claimed at the fact-finding hearing that he'd been sober since March 2024, he admitted that he hadn't submitted any drug screens since August 2024, stating, “I've given enough drug screens in my time.”

[23] Despite their patterns of noncompliance, Parents each focus on the services they did complete. But again, these arguments are effectively requests for us to reweigh the evidence, which we do not do. See K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229. The evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that Parents will not remedy the conditions that resulted in the children's removal and continued placement outside the home.

[24] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In March 2025, Father entered into a global plea agreement with the State whereby he pled guilty to Class A misdemeanor domestic battery and Class A misdemeanor theft in an unrelated case, and the State dismissed the Level 6 felony domestic-battery and invasion-of-privacy charges. In April, the trial court sentenced Father to a total of one-and-a-half years on probation for the misdemeanors.

2.   Section 31-35-2-4 was amended effective July 1, 2025, several months after the termination order was issued in this case. See Pub. L. No. 179-2025, § 25. None of the parties argue that this amendment has any bearing on the proceedings.

3.   In addition to challenging the trial court's conditions-remedied conclusion, Mother contends that “DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health or life of the child.” Mother's Br. p. 26. This circumstance is found in Section 31-35-2-4(d)(4). Although DCS made an allegation under this subsection, the trial court did not conclude that there is a reasonable probability that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the children's well-being, safety, physical health, or life; it concluded only that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the children's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied. See Father's App. Vol. 2 p. 22.

Vaidik, Judge.

Tavitas, J., and Felix, J., concur.